Whitehouse argues that extreme forms of self-sacrifice require a radical form of identity fusion with one's group, typically resulting from shared aversive experiences, and are triggered by out-group threats. However, these arguments are predicated, at least implicitly, on a rather narrow conceptualization of extreme self-sacrifice that is limited to deliberate, fatal risk taking. Consequently, Whitehouse's “general theory of extreme self-sacrifice” both ignores and fails to explain a vast range of other (less) extreme forms of self-sacrifice in which many individuals engage, such as exerting intense effort (Inzlicht et al. Reference Inzlicht, Shenhav and Olivola2018), enduring pain (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011), and exposing themselves to bodily harm and non-negligible risks of death (Lee et al. Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999), to advance their desired causes. Yet there is no clear reason to assume these other forms of extreme self-sacrifice are fundamentally different from the particular ones on which Whitehouse focuses. Indeed, broadening the concept of extreme self-sacrifice reveals that these acts are surprisingly common, do not require identity fusion or out-group threats, and are more likely to reflect a basic cognitive bias than an elaborate evolutionary-cultural adaption to intergroup conflict.
Extreme self-sacrificial acts are surprisingly common
If we broaden the definition of extreme self-sacrificial acts to include great personal sacrifices of leisure, pleasure, or safety (as Whitehouse seems to do when he considers nonfatal acts, such as football hooliganism and blood donations), we find that these are surprisingly common. As a prime example, people engage in pretty extreme forms of self-sacrifice when they sign up to participate in painful, effortful charity fundraisers. These fundraisers require participants to sacrifice leisure for effort (e.g., running marathons [Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011]), pleasure for pain (e.g., walking barefoot on burning coals and/or broken glass, or diving into frozen lakes [Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013]), and even safety for the risk of bodily injury and death (e.g., skydiving [Lee et al. Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999]). Therefore, individuals who participate in these extreme charity fundraisers are willingly making great personal sacrifices and sometimes risking their lives for a greater cause. Moreover, far from being repulsed – or at the very least puzzled – by these extremely painful, effortful pro-social acts, we admire and actively support them (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2018). In many ways, then, participation in extreme charity fundraisers is not so fundamentally different from self-sacrificial acts in times of human conflict, which suggests they share a common underlying psychology.
Extreme self-sacrifice can occur without identity fusion or out-group threats
In contrast to wartime heroism and suicide terrorism, however, people are motivated to participate in (and sponsor) extreme charity fundraisers even without an elaborate process of identity fusion or threats from outside forces. Most charity fundraising efforts are aimed at combating things such as disease and malnutrition, not hostile out-groups. Indeed, research suggests that painful, effortful charity fundraisers are particularly popular and successful (compared with easy, enjoyable means of donating) when the goal is to alleviate human suffering (Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013). In most cases, those participating in such events are brought together, not by shared aversive experiences, but by a common desire to help others overcome adversity. Also, the typical extreme charity fundraising event involves a large group of strangers (fundraising participants) coming together and self-sacrificing to raise money for another group of strangers (donation recipients), rather than tightknit individuals self-sacrificing for the benefit of their in-group.
Of course, many extreme charity fundraisers are also, at their core, social events that bring together participants motivated to advance a common cause, which might lead us to conclude that group dynamics must play a key role in people's decisions to self-sacrifice for a charitable cause. And yet, research shows that even in the absence of any group dynamics, the prospect of suffering for a charitable cause motivates people to donate more to the cause (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013). For example, one experiment found that participants’ willingness to contribute to a collective resource (shared earnings in an economic game) increased when they had to undergo a painful task (keeping both hands submerged in 10 °C water for 60 seconds) to contribute (Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013). Critically, these participants were unacquainted with the other members of their group, and their contribution decisions were made in private, thereby eliminating any possible role of identity fusion or in-group signaling. Despite this, those given the option to sacrifice their well-being (by enduring the cold pressor task) for the group did so. In fact, they sacrificed more of their own earnings to benefit the group than individuals who could contribute without incurring pain.
In sum, neither out-group threats, nor identity fusion, nor group dynamics more generally is required to motivate extreme forms of self-sacrifice for a greater cause.
Extreme self-sacrifice reflects a basic cognitive bias
Rather than being a biological or cultural adaption specifically designed for inter-group conflict, the motivation to engage in many forms of extreme self-sacrifice likely reflects a basic cognitive bias. In particular, it may be a special case of a more general human tendency to derive value from (Inzlicht et al. Reference Inzlicht, Shenhav and Olivola2018) and justify both our own (Arkes & Blumer Reference Arkes and Blumer1985; Thaler Reference Thaler1980) and others’ (Olivola Reference Olivola2018) costly investments. Evidence of its status as a suboptimal bias is well documented in the research literature (Arkes & Blumer Reference Arkes and Blumer1985; Olivola Reference Olivola2018; Thaler Reference Thaler1980) and also comes from the fact that people are motivated to engage in extreme self-sacrifice to further charitable causes, when the very same goals can be achieved without such sacrifices (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011), as well as the fact that this self-sacrifice for charity often yields inefficient outcomes, thereby annulling its (tangible) value (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011).
The persistent appeal of inefficient – even counterproductive (e.g., Lee et al. Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999) – self-sacrificial acts is hard to reconcile with an adaptive evolutionary account. Why, for example, would evolutionary pressures favor individuals motivated to sacrifice valuable resources (money, time, and energy) and partake in extreme physical challenges (exerting immense effort, enduring pain, and risking their health) to send aid to complete strangers (e.g., recipients in other countries)?
Whitehouse argues that extreme forms of self-sacrifice require a radical form of identity fusion with one's group, typically resulting from shared aversive experiences, and are triggered by out-group threats. However, these arguments are predicated, at least implicitly, on a rather narrow conceptualization of extreme self-sacrifice that is limited to deliberate, fatal risk taking. Consequently, Whitehouse's “general theory of extreme self-sacrifice” both ignores and fails to explain a vast range of other (less) extreme forms of self-sacrifice in which many individuals engage, such as exerting intense effort (Inzlicht et al. Reference Inzlicht, Shenhav and Olivola2018), enduring pain (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011), and exposing themselves to bodily harm and non-negligible risks of death (Lee et al. Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999), to advance their desired causes. Yet there is no clear reason to assume these other forms of extreme self-sacrifice are fundamentally different from the particular ones on which Whitehouse focuses. Indeed, broadening the concept of extreme self-sacrifice reveals that these acts are surprisingly common, do not require identity fusion or out-group threats, and are more likely to reflect a basic cognitive bias than an elaborate evolutionary-cultural adaption to intergroup conflict.
Extreme self-sacrificial acts are surprisingly common
If we broaden the definition of extreme self-sacrificial acts to include great personal sacrifices of leisure, pleasure, or safety (as Whitehouse seems to do when he considers nonfatal acts, such as football hooliganism and blood donations), we find that these are surprisingly common. As a prime example, people engage in pretty extreme forms of self-sacrifice when they sign up to participate in painful, effortful charity fundraisers. These fundraisers require participants to sacrifice leisure for effort (e.g., running marathons [Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011]), pleasure for pain (e.g., walking barefoot on burning coals and/or broken glass, or diving into frozen lakes [Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013]), and even safety for the risk of bodily injury and death (e.g., skydiving [Lee et al. Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999]). Therefore, individuals who participate in these extreme charity fundraisers are willingly making great personal sacrifices and sometimes risking their lives for a greater cause. Moreover, far from being repulsed – or at the very least puzzled – by these extremely painful, effortful pro-social acts, we admire and actively support them (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2018). In many ways, then, participation in extreme charity fundraisers is not so fundamentally different from self-sacrificial acts in times of human conflict, which suggests they share a common underlying psychology.
Extreme self-sacrifice can occur without identity fusion or out-group threats
In contrast to wartime heroism and suicide terrorism, however, people are motivated to participate in (and sponsor) extreme charity fundraisers even without an elaborate process of identity fusion or threats from outside forces. Most charity fundraising efforts are aimed at combating things such as disease and malnutrition, not hostile out-groups. Indeed, research suggests that painful, effortful charity fundraisers are particularly popular and successful (compared with easy, enjoyable means of donating) when the goal is to alleviate human suffering (Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013). In most cases, those participating in such events are brought together, not by shared aversive experiences, but by a common desire to help others overcome adversity. Also, the typical extreme charity fundraising event involves a large group of strangers (fundraising participants) coming together and self-sacrificing to raise money for another group of strangers (donation recipients), rather than tightknit individuals self-sacrificing for the benefit of their in-group.
Of course, many extreme charity fundraisers are also, at their core, social events that bring together participants motivated to advance a common cause, which might lead us to conclude that group dynamics must play a key role in people's decisions to self-sacrifice for a charitable cause. And yet, research shows that even in the absence of any group dynamics, the prospect of suffering for a charitable cause motivates people to donate more to the cause (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013). For example, one experiment found that participants’ willingness to contribute to a collective resource (shared earnings in an economic game) increased when they had to undergo a painful task (keeping both hands submerged in 10 °C water for 60 seconds) to contribute (Olivola & Shafir Reference Olivola and Shafir2013). Critically, these participants were unacquainted with the other members of their group, and their contribution decisions were made in private, thereby eliminating any possible role of identity fusion or in-group signaling. Despite this, those given the option to sacrifice their well-being (by enduring the cold pressor task) for the group did so. In fact, they sacrificed more of their own earnings to benefit the group than individuals who could contribute without incurring pain.
In sum, neither out-group threats, nor identity fusion, nor group dynamics more generally is required to motivate extreme forms of self-sacrifice for a greater cause.
Extreme self-sacrifice reflects a basic cognitive bias
Rather than being a biological or cultural adaption specifically designed for inter-group conflict, the motivation to engage in many forms of extreme self-sacrifice likely reflects a basic cognitive bias. In particular, it may be a special case of a more general human tendency to derive value from (Inzlicht et al. Reference Inzlicht, Shenhav and Olivola2018) and justify both our own (Arkes & Blumer Reference Arkes and Blumer1985; Thaler Reference Thaler1980) and others’ (Olivola Reference Olivola2018) costly investments. Evidence of its status as a suboptimal bias is well documented in the research literature (Arkes & Blumer Reference Arkes and Blumer1985; Olivola Reference Olivola2018; Thaler Reference Thaler1980) and also comes from the fact that people are motivated to engage in extreme self-sacrifice to further charitable causes, when the very same goals can be achieved without such sacrifices (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011), as well as the fact that this self-sacrifice for charity often yields inefficient outcomes, thereby annulling its (tangible) value (Olivola Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011).
The persistent appeal of inefficient – even counterproductive (e.g., Lee et al. Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999) – self-sacrificial acts is hard to reconcile with an adaptive evolutionary account. Why, for example, would evolutionary pressures favor individuals motivated to sacrifice valuable resources (money, time, and energy) and partake in extreme physical challenges (exerting immense effort, enduring pain, and risking their health) to send aid to complete strangers (e.g., recipients in other countries)?