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High-stakes decisions do not require narrative conviction but narrative flexibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Fritz Breithaupt
Affiliation:
Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA fbreitha@indiana.edu Experimental Humanities Lab, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA milohick@iu.edu bhiskes@iu.edu www.experimentalhumanities.com
Milo Hicks
Affiliation:
Experimental Humanities Lab, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA milohick@iu.edu bhiskes@iu.edu www.experimentalhumanities.com Department of English, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
Benjamin Hiskes
Affiliation:
Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA fbreitha@indiana.edu Experimental Humanities Lab, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA milohick@iu.edu bhiskes@iu.edu www.experimentalhumanities.com Department of English, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA
Victoria Lagrange
Affiliation:
Experimental Humanities Lab, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA milohick@iu.edu bhiskes@iu.edu www.experimentalhumanities.com Department of English, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA. vlagrang@kennesaw.edu

Abstract

We challenge Johnson et al.'s assumption that people reduce unclear situations to a single narrative explanation and that such reduction would be adaptive for decision-making under radical uncertainty. Instead, we argue that people imagine and maintain multiple narrative possibilities throughout the decision-making process and that this process provides cognitive flexibility and adaptive benefits within the proposed model.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press