Ballot propositions provide a unique instance of direct democracy in which voters have a say in a state’s legislative process. However, voters vary in how they understand and evaluate these measures, many of which can be relatively complicated and comprised of multiple provisions. When multiple provisions exist within a single proposition, how do voters aggregate their potentially varying support across the provisions in their calculus of overall support for the proposition? Are all provisions weighted equally or do some matter more? To examine these questions, we construct novel survey questions on three real ballot measures under consideration during the 2022 midterm election cycle. By randomly assigning how we ask respondents for their support of a given ballot proposition, we garner insight into how voters approach voting on ballot measures and their greater decision-making process. We find evidence of a provision-based negativity bias, which is strongest on the most complex and least polarized issue.

Cultural groups often differ in how much they trust political institutions. Yet such differences need not reflect culture alone or at all because cultural groups are frequently embedded in distinct institutional environments. I examine this issue in Switzerland, where linguistic diversity overlaps with cantonal federalism and allows language-group differences in trust to be studied across and within institutional contexts. Using pooled cross-sectional survey data, I find that French-speaking respondents report lower trust in cantonal authorities than German-speaking respondents in national comparisons. This gap attenuates sharply within cantons, indicating that much of the national difference is associated with between-canton variation. Consistent with this pattern, the national French–German gap is substantially attenuated when cross-cantonal differences in direct-democratic participation rights are taken into account. Evidence from bilingual cantons further reinforces this contextual interpretation, as language-group differences vary in ways consistent with minority status rather than following a uniform French–German divide.

While many citizens support expanding direct democracy, its institutionalisation lags behind popular demand, presumably due to limited enthusiasm among political elites. This article explores both ideological and instrumental reasons why political parties support or avoid direct democracy. Using an original dataset of 701 election manifestos from German parties (1975–2017) and employing a custom dictionary and large language model, over 2,000 relevant statements were classified. Mentions of direct democracy are predominantly positive, as parties opposing it omit the topic, consistent with salience theory. Regression analyses reveal robust support among left-of-centre and populist parties. Moreover, challenger parties emphasise direct democracy more than mainstream parties, but maintain their stance when going mainstream. In contrast, parties are less likely to promote direct democracy when in government than when in opposition. These findings help explain the gap between citizen preferences and actual institutional reforms.

In July of 2024, signatures for placing an anti-gerrymandering initiative on the November ballot were certified by the Ohio Secretary of State. The proposed initiative would have replaced a bipartisan redistricting commission with a citizens’ redistricting commission. Though the initiative ultimately failed, polls leading up to the general election showed Ohioans strongly supported redistricting reform. Using a survey of likely voters in Ohio, the research presented here identifies the factors that explain support for redistricting reform. While there is a strong body of research on redistricting, this research is unique because the survey data come from likely voters during an actual redistricting campaign. The findings show that identifying threats to democracy as the most important election issue, awareness of the redistricting issue, identification with the Democratic Party, and liberal ideology are all positively associated with support for redistricting reform. The findings demonstrate how voters are influenced by partisanship on salient issues and how issue awareness interacts with partisanship to determine support for redistricting. This article concludes with a discussion of the context of the ballot initiative in Ohio.

The responsiveness of political parties to voters’ policy preferences is a core feature of democracies. A growing number of studies analyze this phenomenon, but key obstacles remain, such as the availability of reliable measures and the infrequency of these measures (election periods). As a consequence, the literature remains vague in theorizing and analyzing instances where the preferences of the median voter clash with those of the party electorate. By studying party responsiveness in a different setting, this paper advances the literature on these fronts: we focus on the Swiss political context, where the frequent use of direct democratic institutions enables us to evaluate the dynamic responsiveness of political parties with several observations per year for a large variety of topics. The paper uses a Bayesian item response theory model to operationalize the general ideological position of ballot proposals and uses them to evaluate parties’ responsiveness to the median voter and party voter. Our results confirm the most recent literature that political parties are responsive to their own electorates’ position shift but not the median voter. Furthermore, we show that, in situations where the signal from the general electorate and the party voters disagree, parties value the party voter more, thus giving even more weight to their partisan electorate. These findings have important implications for the study of party responsiveness.

This study investigates expenditure of European parties in referendum campaigns. Previous work exploring why parties initiate referendums hints at the importance of subsequent campaigns to parties, but theoretical insights regarding party behavior in campaigning contexts are fragmented and limited. We argue that party expenditure indicates the extent of their engagement, and identifying explanatory factors can offer insights into underlying strategic goals driving parties in their behavior. Drawing on referendum instrumentalization literature and existing empirical studies, we propose a framework with three strategic factors and corresponding hypotheses. These are tested using official expenditure data for 47 parties campaigning in 24 referendums in eight European countries through bivariate and multivariate analysis. Our findings mainly suggest that parties see referendum campaigns as avenues for image building, spending more on average when they initiate them and when referendums are publicly salient. Additionally, parties seemingly prioritize elections, while spending limits are ineffective in curbing expenditure.

This paper traces and assesses the trajectories of democratic innovations (DIs) in Germany across levels of governance and over time since 1990, providing novel and original data. We focus on three types of DIs that have been applied in Germany: direct democratic instruments, participatory budgeting, and deliberative mini-publics (DMPs). DIs proliferated differently across the different levels of governance (local, state, and federal), with shifting peaks in popularity and differing evolutions in process design and regulations. Going beyond description, this paper discusses the trajectories of DIs by applying a theoretical framework based, firstly, on Elstub and Escobar’s concept of DIs as providing opportunities for citizens (in participation, deliberation, and influence) and, secondly, on Warren’s system-oriented approach on democratic functions (these being empowered inclusion, collective will-formation, and collective decision-making). This framework provides a useful tool for analysing how the trajectories of DIs in Germany have affected citizens’ opportunities. Combined, these trajectories show a movement towards opportunities for inclusive participation, deliberation, and will-formation of a few citizens in DMPs, rather than opportunities for empowered participation or influence on political agendas and decisions.

The global rise of deliberative democratic innovations, particularly minipublics such as citizens’ assemblies and deliberative polls, has been marked by uneven adoption across advanced democracies. While some countries have integrated these mechanisms into their democratic frameworks, others remain hesitant, raising questions about the institutional conditions that facilitate or hinder their adoption. This study employs qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how configurations of three key institutional dimensions – consensus democracy, federalism, and direct democracy – shape the adoption of minipublics. Our findings reveal that minipublics are more likely to be adopted in majoritarian systems with strong federalism and limited direct democracy, where they address participatory gaps. Conversely, systems combining high consensus democracy and extensive direct democratic mechanisms, such as Switzerland, often exhibit lower adoption rates, as existing power-sharing structures fulfil similar deliberative functions.

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. This article presents an investigation of this already well‐established hypothesis once more, but additionally proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influences their lobbying behaviour. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy‐making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland) than when referendums are the exception (Germany). The article demonstrates that Swiss cause groups – often also referred to as ‘public interest groups’ in the literature – use a more balanced mixture of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups, such as industry groups or unions.

For decades, scholars have argued that low and declining political trust affect citizens’ support for democratic and undemocratic reform. While some theorized that low political trust induces alienation and support for non‐democratic decision making, others argued that it pushes critical citizens to support reforms aimed to reinvigorate democracy. Yet, empirical tests of these expectations remained sparse and inconclusive. This paper employs panel data from the Netherlands (covering 3 waves in 3 years) to test these diverging theories simultaneously. We employ the random effects within‐between (REWB) model to differentiate between the effects of structurally low and declining political trust. Our results suggest that low and declining trust both diminish support for representative democracy, enhance support for direct democratic decision making and do not affect support for authoritarianism. These findings cast doubt on the understanding of political distrust as a determinant of political alienation. Rather, they support theories of critical citizenship and stealth democracy.

In the context of an ever growing importance and usage of referendums around the globe, this article provides a comprehensive approach to analyse the determinants of participation in direct democratic votes. In the absence of conclusive empirical evidence about which factors drive direct democratic participation, studies tend to adopt election-specific findings and assume the determinants of electoral turnout to equally apply for referendums. Yet, a strict empirical test of these numerous determinants in a referendum context is still missing. By examining aspects stemming from both election-specific and referendum-specific contexts, this article aims to first test the applicability of common electoral theories of turnout for direct democratic participation and second to analyse the relevance of each factor when simultaneously examined with other contextual and individual factors. This holistic approach represents reality as adequate as possible, that is, to consider various factors that may simultaneously influence the individual decision to vote. Next to individual variables, the analysis particularly focuses on two contextual levels, the community a person lives in and factors linked to a given referendum. The discussion and joint analysis of competing factors addresses the problem of underspecified turnout models, which commonly prevents a detailed assessment of the relative importance of the determinants of turnout. The study uses registered data from the canton of Geneva, Switzerland, which provides official information about individual participation across 43 referendums in 45 communities. We match this individual data with referendum-related factors, such as campaign intensity and importance of the issues at stake, and community-level variables, such as wealth and urbanization. The results of our multilevel, cross-classified models show significant context-related effects, stemming mainly from the referendum and less from the community level. Still, the main driver of direct democratic participation is individual determinants, in particular citizens' past participation record.

It has been argued that political parties are in decline. While they used to be responsible for connecting citizens to the state by translating their preferences into policies, they have increasingly become part of the state, acting as governors instead. While this perspective emphasises parties’ representative function, it is less clear what their role is in a more direct democratic context. Parties may gain support due to such context, but they may also be seen increasingly redundant in a situation where citizens can co‐decide directly. Focusing on party membership, this study tests these rival expectations on a panel of 16 West European democracies over the period 1980–2008 and finds that parties tend to have higher levels of party membership in a direct democratic context. The usage of referendums, however, does not contribute to this effect.

Right‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

In some countries, direct democracy is used successfully to increase legitimacy of decisions or mitigate conflict, and in other countries, authoritarian leaders seem to instrumentalize and manipulate referendums. How can referendum integrity be analyzed? This article presents an empirical instrument to evaluate the variety and integrity of referendums. This encompasses criteria for the analysis of direct democracy. First, we develop a referendum cycle model based on the electoral cycle framework, assessing referendum quality in a number of dimensions from electoral laws and electoral procedures, thematic limitations of referendums, to voter registration, the initiation of referendums, campaign and media coverage as well as campaign financing. The empirical instrument is designed to be used in expert surveys, and piloted in the Turkish constitutional referendum of 2017. The article presents the results of the pilot study, draws out opportunities and limitations of this approach and suggests avenues for its future development.

Using individual data on Swiss federal ballots (VOX data) and an original dataset on the evolution and content of political campaigns, this article elucidates how negative campaigning influences individual turnout during Swiss federal ballots. It hypothesises that the effect of negativism on turnout depends on ‘which camp goes dirty’ and, specifically, on the direction of the political campaign (‘status quo’ versus ‘policy change’ campaigns). A series of multilevel models provide strong support for the hypotheses, by showing that high negativism in ‘status quo campaigns’ decreases individual turnout, whereas high negativism for ‘policy change campaigns’ increases it. It is argued here that this could depend on the emotional responses triggered by negativism in political campaigns.

Are citizens in consensus democracies with developed direct democratic institutions more satisfied with their political system than those in majoritarian democracies? In this article, individual‐level data from the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and an updated version of Lijphart's multivariate measure of consensus and majoritarian democracy covering 24 countries are used to investigate this question. The findings from logistic multilevel models indicate that consensual cabinet types and direct democratic institutions are associated with higher levels of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, consensus democracy in these institutions closes the gap in satisfaction with democracy between losers and winners of elections by both comforting losers and reducing the satisfaction of winners. Simultaneously, consensus democracy in terms of electoral rules, the executive–legislative power balance, interest groups and the party system reduces the satisfaction of election winners, but does not enhance that of losers.

Empirical literature regarding which actors support the most participatory democracy is surprisingly scarce. Discussing the core ideological features of populist and post-materialist-centred parties, we expect that these parties emphasise participatory democracy more than their competitors. Additionally, populist parties should embody a monist demand for greater participatory democracy, while post-materialist-centred (PMC) parties should advocate a pluralist understanding of it. Drawing on party electoral manifestos, we verify these assumptions in several national elections across Europe. Our findings show mixed support for the theoretical expectations. Both post-materialist and populist parties support participatory democracy more than other parties, and their principles diverge. More precisely, our data confirm that PMC parties advocate a pluralist understanding of participatory democracy. Yet populist parties show a fuzzier picture. While populist radical right parties exhibit a monist profile, radical left populist parties are much more in line with post-materialist arguments.

Analyses of voting in European Union referendums typically distinguish between ‘second‐order’ effects and the impact of substantive ‘issues’. In order to explain change in referendum outcome, two types of substantive issues are distinguished in this article. Focusing on Irish voting in the Lisbon Treaty referendums and using data from post‐referendum surveys, it is found that perceptions of treaty implications outperform underlying attitudes to EU integration in predicting vote choice at both referendums, and perceptions of treaty implications are strong predictors of vote change between the referendums. The findings have broadly positive implications for normative assessments of the usefulness of direct democracy as a tool for legitimising regional integration advance.

Although charitable foundations play an important role in modern Western civil societies, knowledge about them and the factors that encourage their prevalence is still quite limited. The relevant literature acknowledges that Switzerland has proven a fertile ground for foundation growth, and in this paper, we develop and empirically test a model in order to examine the effects of the country’s economic and political incentive structure on foundation activity. We find that alongside the required income level that is an important determinant of foundation prevalence, tax incentives, and direct democracy have significant influence on individuals’ philanthropic behavior, as each account for approximately 10 % of the variance in the model presented here.