This chapter is about the interpretation of parameters. Parameter interpretation in the stochastic actor-oriented model is difficult for two reasons. The first, shared with the conditional multinomial logit model on which it is based, is the non-linearity of the link function. The second is the unobserved nature of the sequence of ministeps, the small network changes connecting the consecutive network measurements. The chapter starts with the basics of parameter interpretation in this model and continues with interpretation of parameters specific for actor attributes; for such parameters, the selection plot is presented, a graphical possibility for interpretation. The last section presents three kinds of effect sizes.

This chapter theorizes the activity of public interpretation in making a protest un/intelligible. It draws on the wide range of public responses to the Riots/Uprising and identifies two levels of interpretation at play: between those on the streets who projected the practice of protest into new circumstances and their public audiences; and between different public audiences – hegemonic and alternative, the latter connected to Black counterpublics – whose ways of making sense of the gatherings exemplify practices of understanding and interpretation, respectively. Though both indicate shared expectations of protest, hegemonic and alternative discourses thematized different substantive issues: in the former, racial tension appeared as a central thematic, while disagreements about the proper course of collective action and conversations about the gatherings’ political intelligibility dominated the latter. These respective substantive issues emerged as core themes because of the different interpretive frames each brought to bear, namely, of standpoint, temporal scale, and perspectival plurality. Both began in interpretive equivocation, but hegemonic discourses coalesced quickly around a riot understanding of the events, while alternative ones were characterized by an interpretive plurality that enabled no final understanding to dominate.

Hobbes’s Leviathan provides a good text for evaluating competing interpretations. It contains novel and sophisticated arguments, usually presented with apparent clarity. Yet, as clear as the text seems, the variety of competing interpretations suggests that many of the sentences are vague or ambiguous, and some views possibly contradictory. Some scholars believe that attention to the historical or intellectual context should partly determine the interpretation while others think that close textual analysis is sufficient for understanding. As it turns out, both textually oriented scholars (for example, David Gauthier, Jean Hampton, Gregory Kavka, S.A. Lloyd, and Leo Strauss) and contextually oriented scholars (for example, A.P. Martinich, Quentin Skinner, and Richard Tuck) disagree among themselves about some fundamental issues such as whether the laws of nature are genuine laws according to Hobbes and whether his theory is intended to appeal to theists. This chapter focuses on evaluating competing interpretations with respect to reasonable properties of good interpretations.

The range of methods that courts can use for the interpretation of customary law is in principle no different than that applicable to other sources of international law, and these methods roughly correspond to those enumerated in articles 31-33 VCLT. At the same time, not all these methods are suitable for the interpretation of customary rules of international environmental law (IEL). Most environmental rules have by their inception an inherent constraint with regards to teleological interpretation as they yield to a number of considerations beyond simply the protection of the environment. In light of this, international courts and tribunals have interpreted customary environmental rules in expansive as well as regressive ways, oscillating between these two tendencies. When interpreting expansively, courts take into account developments that appear to affect the rule in question and push it to catch up with these developments. In contrast, regressive interpretation involves а backward looking approach where the courts are content with offering an interpretation that diverges from the standards surrounding the rule and renders a more conservative version of it.

There are four different scenarios when the institutional context of an organization is relevant in the interpretation of customary international law. Based on these scenarios, the following observations about interpretation in the institutional context can be made. Firstly, the separate institutional sphere of an organization adds a layer of normativity and authority next to that of general international law. Therefore, it may happen that instruments created by the organization would have normative effect within the institutional framework, but not per se in general international law. Conversely, a rule of customary international law could be of uncontested validity but not have normative force automatically within the institutional framework. Secondly, within the institutional framework, conduct of the organization may not be readily distinguishable from the conduct of member states. This may then influence the identification of potentially new customary rules. Finally, it seems that the institutional context is conducive to the teleological method of interpretation.

This chapter considers the law of treaties in the light primarily of the key Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, much of which is considered as part of customary law. The chapter discusses the role and nature of international treaties in the light of their binding nature upon states parties (pacta sunt servanda). The making of treaties, from the formalities and methods of consent from signature to ratification, is covered before the chapter turns to reservations. The nature of reservations and their effect upon third parties is addressed is addressed as is the process of amendment of treaties. Consideration of treaty interpretation then follows with the various methodologies examined from the textual, intention and object, and purpose of the treaty points of view, with a careful look at case law. The particular position of human rights treaties in this process is noted. The chapter then turns to the invalidity, termination and suspension of treaties, including a discussion of the concepts of peremptory norms (jus cogens), material breach, supervening impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus).

The forces of history have weighed on the Framers’ constitutional design. Their extended republic has grown geographically but shrunk in terms of transportation and communication. Representation as a filter of popular passions and the extended republic as a protection against majority faction have been less effective than the Framers anticipated. Significant changes to the Framers’ design by amendment, interpretation, and practice have also created openings for the influence of political factions.

This chapter focuses on the rules set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This chapter begins with the concept of a treaty, before discussing treaty-making, with a particular focus on the conclusion of treaties, their entry into force, and reservations to treaties. The chapter then delves into how treaties operate, namely their scope of application and their interpretation. Finally, this chapter looks at the invalidity, suspension, and termination of treaties.

This final chapter traces how anthropology transformed Wittgenstein’s qualified antiformalism into an absolute principle. Through an examination of Writing Culture, the ‘suffering slot’, and work on ordinary life, it shows how anthropological theory made formlessness itself into the only legitimate approach to context. The chapter argues this distinctive interpretation of Wittgenstein has had lasting effects on the discipline.

Chapter 1 introduces the key research question of whether the European Court of Human Rights has the appropriate equipment to respond to authoritarian populism in its position of ultimate interpreter of the European Convention on Human Rights. It sets out the analytical and disciplinary framework, situates the project in a broader field of scholarship and summarizes the upcoming s.

This chapter studies the sixty-plus songs not forming part of Fauré’s seven defined song cycles, with reference also to the recently-published body of wordless vocalises that Fauré produced between 1906 and 1916. His evolving technique in song writing is viewed chronologically, in relation to poets he set, noting how he adapted compositional techniques to different poets; patterns that emerge can imply two further unstated ‘cycles’ involving his settings of Hugo and Baudelaire. Some meticulous hidden musical structuring can be related to his close attention to poetry, along with an unusual but focussed approach to syllabification, with vocal lines characteristically running in rhythmic counterpoint over piano parts rather than comfortably lying within them. Singers with whom Fauré collaborated closely are discussed, noting their vocal and musical qualities and how these may have marked Fauré’s vocal writing; the chapter ends by reciprocally quoting their accounts of Fauré’s wishes and preferences in performance.