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How to get from here to a relational social psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 May 2026
Abstract
Integrating Relational Models Theory with Carey’s core cognition theorizing is possible, promises to be productive, but requires clarifications. We sketch how such an integration can strengthen social psychological theorizing in three areas.
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References
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Thomas argues that knowledge of social relations should be considered core knowledge – innate or early-developing – following Carey (Reference Carey2009, Reference Carey2011). This involves inferring enduring, agent-specific relations from behavior, separate from agent attributes. Carey’s view that core knowledge persists into adulthood aligns with Fiske (Reference Fiske1991) Relational Model Theory (cf. Thomsen et al., Reference Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith and Carey2011).
Surprisingly, the foundational role of relational cognition is not mirrored in the research agenda of social psychology since the 1980s. Instead, social psychology, and especially social cognition, has favored a methodological individualism, extrapolating from conceptual models from cognitive psychology of object cognition (A. P. Fiske & Haslam, Reference Fiske and Haslam1996).
We hope Thomas’ review encourages social psychologists to treat the formation, representation, and navigation of relationships as central to social cognition. As Thomas argues, integrating Relational Models Theory with Carey’s core knowledge framework is not only conceptually compatible but may also be essential for understanding how relational thinking develops and operates across the lifespan. Extensive evidence suggests that relational model core knowledge persists into adulthood, shaping social cognition, behavior, and emotion (A. P. Fiske, Schubert, & Seibt, Reference Fiske, Schubert and Seibt2025). This allows predictions for adult social cognition. Let us name two examples:
First, core knowledge structures can serve as foundations for further conceptual learning. For instance, the understanding of natural numbers emerges from the parallel individuation system via Quinian bootstrapping, aided by language (Carey, Reference Carey2009). Complex social cognition may similarly arise through yet-undiscovered bootstrapping processes. Fiske’s (Reference Fiske2012) meta-relational models could be one such case, as could the application of relational models to intergroup relations. Second, adults may also rely on bootstrapped and potentially abstract social concepts that collapse under cognitive load, revealing the enduring influence of core knowledge, much like how numerical reasoning reverts to the analog magnitude system, another core cognition module, under load.
For such inquiries to succeed, previous proposals for the involvement of core cognition in relational models cognition should be reviewed in light of the new findings. For instance, authority ranking has previously been argued to emerge from the analog magnitude system, because both exhibit Weber’s law (Chiao, Reference Chiao2010; Schubert, Reference Schubert2020). The new proposal in the target article is that authority ranking is instantiated in its own system, not the analog magnitude system. As the number of identified core cognition faculties increases, it becomes more important to mutually differentiate them.
We now highlight three areas where Thomas’ model can help strengthen social psychological theorizing.
Relative vs. absolute judgments
The Stereotype Content Model and similar models (Abele & Wojciszke, Reference Abele and Wojciszke2014; S. T. Fiske et al., Reference Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu2002; Koch et al., Reference Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach and Alves2016) exemplify an individualized approach, focusing on perceived goal compatibility. Even when applied to social interaction, these models don’t capture relations in the sense of the target article. In contrast, Thomas rightly distinguishes between relational and character judgments: a good ally should be warm toward us, but cold toward our adversaries. An indiscriminately warm person may neither be a good ally nor be very competent.
Tracking states and transgressions
Social life is inherently relational. Most interactions occur within a shared history and defined roles that shape our expectations. Thomas emphasizes that even infants track relational histories; adults do too, across various relational models. In equality matching, we ask whose turn it is. In authority ranking, we scrutinize whether power is abused and whether respect is paid. In communal sharing, trust is key: has someone withheld help they could have given?
People have a long memory for transgressions. Resolving interpersonal or political conflicts requires understanding how each party frames offenses within a relational model, shaping views on revenge, repair, and justice (Kelman, Reference Kelman, Nadler, Malloy and Fisher2008). Divergent interpretations of facts can be one source of disagreement. However, the bigger issues are often related to questions of responsibility, blame, entitlement, and duties, which are all inherently relational ideas.
Understanding the relational model
People often classify relationships by kinship or closeness (e.g., spouse, sibling), but Thomas’ model highlights a different layer: the underlying relational model. This has practical implications for analyzing and intervening. For instance, while Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies idealize communal sharing in marriage, others may prioritize authority or exchange, reserving communal sharing for siblings or friends. Such mismatches can lead to cultural and interpersonal conflict.
Even within one culture, relational model mismatches are common and a source of conflicts. When expecting communal sharing, we can be outraged by someone keeping score or expecting us to obey. While communal sharing may seem like the superior model for spouses, siblings, close friends, and others, the model does come with a cost: the lack of scorekeeping can lead to a strong sense of betrayal unless both partners are trustful and trustworthy. In moments of low trust, reverting to equality matching may help stabilize the relationship.
Thus, measuring relational model, type, and strength separately could clarify conflicts resulting from discrepancies between desired and perceived relational model and between own and partner relational model. If Thomas is right, relationships are mentally represented as entities in their own right. People often act for “the relationship’s sake,” e.g., repaying a favor not for the partner, but to maintain balance, even when neither party is concerned with immediate outcomes.
While exchange vs. communal relations (Clark & Reis, Reference Clark and Reis1988), perceived partner responsiveness (Reis & Shaver, Reference Reis, Shaver, Duck, Hay, Hobfoll, Ickes and Montgomery1988), and other measures assess aspects of the distinctions Thomas discusses, her model can serve as a basis for a more comprehensive operationalization of relational models and relationship strength.
Conclusion
Thomas’ review is a fruitful starting point for theorizing on the ontogenetic development of relational cognition and the interaction of relational knowledge with other core knowledge. It can also inspire inquiry into the relational nature of person perception, the relevance of relational history for current responses, and the consequences of mismatched relational models between partners.
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This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.