Chapter 8 examines how early Cold War grand strategy reshaped the constitutional system governing war powers – and how institutional redesign in turn entrenched that strategy. Breaking from the prewar pattern of demobilization, President Truman and Congress built a permanently mobilized national security state, defined by large standing forces, sustained appropriations, and the framework created by the National Security Act. These choices gave presidents ready means of action abroad while weakening one of Congress’s traditional checks: control over whether forces existed to be used. The chapter then turns to two formative tests. In Korea, Truman’s decision to deploy major ground forces without prior authorization extended historical practice to a new scale, even as congressional funding and draft extensions complicate claims of unilateralism. At home, Truman’s attempt to seize the steel industry prompted a rare judicial rebuke, though the Supreme Court’s fractured Steel Seizure opinions expose persistent uncertainty about emergency power within the separation of powers. Finally, the chapter shows that an equally consequential precedent emerged in peacetime through debates over stationing U.S. forces in Western Europe, as forward deployments and alliance commitments blurred war and peace and normalized global readiness through budgets, basing, and treaties – often without combat.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has aspired to remain a major power in international relations. Until the mid-2000s, the country’s leaders sought to revive its great power status in partnership with Western nations. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has moved in the direction of challenging Western global priorities by stressing values of national sovereignty and patriotism. More recently, Russia has sought to establish areas of mutual noninterference in relations with the West. In 2022, this approach resulted in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the escalation of tensions and confrontation with the United States and NATO. Outside the West, Moscow has aspired to take advantage of global economic and geopolitical opportunities. The chapter reviews the main developments in Russian foreign policy since 1991, giving an overview of the country’s relations with Western and non-Western countries.

This chapter examines the global, or systemic, level and its linkages to, and impact on, Arctic security dynamics. These are dynamics and trends that are inherently determined beyond the borders of the Arctic region. Whether price levels for commodities, security interactions between NATO and Russia, or China and the USA, these issues and the political dynamics related to them are not to be confused with how the Arctic states interact in the Arctic region, as explored in the previous chapter.

This is the first of two chapters that will take a closer look at the national level, or the bottom-up approach, to security dynamics in the Arctic. Going beyond generalisations, there is explicit analytical value in further unpacking empirical complexity. By looking at the domestic level, and two Arctic states in particular, it is easier to unpack security dynamics and practices in more depth. This chapter will make use of Norway – a small Nordic NATO country which is also a neighbour to Russia in the Arctic – to showcase the relevance of looking at national policies, interests, and practices when we talk about Arctic security and geopolitics.

This concluding chapter applies the findings of the book to recent developments in the Middle East, which are embedded in broader relational networks. It then focuses on questions of US foreign policy and the role that its security assistance has played in the formation, maintenance, and erosion of international order in the shadow of the enmenshed intergroup and intragroup security dilemmas. The chapter offers lessons learned that inform US foreign policy going forward, with a focus on the two rules of deterrence under the security dilemma: maximizing the credibility of one’s threats and promises while minimizing the sense of threat that others perceive from one’s security investments.

Chapter 11 reviews the evolving US and Chinese relationships with other great powers, emphasizing the uncertainty of alliances and multilateral bodies today. China has never been prone to establish close and lasting partnerships with other states, and the Trump administration shows little regard for the twentieth-century legacy institutions. The chapter examines the causes and consequences of China’s WTO accession, as well as the prospects for an institution that the United States has quit in spirit and may do so in fact. The analysis also considers the rising propensity of both contenders to use trade sanctions against other great powers, presenting data on the relative utility of that option in different relationships.

Chapter 3 analyzes the evolution over time of EU-Russia natural gas interdependence in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. It considers that popular support for trade with Russia varied widely in selected dyads regardless of material benefits. It applies the viewpoint of dominant narratives in different contexts to understand the processes of foreign policy formation and change in contexts of internal and external contestation. The chapter details two notable trends: (1) internally, ultimately dominant narratives emerge from domestic political struggles and the priorities of those norm entrepreneurs who are in a position to engage in “framing” practices for the remainder of the society; (2) externally, especially in markets such as gas where finding substitutes is difficult (due to the rigidity of trade via pipelines), new international economic opportunities can alter domestic interests and power relations among different segments of society. The study integrates responses to both (normative) local aspects and (material) international influences. Finally, a post-scriptum considers the war in Ukraine and the resulting near-termination of contested EU-Russia gas trade.

Chapter 9 assesses the role of trade in and after the Cold War, emphasizing how it mattered less to the two principals than to their allies and clients. Beyond reviewing trade relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, this chapter offers a case study in the political economy of alliances. It highlights the differing ways that these contenders approached trade with their own allies and satellites, and those of their rival, as well as with third parties. Intra-bloc trade relations could be especially tricky, a problem that carries over to our own time.

In 1957 the Europeans created the European Economic Community, which is the basis for today’s European Union. Despite its name, this Community has not been able to promote communitarianism in the sense used in this book, namely a policy seeking to bolster the group. Creating a European organisation based on community capitalism has involved grappling with complex questions: who is a partner and who is a foe? Should Europeans companies be favoured or not? Should Europeans be capable of defending themselves independently, or through the US alliance? This chapter will show first that during the Cold War (1947–1991) defence and diplomacy were largely coordinated on a North Atlantic scale through NATO, despite numerous attempts to create a ‘European power’ (including with a nuclear arsenal). Second, some form of European protectionism nevertheless thrived in specific areas, such as agriculture and aeronautics, but surprisingly not in energy. Third, the ubiquity of national industrial policies led European institutions to counterbalance these policies through free-market rules rather than the creation of Europe-wide industrial policy.

The rise of community capitalism since the mid-2010s is reflected in the return of protectionism, authoritarianism, nativism, and violent conflict. European capitalism was forced to adapt by being more assertive. Europeans have embraced solutions that were previously refused as too protectionist, such as European preference, free trade contingent on adhering to social and environmental norms, subsidies to industry for strategic reasons, and competition policy decisions based on reciprocity. Some of these ideas were long defended by France. Germany previously criticised them, but has embraced some in trade since 2016, and others in foreign policy since 2022. The management of Brexit has reaffirmed the basis of European soft power, which depends on the unity of the Single Market. The Covid-19 pandemic (2020–21) forced the Union to adopt protectionist and interventionist measures. The Russo-Ukrainian War has led to very strong sanctions packages, as well as the Union’s foray into military matters. But the Europeans still remain heavily dependent on the US for defence. Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 has forced Europe to think harder about organising community capitalism.

This chapter explores how technocratic elites in the five NATO host nations respond to the multiple pressures surrounding nuclear sharing. Based on original interview data, it analyses how these elites perceive the purpose of hosting nuclear weapons, assess the legitimacy of various domestic and international audiences, and navigate interactions with diverse stakeholders. The chapter also examines national strategic documents and official government communications directed at the public, parliament, and civil society regarding nuclear sharing. Additionally, it investigates how elites articulate and defend nuclear sharing in international settings, particularly in the context of an increasingly adversarial global environment.

The introduction opens the book, it offers its argument in short, situates the work in the existing scholarship, and offers a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book.

This chapter examines the perspectives of the allies of the NATO host nations, focusing on the broader alliance, the United States as the principal patron, and other European member states. Drawing on strategic documents and official statements, the chapter analyses how these allies discuss nuclear sharing and extended deterrence. It explores the language, framing, and strategic justifications used to support the policy, offering insight into how external stakeholders influence and legitimise nuclear sharing within the alliance framework.

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the book. It begins by engaging with long-standing critiques of nuclear sharing as an undemocratic practice, highlighting how such critiques have evolved over time. The chapter then draws on Peter Mair’s conceptual distinction between responsiveness and responsibility as dual modes of democratic control. Nuclear sharing is presented as a paradigmatic technocratic policy, wherein its perceived democratic deficit is not a flaw but a defining feature. Building on this, the chapter develops the theory of technocratic responsiveness, illustrating how technocrats are influenced by a range of societal stakeholders – including voters, political parties, and civil society actors – and how they remain accountable not only to domestic publics but also to foreign allies within the nuclear-sharing framework.

This chapter examines public attitudes towards nuclear sharing in Europe, drawing on new survey data from the five NATO host nations. Existing scholarship shows that the European publics have long opposed nuclear sharing, consistently favouring nuclear disarmament. While minor variations in survey timing and wording may account for occasional deviations, a clear pattern of opposition emerges across all host countries. This trend has shifted somewhat following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as public support for nuclear sharing has increased. Although there is still little support for expanding the nuclear sharing mission, its current form has been garnering solid backing. This chapter maps the public opinion on nuclear sharing, nuclear use, and disarmament, and analyses the factors that shape these attitudes. It also finds relatively small differences in opinion across the five host nations.

This chapter concludes the book by summarising and answering its central research question. In addition to synthesising the main findings, it advances three further arguments. First, it examines the evolving debates following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and in the early weeks of Trump’s second administration, including proposals to expand nuclear sharing or complement it with additional nuclear capabilities in Europe, and considers how such proposals are likely to be received in the host nations. Second, it analyses the intensifying international backlash against nuclear sharing and explores how this opposition may continue to evolve. Finally, the chapter offers recommendations for how technocrats can enhance their responsiveness and how the public legitimacy of nuclear sharing might be strengthened moving forward.

This chapter examines the positions of European political parties on nuclear sharing across the five NATO host nations. It begins by outlining the theoretical and conceptual foundations for why political parties are important actors in shaping foreign and security policy. The chapter then compares the stances of far-left, centre-left, centre-right, and far-right parties using party manifesto data from the Comparative Manifesto Project’s Manifesto Corpus. In the second half, it analyses parliamentary activity in four of the five countries (excluding Turkey, where no such activity exists), focusing on voting patterns related to motions critical of nuclear sharing. This analysis draws on novel data covering all parliamentary votes on nuclear weapons in the selected countries.