To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 3 provides the first comprehensive quantitative analysis testing the relationship between domestic political volatility and arms control agreement design. Using an original dataset of 225 arms control agreements from 1816 to 2010, the analysis examines how domestic political shifts affect both the likelihood of agreements and their monitoring provisions. The study operationalizes two types of volatility – leadership/cabinet changes and public demonstrations/unrest – and examines their effects conditional on states’ prior beliefs about adversaries’ cooperative intentions, measured through similarity in UN voting patterns. The results support the theory: domestic political volatility is associated with a 47–70 percent increased likelihood of arms control agreements overall. Moreover, the effects on agreement design are conditional on baseline beliefs – when states view adversaries as likely cooperators, volatility increases the probability of low monitoring agreements by about 50 percent. When states view adversaries as likely competitors, volatility increases the probability of high monitoring agreements by about 200 percent. These effects persist when controlling for other factors like power balance, recent conflict, and technological capabilities. The findings support the hypotheses that politically generated uncertainty creates opportunities for international cooperation, with statistical evidence showing a robust correlation between domestic volatility and specific forms of arms control agreements.
Chapter 2 develops a theory explaining when states pursue arms control agreements and why they choose different levels of monitoring provisions. It argues that domestic political volatility in adversary states creates uncertainty about their incentives for cooperation, making formal agreements more likely through two distinct pathways. The "hedging" pathway occurs when states become uncertain about previously cooperative opponents and pursue low monitoring agreements rather than relying on informal coordination. The "risking" pathway emerges when states become uncertain about previously competitive opponents and pursue high monitoring treaties to cautiously seek cooperation benefits. The theory is built on a game theoretic model that analyzes how states select monitoring provisions based on their beliefs about adversary types and implementation challenges. The chapter identifies two key sources of domestic volatility that drive uncertainty: leadership/elite turnover and public pressure on governments. The theory generates testable hypotheses about when states will pursue agreements and what monitoring levels they will select, conditional on their baseline beliefs about adversary intentions. This framework provides new insights into the relationship between domestic politics, uncertainty, and international security cooperation.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.