The central claim of Baumeister et al.'s analysis is that groups become more productive – and more moral – once their members have advanced beyond a first phase of group identification and become differentiated through processes of individuation. This is mainly because differentiation is seen to encourage greater accountability. We acknowledge the importance of both identification and differentiation for group success. However, three decades of research in the social identity tradition (after Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Turner et al. Reference Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987), points to several problems with Baumeister et al.'s analysis. In particular, this work suggests (a) that social identification and differentiation are not mutually exclusive (so that submergence of the self in the group does not necessarily preclude differentiation), (b) that the proposed temporal sequence – from social identification without an emphasis on differentiation to differentiation without an emphasis on social identification – is not necessarily associated with superior organizational outcomes, and (c) that social identification (of some form) is generally a prerequisite for group success, and that attempts to loosen or downplay this will therefore be counterproductive (at least from the perspective of the group itself).

Organizational research thus points to the fact that motivation and group productivity tend to be enhanced in groups that are characterized by high levels of both identification and differentiation (Ellemers et al. Reference Ellemers, De Gilder and Haslam2004). Moreover, rather than being in any sense natural or inevitable, when these processes contribute to group success this is a product not of content-free identification and differentiation but of active forms of identity leadership that create, advance, and embed an often-complex sense of shared social identity (a theory of “us”). This shared identity serves to mobilize and direct group members' energies toward particular goals (Haslam et al. Reference Haslam, Reicher and Platow2011) and its content invariably champions intra-group difference (e.g., in roles, responsibilities, expertise) rather than merely “sameness” (Haslam et al. Reference Haslam, Eggins and Reynolds2003; Rink & Ellemers Reference Rink and Ellemers2007).

Speaking to these various ideas, empirical evidence underlines five key points that challenge Baumeister et al.'s main arguments (for reviews, see Haslam Reference Haslam2004; Haslam & Ellemers Reference Haslam, Ellemers, Vignoles, Schwartz and Luyckx2011).

First, organizational (like other forms of social) identification does not occur only at superordinate or individual levels; it also occurs at a subgroup level (a level Baumeister et al. largely ignore). Subgroup identities afford opportunities for both group identification and differentiation. Indeed, partly as a result of this, their recognition is often central to organizational success (González & Brown Reference González and Brown2003; Peters et al. Reference Peters, Haslam, Ryan and Fonseca2012).

Second, whatever a group's circumstances, it is always crucial to maintain a system in which individual efforts are aligned and individuals are motivated to coordinate their distinct contributions in the interest of achieving shared goals. As a result, group identification often becomes more (not less) important in the context of intragroup differentiation because without this, the activities of group members tend to be oriented toward personal rather than group ends and hence to be disorganized and lack integrative focus (Ellemers Reference Ellemers2012; Ellemers et al. Reference Ellemers, Spears and Doosje1997). Indeed, many of the group maladies that Baumeister and colleagues discuss (e.g., loafing, plundering) result not from lack of differentiation but rather from lack of identification.

Third, because people are often heavily invested in (differentiated) subgroup identities, superordinate identities need to allow for their expression rather than suppressing them. For this reason, organizational outcomes tend to be enhanced where identification is built from a subgroup level up, rather than from a superordinate level down (Eggins et al. Reference Eggins, Haslam and Reynolds2002; Haslam et al. Reference Haslam, Eggins and Reynolds2003). In this way too, differentiation often precedes and is built into superordinate identity content and hence can be a basis for (rather than a barrier to, or a sequel of) social and organizational identification.

Fourth, multiple lines of research point to pitfalls in strategies that, in the absence of group identification, focus on individuation as a locus for personalized incentivization to enhance motivation and performance (e.g., see Bloom Reference Bloom1999). In corporate and sporting contexts, for example, individual-level incentives (especially for “stars”) can easily undermine individuals' intrinsic motivation as well as the coordination and esprit de corps that is needed to achieve optimal collective outcomes (Duffy et al. Reference Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper and Aquino2012).

Fifth, morality is essentially independent of both identification and differentiation per se. In particular, individuation and personal accountability do not guarantee morality because, again, this depends upon the content (e.g., values, norms, goals) that define the superordinate and subgroup identities by which individual group members are (or are not) guided and to which they are (or are not) accountable (Ellemers et al. Reference Ellemers, Pagliaro and Barreto2013). In the Milgram paradigm, for example, whether people behave morally – or, more accurately, whether, when they are pitted against each other, they are guided by the morality of science or the morality of society – depends upon which of these causes they are led to identify with (Reicher et al. Reference Reicher, Haslam and Smith2012).

These various points, and others that space precludes us from discussing, undermine confidence in the general theoretical framework that Baumeister et al. present. It is nevertheless true that the target article's assumptions make sense from the standpoint of an individualistic metatheory that sees groups (and social identifications) as a necessary evil, but one that can (and should) ultimately be overcome by rediscovering the (inherently more rational and moral) power of the individual. However, 30 years of nuanced empirical work – in which research and theory about the self has been closely tied to research and theory about groups – has shown this metatheory to be inconsistent with the facts of social and organizational science (e.g., see Postmes & Branscombe Reference Postmes and Branscombe2012). As their paper's opening line announces, the core weakness of Baumeister et al.'s model is that it appears insensitive to this endeavor.