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The chapter argues that propaganda in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts had three goals: to motivate the troops to fight, to encourage disciplined conduct and correct treatment of civilians, and to instill patriotism and pride in the Soviet Union. The political departments passionately preached hate against the enemy to motivate the troops to fight, which fuelled violence against civilians from enemy countries. Soviet officials were aware of this problem, but they always viewed the troops’ morale and combat capacity as more important than the need to minimize attacks against civilians. Hate propaganda usually stopped after an enemy was vanquished, except in Austria. There, from the outset of the two army groups’ entry into the country, the official message was that Austrians were the Germans’ first victims. In contrast to the “enemy” countries, the Red Army’s propaganda consistently cultivated a pro-Bulgarian and pro-Yugoslav atmosphere in the ranks by telling the troops positive stories about the two countries.
The ‘Blockade’ of Leningrad lasted from September 1941 to January 1944. It was one of the most tragic events of the war, especially with the mass starvation of the early months of 1942. Leningrad had been exposed to attack from the west, due to the Red Army’s rapid collapse in the recently annexed Baltic states, and it was potentially threatened by a Finnish attack from the north. The ability of the Russian forces to hold the city was based on other geographical and political factors, including the enemy’s inability to block Lake Ladoga to the east and the unwillingness of the Finnish government to take part. Starvation was the main weapon; the Germans bombarded Leningrad with artillery and aircraft with only limited effect, and little fighting took place inside the city itself. However, once the Germans had achieved their position near Leningrad from the south, it was difficult for the Red Army to mount successful counterattacks from the ‘mainland’, or from within the encircled city. Fortunately, after winter 1941–1942 the Germans were committed to other parts of the Russian front and there was little likelihood Leningrad would fall, but fighting in the surrounding countryside would be deadly for many months. The final end of the blockade came in January 1944, remarkably late in the war.
This chapter examines the planning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. It sketches Hitler’s long-term economic and ideological motives for seeking to conquer the country, before examining the strategic considerations that determined the invasion’s particular timing in June 1941. Wehrmacht planners’ confidence was boosted by intelligence assessments that overlooked the less-than-overwhelming superiority of the German armed forces and underestimated Soviet military and economic potential. It was also boosted by their identification with the invasion’s ideological goals. Thus were the Panzer divisions and their air support, on which success depended more than anything else, committed to too many targets simultaneously, and the risk grew of a lengthy war in which superior Soviet resources would be increasingly likely to prevail. The chapter also sketches the peripheral roles played by Germany’s Axis allies in the invasion and the under-strength forces that the planners of Barbarossa would commit to rear area security. This underpowered occupation force would be compelled to cooperate closely with the SS and police in its efforts to control the occupied territories. This relationship, together with the Wehrmacht’s own ideological proclivities and harsh perception of military necessity, would help precipitate its deep involvement in Nazi crimes in the East.
This short essay provides a concise top-down picture of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945. It looks at not only its leadership and command (including the State Defence Committee, Stavka, and General Staff) but also size and structure, political supervision, mobilisation and training, and military equipment. When looking at mobilisation and training, it briefly considers not only wider issues but also the mobilisation of specific national groups and women. When considering equipment it identifies some key pieces of equipment that the Soviet Union was able to produce in large numbers, and that proved to be not only relatively easy to manufacture but also rugged and effective.
The alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War has often been seen by Americans as at best a temporary necessity to defeat Nazi Germany. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes how much American and Soviet attitudes changed during the war and how many people in both countries came to believe the wartime collaboration would be a foundation for postwar cooperation. While many American politicians, journalists, and historians have downplayed or even forgotten the vital Soviet role in the crushing of German armies, during the war most Americans were keenly aware of the enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet people. By the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in early 1943, mainstream media in the United States lionized not only the Red Army but even Joseph Stalin. The massive US Lend–Lease aid to the USSR was not crucial to the Soviet survival of German offensives in 1941 and 1942, as some have claimed, but it did significantly enhance the Red Army’s mobility and communications, thereby hastening the joint allied victory in Europe by May 1945.
Mass rather than skill formed the basis of the Red Army’s victory primarily because inadequate training, weak motivation, and low morale plagued the army for the duration of the war, though after the Battle of Kursk, soldier motivation and morale improved. Often poorly led, inadequately fed, ill-trained, and under-supplied, Red Army soldiers faced daunting prospects just to survive. The dire need to replace losses led to abbreviated training; troops were thrown into battle with little preparation, leading combat effectiveness to suffer; fearful and feeling unprepared, soldiers deserted, shirked, straggled, and showed cowardice and committed many acts of indiscipline, crimes, and violations of regulations on a wide scale. When given the right equipment and weaponry, and properly trained to use it, and led by competent leaders, most soldiers fought well and with determination. These conditions, however, did not present themselves very often. Officers were often in positions for which they were unprepared. The ability of the Red Army to fight well improved in 1943 with defense production at full capacity and American Lend-Lease delivering vital supplies.
This is the first of two snapshots – of Germany in 1945, when it became the hub of the largest migration movement of modern European times. The short snapshots consist of direct quotations from representatives of the key transmigrant, migrant, and immigrant groups and set the tone for the chapters that follow. In 1945 these were nearly 3 million soldiers of the Allied armies (Britain, France, United States, USSR); demobilized Wehrmacht soldiers; millions of ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe who fled the advancing Red Army; 10 million Displaced Persons, especially liberated Allied POWs and forced laborers, mainly from Eastern Europe or the USSR, as well as survivors of the Nazi extermination and concentration camps; and 9 million German civilian evacuees who returned from the countryside to the urban centers. The snapshot highlights the conflicts between these groups, which brought perpetrators and victims in close contact; the fight for limited resources like food and housing in a largely destroyed Germany; and the pervasive sense of a devastated continent on the move.
This chapter covers the Soviet-German war after the December 1941 Battle of Moscow and the failure of the initial Blitzkrieg; the Red Army takes the initiative after the Battle of Stalingrad and drives the Wehrmacht back to the western borderlands of the USSR by the spring of 1944. The Soviet winter offensive in 1941-2. Stalin’s over-optimism leads to setbacks at Kharkov and in Crimea. Hitler’s spring 1942 ‘second offensive’, Operation BLUE, concentrated in southern Russia. The Battle of Stalingrad; reasons for the success of Russian counter-attack. The responsibility of Hitler and his generals. Improvements in the Red Army are critically important. Spring 1943 and Hitler’s delayed attempt at a limited offensive in Operation CITADEL. The Battle of Kursk is followed by a successful Red Army counter-offensive across Ukraine in 1943-4. Developing diplomatic relations between Russia, Britain, and America. The Communist International disbanded. The first meeting of the ‘Big Three’ leaders at Tehran in late 1943: agreements about Polish borders and the timing of the British and American cross-Channel landing.
The American Civil War presented an exceptional state of affairs in modern warfare, because strong personalities could embed their own command philosophies into field armies, due to the miniscule size of the prior US military establishment. The effectiveness of the Union Army of the Tennessee stemmed in large part from the strong influence of Ulysses S. Grant, who as early as the fall of 1861 imbued in the organization an aggressive mind-set. However, Grant’s command culture went beyond simple aggressiveness – it included an emphasis on suppressing internal rivalries among sometimes prideful officers for the sake of winning victories. In the winter of 1861 and the spring of 1862, the Army of the Tennessee was organized and consolidated into a single force, and, despite deficits in trained personnel as compared to other Union field armies, Grant established important precedents for both his soldiers and officers that would resonate even after his departure to the east. The capture of Vicksburg the following summer represented the culminating triumph of that army, cementing the self-confident force that would later capture Atlanta and win the war in the western theater.
The story of Red Army military culture in 1917–1945 is a story of selective continuity with centuries of Russian military tradition, as well as dramatic innovation and discontinuity. The Bolshevik Party set out to create a new kind of state, a new kind of army, even a new kind of human being, the New Soviet Man. It never achieved the total transformation it envisioned, but the attempt shaped a unique military culture that blended new ideals with old traditions. For all the discontinuities in the revamped Red Army, the military culture of the Soviet era cannot be considered sui generis; continuities with the old imperial army were also in evidence. However, it was not the intention of the new Soviet state to allow such continuity. In fact, the state had intended just the reverse. Military culture in the Soviet period was dynamic. There were attempts to "change everything" with dramatic pendulum shifts from one end of the spectrum to the other, in terms of organization, recruitment, hierarchies, and political oversight. Most of those efforts settled somewhere in the middle through a long process of debate and compromise. This produced a unique dialectic that distinguished Soviet military culture in 1917–1945 from any other.
Standing squarely in the middle of the Soviet Union's timeline is the Great Patriotic War, the Russian name for the eastern front of the Second World War. During the nineteenth century international trade, lending and migration developed without much restriction. The Soviet Union was an active partner in the process that led to the opening of the 'eastern front' on 22 June 1941. Soviet war preparations began in the 1920s, long before Adolf Hitler's accession to power, at a time when France and Poland were seen as more likely antagonists. In June 1941 Hitler ordered his generals to destroy the Red Army and secure most of the Soviet territory in Europe. The main features of the Soviet system of government on the outbreak of war were Joseph Stalin's personal dictatorship, a centralised bureaucracy with overlapping party and state apparatuses, and a secret police with extensive powers to intervene in political, economic and military affairs.
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