We agree with Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) that the naïve folk conception of time is paradoxical, particularly with respect to the sense of a privileged now. However, we argue that because H&M have placed little emphasis on the subjective experience of the “now moment,” they are likely to be wrong about the cognitive underpinnings of the belief in a privileged now. We doubt that the belief in a privileged now arises from an ancient cognitive system that represents the world without representing change, because the conscious experience of the now moment is inherently the experience of change.
A better model for the way humans think about time should not explain belief about temporal change primarily only with respect to thoughts about the past and future. Instead, the model should incorporate the variety of mechanisms for processing temporally dynamic stimuli that each present different kinds of temporally dynamic experience to conscious awareness in the now moment (Montemayor & Wittmann Reference Montemayor and Wittmann2014; Muller & Nobre Reference Muller and Nobre2014). Mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis Reference Suddendorf and Corballis2007a), which H&M rely on completely to account for the naïve human idea of time, is only one way in which humans relate to the passage of time. Yet it is arguably the least direct way we experience time because it is normally experienced only as simulation.
A more direct way we experience time is through the flow inherent to the sense of the present moment, which is a dynamic sense of events happening in the now, widely acknowledged within discussions of the phenomenology of time (Gruber et al. Reference Gruber, Smith and Block2018; Prosser Reference Prosser2012). At any given moment, there is not only (or not at all) a subjective representation of now as a snapshot with no sense of change. There is a sense of flow; now is a single moment, but it is a moment encompassing change. The dynamic nature of the conscious sense of now is revealed in widely used phrases such as “stream of consciousness” and “what is happening now.” Readers unfamiliar with the phenomenological literature are invited to engage in introspection about their experience of existing in the current moment. Even in a stimulus-poor environment, our experiences in the now moment are dynamic, including breathing, or chains of thoughts. Perceptions in the now are frequently of momentary dynamic events: a flash of light, a spoken word, a looming object. Many conscious perceptions are meaningless outside the context of temporal dynamics. For example, the sense of looming and other motion perceptions inherently relate to change (Gibson Reference Gibson2014), and sound is inherently a temporal phenomenon.
Besides the phenomenological or introspective analysis, various objective observations indicate that the now moment encompasses happening events rather than just a millisecond snapshot. For example, multiple events occurring within a time window (up to 300 ms depending on modality and number of events) can be discriminated even though their order cannot be determined (Montemayor & Wittmann Reference Montemayor and Wittmann2014), indicating that they were experienced as separate happenings within one moment. Further evidence, for example, from language perception, indicates that there are different kinds of experience of now, with different aspects of dynamism (Poeppel Reference Poeppel2003; Wittmann Reference Wittmann2011). The “simultaneous now” is suggested to last approximately 250 ms (still long enough to contain events), whereas the “conscious now” lasts approximately 3 seconds (Montemayor & Wittmann Reference Montemayor and Wittmann2014).
Further evidence for the sense of events happening now comes from work on visual perception. Suitably arranged dynamic stimuli together give rise to our sense of causality in the here and now (Scholl & Tremoulet Reference Scholl and Tremoulet2000). In the same way that changes to the dynamic character of the stimuli can abolish the sense of causality, disruptions to the temporal sequence can also remove the sense of happening that is a cornerstone of the subjective sense of temporal flow (Gruber & Block Reference Gruber and Block2013).
There are numerous functional reasons why the experience of the now moment must be more than a millisecond snapshot. Our perceptions are integrated with our actions (Pezzulo & Cisek Reference Pezzulo and Cisek2016), with the consequence that our perception of the now moment is one of the dynamic affordances currently offered. To perform even the simplest goal-directed actions, short-term temporal dynamics are taken into account (Gibson Reference Gibson2014).
Interestingly, there is evidence that on the lowest levels of subconscious perception, stimulus representations are in fact not dynamic, and perception rather takes the form of a series of discrete static representations. This is even held to be plausible for auditory stimuli although sound is inherently temporally dynamic (VanRullen et al. Reference VanRullen, Zoefel and Ilhan2014). The dynamic perceptions reaching our awareness are therefore not necessarily veridical in the sense of arising directly from the true dynamism of real events. Rather, this is likely to represent a reconstruction (Gruber et al. Reference Gruber, Smith and Block2018). However, the only thing that matters for our current argument is that the lowest levels of perception subject to conscious awareness usually constitute dynamic representations.
We agree with H&M that there is little evidence for mental time travel in most non-human animal species or in human infants. However, given the different ways of experiencing time, it is arguably inappropriate to dichotomize organisms according to “whether or not [their] model of the world contains a temporal dimension” (sect. 1.3, para. 4). Rather than the lack of evidence of mental time travel implying that such organisms have no representation of temporal change, it implies they may have no representation of change except for the change happening in the current moment. In other words, their representational timeline may be very short.
Given the dynamism of the experience of now, our counter-proposal for what makes now special in naïve human belief is that now is the only time when events are experienced to happen. Of course, events are also believed to have happened in the past and are expected to occur in the future, but mental time travel typically involves simulation rather than experience of those events. We argue that our account is more parsimonious than H&M's because their model implies a curious and unsupported phenomenon: that people ignore their salient experience that things happen in the now moment when they are thinking about what now actually is.
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We agree with Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) that the naïve folk conception of time is paradoxical, particularly with respect to the sense of a privileged now. However, we argue that because H&M have placed little emphasis on the subjective experience of the “now moment,” they are likely to be wrong about the cognitive underpinnings of the belief in a privileged now. We doubt that the belief in a privileged now arises from an ancient cognitive system that represents the world without representing change, because the conscious experience of the now moment is inherently the experience of change.
A better model for the way humans think about time should not explain belief about temporal change primarily only with respect to thoughts about the past and future. Instead, the model should incorporate the variety of mechanisms for processing temporally dynamic stimuli that each present different kinds of temporally dynamic experience to conscious awareness in the now moment (Montemayor & Wittmann Reference Montemayor and Wittmann2014; Muller & Nobre Reference Muller and Nobre2014). Mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis Reference Suddendorf and Corballis2007a), which H&M rely on completely to account for the naïve human idea of time, is only one way in which humans relate to the passage of time. Yet it is arguably the least direct way we experience time because it is normally experienced only as simulation.
A more direct way we experience time is through the flow inherent to the sense of the present moment, which is a dynamic sense of events happening in the now, widely acknowledged within discussions of the phenomenology of time (Gruber et al. Reference Gruber, Smith and Block2018; Prosser Reference Prosser2012). At any given moment, there is not only (or not at all) a subjective representation of now as a snapshot with no sense of change. There is a sense of flow; now is a single moment, but it is a moment encompassing change. The dynamic nature of the conscious sense of now is revealed in widely used phrases such as “stream of consciousness” and “what is happening now.” Readers unfamiliar with the phenomenological literature are invited to engage in introspection about their experience of existing in the current moment. Even in a stimulus-poor environment, our experiences in the now moment are dynamic, including breathing, or chains of thoughts. Perceptions in the now are frequently of momentary dynamic events: a flash of light, a spoken word, a looming object. Many conscious perceptions are meaningless outside the context of temporal dynamics. For example, the sense of looming and other motion perceptions inherently relate to change (Gibson Reference Gibson2014), and sound is inherently a temporal phenomenon.
Besides the phenomenological or introspective analysis, various objective observations indicate that the now moment encompasses happening events rather than just a millisecond snapshot. For example, multiple events occurring within a time window (up to 300 ms depending on modality and number of events) can be discriminated even though their order cannot be determined (Montemayor & Wittmann Reference Montemayor and Wittmann2014), indicating that they were experienced as separate happenings within one moment. Further evidence, for example, from language perception, indicates that there are different kinds of experience of now, with different aspects of dynamism (Poeppel Reference Poeppel2003; Wittmann Reference Wittmann2011). The “simultaneous now” is suggested to last approximately 250 ms (still long enough to contain events), whereas the “conscious now” lasts approximately 3 seconds (Montemayor & Wittmann Reference Montemayor and Wittmann2014).
Further evidence for the sense of events happening now comes from work on visual perception. Suitably arranged dynamic stimuli together give rise to our sense of causality in the here and now (Scholl & Tremoulet Reference Scholl and Tremoulet2000). In the same way that changes to the dynamic character of the stimuli can abolish the sense of causality, disruptions to the temporal sequence can also remove the sense of happening that is a cornerstone of the subjective sense of temporal flow (Gruber & Block Reference Gruber and Block2013).
There are numerous functional reasons why the experience of the now moment must be more than a millisecond snapshot. Our perceptions are integrated with our actions (Pezzulo & Cisek Reference Pezzulo and Cisek2016), with the consequence that our perception of the now moment is one of the dynamic affordances currently offered. To perform even the simplest goal-directed actions, short-term temporal dynamics are taken into account (Gibson Reference Gibson2014).
Interestingly, there is evidence that on the lowest levels of subconscious perception, stimulus representations are in fact not dynamic, and perception rather takes the form of a series of discrete static representations. This is even held to be plausible for auditory stimuli although sound is inherently temporally dynamic (VanRullen et al. Reference VanRullen, Zoefel and Ilhan2014). The dynamic perceptions reaching our awareness are therefore not necessarily veridical in the sense of arising directly from the true dynamism of real events. Rather, this is likely to represent a reconstruction (Gruber et al. Reference Gruber, Smith and Block2018). However, the only thing that matters for our current argument is that the lowest levels of perception subject to conscious awareness usually constitute dynamic representations.
We agree with H&M that there is little evidence for mental time travel in most non-human animal species or in human infants. However, given the different ways of experiencing time, it is arguably inappropriate to dichotomize organisms according to “whether or not [their] model of the world contains a temporal dimension” (sect. 1.3, para. 4). Rather than the lack of evidence of mental time travel implying that such organisms have no representation of temporal change, it implies they may have no representation of change except for the change happening in the current moment. In other words, their representational timeline may be very short.
Given the dynamism of the experience of now, our counter-proposal for what makes now special in naïve human belief is that now is the only time when events are experienced to happen. Of course, events are also believed to have happened in the past and are expected to occur in the future, but mental time travel typically involves simulation rather than experience of those events. We argue that our account is more parsimonious than H&M's because their model implies a curious and unsupported phenomenon: that people ignore their salient experience that things happen in the now moment when they are thinking about what now actually is.