What do we know about fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic in its early phases? Does the government’s ideology matter for the scope of anti-crisis measures? There is a growing literature and public debate on the economic and social implications of COVID-19. However, we still know little about the drivers of particular reactions of governments to this extraordinary shock. In this paper, we apply econometric tools to analyze the relevance of government ideology regarding economic policies for anti-crisis fiscal packages enacted in 2020. The results imply that right-wing governments provide significantly bigger fiscal packages than those observed in countries ruled by other political parties. Different responses to the crisis are also noted for the wealthy and the Nordic countries.

Past research has linked stronger physiological threat and disgust responses with conservatism, suggesting a neurobiological basis for ideology. However, replication failures cast doubt on a direct link between physiology and political attitudes. Given interoception’s role in awareness and emotion regulation, we tested whether interoceptive sensibility (i.e., awareness of internal bodily states) moderates the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political orientation. In 632 US citizens, we found that the association between disgust sensitivity and political orientation was moderated by interoceptive sensibility. Among those with lower interoception, higher disgust sensitivity was associated with more conservative ideology and a greater likelihood of Republican identification, whereas this association weakened or disappeared among those with higher interoception. We suggest that among individuals with lower interoception, socially acquired meanings may play a larger role in interpreting disgust-related experiences, strengthening their association with ideology. These findings lay the groundwork for mechanistic, replicable research on psychophysiological antecedents of political cognition.

Violent crime has been commonplace in Latin America over the past decades. While existing research has made progress in explaining the rationale and outcomes of government coercive strategies against crime, it has overlooked the non‐coercive strategies implemented to improve public security. It is argued in this article that political authorities make human capital enhancement efforts to shape actors’ incentives about criminal activity and mitigate crime. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that violent crime increases human capital enhancement efforts, and that the effect of violent crime on human capital enhancement efforts is larger when left‐oriented governments are in power because they stress actors’ motivations over windows of opportunities as the main drivers of crime. Support for these hypotheses is found in a sample of Latin American democracies in the period 1990–2007.

This article analyses the role of political parties in policy accumulation. We study this relationship in the area of social policy. Our analysis builds on a large data set covering the size of policy portfolios (policy targets and instruments) in three subfields of social policy for 22 OECD countries over 30 years. We find that the probability of social policy accumulation is not affected by the government's ideological position. Left governments do not produce more extensive social policy portfolios than right ones. Yet, this striking result does not contradict governments’ political ideologies, as left and right parties accumulate for different reasons. While left parties address new social policy targets to broaden the scope of the welfare state, right parties adopt new policy instruments to condition social benefits. These findings hold regardless of how we measure governments’ ideological position and despite strong endogenous policy growth dynamics, that is, countries with greater policy portfolios also display higher levels of policy accumulation. Our findings indicate that party political considerations can explain the reasons for but not the level of policy accumulation. Changes in government are thus unlikely to stall or slow down the constant accumulation of public policies.

Political parties often adjust their policy agendas in response to changing electoral landscapes, balancing the need to appeal to new voters against the importance of retaining loyal supporters. While these patterns are generally well‐documented in the literature, the specific impact of voter availability on the electoral market remains underexamined. This article investigates how electoral opportunities – i.e., potential to mobilize new voters – and loyalty – i.e., likelihood of retaining current supporters – influence parties' decisions to expand or narrow their policy focus. To analyze this, the study integrates three decades of population data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and European Election Studies with data on parties' issue focus obtained from the Manifesto Project. The analysis shows that parties strategically balance their focus between core and peripheral issues based on the anticipated utility of each approach. This strategy, however, depends on the stability of voter loyalty: expansion into new issues occurs primarily when voter loyalty is robust, although strong opportunities alone can also encourage agenda broadening. These findings contribute to understanding the calculated risks parties take in adjusting their issue attention and highlight why policy adjustments often backfire; namely, when misaligned with voters' availability on the market. This study speaks to the literature on party competition and representation in Europe, illuminating how electoral dynamics shape parties' policy focus.

Does radical right political violence favour or hinder public support for right-wing stances? Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that Islamic terrorism provokes a conservative shift, increases nationalism and induces negative sentiments towards immigration. However, little is known about the consequences of far-right terrorism, despite its incidence in Western societies. We leverage four waves of the British Election Study (BES) and use a quasi-experimental design to analyse individual political orientations shortly before and after terrorist attacks. We find that respondents distance themselves from the ideology associated with the perpetrator and shift away from ideological positions at the right end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, respondents are less likely to report nationalistic attitudes and immigration skepticism, core tenets of extremist right-wing political ideologies. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of the perpetrators and their driving goals are crucial factors shaping the impact of terrorism on public sentiments.

As a consequence of the Eurozone crisis and the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the prospect of a transfer union has become a particularly contested aspect of European integration. How should one understand the public backlash against fiscal transfers? And, what explains voter preferences for international transfers more generally? Using data from the 2014 European Elections Study (EES), this article describes the first cross‐national analysis of voters’ preferences on international transfers. The analysis reveals a strong association between voters’ non‐economic cultural orientations (i.e., their cosmopolitanism) and their position on transfers. At the same time, it is found that voters’ economic left‐right orientations are crucial for a fuller understanding of the public conflict over transfers. This counters previous research that finds economic left‐right orientations to be of little explanatory value. This study demonstrates that the association between economic left‐right orientations and preferences for international transfers is conditional on a person's social class. Among citizens in a high‐income class an economically left‐leaning position is associated with support for transfers, whereas it is associated with opposition to transfers among citizens in a low‐income class.

In the 1990s, a protest rock movement developed on the American continent within informational capitalism, the democratisation of information and communication technologies, and the development of transnational social movements that fought against global powers. To complement the interpretations that understand this type of musical practice as a cultural aspect of social movements, or as commodities that obey the imperatives of the market, I use Auslander’s concept of performance to analyse how these protest rock groups deploy political ideologies linked to international leftist struggles, in the space and time of concerts and other types of mediations. Through an interpretive analysis, I identify some spatial, gestural, corporeal, and sound elements used to act out leftist political ideologies.

Partisanship is the primary driver of voter decision-making in the United States. Partisans expect to prefer their party’s candidates’ issue stances and personal characteristics. Even when they learn negative information, motivated reasoning often keeps them from changing their candidate evaluations or vote choice. However, there is a “tipping point” at which partisans will update their priors and may vote against their preferred party’s candidate. This study seeks to determine whether voters are more likely to reach that tipping point when they see a woman in their party, and under what circumstances. We use a unique experimental design to vary a candidate’s gender, congruence with major elements of the party platform, and their participation in a scandal. We find that women are often evaluated more negatively and that subjects rely on substantive information more when evaluating women candidates. Our findings suggest that campaigns and campaign information may matter more for women candidates.

There remain important questions about how personality shapes risk perceptions, willingness to engage in protective behaviors, and policy preferences during a changing pandemic. Focusing on the Big-5 and COVID-19 attitudes, we find associations between risk perceptions and negative emotionality and agreeableness, as well as between each Big-5 trait and protective behaviors and support for government restrictions. These associations are mostly stable over time, with instability pronounced for lockdown policy support, where agreeableness and conscientiousness diminish in importance as pandemic conditions improve. Negative emotionality, conscientiousness, and agreeableness reduce differences between the political left and right and between those who do and do not trust experts. We highlight the heterogeneous interplay between personality and political ideology to understand pandemic policy support, attitudes, and behaviors.

Leaders decide to engage diplomatically with their foreign peers for various reasons but, given their limited time and resources, they have to choose which peers to prioritize. As such, the study of international diplomatic visits helps shed light on a government's foreign policy approach and better understand its priorities in how it conceives and builds foreign relations. While the literature on diplomatic engagements has largely debated its drivers and effects, the role of domestic influences, in particular of party politics, has remained understudied. We address this gap and investigate the party politics of diplomatic engagements leveraging a new dataset on Italy's high-level international bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000–2023. Our findings show that partisan differences influence not only the overall frequency of such engagements, following curvilinear left–right patterns, but also the political regimes that left- and right-wing governments prioritize in such endeavours, exposing the lower importance right-wing parties assign to democratic principles when managing their countries' foreign relations, as these governments are systematically more likely to interact with authoritarian regimes than with democracies.

An intriguing study concluded that political conservatives exhibited enhanced self-control using the Stroop task [Clarkson et al.: The self-control consequences of political ideology. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A, 112(27): 8250–8253 (2015)]. We preregistered our plans to re-examine this finding using a larger, representative, incentivized, and ideologically balanced sample (n = 476). Across a variety of specifications, we report a consistent null effect of ideology on Stroop response latencies and the Stroop interference effect. These findings suggest that the previously reported result may not generalize. We conclude that there is no causal relationship between political ideology and self-control, as measured by the Stroop task.

During the global COVID-19 pandemic, many countries have expanded the level and coverage of current social insurance and social assistance programs as well as implemented new programs. Based on three separate datasets, V-Dem V-Party dataset; fourteen structured expert interviews; and a dataset of 114 social security measures, we study the link between the welfare regime, pandemic-related social policy measures, and incumbents’ ideological stand. Does the pandemic-related social policy measures mirror the political attitudes of the incumbents? What role did the welfare regime play? We scrutinise eight OECD countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, and the US) representing three different welfare regimes: corporatist-conservative countries, liberal countries, and socio-democratic countries. The key findings of this article show that the pandemic-related social policy measures did not mirror the political attitudes of the incumbents.

The ideological nature of public health is a problem for the profession. Ideological uniformity in the field of public health undermines scholars’ and officials’ legitimacy and compromises their ability effectively to prevent death and disease. I first provide some evidence that public health is ideological and then I argue that the ideology of public health is counterproductive. Additionally, public officials are also likely to violate people’s rights in trying to advance their ideology through public health policy. In light of these moral considerations against the ideological nature of public health, there are compelling reasons for people to resist the expanding scope of public health insofar as it consists in the further imposition of this counterproductive and harmful ideology. I therefore conclude that the profession would be more effective and just if public health officials and scholars focused more narrowly on improving health outcomes instead of promoting their broader ideological agenda through public health policy.

There is growing concern about the impact of declining political trust on democracies. Psychological research has introduced the concept of epistemic (mis)trust as a stable disposition acquired through development, which may influence our sociopolitical engagement. Given trust’s prominence in current politics, we examined the relationship between epistemic trust and people’s choices of (un)trustworthy political leaders. In two representative samples in the UK and US (N = 1096), we tested whether epistemic trust predicts political leader choices through three political dimensions: dogmatism, political trust, and ideology. Although epistemic trust did not directly predict choices of political leaders, it predicted dogmatism and political ideology, which in turn predicted choices of political leaders. A network analysis revealed that epistemic trust and political dimensions only interact through their common connection with dogmatism. These findings suggest that cognitive and affective development may underlie an individual’s political ideology and associated beliefs.