This chapter turns to the collapse of moral judgment Arendt saw in the early weeks of the Third Reich, and which she connects to the collapse of common sense and adherence to conspiracy theories in mass societies. The chapter draws on The Origins of Totalitarianism, coupled with contemporary “virtue epistemology” – the study of intellectual virtues and vices and their relation to knowledge. Arendt, I argue, is an exceptionally insightful virtue epistemologist. The chapter analyzes Arendt’s account of how European social conditions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to the collapse of common sense in the face of a barrage of political lies. She warns that “if everyone always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but that no one believes anything at all anymore.” The result is a dangerous mix of gullibility and cynicism, what in the chapter I label culpable credulousness.

Why do so many people believe the 2020 U.S. election was rigged or that vaccines might cause autism, despite a lack of credible evidence? Chapter 3 explores this question through four key concepts: (1) psychological needs and goals, (2) cognitive heuristics and biases, (3) motivated reasoning, and (4) the viral spread of memes and misinformation. I argue that these false beliefs persist because they satisfy deep psychological needs—for identity, meaning, control, status, or affiliation. The beliefs obtained credibility through social referencing and conformity to ingroup opinions, as well as from constant repetition. Cognitive biases—including availability, stereotyping, confirmation bias, and myside bias—further entrench these views. Another cause of the problem was the sharing of memes and conspiracy theories over the Internet, which reinforces a sense of affiliation and indirect control.¶ Together with identity politics, the selective exposure to information, and weakened trust in epistemic institutions, these forces have accelerated political polarization, endangered public health, and contributed to the “pollution” of the epistemic environment.

Having established the basics of a Pascalian, “cordate” epistemology, this chapter explores the implications for how the world works and applications to some pressing problems today. The way the world looks, and so the reasons your experience gives you, depends on the state of your heart. But the fact that the world can be seen in these ways, according to the different states of heart, is a significant fact about it. Pascal infers much from this built-in ambiguity in the world when it comes to religion. That the world can be seen as both a Godless mechanism and mediating a loving relationship with God confirms one theology (the Augustinian Fall), and disconfirms the rest. A similar situation arises for us today, where the facts about the world can seem equally obvious to both sides of our polarized society, even though they are looking at the same world, albeit from their own “echo chambers.” This chapter explores the relevance of Pascal’s views on ambiguity to the deep disagreements we encounter in society today, applying insights about how the heart influences the way things appear as well as how to communicate with those who profoundly disagree with us.

This chapter focuses on the historical relationship between nationalism and conspiracy theories in times of pandemic. It argues that premodern conspiratorial narratives were mostly focused on eschatological and theological images, aiming to blame and delegitimise the religious Other. In these imaginary plots, the spread of disease was interpreted as an attack on one’s religious beliefs. With the rise of nation-states and the decline of empires and patrimonial kingdoms, periodic outbursts of epidemics gradually attained more nationalist interpretations. In these narratives, the threatening Other was usually nationalised, and even traditional religious groups became reinterpreted as a threat to one’s national security

The epilogue muses on the complications underlying the popularity of Turkish TV series in Iran and the secret gold-for-oil deals made in defiance of US sanctions as touchpoints in a vision beyond triangulation and comparativism.

Historical records and recent events suggest that conspiracy theories and violent extremism are closely associated. However, empirical research examining this link has only recently gained momentum. The present chapter provides an overview of this fast-growing research field. We first discuss theoretical explanations of the link between conspiracy theories and violent extremism, as well as the hypothetical mechanisms underpinning it. Next, we summarize the empirical evidence so far along three main research lines: (a) evidence from radicalized groups and individuals; (b) evidence from general population studies focusing on support for, and intentions to engage in, violent extremism; (c) evidence from the general population focusing on extreme political attitudes. We conclude by formulating recommendations for policy and practice.

An extreme overvalued belief is shared by others in a person’s cultural, religious, or subcultural group. The belief is often relished, amplified, and defended by the possessor of the belief and should be differentiated from a delusion or obsession. Over time, the belief grows more dominant, more refined, and more resistant to challenge. The individual has an intense emotional commitment to the belief and may carry out violent behavior in its service. This chapter discusses the historical foundations of overvalued idea as first described by neuropsychiatrist Carl Wernicke. Case examples of phenomenology in forensic psychiatry are described, as well as implications for the diagnosis of folie a deux. Case examples of Jacob Chansley (U.S. Capitol attack), Anders Breivik, and Malik Hassan are discussed in detail. Finally, a discussion of Gestalt psychology, moral schemas, as well as binary bias and emotional tagging is presented as important to understanding how extreme overvalued beliefs develop.

This chapter explores patterns of misinformation in online conspiracy theory information worlds such as QAnon, as seen in publicly accessible Facebook pages. In particular, it examines issues related to expertise, authority, and gatekeeping; overt acts of misreading; the concept of connecting the dots, or seeing patterns and interconnections between often widely disparate phenomena; and interpretations of the symbolism in everyday life phenomena such as gestures, corporate logos, and celebrity photographs. It argues that, through its ubiquity and persistence, conspiracy theory misinformation functions as a persistent yet de-centered everyday activity, melding deeply serious interpretive acts with elements of gaming and sense-making.

This chapter explores the concept of democratic political causality in different political regimes. It distinguishes between top-down hierarchical causality in religious, traditional, and authoritarian regimes and the bottom-up and horizontal causality found in democracies. Democracy rejects the vertical hierarchical causality since it attributes political actions to human agency rather than transcendental or superhuman forces. Real-world examples, such as the messianic movement in Israel, highlight the tensions when divine attributions clash with democratic ideals. The chapter thoroughly examines the influence of Thomas Hobbes and his social contract theory on modern political thought, particularly his emphasis on bottom-up causality in the formation of the state. Furthermore, the chapter examines the challenges faced by democratic causality, including issues of trust in power holders, understanding others’ motives, and the emergence of conspiracy theories. It discusses self-regulation as an alternative to voluntary political interaction and the tension between individualism and collective action in democratic governance. Finally, the chapter highlights that despite the obstacles and complexities, democratic causality remains a fundamental measure of legitimate political action and authority. It introduces the concept of the “public fact” as a critical element in the epistemological framework of modern democracy.

This chapter explores the erosion of trust in public facts and the crisis within commonsense conceptions of reality. It traces the evolution of scientific practices, emphasizing the role of early experimental scientists like Robert Boyle in grounding them. Ezrahi argues that the contemporary breakdown of epistemological norms, which previously upheld facts as sociopolitical currency, inevitably undermines the foundations of contemporary democracy. The citizens' diminished confidence in understanding why political actors behave in specific ways, coupled with the disparities between motives and visible effects, fosters the proliferation of conspiracy theories. The current breakdown of epistemological norms manifests itself in the “post truth” era and the ascent of “alternative facts.” Ezrahi scrutinizes the challenges of discerning facts from opinions in journalism and underscores the perils of exposure to fake news. The chapter investigates the erosion of a shared commonsense perception of reality through the lens of the Brexit campaign and the Trump presidency. Ezrahi highlights that the blurring of the cosmological dichotomy between Nature and humans has made it increasingly challenging for the public to differentiate between facts and fiction. Finally, he advocates for an awareness of the public’s role in defining political causes and facts.