Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) propose a dual systems framework of temporal cognition. Although we appreciate the effort put forth by the authors, we are concerned with the foundations on which the model is built. One major issue is their choice of a dual systems rather than a dual process framework. Another issue is the overgeneralized relationship between temporal cognition and perception of change. To address some of these concerns, we offer that the model could be extended to include consciousness.
H&M choose to describe temporal cognition as consisting of two dissociable systems: temporal updating and temporal reasoning. The temporal updating system is a primitive system that represents only the most recently experienced state of affairs with no record of what came before. Time is not represented in this system; when a change from what was previously represented is detected, the new information replaces the old information, which is lost. On the other hand, time is explicit in the temporal reasoning system, which represents various states of affairs and the time at which they occurred. In our view, the appeal to two systems is overly broad; the evidence H&M present is compatible with two “processes,” rather than two “systems” (Evans & Stanovich Reference Evans and Stanovich2013). They do not refer to any specific mechanisms into which these putative systems could be reduced. Furthermore, H&M's model cannot be linked or decomposed into neural elements that can be empirically tested to ascertain the independence of the two systems they propose. This point is important because temporal updating and temporal reasoning can be manifested from multiple physical states, properties, and events (cf. the philosophical thesis of “multiple realization,” Polger & Shapiro Reference Polger and Shapiro2016); without knowing which ones, conclusions about systems are premature.
A second issue is that H&M assume that perception of change underlies temporal updating, emphasizing that change is necessary for an organism to update representations of how things are in its environment. However, we submit that the relationship between perception of change and temporal updating is mediated by consciousness. Consciousness is not explicitly considered in H&M's model, even though it has been shown that consciousness and psychological time are necessary for one another to occur (e.g., Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn Reference Berkovich-Ohana and Glicksohn2014; James Reference James1890). To illustrate, imagine a Ganzfeld environment in which the sensory experience is uniformly maintained. Despite the absence of environmental and external sensory input, participants are still able to temporally update and experience the passage of time (Glicksohn et al. Reference Glicksohn, Berkovich-Ohana, Mauro and Ben-Soussan2017). The subjective experience is made possible here, not by environmental changes, but by awareness of internal events (e.g., heart beat and rhythm). Another example of the role of consciousness in mediating the relationship between perception of change and temporal updating is binocular rivalry, where two very different visual stimuli are presented to the two eyes simultaneously (Alais & Blake Reference Alais and Blake2005). The brain detects the difference between the two stimuli and resolves the rivalry outside of awareness. At the conscious level, two images are not seen simultaneously, but sequentially in alternation, as the rivalry is resolved differently over time. Such experience of binocular rivalry implies perception of change and time passage. Without consciousness, neither one is possible. Therefore, consciousness must be considered in any model of temporal processing.
Both content and state aspects of consciousness should be considered in future models of psychological time. Examples of how content plays a role in time perception are evident in various temporal distortion cases. For example, the perceived duration of an object varies with its perceived spatial location: in a prismatic adaptation task, an object centrally located at the retinotopic level is perceived as located outside of central vision. The crucial result is that the perceived duration of the object varies with the perceived location, even though the actual display duration is equal (Isham et al. Reference Isham, Le and Ekstrom2018). This suggests that spatial and temporal information are cognitively integrated to form the content of the temporal experience. In another example, the subjective moment of action in a racing game varies with performance feedback (winning or losing). Unbeknownst to the participants, performance feedback is arbitrarily chosen and delivered by a computer. Subsequently, participants judge the timing of action as earlier if they are told they have won (i.e., “If I won, then I must have pressed the button sooner”) and later if they are told they have lost (Isham et al. Reference Isham, Banks, Ekstrom and Stern2011). The results support the perspective that temporal reasoning is affected by the contents of consciousness.
The state of consciousness also plays an important role in time perception. When a conscious state varies, psychological time is experienced differently. For example, time dilation is experienced when an organism is aroused (e.g., threat, van Wassenhove et al. Reference van Wassenhove, Buonomano, Shimojo and Shams2008), or experiences heightened consciousness (e.g., during meditation, Kramer et al. Reference Kramer, Weger and Sharma2013). Temporal duration also fluctuates in altered states of consciousness (e.g., near-death experiences, Wittmann & Paulus Reference Wittmann and Paulus2008). In short, temporal cognition is greatly impacted by different states of consciousness.
Given these shortcomings of H&M's model, we propose that a dual process framework is more suitable than a dual systems framework at this point in our understanding of temporal cognition. We also urge that research be directed to discovering the underlying neural substrates that characterize temporal updating and temporal reasoning. In this manner, the scientific goals associated with dual process theories would help frame an examination of the mechanisms of temporal cognition (cf. Evans & Stanovich Reference Evans and Stanovich2013). In addition, given that H&M's model provides an overly substantial and general claim about change and temporal updating being closely related, we propose that the emphasis on change alone should be reconsidered. Last, we urge that consciousness be considered in models of temporal cognition as it is directly relevant to both change and the sense of time. We believe these suggestions may help strengthen H&M's current model and inform future theories of temporal cognition.
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Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) propose a dual systems framework of temporal cognition. Although we appreciate the effort put forth by the authors, we are concerned with the foundations on which the model is built. One major issue is their choice of a dual systems rather than a dual process framework. Another issue is the overgeneralized relationship between temporal cognition and perception of change. To address some of these concerns, we offer that the model could be extended to include consciousness.
H&M choose to describe temporal cognition as consisting of two dissociable systems: temporal updating and temporal reasoning. The temporal updating system is a primitive system that represents only the most recently experienced state of affairs with no record of what came before. Time is not represented in this system; when a change from what was previously represented is detected, the new information replaces the old information, which is lost. On the other hand, time is explicit in the temporal reasoning system, which represents various states of affairs and the time at which they occurred. In our view, the appeal to two systems is overly broad; the evidence H&M present is compatible with two “processes,” rather than two “systems” (Evans & Stanovich Reference Evans and Stanovich2013). They do not refer to any specific mechanisms into which these putative systems could be reduced. Furthermore, H&M's model cannot be linked or decomposed into neural elements that can be empirically tested to ascertain the independence of the two systems they propose. This point is important because temporal updating and temporal reasoning can be manifested from multiple physical states, properties, and events (cf. the philosophical thesis of “multiple realization,” Polger & Shapiro Reference Polger and Shapiro2016); without knowing which ones, conclusions about systems are premature.
A second issue is that H&M assume that perception of change underlies temporal updating, emphasizing that change is necessary for an organism to update representations of how things are in its environment. However, we submit that the relationship between perception of change and temporal updating is mediated by consciousness. Consciousness is not explicitly considered in H&M's model, even though it has been shown that consciousness and psychological time are necessary for one another to occur (e.g., Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn Reference Berkovich-Ohana and Glicksohn2014; James Reference James1890). To illustrate, imagine a Ganzfeld environment in which the sensory experience is uniformly maintained. Despite the absence of environmental and external sensory input, participants are still able to temporally update and experience the passage of time (Glicksohn et al. Reference Glicksohn, Berkovich-Ohana, Mauro and Ben-Soussan2017). The subjective experience is made possible here, not by environmental changes, but by awareness of internal events (e.g., heart beat and rhythm). Another example of the role of consciousness in mediating the relationship between perception of change and temporal updating is binocular rivalry, where two very different visual stimuli are presented to the two eyes simultaneously (Alais & Blake Reference Alais and Blake2005). The brain detects the difference between the two stimuli and resolves the rivalry outside of awareness. At the conscious level, two images are not seen simultaneously, but sequentially in alternation, as the rivalry is resolved differently over time. Such experience of binocular rivalry implies perception of change and time passage. Without consciousness, neither one is possible. Therefore, consciousness must be considered in any model of temporal processing.
Both content and state aspects of consciousness should be considered in future models of psychological time. Examples of how content plays a role in time perception are evident in various temporal distortion cases. For example, the perceived duration of an object varies with its perceived spatial location: in a prismatic adaptation task, an object centrally located at the retinotopic level is perceived as located outside of central vision. The crucial result is that the perceived duration of the object varies with the perceived location, even though the actual display duration is equal (Isham et al. Reference Isham, Le and Ekstrom2018). This suggests that spatial and temporal information are cognitively integrated to form the content of the temporal experience. In another example, the subjective moment of action in a racing game varies with performance feedback (winning or losing). Unbeknownst to the participants, performance feedback is arbitrarily chosen and delivered by a computer. Subsequently, participants judge the timing of action as earlier if they are told they have won (i.e., “If I won, then I must have pressed the button sooner”) and later if they are told they have lost (Isham et al. Reference Isham, Banks, Ekstrom and Stern2011). The results support the perspective that temporal reasoning is affected by the contents of consciousness.
The state of consciousness also plays an important role in time perception. When a conscious state varies, psychological time is experienced differently. For example, time dilation is experienced when an organism is aroused (e.g., threat, van Wassenhove et al. Reference van Wassenhove, Buonomano, Shimojo and Shams2008), or experiences heightened consciousness (e.g., during meditation, Kramer et al. Reference Kramer, Weger and Sharma2013). Temporal duration also fluctuates in altered states of consciousness (e.g., near-death experiences, Wittmann & Paulus Reference Wittmann and Paulus2008). In short, temporal cognition is greatly impacted by different states of consciousness.
Given these shortcomings of H&M's model, we propose that a dual process framework is more suitable than a dual systems framework at this point in our understanding of temporal cognition. We also urge that research be directed to discovering the underlying neural substrates that characterize temporal updating and temporal reasoning. In this manner, the scientific goals associated with dual process theories would help frame an examination of the mechanisms of temporal cognition (cf. Evans & Stanovich Reference Evans and Stanovich2013). In addition, given that H&M's model provides an overly substantial and general claim about change and temporal updating being closely related, we propose that the emphasis on change alone should be reconsidered. Last, we urge that consciousness be considered in models of temporal cognition as it is directly relevant to both change and the sense of time. We believe these suggestions may help strengthen H&M's current model and inform future theories of temporal cognition.