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Chapter 7 examines Kenya’s electoral institutions from the era of the Electoral Commission of Kenya through the post-2007 crisis reforms that created the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. It explores how the breakdown of party consultation, unilateral appointments, ethnic tensions, and administrative failures contributed to the 2007 electoral disaster. The chapter evaluates the post-crisis reforms that sought to strengthen autonomy through constitutional redesign and professionalization, while also documenting persistent challenges related to capacity, trust, and inclusion. Through interviews and secondary reports, the chapter assesses how Kenya’s evolving institutional design influenced the country’s ability to manage contentious elections and highlights the importance of sustained, structured engagement with political actors.
This chapter focuses on responses to member state crises for one organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Whereas the previous chapter identified whether African RIO members behaved as expected on average, in this chapter, I look for evidence of theorized causal mechanisms linking leaders’ prior behavior to co-members’ willingness to provide support. I examine eighteen political and security crises which occurred in members of the Economic Community of West African States between 1990 and 2017. For each crisis, I assess whether the leader in crisis was in good standing with co-members based on prior contributions to regional security operations, or whether they had a record of destabilizing co-members. I then assess whether their standing informed co-members’ responses to the crisis in the manner anticipated by the theory. After establishing the prevalence of pro-government responses to members in good standing and anti-government responses to members not in good standing, I turn to three cases.
Following the June 2010 elections, Belgium was left for more than a year without a full government, as negotiations about constitutional reform dragged on. In this article, I investigate why this interregnum did not have any fatal consequences for Belgian governance and society. On a formal level, the Belgian constitution allows a caretaker government to take all necessary steps to ensure continuity, thus avoiding government deadlock. From a political science perspective it can be noted that in a system of multi-level governance, other levels typically step in if one level fails. This is especially the case in a country like Belgium with a strong pro-European consensus, where European Union (EU)-interference is considered as legitimate. The theoretical relevance is that multi-level governance can be seen as a safeguard against government failure.
In this debate section, four Belgian political scientists reflect on the theoretical relevance of the lengthy political crisis that Belgium has known following the elections of June 2010. It is argued that the absence of a federal government did not lead to a policy vacuum, as regional governments, the European Union, public service managers and Members of Parliament tried to expand the scope of their authority. Given trends towards multi-level governance, it is expected that the Belgian political system will manage to survive, even if one of the levels of government (temporarily) falls out.
Political parties in Europe are undergoing profound transformations, with many abandoning traditional brands. This study analyzes party names as indicators of ideological and organizational change, combining an original content analysis across 28 European countries (1945–2023) with two conjoint survey experiments. We find that “nonparty” names have become the majority, reflecting a shift away from ideology toward alternative forms of identification. While movement names appear in wavelike patterns linked to protest cycles, such as after the 2008 Great Recession, nonclassical names are especially prevalent among new, opposition, and right-wing parties. However, a paradox emerges: despite their growing adoption, nonclassical names do not easily yield the anticipated electoral benefits, as new parties seem to gain little from abandoning classical naming conventions. By tracing long-term naming trends and integrating survey-based experimental evidence, we advance debates on party transformation, political branding, and the evolving interplay between electoral and movement politics in contemporary democracies.
Based on an analysis of the situation in France after the uprising of May 13, 1958, this article analyzes the theoretical and empirical class of ambiguous political events. During such events, the holders of political power, faced with an actor who has assumed a political role by transgressing the established order, must take a stance. Since contradictory meanings can be attributed to the challenger’s actions based on the categories of thought constituting that order, the power holders experience an ambiguity: they are unable to say “how things stand with what is,” to use Luc Boltanski’s expression. The challenge, then, is to elucidate both the process through which they can leave their cognitive uncertainty behind and the conditions that would make that possible. This approach sheds light on the transition from one political order to another.
If Edward I had died in the course of his conquest of Wales in the early 1280s, his successor would not have been the notorious Edward II, but King Alfonso I, born at Bayonne in 1273, and named after his godfather, the queen’s brother and king of Castile. In fact, Alfonso was to die a child in 1284, just as Edward’s first two sons had done, but the details of his life are a reminder that English kingship was not just – or even, at times, very – English. The kings of England, descended from Normans and Angevins in the male line, wished to be leading figures on the European stage, and they jealously defended lands, rights and connections across the continent, as well as in these islands.
In contexts of institutional crisis, conflicts arise in which different pressure groups try to maximize their influence, seeking to adjust a political reality in line with their own interest. This article analyzes the changes in the attitudes of economic elites regarding the process of drafting of a new Constitution in Chile. Based on the literature on the political culture of entrepreneurs, the research hypothesis posed in this study suggests the existence of a widespread conservative attitude within this social group regarding a change in institutional rules. This mainly relates to the perception that a new Constitution in Chile could threaten its predominant place in the distribution of economic and political power. The results obtained after analyzing in-depth interviews with presidents or vice presidents of the main business organizations in the country show changing positions throughout the different stages of the constituent process. Even though some attitudinal changes towards an adaptation become visible, what ultimately prevails is an unmitigated rejection of the constituent process. These findings clearly suggest a return to the initial stances of most entrepreneurs, something that also happened in the elite examined as well as in the rest of Chilean society. Thus, one can speak about a sort of “boomerang effect”: the attitudes of rejection have once again dominated the space of discursive expression where the pressure exerted by public opinion seemed to pave the way for a certain reformism or a transforming reaction. This evidence confirms a disconnection found in the literature which reveals the dynamic nature of short-term attitudes linked to each specific situation, albeit with more stable values and positions specific to the political culture which exist on a more persistent basis.
Analysis of the oracular data newly discovered in the Shang era Huayuanzhuang site opens a fascinating window in the political and ritual activities of a prince previously unknown. He is identified as the prince Zai, the future king Zu Jia. These new data shed light of the pre-royal career of Zu Jia, and the nature and the mode of his relationship with the king Wu Ding, his father, and Lady Hao, his mother. This article also examines the difficult accession to royal power of Zu Jia in a context of political crisis. It studies and clarifies some of the steps leading to the selection of royal princes as heirs to royal power. Finally, this article examines the importance of the relationship between those princes and their mothers in the specific context of royal polygamy.
This article explores the political crisis before Wu Ding. The accession of king Wu Ding to the throne was not a given but the result of a political move by his father Xiao Yi. It must be seen as one of the consequences of an earlier political crisis named the “nine generations chaos” by Sima Qian, during which an attempt to share royal power between two royal lines finally collapsed and led to a move by Pan Geng to a new capital. This new city has recently been discovered north of the Huai river. The political crisis of the time led Shang kings to try to implement a unilineal system of succession. Other steps, ritual in particular, were involved after the reign of the king Zu Jia, one of the reigning sons of Wu Ding, in order to ensure the primacy of the unilineal system of royal succession.
Chapter 6 presents a case study of Xi Jinping’s wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign. By all accounts, corruption continued to grow in China throughout the 1990s and 2000s and became among the public’s largest governance concerns. Xi and other party leaders believed that the combination under the Hu Jintao administration of policy failings like the spread of corruption, risky political liberalization, and general party weakness was precipitating a crisis in the CCP’s ability to govern. Since 2012, Xi has pursued anti-corruption campaign as part of his broader mission to restore party discipline and reassert party leadership over China’s state and society. I argue that his administration’s campaign, though not yet finished, has already been successful in curbing corruption. Furthermore, corruption was curbed under Xi using decidedly authoritarian methods. Benefiting Xi was the fact that he has faced far fewer constraints on his leadership than Hu Jintao or Jiang Zemin did early in their administrations. The larger political implication of my findings in this chapter is that Xi is succeeding in strengthening CCP organization and discipline, which likely helps prolong one-party rule.
Many claim that Polish theatre is political. Joanna Krakowska maps this narrative in Polish historiography, which, as she stresses, is usually construed in cycles determined by political events. Politicality, however, is a capacious and diverse category that offers the possibility of seeing theatre in Poland both as political and as a medium declaring itself to be apolitical, which can become the most meaningful political gesture of all. Krakowska invites us to consider theatre history in relation to the political subject while Grzegorz Niziołek asserts that ‘Polish mainstream theatre is anti-political rather than political’. He demonstrates how political analysis is usurped by an ethical imperative and is thus seen as a threat to the national values – rather than political theatre, theatre was used to strengthen national identity, which obscured wrongdoing. Nevertheless, even theatre that is not explicitly political, Niziołek argues, has produced political effects, and any given historical moment positions theatre in relation to a dominant ideology.
By the end of 1887, the political process of abolition entered its final phase. Afraid of a civil war, sectors of the political and social elite moved to support abolition. The army’s decision to support abolition in October 1887 was decisive, stripping the state of its capacity to keep quashing the movement by force. In February 1888, the Crown and a dissident faction of the Conservative Party followed suit. The new balance of power dismantled the confrontation between the proslavery countermovement and the abolitionists and produced a compromise. Abolition came in May 1888, without indemnification to slave owners, just as the abolitionists had wanted. However, the pro-slavery countermovement managed to block all their other demands, such as social protection and land for former slaves.
The “Ibiza affair,” a succession of scandals triggered by undercover recordings of the FPÖ's former head, Heinz-Christian Strache, in compromising discussions with a purported Russian oligarch's niece has profoundly altered Austria's political landscape and public debates. This article offers a historically contextualized analysis of the multiple voices and competing truth claims articulated by diverse actors in the course of the scandal's fallout. Empirically, this discussion offers a systematic analysis of political and media discourses focused on “Ibiza” between May 2019 and June 2020. Conceptually, the argument builds on Michel Foucault's approach outlined in I, Pierre Rivière and its subsequent applications within nationalism studies. This analysis thus examines data through the questions as to who speaks about the event in question, how they do so, what is being claimed and disputed, and which political strategies and trajectories this enables. The competing, partly shifting positions revealed are the following: Strache's initial regret that soon turned to a self-ascribed “victim-cum-martyr” status; the FPÖ's distancing and eventual rupture from its long-standing Bundesparteiobmann; the Kronen Zeitung's attempted ideological repositioning; the ÖVP's need and opportunity to shift its positions vis-à-vis its political competitors; and critical voices calling for far-reaching structural changes. With the full facts behind the scandal still to be established, the (post-Foucauldian) approach applied here captures the contestations, (new) fault lines, and (shifting) political boundaries constitutive of a discursive field in a crisis context.
This article is an attempt to take stock and critically reflect on the UK’s decade of austerity and social policy hostility over the past decade. It distinguishes between economic and political austerity and digs deeper into the data on expenditure in order to examine the impact of austerity on British public expenditure and politics. It argues that the decade of austerity was a hostile one for British social policy which not only undermined the financial base of key parts of the welfare state, it reshaped it and redefined its priorities, setting in train a series of subsequent events that would further change, not just British social policies, but British economics, polity and politics. And, as subsequent crises – notably Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic – testify, crisis events tend to be linked, and each one shapes and influences the ability of the state to respond to the next.
This chapter dons political economy glasses to review Madagascar’s economic and political history from precolonial times to the present day, drawing on the theories developed by North and his co-authors (2009 and 2012b), Acemoglu and Robinson (2005 and 2012) and Khan (2010), and applies the concepts they have fashioned (institutions, social orders, control of violence and rents, elite coalitions, etc.) to the Malagasy case. Significant changes have taken place and we have seen the gradual expansion of the elite political and economic circle. At the same time, democratic aspirations have surfaced and found a voice to speak out against the different regimes’ abuses and precipitate their fall. Yet the fact remains that the system and practices at the highest levels of the state have barely changed. Each regime has systematically sought to increase its power by concentrating it, personalising it and securing the support of a small group of influential players. Unable to think outside of the short-term box, none has sought the support of the masses by trying to meet popular aspirations.
This chapter builds on the previous ones by presenting a close analysis of the institutional and infrastructural factors that precipitated the outbreak and that perpetuated its spread. Precipitating describes the factors that immediately triggered the outbreak while perpetuating describes the factors that maintained propitious conditions for the ongoing transmission of cholera and that curtailed an effective public health response. I argue that the origins, scale and impact of the cholera outbreak were overdetermined by a multi-level failure of Zimbabwe’s public health infrastructure. I situate this multi-level failure in the country’s political conflicts and economic crisis, which created a ‘perfect storm’ for the fulmination of cholera. The chapter is organised around three principal features of Zimbabwe’s health infrastructure: the collapse of functioning health care delivery services; the spectacular mismanagement and sabotage of the country’s water reticulation systems; and the livelihood changes ushered in by the Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown and hyperinflation, which rendered vast swathes of the population vulnerable to cholera through food insecurity and malnutrition.
This paper studies banking liquidity crises under the assumption that the government may have private benefits in bailing-out a collapsing banking sector for reputation concerns. This political distortion feeds political uncertainty, as citizens may not agree with a bailout decision and overthrow the government. This paper shows that higher political uncertainty increases both financial and political instabilities as it enlarges the set of parameters for which bank runs and the dismissal of the government are optimal. Higher political uncertainty may stem from the occurrence of a politico-financial crisis in another similar country. Contagion takes place if citizens update their beliefs on the type of their government. Doing so, they may reinforce their beliefs that the government is self-interested and bank bailouts are not socially optimal.
Dissolution of the Bundestag by the Federal President on advice of Federal Chancellor — A ‘negative’ motion for a vote of confidence — Precedents of 1972 and 1982 — Dissolution in conformity with the constitution according to German constitutional court — The existence of a political crisis sine qua non for a dissolution to be constitutionally legitimate — Limited judicial control on decision to dissolve as set out in a 1983 ruling even further limited in the 2005 ruling — Effects of the exercised judicial self-restraint on constitutional division of powers — No proof for a decline of the rule of law or of acceptance of directly democratic elements — Strengthening of the powers of the Federal Chancellor sign of faith in the stability of the German government system.
The Chinese Communists attempted to transform urban institutions and social life in fundamental ways. This chapter discusses general trends and impressions about Chinese urban life, with a focus on the larger cities and occasional efforts to note the diversity of reactions of urban groups. The tempo of life in the early years varied. The years through 1952 were ones of novelty and disruption, with campaigns to remake society disturbing orderly work and study routines. In 1957 and then in the ensuing Great Leap Forward the tempo began to change back toward campaign mobilizations once again, and China was plunged into first a political and then an economic crisis. This chapter comments on Cultural Revolution's impact on people's lives and feelings. The Cultural Revolution produced a drastic disruption of urban social order. The legacy of crime and juvenile delinquency spawned by the Cultural Revolution carried over into the post-Mao period, producing continued popular anxieties.
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