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Persistent poverty and economic inequality are features of American society. In turn, they shape people’s engagement with the legal system. People experiencing poverty end up in housing court facing evictions, in criminal court facing charges for crimes of desperation, in small claims court facing debt collection, and in family court facing removal of their children. Yet the rules of evidence generally erase the facts of poverty and social class in trials. Sometimes this is salutary by removing the prejudice a party can face simply for being poor in a supposed meritocracy. Yet it is impossible to “erase” the bias poor people can face in court because their social class is obvious through other cues. Moreover, the relevance rules exacerbate the effects of poverty by masking economic injustice and thereby dampening calls for collective action.
This paper examines how information about individuals’ income position and national inequality shape preferences for redistribution, addressing the puzzle of rising inequality alongside stagnant redistribution. Using a survey experiment in South Korea, we find that individuals systematically misperceive their place in the income distribution, and that correcting these misperceptions significantly alters their policy preferences. Specifically, respondents who overestimate (underestimate) their income position become more supportive of (opposed to) redistribution when given accurate information, compared to those who remain uninformed. By contrast, providing information about national-level inequality has no impact on redistribution preferences, even among those previously unaware of the extent of inequality. This null effect persists across subgroups defined by income, trust in government, and belief in meritocracy. Our findings suggest that egocentric, rather than sociotropic, considerations drive support for redistribution.
This chapter critically examines the widespread assumption that belief in free will is pragmatically beneficial for society. While some researchers argue that disbelief in free will leads to antisocial behavior, reduced moral responsibility, and societal dysfunction, the chapter challenges these claims by highlighting methodological flaws and replication failures in the relevant studies. The author argues that the supposed benefits of belief in free will are overstated and cannot justify maintaining it as a “noble fiction.” The second half of the chapter explores a more troubling consequence: the moral and political costs of believing in free will. Drawing on empirical research from psychology and political science, the author shows that belief in free will correlates with increased punitiveness, reduced empathy, stronger belief in a just world, and greater acceptance of economic inequality. These views coalesce into what the author calls the “just deserts cluster,” which sustains systems of blame and punishment by presuming individuals deserve their lot in life. In contrast, adopting free will skepticism is shown to promote compassion, humility, and social justice by recognizing the role of luck and systemic factors in shaping human behavior. The chapter lays the groundwork for a moral reorientation grounded in realism and empathy.
Lives are comprised of the stories we tell. At the beginning of this chapter, I argue for the importance of understanding how narratives not only mirror but also shape our understanding of ourselves and others. I draw on classic and contemporary research in social and cultural psychology to show how narratives are remembered and transformed over time and between people. I also discuss master narratives – dominant stories that help create shared understanding and cohesion in societies. I then introduce two dominant master narratives concerning economic development. The first highlights growing inequality and its detrimental impact on societies. The second emphasizes that, despite the vices of capitalism, economic growth has led to increased prosperity. I situate these narratives in the contemporary political and academic zeitgeist, where inequality dominates. I end the chapter by discussing the moral imperative to alleviate global poverty, create fairer societies, and pursue human capabilities as a guide for rethinking economic development.
I start this chapter by briefly describing three possibilities for the future of capitalism and economic inequality. The first is that the rich continue to get richer; the second is a polar opposite approach that seeks to create economic equality at all costs; and the third involves the possibility of multiple forms of capitalism. Each possibility is explored in the next three chapters. In the remainder of this chapter, I explain why it is important to chart possibilities: doing so helps us understand potential paths forward and can meaningfully guide us toward the forms most congruent with our wishes. This world-making approach to psychology draws on theorizing around the psychology of imagination, which I develop here. I also return to value pluralism to help frame our understanding of the three futures that comprise Part III.
I provide an overview of the book in this introductory chapter. The scope, limits, and style of the book are outlined. I introduce a central tension: that humanity has never been so prosperous, yet it often feels to many of us as though we never have enough. The view from manywheres is a central organizing principle in the book. The idea is to stay on the move between multiple disciplines, methods, and perspectives to comprehensively understand economic inequality. From this holistic view, I articulate a new vision for economic development – one based on the alleviation of poverty, the creation of fairness in our shared economic systems, and the pursuit and achievement of human capabilities.
I present the first of three possibilities for the future of economic development and inequality. In this scenario, the rich continue to get richer, leaving the rest of us behind. I describe four implications of this continued concentration of wealth. First, the super-rich will continue to disproportionately influence politics, furthering fragmentation and polarization in society and deepening civic discontent. Second, economic inequality will amplify ill-health. Third, poverty will persist despite increased aggregate prosperity. Fourth, the climate will continue to deteriorate to our collective detriment. This dystopian possibility underscores the urgency of imagining and pursuing alternative futures.
I begin this chapter by discussing people’s subjective and psychological interpretations of objective economic realities. I present social psychological evidence suggesting that people frequently misinterpret economic realities. I then present evidence from multiple sources illustrating the key point of the chapter: that the rich are getting richer. These data are from Our World in Data and are presented to illustrate how income and wealth inequality in Western neoliberal societies, and throughout the world, wax and wane over time. I critically assess the realities behind these figures and delve into the complexities behind changing patterns of economic inequality. I end the chapter by discussing the ways in which rising levels of contemporary income and wealth inequalities have permeated contemporary political realities.
Despite egalitarian rhetoric, governments often fail to implement redistributive policies. We argue that selective egalitarianism helps to understand this puzzle. Analysing a new dataset of 850,000 manifesto statements and equality policies in 12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (1970–2020), we show that even parties committed to equality avoid taxing the rich. Instead of engaging in complex top-end taxation, which is perceived as electorally risky, they pursue pre-distribution and welfare policies with less concentrated costs and complexity. Even these policies are primarily adopted if the party’s constituency is not too educated or rich to benefit from them. Our findings suggest that equality-oriented governments adopt an approach that insures the middle, buffers the poor, but spares the rich. The result is a rhetorical commitment to equality that eschews its most redistributive instrument(s). The patterns we reveal help to explain the consequential disconnect between redistributive demand and actual policy, even under ostensibly economically egalitarian governments.
How healthy you are is dependent on where you live. Americans suffer more cancers, heart disease, mental illness, and other chronic diseases than those who live in other wealthy nations, despite having the most expensive healthcare system in the world. Why? Embark on a journey to unravel the profound impact of public policies on American health from before birth in Born Sick in the USA: Improving the Health of a Nation. Delve into the intricate web where economic inequality weaves a tapestry of sickness stemming from a highly stressed society. This compelling read illuminates the need for transformative change in social safety nets and public policies to uplift national health and well-being. Through vivid storytelling, the book unveils the symptoms, diagnosis, and 'medicine' required to steer the nation toward a healthier future. Join the movement for a healthier America by embracing the insightful revelations and empowering calls to action presented within the pages of this eye-opening book.
The growth in economic inequality in the United States over the past forty years has stimulated interest among scholars in the effects of exposure to inequality on the American people. A prominent vein of scholarship explores whether exposure to inequality diminishes belief in a key pillar of the ‘American dream’ – the meritocratic ideal that hard work will translate to economic success. We offer this literature a novel test that explores the relationship between quotidian exposure to economic inequality in one’s adolescent residential context and belief in the American dream among roughly 1.3 million late-adolescent Americans entering college. We find that adolescent residence in high-inequality areas is associated with decreased belief in the American dream upon entering adulthood. Further analysis revealed that this relationship is most pronounced among young Americans raised in higher income households.
Why do both economically advantaged and disadvantaged voters sometimes converge in their support for conservative parties? This study examines how subjective class consciousness mediates the relationship between economic inequality and political behaviour in South Korea. Moving beyond conventional class-voting models based on income or occupation, it conceptualises class as a relational and perceptual construct formed through social comparison. This study argues that rising inequality weakens identification with the subjective middle class, generally associated with progressive orientations, while reinforcing symbolic divisions between those who perceive themselves as upper or lower class. Using nationally representative survey data and local administrative–level (si-gun-gu) electoral returns from 2012 to 2022, the analysis finds that both subjective class identification and local inequality are significantly associated with conservative support. At the individual level, voters identifying as either the upper or lower class are more likely to support conservative parties than those identifying as the middle class. At the local administrative-unit level, higher inequality corresponds with greater conservative vote shares. These findings suggest that inequality influences political behaviour not only through material conditions but also through perceptions of social hierarchy.
Standard economic reasoning makes a compelling case for taxing on a lifetime (or even multigenerational) scale, instead of annually. But, in addition to practical problems, lifetime accounting raises serious philosophical challenges and objections. The question of the relevant time period over which to distribute tax (and other fiscal) benefits and burdens is fundamental in a number of areas. Among them are the longstanding debate about income versus consumption taxation, the equity of retirement programmes, and the progressivity of various countries’ fiscal systems.
In China, the public has gradually shifted its focus from GDP growth to quality-of-life issues, presenting new challenges for the government. Food safety, as a prominent concern, exemplifies this shift. This chapter examines the impact of food safety issues on ordinary Chinese citizens’ trust in the government and their perceptions of governmental responsibility. The findings indicate that food safety problems diminish public trust in both central and local governments; however, this negative effect is mitigated among individuals with lower levels of education. Furthermore, the Chinese public is inclined to attribute primary responsibility for food safety crises to the central government rather than local authorities when assessing the severity of these issues. These results highlight the political implications of food safety concerns in China.
The past few decades have witnessed a significant religious revival in China, coinciding with a sharp increase in economic inequality. This chapter investigates the impact of religion on the Chinese public’s perceptions of income disparity and political trust. The findings reveal a notable difference in the perceived fairness of personal income distribution between religious and nonreligious individuals. Religious beliefs are positively correlated with a heightened sense of fairness regarding both personal and national income distribution. These perceptions of fairness, in turn, contribute to fostering people’s trust in political institutions and government officials. However, religious beliefs mitigate the positive effect of perceived fairness in income distribution on institutional trust. Consequently, when income distribution is perceived as unfair, institutional trust declines more sharply among religious believers compared to their nonreligious counterparts.
This study examines how Americans conceptualize democracy and whether their support for democratic principles remains consistent across different trade-offs. Using a conjoint experiment, we test whether citizens act as principle holders—maintaining support for democratic norms regardless of circumstances—or benefit seekers who prioritize material outcomes over liberal democratic norms. Our findings reveal that while respondents generally prefer democratic principles including rule of law, political equality, and freedom of expression, these preferences are moderated by economic well-being. When presented with scenarios featuring economic disadvantage, support for traditional democratic principles declines markedly. This context dependency challenges conventional survey measures of democratic attitudes, as we observe substantial divergence between participants’ self-reported understandings of democracy and their revealed preferences when forced to navigate trade-offs. These results help to explain why campaign appeals framing democracy as “on the ballot” proved ineffective in the 2024 US presidential election, as voters facing economic hardship privileged material concerns over abstract democratic principles. Our findings contribute to debates about democratic backsliding by demonstrating that economic conditions play a crucial role in shaping citizens’ commitment to democratic governance, with implications for understanding populist mobilization and the resilience of democratic norms during periods of economic uncertainty.
The last chapter is the Conclusion. After a brief overview of the book’s key themes, topics, and arguments, the chapter places India in a comparative perspective and asks the following questions. How analogous are political and economic trends in India when compared to similar countries? How do India’s achievements and shortcomings discussed in the book stand up against some other comparable countries?
Democratic innovations (DIs), such as deliberative mini-publics and referenda, are gaining traction in Europe, but their legitimacy depends on public support and their ability to address democratic discontent. While prior research focuses on individual-level drivers, structural conditions remain understudied. This study uniquely integrates the regional economic context into the analysis, combining survey data (N = 16,000) with economic indicators from ninety-one regions in thirteen European countries. Findings show that DIs receive slightly more support in poorer regions. Additionally, in these regions, economic hardship fuels demand for DIs by amplifying economic deprivation and political disaffection (‘enraged’ mechanism), whereas in wealthier regions, political interest is the key driver of public support for DIs (‘engaged’ mechanism). By incorporating economic conditions into the study of DIs, this research refines two key theories of DI support and offers a more nuanced understanding of when and why citizens support institutional change, thereby informing more context-sensitive participatory policies.
We are all parties to a social contract and obligated under it. Or is this mere fiction? How is such an agreement possible in a society riven by deep moral disagreement? William Edmundson explains the social-contract tradition from its beginnings in the English Revolution, through Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to its culmination in the work of John Rawls. The idea that legitimate government rests on the consent of free equals took shape in the seventeenth century and was developed in the eighteenth but fell into disuse in the nineteenth century even as democracy, toleration, and limited government gained ground. Edmundson shows how Rawls revived the idea of a social contract in the mid-twentieth century to secure these gains, as the then-dominant moral theories, such as utilitarianism, could not. The book also defends Rawls's conviction that political equality is integral to the idea of reciprocity at the heart of the tradition.
A growing literature explores the effect of economic inequality in citizens’ surrounding environment on their political attitudes and behavior. This literature typically relies on measures of income concentration or gap-size, which reflect under-tested presumptions about how citizens perceive the economic conditions surrounding them. Utilizing survey data to explore perception of economic inequality in Americans’ residential environment, this note finds that measures capturing income concentration or gap-size perform poorly relative to a measure capturing the joint prevalence of “haves” and “have-nots.” These results suggest that commonly used measures of economic inequality may not fully capture the features of people’s daily environment used to perceive the existence or magnitude of inequality. The results guide future research toward using contextual indicators that treat inequality as a compound phenomenon involving manifestations of poverty and affluence.