Greece’s politics were dominated by renewed mobilisation over the 2023 Tempi rail disaster and by the Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid (OPEKEPE) agricultural subsidies scandal. The government survived a March no-confidence vote but faced sustained pressure over accountability, rule-of-law concerns and corruption. Konstantinos Tasoulas, New Democracy’s former President of the Parliament, was elected President of the Republic in February, while a March Cabinet reshuffle brought Kyriakos Pierrakakis to the Finance Ministry; in December he was elected Eurogroup President. The opposition remained fragmented. PASOK-KINAL retained its main opposition status but failed to capitalise decisively, SYRIZA continued to decline, and Alexis Tsipras resigned his parliamentary seat amid return speculation. Seismic activity on Santorini, a destructive wildfire season, a controversial labour law allowing 13-hour workdays under certain conditions, farmers’ blockades and persistent cost-of-living pressures reinforced a broader picture of governmental turbulence. By year-end, opinion polls pointed to a potential ungovernability scenario after the next parliamentary elections.

On 20 January, Donald Trump returned to the White House and immediately began to challenge previously accepted constitutional and legal expectations. Setting the tone for the year, by the end of his first day in office, he had issued executive orders soon challenged in, stayed by, or overturned by the courts, pardoned or commuted the sentences of January 6 rioters, and appointed a cabinet widely seen to be more notable for its loyalty to him than to the mission of, or competence for, the departments they were to head.

The year 2025 in Lithuania was marked by political scandals, mass protests, and a change of cabinet. The position of Prime Minister remained in the hands of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, but both the Prime Minister and the composition of the ruling coalition changed. The cabinet formed by Gintautas Paluckas collapsed because of allegations of non-transparent business practices, while the formation of Inga Ruginienė’s new cabinet was likewise accompanied by controversies that escalated into mass protests, largely directed against the coalition partner – the populist Nemuno aušra. Journalists and the newly established Cultural Assembly, which brought together hundreds of cultural institutions, independent artists, and organisations, played a key mobilising role in this protest movement.

The Constitutional Court’s decision to invalidate the presidential round of elections, organized in December 2024, deeply divided Romanian society and led to the country being downgraded to the status of a hybrid regime characterized by high volatility, high polarization, and the rise of far-right parties. Nicușor-Daniel Dan, the pro-European Mayor of Bucharest, won the presidential elections of May 2025, while the cabinet of Ilie-Gavril Bolojan adopted policies to avoid economic collapse in the summer. However, the structural problems that led to the rise of far-right parties remain unaddressed, whereas the economic austerity measures and the continued hold on power of corrupt politicians could lead to more public dissatisfaction.

The defining feature of Polish politics in 2025 was the consolidation of institutional gridlock. The narrow victory of radical-right challenger Karol Nawrocki over the ruling coalition’s Rafał Trzaskowski in the presidential run-off ensured that the cohabitation paralysing the Tusk government since December 2023 would persist through to at least the next parliamentary election. A substantial July cabinet restructuring – which cut the Council of Ministers from 27 to 22 and sharply reduced the share of women among ministers – reflected an effort to reassert political authority rather than expand the government’s policy reach, as initiatives on abortion liberalisation and civil partnerships once again stalled. Dissensus within the ruling coalition was manifest in the dissolution of the Third Way electoral alliance, Szymon Hołownia’s announcement that he would step down as Polska 2050 leader, and the disproportionate effects of the reshuffle on the junior partners. A parallel fragmentation on the right, where Confederation emerged as a serious electoral rival to PiS, reshaped the opposition camp.

In 2025, Robert Fico’s coalition government survived its most serious internal crisis since taking office, as defections within the junior coalition parties temporarily stripped it of its parliamentary majority. Mass protests erupted in response to Fico’s late December 2024 visit to Vladimir Putin in Moscow and continued in waves throughout the year. The coalition stabilised through a March cabinet reshuffle that further consolidated SMER-Social Democracy’s dominance. By autumn, a sweeping constitutional amendment – embedding conservative social values and asserting national sovereignty over EU law, narrowly passed with support of some opposition deputies – marked both a political triumph for Fico and a deepening rupture with EU norms. The year ended with SMER-SD formally expelled from the Party of European Socialists, the European Commission launching infringement proceedings over the constitutional changes, and the abolition of the independent Whistleblower Protection Office completing the hollowing out of Slovakia’s anti-corruption architecture.

In 2025, Italy remained under the leadership of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose right-wing coalition government completed its third year in office with remarkable stability. Building on FdI’s electoral dominance at the 2024 European Parliament elections, the government survived the main electoral contests of the year without significant damage. At the same time, 2025 was marked by intense institutional conflict, most notably between the executive and the judiciary. Pro-Palestinian protests represented the most visible expression of social mobilisation during the year. Overall, Italy in 2025 was politically stable at the top but conflictual underneath, confirming the government’s unusual durability while exposing persistent tensions beneath the surface.

2025 was a year of political instability in the Netherlands. The experimental Schoof cabinet, supported by parties from the radical right and the centre-right, fell owing to disagreements over migration. New elections were called. Before the campaign was fully underway, the cabinet collapsed a second time as another party withdrew its support. The social-liberal opposition party D66, led by Rob Jetten, won the elections. By the end of the year, D66 was leading negotiations to form a centre-right government.

2025 marked the first full year of the Starmer Government and was characterised by the continued pressure of immigration on national politics, alongside the success of Reform UK at the local elections. A full Cabinet reshuffle took place after Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner resigned in September. Rebellion over proposed benefit reforms led to a government U-turn in July and the UK asserted its place on the international stage through the formal recognition of the state of Palestine as well as helping shape the Coalition of the Willing to assist with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, this was overshadowed by controversy surrounding Peter Mandelson, the British Ambassador to the US, and his resignation from the post.

The year 2025 featured expectations with respect to the upcoming spring 2026 elections. There were many political developments that, among others, led to two legislative referendums as well as several interpellations raised by opposition (centre-)right parties, which however did not cause any ministers to lose their positions. The centre-left governmental coalition encountered reform tiredness and growing criticism of its weak implementation in a number of key policy areas, with the Long-Term Care Law being a special concern after suffering repeated problems implementing it. Still, the government could point to some reforms made, like in the healthcare system where it claimed it had further assured that the public system would continue and also be improved. Pension system reform was another more important reform and it was supported by all partners of the tripartite Economic and Social Council. Nevertheless, several government decisions were strongly criticised by employers’ organisations.

The year 2025 found Spain at the midpoint of the legislative term with increasing political weakness for the left-wing coalition government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and Sumar. Despite favourable macroeconomic indicators, corruption scandals involving senior Socialist figures, rhetorical rupture with investiture partners, and several legislative defeats contributed to a context of parliamentary fragility. The absence of a new national budget and growing discontent over the housing crisis further weakened the government’s position, although it remained in office and continued to pass some policy measures, such as an increase in the minimum wage. Meanwhile, the opposition intensified competition on the right ahead of the 2026 electoral cycle. Internationally, Spain adopted an active stance, especially regarding the war in Gaza and debates within NATO over defense spending.

In 2025, the federal election resulted in historic losses for the outgoing ‘traffic-light coalition’ and saw the return of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) to government. The election continued the trend towards even higher party system fragmentation. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) recorded its worst ever result (16.4%), while the Free Democratic Party (FDP) did not surpass the five-percent-threshold. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the second largest party (20.8%), and the Left regained relevance (8.8%). A grand coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD emerged as the only viable option but proved fragile. Following two years of recession, economic growth remained close to zero, and unemployment exceeded three million people. Migration and economic concerns dominated public debate, while the AfD continued to gain in the polls. The Hamburg state election confirmed the city’s status as an SPD stronghold, while the CDU, but also the Left and AfD gained considerably.

The US president’s desire to acquire Greenland created a major crisis at the beginning of the year, and it has been a recurrent theme during 2025. Both the Social Democrats and Liberals declined in electoral support at the municipal elections in the fall, but it harmed the Social Democrats to a larger extent than the Liberals, which increased their number of mayors. The Social Democrats lost, also, the mayor position of Copenhagen. Within parliament, 2025 was much more stable than the turmoil of the last years and election periods.

The first year of the new centre-left government of the Social Democrats, Liberal Reform, and the People’s Party was quite eventful, but the government remained popular. A majority of voters continued to claim support for the government according to the monthly Gallup polls. The parliamentary majority used a clause on cloture vote in the Parliament Act to break a filibuster that had lasted for 160 hours – a clause that had not been used for decades. The filibuster was an attempt to avoid a vote on a government bill raising fishing fees in the Icelandic quota system of fisheries. The bill and the break of the filibuster were supported by a large majority of voters according to opinion polls. This may lead to the end of a long tradition of using extremely long filibusters in Parliament.