Menninghaus et al. address a version of the “paradox of tragedy” (see Robinson Reference Robinson, Sander and Scherer2009). We do not want to experience suffering, for example, grief, but we enjoy stories about grief, even when they make us weep. The article insightfully articulates eight factors to explain the paradox. But, as with any new theory of complex phenomena, there are problems with the current formulation. First, the eight factors appear diffuse, almost random, only loosely held together by the spatial metaphor of Distancing and Embracing. Moreover, the authors draw on a range of theories from psychoanalysis to Structuralist linguistics. A more satisfying explanation would integrate those factors into an account that relies on better understood, literally specified, cognitive structures and processes.
To some extent, the authors take up appraisal theory for their explanatory framework. That provides a degree of integration. But it may lead to other problems. Specifically, the authors explain the paradox of tragedy by reference to processes that may raise difficulties for appraisal-based accounts. For example, the fiction frame discussed by the authors as part of the Distancing metaphor, would seem to generate the “paradox of fiction” (see Robinson Reference Robinson, Sander and Scherer2009), the problem that we know characters do not exist, but we weep over their (nonexistent) sorrow and rejoice over their (nonexistent) happiness. If emotion results from our assessment of an event's consequences for our well-being, as appraisal accounts have it (see Oatley Reference Oatley2012, p. 30), then it would appear that fictions should have no emotional consequences. Prima facie, our emotional response to fiction would appear problematic for appraisal theory. Of course, it is always possible for advocates of appraisal theory to contend that the appraisal process need not have bearing on our actual well-being or even our beliefs about our well-being. But then one wonders just what is being explained by appraisal theory and how it is being explained.
There are three points to be made in relation to these issues. First, the insights of the article might be more productively developed by reference to an account of emotion that takes elicitors for emotion to be concrete particulars given in perception, (emotional) memories, and simulations. The idea here is that the eliciting conditions for emotion are ultimately concrete and experiential. Appraisal may affect our emotions, but it does so not because of its logic, but because of the concrete emotional memories or simulations that it activates. This is why, for example, painful images of individual suffering tend to arouse our empathy, whereas statistics typically do not (cf. Bloom Reference Bloom2016, p. 89). Simulation of concrete particulars may be an especially important and underappreciated process in emotional response. (For further discussion, see Hogan [Reference Hogan2011].)
Second, and related to the first point, the Distancing-Embracing metaphor may be discarded if we have an adequate account of simulation. The paradoxes of tragedy and fiction are versions of problems that bear on counterfactual and hypothetical simulations. Consider what happens when we imagine dire outcomes of some unattempted action. We have an aversive response to those simulated outcomes. That aversive response helps to motivate us to avoid actions that would lead to those outcomes. Conversely, if we imagine desirable outcomes, we experience a degree of pleasure. That pleasure helps to motivate us to engage in the relevant sorts of action. In both the aversive and attractive cases, we have a version of the paradox of fiction. We feel emotion even though we are not experiencing real situations, but imagining unreal ones. This is not a paradox for the explanation of emotion in terms of concrete, experiential particulars. (For further discussion, see Hogan [Reference Hogan2013].)
In the case of aversive simulation, we have in effect a paradox of tragedy as well. We engage in the simulation of tragic outcomes to our endeavors, despite the aversive quality of the experience, sometimes even dwelling on the utter awfulness of those outcomes. Prima facie, one would expect this to be a matter of reward system involvement, which drives “seeking” (as Panksepp & Biven [Reference Panksepp and Biven2012] put it), even in the absence of “liking” (on reward components, see Chatterjee [Reference Chatterjee, Shimamura and Palmer2014, p. 209]). There is at least some evidence for this in research showing the activation of the reward system in compassion (see Kim et al. Reference Kim, Kim, Kim, Jeong, Park, Son, Song and Ki2009), which presumably involves simulation of the target's feelings and experiences.
In short, the paradoxes of fiction and tragedy are special cases of the emotional operation of simulation. The literary paradoxes are explained by the same processes as account for simulation.
Finally, this analysis is consistent with the evolutionary function of simulation. Specifically, simulation allows us to avoid danger and pursue opportunities with less risk, because we envision the consequences of our actions “offline.” This is particularly important in the case of danger, because simulation involves no real threat. But simulation has this function only if it engages our motivation systems. The simulation of dangerous outcomes motivates our avoidance of actions leading to those outcomes precisely because it provokes our fear. At the same time, our emotional response to such simulated outcomes cannot be so aversive as to prevent simulation in the first place. Thus, evolution has calibrated simulation bearing on dangers to produce both aversive emotion and engagement (through reward system activation).
Of course, emotion in response to simulation must not be as strong as emotion in response to real experience. We see this particularly in the simulation of future pleasure. The enjoyment of such simulation must be less than the actual experience of pleasure or we would not be motivated to pursue the real pleasure. Fantasy would be as good as the real thing. Here, too, evolution has calibrated simulation, in this case producing pleasure, but also limiting it.
The aim of these comments is to suggest a more systematic and integrated account of the emotional response to fiction, incorporating the insights of Menninghaus et al. For example, simulation helps us to understand the cognitive processes adumbrated by the Distancing-Embracing metaphor. In addition, the two forms of evolutionary calibration help us to understand the function of those processes.
Menninghaus et al. address a version of the “paradox of tragedy” (see Robinson Reference Robinson, Sander and Scherer2009). We do not want to experience suffering, for example, grief, but we enjoy stories about grief, even when they make us weep. The article insightfully articulates eight factors to explain the paradox. But, as with any new theory of complex phenomena, there are problems with the current formulation. First, the eight factors appear diffuse, almost random, only loosely held together by the spatial metaphor of Distancing and Embracing. Moreover, the authors draw on a range of theories from psychoanalysis to Structuralist linguistics. A more satisfying explanation would integrate those factors into an account that relies on better understood, literally specified, cognitive structures and processes.
To some extent, the authors take up appraisal theory for their explanatory framework. That provides a degree of integration. But it may lead to other problems. Specifically, the authors explain the paradox of tragedy by reference to processes that may raise difficulties for appraisal-based accounts. For example, the fiction frame discussed by the authors as part of the Distancing metaphor, would seem to generate the “paradox of fiction” (see Robinson Reference Robinson, Sander and Scherer2009), the problem that we know characters do not exist, but we weep over their (nonexistent) sorrow and rejoice over their (nonexistent) happiness. If emotion results from our assessment of an event's consequences for our well-being, as appraisal accounts have it (see Oatley Reference Oatley2012, p. 30), then it would appear that fictions should have no emotional consequences. Prima facie, our emotional response to fiction would appear problematic for appraisal theory. Of course, it is always possible for advocates of appraisal theory to contend that the appraisal process need not have bearing on our actual well-being or even our beliefs about our well-being. But then one wonders just what is being explained by appraisal theory and how it is being explained.
There are three points to be made in relation to these issues. First, the insights of the article might be more productively developed by reference to an account of emotion that takes elicitors for emotion to be concrete particulars given in perception, (emotional) memories, and simulations. The idea here is that the eliciting conditions for emotion are ultimately concrete and experiential. Appraisal may affect our emotions, but it does so not because of its logic, but because of the concrete emotional memories or simulations that it activates. This is why, for example, painful images of individual suffering tend to arouse our empathy, whereas statistics typically do not (cf. Bloom Reference Bloom2016, p. 89). Simulation of concrete particulars may be an especially important and underappreciated process in emotional response. (For further discussion, see Hogan [Reference Hogan2011].)
Second, and related to the first point, the Distancing-Embracing metaphor may be discarded if we have an adequate account of simulation. The paradoxes of tragedy and fiction are versions of problems that bear on counterfactual and hypothetical simulations. Consider what happens when we imagine dire outcomes of some unattempted action. We have an aversive response to those simulated outcomes. That aversive response helps to motivate us to avoid actions that would lead to those outcomes. Conversely, if we imagine desirable outcomes, we experience a degree of pleasure. That pleasure helps to motivate us to engage in the relevant sorts of action. In both the aversive and attractive cases, we have a version of the paradox of fiction. We feel emotion even though we are not experiencing real situations, but imagining unreal ones. This is not a paradox for the explanation of emotion in terms of concrete, experiential particulars. (For further discussion, see Hogan [Reference Hogan2013].)
In the case of aversive simulation, we have in effect a paradox of tragedy as well. We engage in the simulation of tragic outcomes to our endeavors, despite the aversive quality of the experience, sometimes even dwelling on the utter awfulness of those outcomes. Prima facie, one would expect this to be a matter of reward system involvement, which drives “seeking” (as Panksepp & Biven [Reference Panksepp and Biven2012] put it), even in the absence of “liking” (on reward components, see Chatterjee [Reference Chatterjee, Shimamura and Palmer2014, p. 209]). There is at least some evidence for this in research showing the activation of the reward system in compassion (see Kim et al. Reference Kim, Kim, Kim, Jeong, Park, Son, Song and Ki2009), which presumably involves simulation of the target's feelings and experiences.
In short, the paradoxes of fiction and tragedy are special cases of the emotional operation of simulation. The literary paradoxes are explained by the same processes as account for simulation.
Finally, this analysis is consistent with the evolutionary function of simulation. Specifically, simulation allows us to avoid danger and pursue opportunities with less risk, because we envision the consequences of our actions “offline.” This is particularly important in the case of danger, because simulation involves no real threat. But simulation has this function only if it engages our motivation systems. The simulation of dangerous outcomes motivates our avoidance of actions leading to those outcomes precisely because it provokes our fear. At the same time, our emotional response to such simulated outcomes cannot be so aversive as to prevent simulation in the first place. Thus, evolution has calibrated simulation bearing on dangers to produce both aversive emotion and engagement (through reward system activation).
Of course, emotion in response to simulation must not be as strong as emotion in response to real experience. We see this particularly in the simulation of future pleasure. The enjoyment of such simulation must be less than the actual experience of pleasure or we would not be motivated to pursue the real pleasure. Fantasy would be as good as the real thing. Here, too, evolution has calibrated simulation, in this case producing pleasure, but also limiting it.
The aim of these comments is to suggest a more systematic and integrated account of the emotional response to fiction, incorporating the insights of Menninghaus et al. For example, simulation helps us to understand the cognitive processes adumbrated by the Distancing-Embracing metaphor. In addition, the two forms of evolutionary calibration help us to understand the function of those processes.