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The Introduction charts the intellectual mission of the Handbook: to bring distinctive theoretical depth and multidisciplinary analysis to competition law. It explains that foundational concepts – such as “competition,” “anticompetitive harm,” and “restriction of competition” – are persistently vague and contested because the field has historically been undertheorized and shaped by shifting social, economic, and political struggles. It argues that only by integrating perspectives from law, philosophy, economics, political theory, sociology, and history can scholars and competition law institutions move beyond doctrinal silos and address new challenges posed by digital markets, sustainability, and democracy. The Introduction confronts the evolving debates between major schools of thought, highlights the ability of theory to both empower and reform, and stresses the need for constant conceptual and normative adaptation. As highlighted in the Introduction, the Handbook aims to serve as a reference point for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners seeking a rigorous, responsive, and context-sensitive competition law in the twenty-first century.
‘In a capitalist democracy’, Kenneth Arrow observed in his seminal book Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, ‘there are essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting, typically used to make “political” decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make “economic” decisions.’ Competitive markets and democratic voting, Arrow posited, share a common role: both are mechanisms whose essential function consists of aggregating individual preferences or values and translating them into social decision making. Not only did Social Choice and Individual Values shed light on common features and shortcomings of markets and democratic voting as modes of social choice; but it also lay the foundations of modern social choice theory as a framework to systematically analyse the role of markets and democratic decision making in guaranteeing individual choices, rights, liberties, and rational outcomes. This chapter explores how social choice theory allows us to (re)think competition law. It shows that social choice theory may serve as a conceptual tool enabling a better understanding of the relationship between competition law and democracy and allowing us to apprehend competition as an ‘institution’.
This paper explores the concept of interoperability as a fundamental principle in polycentric governance systems, challenging the primacy of overarching rules in maintaining order and coordination. We argue that interoperability offers a more flexible and practical approach to managing complex, heterogeneous governance landscapes. Drawing on insights from institutional economics, network analysis, and Hayekian social theory, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding interoperability in polycentric systems. By prioritizing functional compatibility over consensus, interoperability enables even more diverse governance entities to cooperate effectively without requiring overarching rules or objectives. This reframing of polycentricity opens new avenues for designing adaptive, resilient governance frameworks capable of addressing the challenges of deep social heterogeneity and rapid change.
How do political institutions shape what courts do? This article develops a theory of judicial regime maintenance and argues that courts reproduce contested institutional settlements in systematically different ways. Comparing the U.S. H-2 and H-1B labor migration programs, I show how class conflict produces distinct statutory and regulatory frameworks that structure subsequent litigation. In dense regimes, courts regularize policy through recurring judicial review. In thinner and more permissive regimes, courts preserve existing arrangements through insulation. Collectively, these forms of judicial regime maintenance contribute to institutional lock-in and path dependence by making contested political settlements increasingly difficult to alter over time.
This paper argues that video games – far from being mere entertainment – constitute fully fledged digital institutions. Focusing on massively multiplayer online games, it shows how rule-based environments make institutional processes unusually visible, traceable, and dynamic. Building on post-Northian institutional theory and the 4E cognition framework, the paper advances a socio-cognitive perspective in which institutions are not only systems of rules and incentives but also affective environments. Emotions are shown to play a constitutive role, understood relationally rather than as internal states or institutional properties alone: they shape how agents interpret constraints, coordinate action, and engage in moral evaluation. Through the analysis of violence, reward mechanisms, and governance structures, the paper demonstrates how institutional design organises both behaviour and emotional experience. By foregrounding the affective dimension of institutional life, it contributes to a broader theory of digital institutions in which cognition, interaction, and emotion are tightly integrated.
This paper argues that the standard rationale for regulating markets also applies to democracy. Economists and philosophers commonly defend government intervention in markets on the grounds that markets predictably suffer from failures such as public goods problems, information asymmetries, principal–agent dilemmas, lack of competition, irrationality, and externalities. Democratic politics exhibits the same failures – often more severely – yet is typically assumed to be exempt from regulation. We challenge this asymmetry by showing that the justificatory structure for market regulation straightforwardly extends to democratic processes. We sketch a range of equality-preserving interventions – such as participation incentives, disclosure and promise-tracking mechanisms, transparent ballot design, and safeguards against catastrophic risks – that regulate democracy without abolishing it. Just as regulating markets is not the same as abolishing them, regulating democratic processes is not undemocratic. Recognizing this parity reframes debates about institutional design and opens a new research agenda in democratic theory.
The 18th century regime of electoral republicanism within nation-states, later rebranded as ‘democracy’, appears to be threatened around the world. To rebuild democracy on sounder bases, theorists and practitioners alike emphasize the value of inclusive and participatory institutions. But how should these institutions be built? This paper presents the results of a deep dive into the forms that inclusion and participation have taken across history and the globe – we refer to them as ‘collective governance’. We describe the methodology used to explore the cases, what the data look like, and some preliminary findings. These findings put pressure on well-known social scientific assumptions about the possibilities and limits of collective governance and present a more fine-grained picture of the conditions that may sustain robust collective governance institutions at scale.
Chapter 1 introduces the book’s central puzzle: why some electoral management bodies earn public trust and develop real autonomy while others remain vulnerable to manipulation. It argues that formal institutional design alone cannot explain cross-national variation. Instead, de facto autonomy emerges through political negotiation, transparency, accountability practices, and structured partisan engagement. Drawing on fieldwork, elite interviews, and archival research across Latin America and Africa, the chapter outlines a new theoretical framework centered on partisan inclusion within administrative processes that can foster legitimacy, reduce uncertainty, and strengthen electoral integrity. The chapter also introduces the book’s cross-regional comparative strategy, explains case selection, and previews how the empirical chapters illustrate the mechanisms through which party consultation, institutional sequencing, and administrative practices jointly shape election quality. The chapter positions the book within broader debates on democratic resilience, institutional trust, and the conditions under which electoral authorities acquire real independence.
Chapter 5 analyzes Ghana’s Electoral Commission (EC) across the country’s four republics, exploring how political competition, constitutional reforms, and patterns of informal partisan inclusion shaped the EC’s reputation as one of Africa’s most respected electoral management bodies. The chapter traces the evolution of party representation in electoral administration, showing how informal consultative forums, inter-party committees, and transparency mechanisms strengthened legitimacy and helped resolve disputes. It examines key moments, such as electoral transitions, administrative expansions, and conflict-laden reforms, that tested the EC’s autonomy. Using interviews and historical documents, the chapter highlights how Ghana’s consociational tendencies and stable political settlement contributed to robust election management, while also identifying vulnerabilities related to appointment powers and regional representation. The chapter situates Ghana as an example of how inclusion and administrative practice interact to produce durable de facto autonomy.
This article examines the conditions under which policy learning occurs, distinguishing between instrumental learning (evidence-based, problem-solving oriented) and political learning (strategic, shaped by institutional position and incentives). Drawing on three cases presented by Claudio Radaelli – examining bureaucrats, politicians, and experts – the paper shows that much of what occurs in policy practice is best understood as political learning: actors acquire and deploy knowledge strategically, filtered through professional hierarchies, electoral pressures, and reputational concerns. While the literature has long recognised these dynamics, the paper argues that existing accounts of political learning understate its relational and contextual character. Political learning emerges through positioned interactions within institutional and epistemic communities, rather than from individual strategic calculation alone, and from alignment with shifting background political conditions that determine what knowledge becomes actionable. Recognising this relational dimension has implications for institutional design aimed at fostering democratic accountability and integrating expertise more effectively into policy making.
This study examines whether centralisation of environmental regulatory authority improves air quality by addressing governance failures in decentralised systems. Exploiting the staggered provincial implementation of China’s environmental regulatory centralisation reform as a quasi-natural experiment, we employ a difference-in-differences framework with granular grassroots-level data to identify causal effects. Results demonstrate that centralisation substantially reduces particulatematter concentrations through three mechanisms: reducing elite capture by insulating decisions from local networks and corruption, correcting incentive-driven data manipulation as evidenced by convergence between satellite and official measurements, and internalising cross-jurisdictional externalities by aligning regulatory scope with pollution diffusion. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that pollution reductions are concentrated in regions with greater pollution severity and deeper corruption, whereas differences in economic development and industrial structure play a comparatively modest role. These findings advance institutional economics by providing causal evidence that governance structure reforms addressing elite capture and principal-agent problems can generate marked environmental improvements, with implications for regulatory design in developing economies facing weak local institutional capacity.
Why do some electoral commissions earn public trust while others collapse under pressure? Why Elections Need Parties offers a sharp and timely exploration of how democracies succeed or stumble at the ballot box. Drawing on more than a decade of fieldwork, elite interviews, and archival research across Latin America and Africa, Alejandro Trelles uncovers the institutional and political forces that determine whether electoral management bodies (EMBs) gain real autonomy or become vulnerable to manipulation. Trelles develops a new theory of partisan inclusion to show how party engagement, transparency, and accountability can strengthen, rather than weaken, electoral governance. Through vivid country cases and rich comparative analysis, this book demonstrates how institutional design, consultation mechanisms, and administrative practice shape election quality and democratic resilience.
This article examines how bicameral institutional design shapes legislative cohesion in a presidential democracy. Differences in time horizon, electoral calendars and the legislative importance of bills generate systematic variation in coalition behaviour across chambers, even under similar electoral rules. Using 11,861 roll-call votes from the Chilean Congress between 2006 and 2018, we compare party coalition cohesion in both chambers using the Rice and Unity indices. Government coalitions are consistently less cohesive in the Senate than in the Chamber of Deputies, while opposition patterns vary by indicator and context. Cohesion increases for both coalitions in qualified majority votes and, to a lesser extent, in more advanced law-making stages, but absences – more frequent in the Senate – are used strategically. The Chilean case illustrates how bicameral differences in institutional design and time horizon condition legislative cohesion, with implications for the broader study of bicameralism and law-making in Latin America and beyond.
How can democratic systems connect deliberation to mass participation? Recent debates on deliberative democracy have sharpened this question by highlighting the tension between the deliberative quality often associated with small-scale forums and the democratic imperative of broad citizen inclusion. This article addresses that challenge by examining democratic innovations in Latin America that enable participation at large scale without relinquishing core deliberative properties. Drawing on the LATINNO dataset and focusing on two recurrent types of democratic innovations – multilevel policymaking and participatory planning – the article develops an analytical framework centered on three design features: open participation, sequential deliberation, and institutionalized collaboration. I argue that, when combined, these features allow large numbers of citizens and civil society organizations to enter deliberative processes while sustaining core deliberative properties such as iterative justification and preference refinement, and strengthening the prospects that policymaking institutions will take up the resulting outputs. The comparison shows that multilevel policymaking and participatory planning constitute two distinct routes to large-scale deliberation: the former relies more strongly on cumulative sequencing across territorial or deliberative stages, while the latter operates through the integration of heterogeneous inputs across multiple spaces and modalities. By bringing Latin American democratic innovations into dialogue with contemporary deliberative theory, the article expands the range of institutional designs through which deliberation can be connected to the mass public.
Arms control agreements present a dual puzzle: states often fail to reach them despite potential mutual benefits, and when agreements do emerge, they vary dramatically in their monitoring provisions – from basic self-reporting to intensive on-site inspections. Approximately 225 multilateral and bilateral agreements have sought to limit military capabilities or behaviors between states. This chapter introduces these empirical patterns and situates them within broader debates in international relations. While political scientists typically associate uncertainty with conflict and instability, this book argues that uncertainty – particularly from domestic political changes – can create opportunities for formal cooperation. The analysis focuses on monitoring provisions as a critical design feature that allows states to detect violations while potentially creating new security vulnerabilities through information exposure. Drawing on both institutionalist and security studies approaches, the book examines how states manage these trade-offs differently under varying conditions. The chapter previews the book’s key contributions: a new theoretical framework linking domestic political volatility to agreement design, comprehensive data on historical arms control agreements, and detailed case studies based on archival materials. This approach offers fresh insights for both scholars studying international cooperation and practitioners confronting contemporary security challenges.
Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes-such as leadership transitions or social unrest- can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncertainty, states that previously relied on informal understandings hedge by establishing lightly-monitored agreements, while those that anticipated deception take calculated risks through agreements with intensive verification. Through comprehensive data analysis and rich case studies, Jane Vaynman challenges conventional wisdom about uncertainty in international relations while offering insights for policymakers. As states confront challenges from nuclear competition to emerging technologies, understanding when arms control becomes viable is more vital than ever.
Chapter 3 explains why the ICC makes the US so worried. The overarching fear is that the ICC might initiate politically biased investigations and prosecutions that target American troops scattered across the globe. This fear is the result of the US losing two key negotiating battles over the Court’s institutional design at the Rome Conference, the 1998 diplomatic gathering that established the ICC. The first is that the ICC has jurisdiction over all individuals – including those from states that, like the US, never joined the Court – when they are on the territory of an ICC member. The other is that the ICC has an independent prosecutor who can select his or her own situations to investigate without needing the permission of states or the UN Security Council. The combination of these two factors alarmed Clinton administration officials. Given America’s global military presence, its troops would be uniquely exposed to the ICC’s jurisdiction and might face an ICC prosecutor who was free to inject anti-American biases into the Court’s work. From the US perspective, the Rome Conference spawned to a new threat to America’s global military.
To mitigate uncertainty, it is often assumed that governments negotiate ample flexibility provisions when entering new international treaties. Yet, the case of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) suggests that governments prioritize the more stringent commitments when faced with uncertainty. In this paper, we investigate the effects of uncertainty spikes occurring during negotiations on the design of 251 bilateral PTAs. Our theory proposes that sharp increases in uncertainty make governments more prone to signing deeper PTAs to emphasize their commitment to liberalization. In doing so, governments cater to firms’ demands for institutions protecting investment, upholding intellectual property rights, and promoting regulatory harmonization. We find robust evidence that PTAs are deeper when the contracting parties are faced with uncertainty spikes during negotiations. However, we do not find equally consistent evidence that countries also make PTAs more flexible. While much of the rational-design literature has focused on flexibility as a tool to cope with uncertainty, our findings suggest that countries rather tend to tighten their international commitments in turbulent times.
Despite some prominent critics, deliberative democrats tend to be optimistic about the potential of deliberative mini‐publics. However, the problem with current practices is that mini‐publics are typically used by officials on an ad hoc basis and that their policy impacts remain vague. Mini‐publics seem especially hard to integrate into representative decision making. There are a number of reasons for this, especially prevailing ideas of representation and accountability as well as the contestatory character of representative politics. This article argues that deliberative mini‐publics should be regarded as one possible way of improving the epistemic quality of representative decision making and explores different institutional designs through which deliberative mini‐publics could be better integrated into representative institutions. The article considers arrangements which institutionalise the use of mini‐publics; involve representatives in deliberations; motivate public interactions between mini‐publics and representatives; and provide opportunities to ex post scrutiny or suspensive veto powers for mini‐publics. The article analyses prospects and problems of these measures, and considers their applicability in different contexts of representative politics.