Drawing on archival sources from Paribas as well as published statements from bank chairmen Jean-Yves Haberer, Michel François-Poncet and André Lévy-Lang, this chapter examines Paribas in the European economy of the 1980s and 1990s, the evolution of the bank’s business strategy amid the macroeconomic changes of market integration and market openings, and the bank’s perspectives on the Single Market and banking regulation in European economic governance. If carmakers like Volkswagen and BMW expressed enthusiasm about the business opportunities of the Single Market Program for their supply chains, production, and distribution and even supported the EEC’s efforts to develop environmental regulations, merchant banks like Paribas seemed rather ambivalent and even directly opposed to the regulatory and social dimensions of market integration through their lobbying efforts and business interest associations. In the early 1990s, the opening of Central and Eastern Europe presented new investment and growth opportunities making Paribas much more interested in business opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, the “CEE,” than in the business environment of the EEC and its Single Market.

We present historical background, contemporary status, and potential future development of the psychology of religion (PoR) in Poland, beginning with its origins: the formative people, places, and various intellectual schools of thought. Writing about the current state of the topic, we reflect on influential factors that are either facilitating or inhibiting the study of PoR, including publication options, topical emphases, practitioners, orientations, methodologies, and professional organizations.

We offer opinions concerning future development topics that are emerging as important in the immediate future and/or are perennially important in order to stimulate creative and useful research including Western theoretical relevance, the extent to which Western PoR theories may or may not contain reasonable expectations and concepts for this region, contextual nuances, Indigenous theoretical concerns, collaborative research opportunities, and common faux pas – reflections on what people unfamiliar with this region commonly and incorrectly assume about conducting PoR work in this context.

Chapter 4 analyzes historical antecedents, crises requiring solutions, and junctures resolving these crises in four case studies. As Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania feature key similarities and differences, these countries are both comparable and representative of the diversity of experiences in Eastern Europe. I begin by showing that neither historical antecedents nor kinds of crises were predictive of the balance of political power during key market reform periods, suggesting that postcommunist junctures potentially constituted real turning points in these countries. I then focus on political configurations during junctures. Although Czechia and Romania differed from one another, crucial neoliberal deepening in both was presided over by the reformist Right while the Left led the opposition – a predictable pattern. And whereas Slovakia and Poland were also dissimilar in many ways, leading reformers here behaved contrary to campaign promises by bait-and-switching. By demonstrating that prior developments did not determine political configurations and by emphasizing the role of political agency amid moments of heightened uncertainty during postcommunist junctures, the chapter supports the book’s central argument about the causal relevance of contingency and lays the basis for comparing subsequent developments in the four countries.

Chapter 7 further develops the study’s critical juncture framework and justifies its extension to cases in South America. Drawing lessons from Eastern Europe, I begin by distinguishing between varying illiberal tendencies in Slovakia and Poland, based on which I offer new theoretical insights. As I elaborate sequences linking (1) illiberals’ divergent ability to be politically dominant back to whether neoliberal reform agents were social democrats or polarizing populists, and (2) contestatory versus moderate tendencies back to whether or not anti-neoliberal protest was institutionalized during critical periods of early market reform, I elaborate the argument about the durable effects of contingency associated with postcommunist junctures. I then make the case for applying the refined framework to South American cases. Here, I note some blind spots in scholarship on Latin American populism and highlight important commonalities between dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Andes. Next, I review the advantages of analyzing developments in Ecuador and Peru from a comparative perspective that is sensitive to both cross- regional and intra-regional patterns of similarity and difference. Ending with a discussion of the insufficiency of standard explanations of illiberal trends, the chapter sets the stage for the paired comparison that follows.

This chapter discusses the integration of AI into the judicial systems of Lithuania and Poland. It provides a historical context, outlining the progress of both countries in digitalisation and AI readiness. The chapter notes relevant political and planning documents and then focuses on the current state of AI in non-judicial and judicial activities within the courts of Lithuania and Poland. The authors present technological solutions used for case assignment, case handling, and document processing, anonymisation of judgments, voice-to-text transcription, and tools developed for automating press release preparation. The chapter then explores the potential for AI in judicial decision-making, considering the prospects for partial and full judicial automation and identifying scenarios where AI could play a more significant role without compromising the quality of judicial outcomes. It highlights the Polish pilot project ‘Digital Judge’s Assistant’, and discusses the stringent regulations under the EU AI Act 2024 and the GDPR that govern the use of AI in judicial processes.

Chapter 5 examines path dependencies in Slovakia and Poland, where postcommunist junctures produced powerful illiberal reactions in the 2000–20 period. It does so by unpacking political and societal dynamics and emphasizing how illiberal forces reaped considerable electoral benefits. In both countries, mainstream leftist parties embraced the neoliberal agenda and (eventually) failed, with many of their former supporters becoming available for subsequent populist mobilization. As the Left’s failures occurred amid the rising salience of economic concerns, adaptive illiberals gained at the ballot box. While it stresses key similarities in terms of the core mechanism linking postcommunist junctures and illiberal electoral outcomes, the chapter also identifies important distinctions between reactive sequences in Slovakia and Poland. Indeed, bait-and-switch tactics may have defined junctures in both cases, but political configurations featured more nuanced distinctions specifically in terms of agency, which, in turn, conditioned important differences between illiberals in the two countries. Overall, whereas the patterns of similarity substantiate the book’s core theory linking early market reform legacies and illiberal electoral outcomes, the differences suggest that the critical juncture framework can be further refined – to which I return in the book's final part.

Chapter 5 addresses the German–Polish Convention of 15 May 1922, a legal instrument that was negotiated with the direct participation of the League Secretariat and whose aim was the smooth partition of the multi-ethnic industrial region of Upper Silesia. It shows that while this treaty provided opportunities for ‘peace through law’, it ultimately failed to meet this expectation. After providing an overview of the Convention’s drafting process and its key features, notably its reliance on international procedural avenues to guarantee individual rights, the chapter examines these guarantees and how they came into being. It then focusses on the role of the president of the Mixed Commission for Upper Silesia, Felix Calonder, a vocal proponent of ‘peace through law’. In his role as local guarantor of minority rights, Calonder developed a systematic case law that was unequalled before the advent of the international human rights law bodies after the Second World War and foreshadowed some of the principles adopted by them. It concludes by reflecting on the various limitations that this law shared with other attempts to use legal techniques to solve interstate conflicts of the interwar period.

This concluding chapter discusses the main contributions of the volume, notably the implications of adopting a practical approach to social democracy. It also considers the key analytical lessons from the chapters for understanding the evolution of reformist politics, policy-making as well as the role rhetoric, language, and ideology. It also reflects on the wider implications of this agenda by examining its relevance to other parts of the world, such as Latin America (Brazil) and East Central Europe (Poland), and other policy areas, notably immigration. The analysis implies that the core logic of practical social democracy could be applicable across a wide range of countries and policy areas, but it also highlights that the specific nature of the feasible trade-offs between governance, electoral, and organisational imperatives vary across such settings and over time, thereby contributing to the diversity of reformist parties and policies.

This chapter intends to explore the roots of the Polish ‘constitutional crisis’ by utilising the concept of constitutional drift. While the Polish 1997 Constitution contains provisions that would enable interpreting it by using the lenses of Sciulli’s societal constitutionalism (which we call the ‘societal imaginary’), such opportunity was disregarded by more dominant liberal and communitarian imaginaries present in the political and constitutional discourse. The latter contributed to fostering a governance structure that strengthened the executive (the cabinet) at the expense of all social actors whose rights are strongly embedded within the Constitution – social partners, civil society and professional self-government organizations. Overall, the processes similar to those happening to the juridical power after 2015 in Poland, had been happening to other competitors to power prior to 2015 and constitutional crisis should be seen as a relatively late phase of the constitutional drift resulting from overlooking possibilities granted by societal imaginary.

This chapter aims to analyse the Polish ‘integration clause’: Article 90 of the Constitution as an element of the Polish constitutional imaginary. The notion of constitutional imaginary as formulated by Martin Loughlin will provide the theoretical framework for these considerations. Perceived through the lens of Louglin’s constitutional imaginary concept, Article 90 turns out to be the provision that shapes intricate relations of two big ineffable ideas: sovereignty and European integration. The latter has been perceived in the constitutional practice as both the ineffable aspiration and the object of serious concerns. Since Poland’s accession to the EU, for a long time, constitutional practice with regard to the EU was a syncretic collection of cautious friendliness towards EU law, emphasis on (formal) constitutional supremacy and narrowing down the interpretation of ‘the conferral of competences’. Nevertheless, until recently, the constitutional text had tended to be interpreted as facilitating rather than limiting Poland’s participation in European integration. Therefore, the recent Eurosceptic turn after 2015 was not justified either in the sphere of thought or in the constitutional text. It disturbed the existing balance between ideology and utopia.

For many of us, Rousseau remains a central theorist of popular sovereignty. Less well known is that Rousseau was also among the first francophone political thinkers to theorize the concept of public opinion. This chapter makes two main claims. First, I argue that Rousseau advocated a sleepless public opinion as a complement to a sleepless sovereign. Second, I contend that, at key junctures of his work, Rousseau posited that direct popular sovereignty was constitutive of democracy. The chapter unfolds chronologically. I first reconstruct the mid eighteenth-century political debate in Rousseau’s native Geneva, which serves as a prelude to understand the conception of the people’s two powers that Rousseau associated with an ideal small city state in the Letter to d’Alembert, The Social Contract, and the Letters from the Mountains. I then turn to Rousseau’s account of public opinion and popular sovereignty in large countries, focusing on England and Poland. The chapter concludes by highlighting how, for subsequent generations of political thinkers in France, Rousseau’s distinction between public opinion and popular sovereignty opened new pathways for thinking about democracy.