This conclusion synthesizes the book’s findings and draws lessons for understanding and countering authoritarian propaganda. It argues that service propaganda—reaffirming and informative coverage tailored to pro-regime citizens—functions primarily as a tool of belief maintenance rather than persuasion, sustaining autocrats’ bonds with their supporters over the long term. While effective, this model faces inherent risks: crises can erode trust when reaffirming content conflicts with citizens’ lived experiences, and catering to supporters creates a strategic lock-in difficult to reverse. The conclusion draws four lessons for combating authoritarian messaging. First, truth alone is insufficient—citizens prefer propaganda because it meets their informational and emotional needs, and media literacy interventions often fail or backfire. Second, weakening propaganda requires undermining the regime’s connection to citizens, a task best accomplished by capitalizing on crises and exogenous shocks rather than information provision alone. Third, independent journalism remains essential: even with a small audience, it sustains oppositional thinking and preserves professional capacity for future democratic openings. Fourth, resisting authoritarianism requires playing a long game—supporting institution-building and engaging not only liberal opponents but also the broader public that has found meaning in authoritarian propaganda.

Why do citizens in autocracies believe state propaganda, even when its falsehoods are obvious? This introduction argues that existing explanations—persuasion, intimidation, and epistemic confounding—fail to account for how authoritarian media build credibility. The book advances an alternative framework: “service propaganda,” in which state-controlled media cultivate trust by serving pro-regime majorities. Authoritarian media reaffirm supporters’ identities and worldviews while meeting their informational needs, earning credibility—and making it easier to spread outright disinformation. This consumer-oriented approach is analogous to partisan media in democracies. Drawing on large-scale text analysis of Russian state television and extensive surveys, the book examines Russia under Vladimir Putin as a crucial case in comparative context. The introduction outlines the book’s contributions: reframing propaganda as a service to supporters, centering citizens’ role in co-constructing authoritarian narratives, and illuminating why independent journalism struggles to compete. It also previews implications for policymakers seeking to counteract propaganda in autocracies and beyond.

This chapter examines informative propaganda—state media’s effort to appear as a credible news source, retaining pro-regime audiences. Rather than relying on political narratives alone, Russian state television invested in diverse reporting to meet news consumers’ informational needs. The chapter distinguishes informative propaganda from “honest” propaganda: its aim is not to admit inconvenient facts but to construct an impression of journalistic authority. Analyzing Channel One’s prime-time broadcasts in 2000–2021, it identifies nineteen news topics across five domains—international affairs, domestic policy, domestic problems, general interest, and soft news—showing that about a quarter of broadcasts covered non-political content. The chapter also analyzes how state media mimic journalistic credibility through signals of timeliness, field reporting, and investigative effort, documenting their growing use over time. Finally, it reexamines the “confounding” hypothesis, arguing that incoherent propaganda messaging reflects improvisation rather than a deliberate strategy to confuse. The findings explain how service propaganda keeps pro-regime audiences satisfied and reduces demand for independent journalism.

Why do Russians embrace propaganda narratives even when these narratives are costly, as in the case of the 2014 food embargo? This chapter examines the demand side of propaganda, arguing that Russians’ susceptibility to pro-regime messaging is best explained by politically biased news processing rather than state brainwashing or poor discernment capacity. Drawing on two original surveys in which thousands of Russian respondents evaluated dozens of real news stories, the chapter shows that Putin supporters are substantially more likely to rate pro-regime stories as true and critical stories as false—a difference of 10–15 percentage points compared to opposition-minded citizens. Yet when political cues are absent, supporters and critics demonstrate very similar capacity to distinguish true from false information, and overall, Russians’ discernment is close to international benchmarks. These findings suggest that pro-regime majorities’ receptivity to propaganda stems from the political congruence between propaganda content and their prior beliefs—a core mechanism of service propaganda—rather than from the coercive power of the state media apparatus. The chapter concludes by discussing why political biases reduce opposition-minded citizens’ resistance to critical information and why independent journalism faces deep barriers in authoritarian societies.

This chapter explores the Venezuelan government’s actions against political opponents abroad, detailed by different media sources, human rights organizations, think tanks, and academic studies, and discusses them by applying theoretical and methodological elements found in the transnational repression literature. The objective is to identify if there is an escalation process in Venezuelan transnational repression and offer potential explanations of that process. After looking at the Venezuelan government’s motives to engage in repressing activities, the instruments and tactics applied, and the implications and consequences, the chapter argues that the Venezuelan government seems to have escalated transnational repression since 2015 as its international legitimation decreased following denunciations and actions by its exiled opposition and massive outmigration. Recent changes in the political orientation of the Colombian government and the U.S. repatriation of Venezuelans have increased Venezuela’s capacity to control and repress dissidents but have also made it more dependent on external actors’ behavior.

The primary threat of AI is not a dystopian uprising, but the quiet, rational surrender of human autonomy for convenience. While existing risks like discrimination and disinformation are concerning, another profound danger is one we willingly embrace: a life optimized by AI. As we delegate increasingly consequential decisions – from career paths to personal relationships – to demonstrably superior AI systems, we become meat puppets, happier and healthier, yet stripped of meaningful agency. The chapter argues that this philosophical loss, driven by the competitive pressure to optimize our lives, likely cannot be curbed by regulation and will be the defining, irreversible tragedy of the AI age.

The media plays an important role in how EBM is perceived by the public, but this process suffers from various "information disorders." Improving communication of EBM to journalists could advance how they report EBM to the public.

This chapter challenges the prevailing narrative that the release of open-source models constitutes the “democratization” of generative AI (GenAI). Arguing that genuine democratization requires far more than mere access, the analysis posits that openness is a necessary but insufficient condition. Current initiatives often create a “techno-utopian mirage,” benefiting only those who already possess the requisite expertise, computational power, and economic resources. The concentration of GenAI use in wealthy, English-speaking nations reveals a digital and linguistic divide, while the industry’s reliance on a workforce of low-wage global laborers highlights exploitative practices antithetical to democratic ideals. Furthermore, companies often protect proprietary trade secrets like reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) methods, which are central to model quality. Until these systemic issues are addressed, “democratization” will remain a marketing slogan rather than a meaningful reality.

This chapter explores the delicate balance between the need to combat online disinformation and the safeguarding of fundamental rights, particularly media freedom and pluralism, as essential elements of freedom of expression and democracy. The chapter outlines the evolution of the EU’s policies and regulations related to information integrity and discusses the key elements and challenges of the EU’s approach to addressing disinformation in the context of media pluralism. Focusing on the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the Digital Services Act, and the European Media Freedom Act, the chapter discusses their complex interplay and overarching strategy, which delegates the critical task of assessing systemic risks and fundamental rights – including media freedom and pluralism – to very large online platforms.

This chapter examines the legitimacy and sustainability of sanctions against media outlets as a tool to counter foreign propaganda, focusing on the European Union’s restrictive measures against state-controlled Russian media following the invasion of Ukraine. While acknowledging the pressing need to address harmful disinformation and propaganda, particularly in times of war, we argue that the EU’s current sanctions model raises significant concerns regarding media freedom and freedom of expression. The chapter critically analyses the conceptual ambiguity surrounding ‘propaganda’ and ‘disinformation’ in international law, highlighting the tensions between content-based restrictions and fundamental rights. Drawing on comparative analysis of national approaches, particularly from Eastern European states, the chapter proposes an alternative tripartite framework for assessing media sanctions. This framework focuses on: (1) behaviour and content of media outlets; (2) adherence to principles of independent media and quality journalism; and (3) the relationship with ‘aggressor states’. We contend that this approach provides more objective criteria for identifying bona fide news media and propaganda channels, while better aligning with international human rights standards and the liberal understanding of media freedom.

This chapter explores potential advancements in co-regulatory settings to better cope with basic rights and democratic requirements when tackling disinformation online. While dubious information has become increasingly prevalent on social media platforms and might cause individual and societal harm, regulatory measures have depend on state regulation, self-regulation, and traditional co-regulation. In view of the disadvantages of state regulation and self-regulation, co-regulatory approaches are seen as the way forward in disinformation governance. The chapter argues that current co-regulatory settings have inherited structural deficits from state regulation and self-regulation when dealing with the specific challenges of disinformation, especially in cases of ‘awful but lawful’ speech. The chapter examines the requirements of adequately advanced co-regulatory approaches, the roles of the relevant actors, and the implications for future EU audiovisual policies.

Chapter 5 analyzes contemporary societal transformations through the lens of emerging technologies, political trends, and cultural shifts. It emphasizes how social media and artificial intelligence (AI), especially large language models, are reshaping communication, public perception, and decision-making processes. Social media amplify discontent, promote self-organization, and facilitate both progressive movements and misinformation. A concerning trend is the apparent societal shift from rational, collective discourse toward more intuitive, individualistic, and emotionally driven communication. This is evidenced by linguistic analyses of books, search trends, and journalistic styles. The chapter also explores the effects of neoliberal economic policies, which have fueled inequality and stress, potentially impacting cognitive function and social cohesion. Concurrently, a rise in populism and democratic backsliding is observed, driven by perceived grievances, xenophobia, and manipulation of public opinion. Together, these interconnected developments suggest humanity is at a critical juncture.