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This chapter explores post-conflict diplomacy in the Iraq War by introducing the idea of “inter-conflict diplomacy,” or how the United States interacted and negotiated with different Iraqi power brokers while building an Iraqi state from the ground up and participating in ongoing military conflict. In contrast to claims that the United States “imposed” democracy there, it argues that US concerns over Iraqi sovereignty, as well as Iraqis’ assertions of their national sovereignty, limited the United States’ ability to reshape Iraqi politics and society. It provides case studies on the making of the Iraqi Constitution from 2003 to 2005 and the negotiations over the continued US role in Iraq after 2008 to illustrate this argument. Finally, it examines how the concept of “intra-conflict diplomacy” might usefully illuminate other US interventions where the boundaries of war, peace, sovereignty, and legitimate authority are disputed and fluid.
Traveller, archaeologist, linguist, intelligence officer and political adviser: between 1915 and 1926, the year of her death, Gertrude Bell had a central role in the British Intelligence Office in West Asia (the Arab Bureau) and as a member of both the British and Iraqi administrations. Like many prominent figures of the European colonial past, her role in these events remains controversial. A fierce supporter of Arab independence but a British imperialist nonetheless, her political position within the country to which she dedicated a good portion of her life was marked by contradictions. One key area was the management of Iraqi cultural heritage. This article analyses and contextualises Bell’s actions in this field, not just within the boundaries of Iraq, as has previously been done, but within the broader context of British and French influence in the Mandates established after the First World War. In this way, we can place Bell’s policies into a coherent ideology alongside the contemporary debates on the fate of archaeological heritage, while following her path from ‘unofficial’ and ‘unimportant’ to an accomplished ‘person’.
The 2026 war in Iran is thus far the high-water mark of the interventionism of the second Trump administration. This essay argues that the war in Iran is profoundly unjust and even worse than the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Like the Iraq War, it fails to meet the main criteria of just war theory and lacks any plausible humanitarian justification. But it is also symptomatic of backsliding toward an autocratic way of war, rendering it wrong in ways that go beyond violations of the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The war in Iran is undemocratic, abdicates any sense of humanitarian or reparative responsibilities, and is highly revisionist of the prevailing international order. In these respects, it is even worse than the 2003 Iraq War.
The Franklin Book Programs (FBP), an American translation and publishing initiative that operated from 1952 to 1978, opened an office in Baghdad in 1957. Based on an analysis of the entirety of the correspondence between the New York headquarters of FBP and its satellite office in Baghdad, a total of 3,771 documents – over 5,000 pages of material in all – held at the Harry Ransom Center, this chapter addresses the inner workings of Franklin’s Iraq office, with special attention to the FBP’s connections to Iraqi poet Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb and the Palestinian intellectual Jabrā Ibrāhīm Jabrā, who lived in Baghdad, as part of its translation activities. Overall, it follows the rise and demise of FBP Baghdad to offer further evidence of Franklin’s changing priorities during the 1960s, which track the realignment of global politics during the cultural Cold War.
In this autobiographical chapter, Musa Sadr recounts the Sadr family’s lineage of religious scholars and his initial reluctant entry into religious studies at his father’s urging, later combining it with law. Still, his dedication to religious leadership stems from his belief in the unique position of Shiʿi scholars to serve their community. When he moves in the late 1950s to Tyre, Lebanon, following an invitation to succeed the local religious leader Imam Abdul Hussein Sharafeddin, he is guided by the principle that religion should serve life by addressing social, cultural and health concerns. This conviction leads him to the establishment of the Supreme Islamic Shiʿi Council (SISC) in 1969 to represent the Shiʿi community in Lebanon.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the military responses that follow, stand as the defining events shaping war and society in twenty-first century U.S. culture. This chapter traces this history, beginning by placing the attacks and the events that followed in a broader historical context stretching back to the late 1970s before examining the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the evolution of military strategy, the impact of new technologies like drone warfare, the evolution of the all-volunteer force during prolonged conflict, and the physical and psychological consequences of war for servicemembers and their families. The chapter also addresses domestic responses to these conflicts, including the surveillance and detention of Arab and Muslim Americans, protest and resistance to the conflicts, and larger political shifts. This multidisciplinary approach to the past quarter century of domestic and foreign policy illuminates how the contours of American engagement with foreign policy, warfare, and the military have evolved and how the War on Terror remains the defining paradigm through which contemporary Americans contemplate the intersection of war and society.
The article examines efforts by the Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) to enumerate the harm its forces inflicted on Syrian and Iraqi civilians between 2014 and 2018. Drawing on more than 1,300 declassified civilian harm assessments, this article examines the rationale behind the decision to count civilian casualties, the policies that governed how civilian casualties were counted, and what CJTF-OIR officials did with the data collected. Although accurate counts are critical to ethical debates, we show that, on their own, these counts are insufficient when it comes to recognizing the harm inflicted upon civilians and holding militaries accountable. We trace coalition metrics back to concerns about consequence management, showing how martial considerations about optimizing violence—rather than moral concerns about constraining violence—governed the enumerative enterprise. We argue that the way the coalition previously counted civilian casualties erased certain harms from view, including the indirect, cumulative, and reverberating violence that civilians suffered during this conflict. Furthermore, we contend that these numerical indicators tell us little about how civilians experience these harms, a lack of which can become an impediment to ethical consideration. Finally, we contrast the coalition count with Airwars figures to reveal both the numerical discrepancies between the different counts and differences in how these figures have been used. We contend that counting casualties is critical, but also complicated, contestable, and—at times—too constrictive.
Army chaplaincy was prone to provoke controversy. In the increasingly secular, pacifistic and multimedia context of the late twentieth century it was particularly vulnerable to hostile criticism, not least in the sending Churches. Even in the 1950s, though, it had its detractors. These were years in which the RAChD was laden with starchy veterans of the Second World War (who could relate poorly to National Servicemen); notably preoccupied with sex; and hampered by the Churches’ tendency to offload their delinquent clergy onto the Army. If National Service coloured negative stereotypes of chaplaincy over subsequent decades, media power and the dramatic circumstances of the Falklands War created a national celebrity in the form of David Cooper, chaplain of 2 PARA. In the 1990s, however, and lacking an equivalent stage, chaplaincy faded into the background, returning to the fore in the War on Terror, during which media portrayals of chaplaincy were once again usually favourable. Nevertheless, the findings of the Baha Mousa Inquiry of 2011 proved a serious embarrassment, reigniting charges of ‘role tension’ and ‘role conflict’ and highlighting the precarious nature of chaplaincy’s wider image.
This article examines the political ecology of water and ethnic conflict in Kirkuk, Iraq. Kirkuk is an internally disputed frontier territory, controlled by the federal government of Iraq but claimed by Kurdish nationalists. Kirkuk contains some of Iraq’s largest oil fields and most productive agricultural lands. In recent decades Kirkuk has also faced water shortages tied to global climate change. The article deploys survey data, supplemented by qualitative historical research, to evaluate framing of environmental security and the relationship between water insecurity, ethnic conflict, and governance. We find that commitments to competing programs for territorial control in Kirkuk correlate with different framing of ecological risk factors. Arabic-speaking respondents frame water scarcity as a matter for the federal government. Kurdish-speaking respondents prefer to enlist the Kurdistan Regional Government or local politicians to deal with water scarcity, undercutting federal jurisdiction. These findings cast doubt on environmental security and peacebuilding theories which suggest that ecological scarcity can spur inter-ethnic cooperation toward sustainability. Rather, commitment to different ethnoterritorial programs justify different perspectives on ecological change. At a policy level, these findings show that political conciliation must come before progress in environmental peacebuilding.
Iraq higher education faces a host of challenges, some spurred by the 2003 war and others by more recent developments. Following a general trend of deteriorating freedoms, Iraqi academics in the social sciences and humanities face new policies from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research that prohibit them from studying any politically sensitive topics and from engaging meaningfully in developments in the country. The ministry itself was recently controlled by the Sadiqoun political party, which is affiliated with Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, an armed group designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Department of State, a designation that raises further challenges to international collaboration for Iraqi scholars. Compounding this, and particularly for political scientists, is political party interest in co-opting professors and departments to groom subservient party cadres.
This chapter delves into the geopolitical landscape of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, often considered an ‘island of stability’ amid the turbulence in the broader Middle East. While this notion holds true in comparison to neighbouring countries like Iran, Iraq and Yemen, the chapter highlights that the Gulf region is not immune to internal and external conflicts. It discusses the impact of significant events such as the Iran–Iraq War, the Gulf War and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the political dynamics of the Gulf states. The analysis spans four parts, each focusing on a key conflict: the Iran–Iraq War, the liberation of Kuwait, the 2003 Iraq War, and the war in Yemen since 2015. These conflicts have not only shaped the formation of the GCC in 1981 but have also significantly influenced the broader regional system. Emphasising the period since 1979, the chapter explores how over four decades of wars, revolutions and inter-state tensions have affected the security and stability of the Gulf states. Despite a generation passing since the last inter-state war, the ongoing fragmentation of Yemen into civil wars involving regional actors signals a transformation in the nature of conflicts. The chapter also highlights the challenges to regional stability, including the difficulty in reaching a comprehensive agreement addressing Iran’s ballistic missiles programme and its support for non-state actors. As the possibility of increased US disengagement from the Gulf looms, questions about the future security architecture in the region and the role of external participants gain prominence. The chapter raises concerns about potential security vacuums and the responses of regional actors in such a scenario.
There is a long history of persecution of the Yazidi minority in Iraq. Following the rise of ISIS in the early 2010s, however, their status as non-Muslims rendered them particularly vulnerable. According to ISIS’ interpretation of Islamic law, Yazidis were infidels. Men who refused to convert were to be killed, and women enslaved. Therefore, when ISIS launched a surprise attack on Sinjar, a region heavily populated by Yazidis, all those who could immediately fled. Tens of thousands of Yazidis became stranded and besieged on Mt Sinjar, in extremely hazardous conditions. At imminent risk of genocide, they desperately sought assistance. Within days, a multifaceted international response enabled the vast majority of them to survive and escape. A key focus of the chapter is the nature of that response. It considers what led to the provision of emergency humanitarian aid, to the US military strikes that prevented further ISIS attack, and to the opening of a route to safety. Through careful examination of these critical events, it identifies the factors that mitigated genocide. The chapter concludes by reflecting on what lessons can be learned from this case study of resilience.
Atrocity denial suffuses the bedrock of the academic field of modern Middle East studies. One of the most frequently cited works about modern Assyrians is a 1974 revisionist account of the 1933 massacres of Assyrians in Iraq. Its author, Khaldun S. Husry, dismisses Assyrian recollections of the violence as “propaganda of the victims.” Examining how Husry’s article came to be published reveals that the editor who published it, Stanford Shaw, promoted its logic as part of his denial of the Armenian genocide. As a result of the influence of this denialism, Assyrians—who continue to face displacement and dispossession over a century after hundreds of thousands of them, alongside Armenians, were killed by the Ottoman Empire—are systematically demeaned in academic literature. Scholars routinely treat Assyrians as problematic, questioning their legitimacy through racist lines of inquiry. They then claim, as moral licensing for their contempt, that their aim is to critique ethnic nationalism and colonialism. Analyzing the disparagement of Assyrians in the Middle East studies field offers lessons about what good and bad critiques of ethnic nationalism look like, how to avoid historiographical and citational pitfalls when writing about marginalized people, and why revisionist histories of atrocities are profoundly harmful.
Chapter 1 opens with the question of how to achieve normative legitimacy of the state (legitimation). How does the state become accepted and expected by a population to be the arbitrator of their collective life? The chapter reviews legitimation crises in Iraq at four key historical junctures: the foundational moment in 1921, the 1958 revolutionary coup d’etat, and the 1990s in the lead-up to the post-2003 state. Drawing on the work of Iraqi sociologist and public intellectual Ali al-Wardi, this chapter argues that legitimation of a state’s ruling principles (normative legitimation) is linked to a state’s ability to address social injustice. Furthermore, social injustice is intrinsic to any state order. A robust democracy is the only reliable mechanism through which to uncover the nature of injustice – and ways of addressing it – at any given time and space, and thereby avoid a legitimation crisis.
Chapter 2 explores the significance of domination in state consolidation. It argues that while violence is the crudest and most basic form of establishing domination, it remains constitutive of state consolidation: within its boundaries, the state’s relationship to violence is constitutive. The chapter explicates an extreme case when the state lost all control over portions of its territory and population. These events were centered around the interstate war with Iran in the 1980s and a state-organized counterinsurgency campaign to capture the northern Kurdish territories in 1987 and 1988. The case allows us to zoom in on one of the longest legitimation and domination problems in Iraq: the reach of the state vis-à-vis Kurdish national aspirations. It also illustrates how this episode of state violence in Kurdistan triggered a series of developments that led to de facto and de jure Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. I show how the processes that contributed to the weakening of the Iraqi state consolidation are the same ones that also made a Kurdish autonomy possible.
This article reports on outcomes and lessons learned from a four-day mhGAP-IG cascade training programme delivered in 2023 to psychosocial support workers from Red Crescent Societies in Iraq, Egypt and Jordan by primary care physicians who had themselves completed mhGAP-IG training. Participants demonstrated significant gains in knowledge, confidence and competence, supported by assessments and qualitative feedback. The training improved preparedness, clarified clinical language and enhanced comfort in addressing mental, neurological and substance use disorders. This experience highlights the feasibility of cascade training as a sustainable model to strengthen front-line mental healthcare capacity in conflict-affected low- and middle-income countries.
Why does the state matter to its people? How do people know and experience the state? And how did the state come to be both desired and dreaded by its subjects? This study offers a historically grounded social theoretical account of state consolidation in Iraq, from the foundation of the country as a League of Nations British Mandate in 1921 through to the post-2003 era. Through analysis of key historical episodes of state consolidation (and fragmentation) during the past century, Nida Alahmad argues that consolidation rests on two sequential and interdependent factors. First, domination: the state's capacity to dominate land and population. Second, legitimation: whereby the state is accepted and expected by the population to be the final arbitrator of collective life based on common principles. Moving between intellectual traditions and disciplines, Alahmad demonstrates that a theorization of state consolidation is a theorization of the modern state.
This article reconstructs the religious and political activities of the Lebanese Shi‘i scholar Mohamad Jawad Chirri, who founded the first purpose-built Shi‘i mosque in the United States in 1963. It uses Chirri’s biography to explain the institutional, ideological, and political concerns structuring the global Shi‘i revival of the mid-twentieth century, as well as the strategies adopted by Islamic revivalist figures to achieve their institutional ambitions in a competitive and increasingly globalized religious marketplace. A hypermobile activist who lived and travelled between southern Lebanon, southern Iraq, Michigan, and West Africa, Chirri’s institutional initiatives and public activism took place outside the purview of the centres of Shi‘i religious authority in southern Iraq and Iran. The article argues that Chirri’s work, thought, and legacy complicate diffusionist understandings of Islamic revivalist activity as an ideologically coherent project of politicization or radicalization in the years surrounding the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The ‘global’ Shi‘i revival should instead be understood as an entanglement of institutional projects linked by transnational familial, professional, and financial networks emerging in the 1950s.
This article uses the theory of recognition to analyze sectarian conflicts in Iraq. After describing the sectarian and historical background of contemporary Iraqi politics, the article critiques the implementation of consociationalism and policies influenced by liberal multiculturalism in deeply divided societies. It argues that these policies lead to a dangerous reification of identities. The article argues that a progressive implementation of deliberative democracy practices could improve identity-related issues in Iraq and explains how democratic practices are legitimized by the most influential Islamic religious figure in Iraq.
Realists and liberals dispute the post-war record of the transatlantic alliance. Yet, the crisis over Iraq has prompted consensus on the notion that transatlantic relations will ‘never be the same’. This article offers two central arguments. First, the US-European alliance was transformed, long before the Iraq crisis, by the end of the Cold War. Second, convergence on ends for the international order remain obscured by transatlantic disputes over means.