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The contestation of international organizations (IOs) over past decades has inspired a rich research program. This essay takes stock of progress by reviewing key findings in existing scholarship and identifying critical areas for future study. We propose a typology that distinguishes between internal contestation, which criticizes the institutions or policies of an IO with the aim of reform, and external contestation, which challenges an IO’s foundational principles and very existence. Building on this conceptual distinction, we review the most important findings of existing research on three key themes: patterns of contestation, drivers of contestation, and responses to contestation. We also argue that this conceptualization helps us better understand the changing nature of contestation: while criticism of how IOs function has long been a staple of world politics, it recently appears to have shifted toward a deeper form involving more fundamental questioning of IOs themselves. We conclude by highlighting the need for dynamic theories and improved measurements to explain when and how IO contestation shifts from internal criticism to external rejection, and by outlining a forward-looking research agenda on organizational robustness, hegemonic contestation, and the relationship between IO contestation and the broader contestation of global governance.
This paper proposes demoicratic representation as a subtype of representation in international organizational practice. It develops a social ontology of the People and theory of representation which underpins the thesis that the People is represented only by all the different types of representative persons who act within different types of governmental institutions and procedures of the People. A further important tenet of the paper is that democratic Peoples are accountable to each other as Peoples and to each other’s citizens. In a union of Peoples whose representatives act under any decision rule there is a possible second-order consent-deficit about the decision rule. Consequently, in demoi-cratic representation IOs ought to embody all the representative institutions of the People in their organization or be part of a system of mutual accountability and thereby assure demoicratic representation by IOs. Demoicratic representation ought not to be understood as working exclusively under the principle of consent. Rather it is the representational space in which the consent-deficit about the decision rule of inter-People relations is addressed and calibration sought.
This chapter begins by asking the question, what is the employment law at international organizations? The answer – international administrative law – implements the treaty-basis of international organizations. Second, the chapter sets out how this book paradigmatically structures international administrative law as the encounter between the status of the international civil service, administrative authority at international organizations and the influence of judgments of international administrative tribunals. Third, this book interprets international administrative law as a framework of interconnected legal principles and legal duties. Fourth, and in conclusion, the chapter identifies ways in which the book may be useful to different types of readers, namely: the employees and managers at international organizations; Member States; lawyers and students of the law; and those wanting to apply the employment law at international organizations to circumstances that seem advanced, rather than introductory.
Al-Mizan: A Covenant for the Earth was completed which is led by United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) under the umbrella of Faith-Based Organizations and is contributed by Muslim thought leaders worldwide. The covenant reminds that responsibility of humanity, especially Muslim communities, is on climate change and is to project natural resources and biological variety of world’s common heritage. Moreover, the covenant emphasizes that it is a sacred aim that humanity must respect the natural balance in accordance with values that establish the fundamental of Islam.
International organizations perform activities in areas in which states can no longer operate effectively in isolation, and in which there is a common interest in cooperation within a permanent international framework. This chapter will examine international organizations primarily from a legal perspective. The chapter aims to present a general overview of the law of international organizations. This chapter discusses the legal status, privileges, and immunities of international organizations. The chapter further deals with membership issues, powers, and institutional structures. The chapter also looks at decisions of international organizations: the way in which they are taken and the different types of decisions. The chapter briefly examines the finances of international organizations. There has been an exponential increase in the activities of international organizations over the years. Not all of these activities have been successful, however, and there have been failures and wrongdoings. In recent years, a much-debated issue is to what extent international organizations and/or their members may be held responsible for such failures and wrongdoings.
How does racism structure the patterns of cooperation and contestation in international relations? We propose a theory of institutional racism in international relations, examining how international organizations perpetuate racial disparities despite their nominally race-neutral principles. Based on our original data, language in the founding charters of international organizations has shifted from open expressions of racism to the espousal of antiracism. However, membership patterns suggest a persistent bias in favor of white-majority countries: (1) such countries remain overrepresented as inception members of newly formed organizations, and (2) even after accounting for a variety of potential confounders, organizations that overrepresent white-majority countries tend to disproportionately draw new members from other white-majority countries. International organizations that explicitly profess antiracist principles, such as the International Criminal Court, exhibit similar bias. The findings suggest that understanding the structure and biases of the international order requires careful attention to the role of race.
Chapter 5 explores how war once again brought PR and the US government closer together, before examining how PR firms engaged in the debates over the shape of the postwar world. Both the John Price Jones Corporation and Harold L. Oram Inc. supported the American Association for the United Nations, reflecting the popular “one world” viewpoint of the time. Yet Oram also provided PR support to the Committee for the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was part of a more aggressive US policy of containment and seemed at odds with the desire to support the universal UN. Yet as the Cold War intensified, international events forced many fading Wilsonians to reluctantly move away from a “one world” to a “Cold War” position. Even the more internationalist-leaning PR counselors such as Jones and Oram found themselves adopting an increasingly anticommunist position that aligned with the government and only intensified in the 1950s.
This chapter unpacks the complex relationship between international organizations and peaceful change in the international system through various perspectives on international relations. We identify three types of peaceful change associated with international organizations: institutional change within IOs, interactional change among IOs, and transitional change involving IOs and power dynamics in the international system. The latter has the potential to bring about a “maximalist peaceful change,” resulting in profound positive changes in international relations and human life. However, it also carries significant risks. As great power rivalry intensifies and challenges to the existing liberal international order grow, understanding the role of international organizations in promoting or hindering peaceful change becomes crucial. This chapter serves as an introduction to the volume, providing an overview of its content and summarizing the major findings of other chapters. The book not only diagnoses the ability of international organizations to facilitate order transitions but also offers suggestions to address their current shortcomings in promoting peaceful change.
International organizations have issued recommendations and prescriptions on constitution-making and reform, especially since 1989. However, such constitution-shaping activities by European and universal organizations, notably the UN, have for the most part not led to a better operation of the rule of law on the ground. Besides these problems of effectiveness, normative concerns against constitutional assistance and advice by international organizations have been raised. It is suggested that, in order to become more legitimate (which might then also improve effectiveness), constitution-shaping by international organizations needs to absorb postcolonial concerns. This includes respect for local rule-of-law cultures flowing from non-European constitutional thought and the inclusion of a much deeper social agenda with a global ambition. Thus revamped, international organizations’ constitution-shaping role could be reinvigorated so as to sustain the rule of law on the domestic level, thereby contributing to transnational ordering and global constitutionalism.
While many scholars expect people's ideological orientations to drive their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs), research has found surprisingly limited support for this common assumption. In this article we resolve this puzzle by introducing the perceived ideological profile of IOs as a critical factor shaping the relationship between ideological orientation and such beliefs. Theoretically, we argue that citizens accord IOs greater legitimacy when they perceive these organizations as ideologically more congruent with their own orientations. Empirically, we evaluate this expectation by combining observational and experimental analyses of new survey evidence from four countries: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the United States. We find that citizens indeed perceive IOs as having particular ideological profiles and that those perceptions systematically moderate the relationship between people's ideological orientations and their sense of IOs’ legitimacy. These findings suggest that political ideology is a more powerful driver of legitimacy beliefs in global governance than previously understood.
Multilateral diplomacy is defined as the management of relations among three or more nation-states, both within and outside international organizations. The main value of multilateral diplomacy is its ability to reduce the complexity of international relations in everyday life, including traveling, sending mail and solving crimes across borders. It produces agreements that are much more practical and less costly than a web of bilateral arrangements between individual countries, and it sets common standards that enable collaboration among scientists, engineers and businesses around the world. In addition to formal international organizations, multilateral diplomacy is practiced in informal or ad hoc groups and coalitions. There are few things in multilateral diplomacy more important than who writes the rules, who sets the agenda, and who holds the pen during negotiations.
Despite gains at lower levels, women have made limited inroads into leadership roles in international organizations. Using a novel data set of both nominees and selected heads of 129 international organizations, we uncover several empirical patterns. Women’s representation at the highest levels remains far below parity but has been improving steadily since the 1990s. One caveat is that this improvement has only occurred in a subset of institutions, which suggests a concentration of women leaders. Based on the available data, we examine whether the appointment of a woman leader impacts equality in the institution’s overall staffing profile. We find that such changes occur only once there is a history of appointing women. We also look at the nominations process and find that when women are included in the nominee pool, they tend to be selected, although often they are absent. Our analysis contributes much-needed data to the broader literature on leadership in international organizations and introduces a new data set with a range of other potential applications.
This chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the book and outlines its broader implications for our understanding of politics. It reviews evidence in the book showing that elite communication affects the way citizens perceive of the legitimacy of IOs. When elites endorse or criticize international organizations in public, citizens take notice and adjust their opinions. In addition, it concludes that elites are more likely to shape citizen opinion toward international organizations under some conditions than others. Key moderating factors pertain to all three key components of the communicative context: elites, messages, and citizens. The chapter then discusses the broader implications of the book for current debates in four areas: legitimacy and legitimation, drivers of public opinion, elite influence and democracy, and the contemporary backlash against global governance.
This chapter explores the conditions under which global elites are influential in shaping citizens’ legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. It distinguishes between member governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations as three sets of global elites, evaluates whether these elites impact legitimacy beliefs through their communication, and identifies the conditions under which such communication is more successful. The chapter examines theoretical expectations comparatively across five prominent global or regional international organizations, including the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations. At the heart of the empirical investigation is a survey-embedded experiment in three countries (Germany, the UK, and the US). The analysis shows that communication by more credible elites (member governments and NGOs) has stronger effects on citizens’ legitimacy perceptions than communication by less credible elites (international organizations themselves).
This chapter presents the books theory of elite communication effects on public opinion in global governance. It begins by defining legitimacy beliefs and introducing its favored empirical measure of such beliefs. In developing the book’s theory, the chapter starts from what is distinctive about the global setting in which elites and their messages may impact public opinion. The core of the argument is presented in two steps. The first step explains why elite communication can be expected to shape citizens’ legitimacy beliefs, given that citizens rely on cognitive heuristics when forming opinions. The second step specifies when elite communication can be expected to be particularly influential, identifying conditions associated with all three components of the communicative setting – elites, messages, and citizens.
This chapter focuses on domestic elites and examines the conditions under which political parties influence public perceptions of international organization legitimacy. While it is well-known that political parties are powerful communicators about domestic political matters, less is known about the effects of party cues on global political issues. The chapter explores this topic based on two survey experiments on party communication regarding two international organizations (North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Nations). The experiments are embedded in surveys conducted in two countries (Germany and the US), which vary in the degree of political polarization. The chapter finds that party cues tend to shape legitimacy beliefs toward NATO and the UN in the highly polarized US setting, while few effects are detected in the less polarized German context.
This chapter sets the stage for the book by providing an empirical overview of citizen legitimacy beliefs, elite legitimacy beliefs, and elite communication in global governance. It shows that citizen legitimacy beliefs vary across countries, international organizations, and over time, but that there is no secular decline in international organization legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. It further demonstrates that elites are divided in their legitimacy beliefs, but that they on average moderately support international organizations. Elite communication in global governance tends to be negative in tone in the context of the international organizations studied, but also involves a broadening of narratives about international organizations and a pattern of fluctuations over time.
This chapter outlines the key paradox motiving the book: while world politics features growing elite contestation over international organizations, we know little about the effects of such communication on citizens legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. The chapter explains the theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions of the book, and outlines its core argument and findings in brief. It motivates the survey-experimental and comparative research design developed to study elite communication effects on legitimacy beliefs in this book. By providing a review of previous research on legitimacy, legitimation, public opinion, and elite influence, this introductory chapter relates to some of the most important debates in contemporary international relations research.
This chapter examines whether and to what extent information about the procedures and performances of international organizations affects citizens legitimacy beliefs. It examines this issue comparatively across seven international organizations in different issue areas, including the African Union, European Union, United Nations Security Council, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The survey is conducted in four countries in diverse world regions (Germany, the Philippines, South Africa, and the US). The analysis shows that information about both procedures and performances impact legitimacy beliefs. Moreover, citizens update their legitimacy beliefs in line with information about democracy, effectiveness, and fairness in global governance.
This chapter examines how information on the authority and purpose of international organizations influences citizen legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. Advancing on previous research that primarily has studied effects of procedures and performances on citizens legitimacy beliefs, this chapter uses a conjoint experimental design to assess how different institutional qualities matter when simultaneously communicated to citizens. The chapter explores this issue across hypothetical international organizations in two countries (Germany and the US). It finds that citizens form legitimacy beliefs in line with information about authority and purpose in international organizations. However, this relationship depends on citizens’ political priors. Information about an international organization’s authority has a weaker negative effect on legitimacy beliefs among internationalist citizens. Moreover, the effect of information about an international organization’s social purpose depends on citizens’ political values. These conditioning effects are only found in the more polarized context of the US and not in Germany.