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De nombreux commentateurs estiment que la dernière philosophie de Ludwig Wittgenstein débouche sur un relativisme, ou tend à l’alimenter. Pour cette raison, plusieurs la rejettent ; même les wittgensteiniens les plus fidèles concèdent souvent, tout en le jugeant bénin, un certain relativisme dans ses écrits tardifs. Cet article se propose pourtant de montrer qu’aucune forme de relativisme n’est réellement assumée par Wittgenstein, dès lors que l’on tient compte de son contextualisme pragmatique. Il reconnaît plutôt la pluralité de formes de vie. Cette pluralité ne saurait être assimilée au relativisme.
Tracey Rowland has recently written a chapter on Ratzinger’s view of Wittgenstein and notes that he interprets Wittgenstein as a logical positivist whose philosophy fails to seek truth itself. This reading of Wittgenstein lacks a serious engagement with the English Dominicans’ reception of him. If Ratzinger had interacted more with them, he might have had a different picture of Wittgenstein and recognized the ways in which his work encourages humanity to live in a state of wonder flowing from its creaturely existence. In particular, Fergus Kerr and others offer a compelling account of how Wittgenstein’s philosophy creates this sense of wonder and, by implication, reveal the areas of continuity between him and Ratzinger. This fact is concretized by identifying the way Ratzinger’s understanding of the clarity of scriptural and dogmatic language is enhanced by Wittgenstein’s grammatical analysis. Ultimately, this essay provides an example of how Wittgenstein and Ratzinger can be placed in fruitful dialog with one another.
The ‘relational turn’ in International Studies offers an important opportunity for the field to move beyond Eurocentric conceptions of relationality in the study of international politics. But pluralizing sources for relational thinking requires practical negotiation of epistemic, ontological, and cosmological differences for which the field remains poorly equipped. To address the methodological needs around navigating relational differences, this article rereads the philosophical method of Ludwig Wittgenstein alongside key insights from decolonial theory to provide a conceptual and practical bridge between Westernized approaches to International Studies and the diverse relationalities at play in non-Westernized ways of knowing and being. Scholars of International Studies and decolonial theory highlight Wittgenstein’s utility for deconstructing epistemic and ontological Eurocentrism. However, this article introduces for the first time the important practical, epistemic, and ethical consonances between Wittgenstein’s method of dialogical comparison and decolonial practices of pluriversal dialogue around specific ‘connectors’, seemingly cognate concepts whose irreducible plurality of meaning provides grounds for contingent practices of pluriversal encounter. Through its family resemblances to pluriversal dialogue, Wittgenstein’s method re-envisions the field’s key concepts as sites for discursive encounter across epistemic, ontological, and cosmological differences, opening possibilities for engagement with correspondingly diverse modes of relationality.
This book develops and defends a novel ‘knowledge-first’ theory of intentional action that places knowledge at its core. The project is motivated by problems with the dominant ‘decompositional picture’ of action. The decompositional view treats actions as composed of two separate components: external bodily movements and internal mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs). Such views, it is argued, fail to accommodate a central feature of intentional action: namely, the fact that intentional actions are characteristically actions that are controlled, or guided, by their agents. As a result, the decompositional picture threatens to radically alienate us from our own bodily actions. Building on ideas from Elizabeth Anscombe, this book argues for a non-decompositional account of intentional action that places a certain kind of knowledge – practical knowledge – at its centre. Along the way, a number of related topics are discussed, such as the nature of agential control, skill, and an ontology of actions as hylomorhically structured particulars.
A sound philosophy of mathematical physics balances a philosophy of mathematics with a philosophy of physics, sharpening the general applicability problem of mathematics by also taking care of: (i) the early modern `mathematization of the world picture'; (ii) the theory-laden character of the targets of mathematical models of modern physics; and (iii): Wigner's `unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences'. Guided by a historical survey, I propose that theories of mathematical physics are meaning-constitutive a priori constructions, conventional but far from arbitrary and best described as hypothetical. Their models subsequently mediate between theory and nature, that is, between the a priori and the a posteriori. Models mediate by playing the role of Wittgensteinian yardsticks or objects of comparison to be held against nature as represented by data models, where the comparison is made via surrogative inference. This balancing act compromises realism.
Since Wittgenstein's death in 1951, readers have advanced numerous claims about his philosophy's political significance. Some take his philosophy to have a conservative or reactionary bent; others take it to have a relativistic leaning; yet others associate it with classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, or Marxism. The Political Wittgenstein surveys this terrain in four chapter-length narratives about the development of distinct views of the political significance of Wittgenstein's thought. This Element offers a thorough introduction to the question of a Wittgensteinian approach to political thought. It simultaneously makes a case for reading Wittgenstein's philosophy as, at base, political, liberating and pressingly pertinent.
This final chapter provides a summary of the book, together with some additional clarifications. Along the way, I will highlight several open questions and difficulties faced by the present account – and, if the account offered here is accurate, by Wittgenstein’s own position.
This Element traces the development of Wittgenstein's views on belief formation throughout the different phases of his philosophy. Section 1 concentrates on the Tractarian period, where the sparse references to belief consist primarily of reactions to Russell. The logical purism of the early Wittgenstein led him to reject psychological stances such as those found in Russell's epistemological works. Section 2 explores Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, focusing on his evolving views on belief formation, influenced by his shift to viewing language as a social practice. It addresses key texts, including The Big Typescript and 'Cause and Effect', and links the psychological mechanisms of belief to Wittgenstein's later grammatical investigations in an analysis that extends to his reflections on mathematics and religion. Section 3 reconstructs the intellectual trajectory that would culminate in On Certainty, tracing the influence of Moore and Newman on the range of belief-forming processes Wittgenstein examines in his final writings.
“Common sense” has multiple meanings, some of them familiar and others less so. This chapter pursues the themes of Chapter 6 by disentangling five meanings of common sense and examining how Arendt uses them in her own epistemology. Hers, I argue, is a version of social epistemology, in which the reliability of empirical knowledge turns not only on our own capacities but also on the comparison of our judgments with those of others. Even though Arendt was deeply concerned about skepticism and the collapse of common sense, and occasionally wrote about the philosophical problem of radical skepticism, this chapter argues that she ultimately rejects the problem rather than attempting to solve it.
Sellars’s long-neglected account of “picturing” has recently found more sympathetic interpretations. At the same time, there has been more sustained engagement with Sellars in terms of Kant. However, there has not yet been an inquiry into the role that “picturing” played in debates amongst nineteenth- and twentieth-century neo-Kantians prior to Sellars. This chapter examines how neo-Kantians such as Helmholtz, Riehl, and Hertz used the concept of picturing in theorizing both scientific philosophy of mind and adjudicating debates between realism and idealism. Thus Sellars belongs to a rich and complicated tradition in his own use of the concept to address both problematics.
The chapter examines anthropology’s first explicit engagements with Wittgenstein through the rationality debates and British structuralism. It shows how these developments reflected aspects of Wittgenstein’s transitional thinking about context, particularly regarding questions of cultural translation and understanding. The chapter argues that these debates turned on problems of contextual form that continue to animate anthropological theory.
This chapter analyses Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘form of life’ as his final model of context. It argues that the deliberate vagueness of this concept represents Wittgenstein’s attempt to avoid the metaphysical commitments involved in previous formal models while still providing tools for understanding context. This strategic formlessness contrasts with how the concept was later interpreted in anthropology.
The conclusion examines more contemporary versions of anthropology’s dominant current of antiformalism. Tracing this pattern across diverse approaches – embodiment, assemblage thinking, infrastructure – it reveals how a certain sort of Wittgensteinian antiformalism has become orthodox. While scholarship focussed on form exists, it remains largely subordinate to an implicit picture that finds ethnographic facts ‘unanalysable, specific, indefinable’. By contextualzing this stance, the conclusion suggests holding commitments – formalist or antiformalist – more lightly in order to recover explanatory power without sacrificing reflexivity.
This chapter introduces the book’s central argument about the parallel development of ideas about context in anthropology and Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It situates both within broader ‘cultures of context’ in twentieth-century thought, while establishing key themes about form and formlessness. The introduction argues that anthropology’s current antiformalist stance represents not progress but a particular historical development that deserves examination. It outlines how the book will trace shifts from logic to language to life as models of context in both Wittgenstein and anthropology.
This chapter examines how early British social anthropology developed formal approaches to context that paralleled Wittgenstein’s logical contextualism. It focuses on Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism and its similarities to Tractarian logic, while contrasting this with Malinowski’s more fluid approach. Through examination of the Cambridge School of anthropology and its influence, the chapter demonstrates how a particular culture of context emerged in early anthropology that privileged formal, logical structure.
This chapter analyses Wittgenstein’s transitional period and his shift from logical to linguistic models of context. Centred on his work in early 1930s and on his ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, it shows how Wittgenstein moved from seeing context as singular logic to viewing it as multiple ‘logical spaces’ or ‘grammars’. This shift prefigures later anthropological moves away from formal systems while retaining some commitment to structure through language as model.
Wittgenstein was associated with conceptual analysis and it is widely presumed that that there is a Wittgensteinian account of concepts, yet sustained treatments of the topic in his work are difficult to find. My contribution shows that this irony is more apparent than real. Wittgenstein discussed concepts at some length in material from the early 1930s and manuscripts and lectures from his final period. On that basis I discuss Wittgenstein’s answers to five crucial questions about concepts – concerning their definition, possession, individuation, function and how best to investigate their nature. Wittgenstein and thinkers who influenced or were influenced by him (Frege, Dummett, Peacock) have contributed substantially to our understanding of concepts in two ways: first, methodological reflections on how to approach philosophically contested concepts, the concept of a concept included; secondly, elucidation of the nature and role of concepts through their connections with linguistic meaning, explanation, understanding, abilities and rules.
More than any other of Emerson’s essays, “Experience” shows us a succession of states, moods, and “regions” of human life. It is not a “carpet” essay in Adorno’s sense, in which a set of themes is woven into a core idea, but a journey essay, which moves from region to region, and portrays life as a set of moods through which we pass. Like a piece of music, “Experience” is in motion. It provides an exemplary case of the essay as Montaigne describes the form: “something which cannot be said at once all in one piece.” Chapter 7 considers whether “Experience" is to be seen as what Cavell calls a “journey of ascent” – as in the journey up and out of the cave in Plato’s Republic; as a version of Plato’s myth of Er; or, with its praise of “the midworld,” as a return to the ordinary as Wittgenstein thinks of it.
This chapter takes up the language-learning passage from Confessions 1.8.13, which Wittgenstein quoted at the beginning of his Philosophical Investigations. “Where Wittgenstein notices an impossible kind of foreignness in Augustine’s confessional account of first language-learning,” it observes, “Augustine negotiates the mystery of the soul’s alienation from God.” Here is another kind of foreignness, and that chapter aims at inducing a kind of perplexity in our consideration of Augustine’s superficially straightforward account of language-learning. Drawing on Augustine’s dialogue On the Teacher, it invites us to puzzle over Augustine’s insistence that language is for teaching – apparently to the exclusion of learning – only to find him concluding that no human being is ever a teacher. The only teacher is the Inner Teacher, the Word, who teaches not by signs but by the realities themselves, with an intimacy and interiority that the infant Augustine longed for but never captured. The Word’s teaching overcomes both the foreignness and the alienation with which Augustine began, though this resolution poses the temptation “to render the whole of the earth, indeed even creation itself, into a place of unlikeness.”
Chapter 2 begins with Emerson’s responses to the ineffable character of mystical experience: one of silence and listening, the other of a profusion of terms from a multitude of cultures. Writings on mystical experience by William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein are part of the discussion. This chapter considers Emerson’s skepticism about the “external world” and “other minds” and about both freedom and fate, which form a “knot of nature.” The following section concerns skepticism as an existential condition, as when Emerson writes in “Experience”: “So it is with us, now skeptical, or without unity.” The chapter concludes by considering skepticism as a positive way of life, what Emerson calls a “wise skepticism.” This form of skepticism has roots in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds and, in a particularly important form for Emerson, in the Essays of Montaigne.