Whitehouse offers a compelling general theory of extreme self-sacrifice, insofar as it draws from an impressive body of empirical work on social cohesion and extreme group behavior. However, as researchers who investigate similar phenomena and wish to build upon Whitehouse's theory, we have two primary concerns. First, we are uncertain about the underlying logic of Whitehouse's central thesis. Second, Whitehouse's focus on identity fusion as the determinant of extreme self-sacrifice is outwardly too limiting. We suspect that other pertinent factors, such as exogenous sociopolitical dynamics and constituents inherent to the functioning of religious systems, will be essential to building a general theory of extreme self-sacrificial behavior.
Beginning with the logic underlying Whitehouse's theory, we are uncertain about privileging only identity fusion and group threats as the necessary conditions of extreme self-sacrifice. To illustrate this point, consider the heart of Whitehouse's explanation regarding the pathway from fusion to sacrifice (his Fig. 1):
Stable perceptions of shared essence created by either of these pathways [i.e., intense collective experiences or shared biology] is predicted to give rise to fusion with a locally bounded group or relational network. Fusion produces a strong impression that members of the group are one's kin, eliciting willingness to pay high personal costs to support the group and, in the face of out-group threat, to fight and die if necessary to protect members of the group. (sect. 1, para. 6)
Accordingly, if person P is willing to engage in extreme self-sacrifice, then P is identity fused and P's group is threatened. The difficulty in accepting this proposition, given that it accurately reflects Whitehouse's central thesis, is that research on collective violence in the social sciences suggests that other conditions – besides identity fusion and group threat – are equally as necessary for extreme self-sacrifice. For instance, minimal group contact between P and the out-group targeted by P's sacrifice seems necessary, because increased and sustained contact between two groups reduces one's willingness to harm the out-group in question (Al Ramiah & Hewstone Reference Al Ramiah and Hewstone2013). Additionally, postconflict ethnographies find that sociohistorical grievances toward an out-group, or perceptions of perpetual in-group victimhood, strongly motivate combatants, who willingly engage in the act of killing to protect or avenge their group (Hinton Reference Hinton2004; Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001; Schori-Eyal et al. Reference Schori-Eyal, Klar, Roccas and McNeill2017). Finally, persons who willingly sacrifice for their group, such as combatants who volunteer for conflict or undertake acts of collective violence, are often incited to do so by inflammatory media, propaganda, or group leaders whose vitriolic speech inspires their actions (Leader et al. Reference Leader Maynard and Benesch2016).
A more striking problem is that the core proposition of Whitehouse's theory seems to beg the question, given Whitehouse's conceptions of identity fusion and extreme self-sacrifice. He writes that identity fusion, especially local fusion, is characterized by a willingness to fight and die when the group is under attack (sect. 1, para. 2). He then defines extreme self-sacrifice as a form of altruistic suicide, in which one gives his or her life for the group (sect. 1, para. 2). Therefore, saying one is willing to engage in extreme self-sacrifice, which is to die for the group, whenever one is identity fused, which is characterized by a willingness to die for the group, appears circular.
Granted, we do not intend to oversimplify Whitehouse's overall theory, which is quite promising, but the purported circularity in the underlying argument is apparent in a few key passages, such as the conclusion, where Whitehouse says:
What would be fatal for the theory is if it turned out that convictions of shared essence failed to predict high fusion scores or if fusion (plus out-group threat) were shown to be a poor predictor of actual (as opposed to declared) willingness to fight and die for the group. (sect. 7, para. 4)
Although we admire Whitehouse for positing such a bold proposition, we are again puzzled by the circularity of the statement before the disjunct. Put simply: Because high fusion scores measure convictions of shared essence, it is unclear how they could then fail to predict fusion scores.
Circularity aside, limiting the determinants of extreme self-sacrifice to identity fusion and group threat is likely to weaken the theory as opposed to strengthening it. After all, the above passage implies that a person's willingness to engage in extreme self-sacrifice is determined by identity fusion and group threat alone. We suspect that research will falsify this claim, given the limitations of identity fusion as a measurement. For instance, Kiper (Reference Kiper2018), undertook fieldwork among former combatants and survivors of the Yugoslav Wars in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Serbia, where he surveyed hundreds of participants on identity fusion (based on Swann et al. Reference Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse and Bastian2012). He found that many communities had individuals who scored high on identity fusion scales, but were expressly against going to war for their group. Kiper also noted that many communities reached saturation points with identity fusion, with nearly everyone maximally fused, rendering data difficult to interpret. Specifically, although many Serbs and Bosnians were maximally fused, measurements did not reveal whether they had similar understandings of what it meant to be maximally fused with their group. Furthermore, identity fusion was often unpredictive of one's willingness to participate in collective violence. Whether these findings are anomalous or cohere with the next generation of scholars investigating identity fusion remains to be seen.
As a final point, we stress that we agree with Whitehouse that identity fusion plays an important role in understanding terrorism, ethnoreligious violence, and self-sacrificial violence (Kiper & Sosis Reference Kiper and Sosis2016a), and we agree that ritual is vital to this process (Sosis & Kiper Reference Sosis, Kiper, Bergmann and Kain2014). Nevertheless, we think his theory would be strengthened by recognizing that such violence is also characterized by a manipulation of recurrent features of religious and quasi-religious traditions, such as myths, sacred values, symbols, and both meaning and moral systems (Kiper & Sosis Reference Kiper, Sosis, Liddle and Shackelford2016b). In other words, understanding self-sacrificial violence will likely require a more holistic approach that includes the sociopolitical factors highlighted above, as well as those factors that motivate sacrificial behavior across religious systems (Sosis et al. Reference Sosis, Phillips, Alcorta, Shackelford and Weeks-Schackelford2012).
Whitehouse offers a compelling general theory of extreme self-sacrifice, insofar as it draws from an impressive body of empirical work on social cohesion and extreme group behavior. However, as researchers who investigate similar phenomena and wish to build upon Whitehouse's theory, we have two primary concerns. First, we are uncertain about the underlying logic of Whitehouse's central thesis. Second, Whitehouse's focus on identity fusion as the determinant of extreme self-sacrifice is outwardly too limiting. We suspect that other pertinent factors, such as exogenous sociopolitical dynamics and constituents inherent to the functioning of religious systems, will be essential to building a general theory of extreme self-sacrificial behavior.
Beginning with the logic underlying Whitehouse's theory, we are uncertain about privileging only identity fusion and group threats as the necessary conditions of extreme self-sacrifice. To illustrate this point, consider the heart of Whitehouse's explanation regarding the pathway from fusion to sacrifice (his Fig. 1):
Stable perceptions of shared essence created by either of these pathways [i.e., intense collective experiences or shared biology] is predicted to give rise to fusion with a locally bounded group or relational network. Fusion produces a strong impression that members of the group are one's kin, eliciting willingness to pay high personal costs to support the group and, in the face of out-group threat, to fight and die if necessary to protect members of the group. (sect. 1, para. 6)
Accordingly, if person P is willing to engage in extreme self-sacrifice, then P is identity fused and P's group is threatened. The difficulty in accepting this proposition, given that it accurately reflects Whitehouse's central thesis, is that research on collective violence in the social sciences suggests that other conditions – besides identity fusion and group threat – are equally as necessary for extreme self-sacrifice. For instance, minimal group contact between P and the out-group targeted by P's sacrifice seems necessary, because increased and sustained contact between two groups reduces one's willingness to harm the out-group in question (Al Ramiah & Hewstone Reference Al Ramiah and Hewstone2013). Additionally, postconflict ethnographies find that sociohistorical grievances toward an out-group, or perceptions of perpetual in-group victimhood, strongly motivate combatants, who willingly engage in the act of killing to protect or avenge their group (Hinton Reference Hinton2004; Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001; Schori-Eyal et al. Reference Schori-Eyal, Klar, Roccas and McNeill2017). Finally, persons who willingly sacrifice for their group, such as combatants who volunteer for conflict or undertake acts of collective violence, are often incited to do so by inflammatory media, propaganda, or group leaders whose vitriolic speech inspires their actions (Leader et al. Reference Leader Maynard and Benesch2016).
A more striking problem is that the core proposition of Whitehouse's theory seems to beg the question, given Whitehouse's conceptions of identity fusion and extreme self-sacrifice. He writes that identity fusion, especially local fusion, is characterized by a willingness to fight and die when the group is under attack (sect. 1, para. 2). He then defines extreme self-sacrifice as a form of altruistic suicide, in which one gives his or her life for the group (sect. 1, para. 2). Therefore, saying one is willing to engage in extreme self-sacrifice, which is to die for the group, whenever one is identity fused, which is characterized by a willingness to die for the group, appears circular.
Granted, we do not intend to oversimplify Whitehouse's overall theory, which is quite promising, but the purported circularity in the underlying argument is apparent in a few key passages, such as the conclusion, where Whitehouse says:
What would be fatal for the theory is if it turned out that convictions of shared essence failed to predict high fusion scores or if fusion (plus out-group threat) were shown to be a poor predictor of actual (as opposed to declared) willingness to fight and die for the group. (sect. 7, para. 4)
Although we admire Whitehouse for positing such a bold proposition, we are again puzzled by the circularity of the statement before the disjunct. Put simply: Because high fusion scores measure convictions of shared essence, it is unclear how they could then fail to predict fusion scores.
Circularity aside, limiting the determinants of extreme self-sacrifice to identity fusion and group threat is likely to weaken the theory as opposed to strengthening it. After all, the above passage implies that a person's willingness to engage in extreme self-sacrifice is determined by identity fusion and group threat alone. We suspect that research will falsify this claim, given the limitations of identity fusion as a measurement. For instance, Kiper (Reference Kiper2018), undertook fieldwork among former combatants and survivors of the Yugoslav Wars in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Serbia, where he surveyed hundreds of participants on identity fusion (based on Swann et al. Reference Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse and Bastian2012). He found that many communities had individuals who scored high on identity fusion scales, but were expressly against going to war for their group. Kiper also noted that many communities reached saturation points with identity fusion, with nearly everyone maximally fused, rendering data difficult to interpret. Specifically, although many Serbs and Bosnians were maximally fused, measurements did not reveal whether they had similar understandings of what it meant to be maximally fused with their group. Furthermore, identity fusion was often unpredictive of one's willingness to participate in collective violence. Whether these findings are anomalous or cohere with the next generation of scholars investigating identity fusion remains to be seen.
As a final point, we stress that we agree with Whitehouse that identity fusion plays an important role in understanding terrorism, ethnoreligious violence, and self-sacrificial violence (Kiper & Sosis Reference Kiper and Sosis2016a), and we agree that ritual is vital to this process (Sosis & Kiper Reference Sosis, Kiper, Bergmann and Kain2014). Nevertheless, we think his theory would be strengthened by recognizing that such violence is also characterized by a manipulation of recurrent features of religious and quasi-religious traditions, such as myths, sacred values, symbols, and both meaning and moral systems (Kiper & Sosis Reference Kiper, Sosis, Liddle and Shackelford2016b). In other words, understanding self-sacrificial violence will likely require a more holistic approach that includes the sociopolitical factors highlighted above, as well as those factors that motivate sacrificial behavior across religious systems (Sosis et al. Reference Sosis, Phillips, Alcorta, Shackelford and Weeks-Schackelford2012).