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Scholars have often used the category of Neo-Pythagoreanism in order to define the interest in Pythagoreanism that resurfaced in the Early Imperial period. The paper challenges this approach, opening a new direction in the scholarship on Pythagoreanism and its relation with post-Hellenistic Platonism. First, the paper detects the criteria by which a distinct Pythagorean orientation could be identified: the existence of a Pythagorean school, the affiliation to a way of life (bios), or the commitment to certain philosophical doctrines. Since there is no certain evidence of Pythagorean institutions and communities, it is difficult to speak of a Pythagorean identity according to the first two criteria. Even according to the third criterion, we must come to a negative conclusion: the doctrinal interpenetration of Platonism and Pythagoreanism at that time does not allow for a distinction between two different philosophical directions. The appearance of apocryphal Pythagorean writings can be seen as an attempt to establish a continuity between Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle rather than to create a philosophical identity for Pythagoreanism.
By analysing surviving testimonies on the existence of a possible Commentary on the Sophist and some passages from Damascius’ Commentary on the Parmenides and Problems and Solutions, this chapter explores Damascius’ reading of the Sophist on not-being. It argues that Damascius, drawing on the Sophist, distinguishes not just two types of non-being but two types of nothingness. This nuanced interpretation, grounded in a close reading of the text, allows Damascius to offer a fresh interpretation of the ‘parricide’ of Parmenides, advancing the Neoplatonic discussion on nothingness.
This chapter reassesses the evidence for connecting Xenocrates’ account of the World-Soul with the Greatest Kinds of the Sophist. It argues there are no solid grounds to attribute this exegetical strategy to Xenocrates, countering a tradition initiated by Plutarch. The findings support the view that the Early Academy primarily employed the Sophist for debates on classification, division, and genus–species relations, not in other contexts, including cosmological.
This chapter investigates whether Proclus employs a distinction akin to the Fregean subsumption/subordination distinction to cast light on puzzling claims in the Sophist, such as ‘Motion is at rest’. It argues that Proclus distinguishes predicates true of a Form’s nature from those true by participation to avoid contradiction. The chapter concludes that Proclus’ account, while ingenious, suffers from logical and ontological flaws, cautioning against its adoption for interpreting Plato.
This article analyses the philosophical discourse on illegitimate gods in Lucian’s Concilium deorum, Cicero’s De natura deorum and Plutarch’s Amatorius. Lucian describes certain gods as bastards (νόθοι) who have been illegally registered (παρέγγραπτοι) in the divine community. Similar descriptions occur in Cicero and Plutarch, although textual transmission has obscured this. The references to illegitimate gods in these three texts should be interpreted as engaging in different ways with so-called sorites paradoxes. Academic sceptics used such paradoxes to point out the vagueness of the concept ‘god’ in Stoic theology. As the example of illegitimate gods is invoked with a similar goal in a negative, sceptical context by Cicero and in a positive defence of religion by Plutarch, it shows how scepticism could be reconciled with religion. Once this intellectual background is reconstructed, unnoticed aspects of Lucian’s satirical take on it can be brought out. Based on the integrated analysis of these key passages, two emendations are proposed: at Cic. Nat. D. 3.39 read nothos [: nouos MSS] et adscripticios; at Plut. Amat. 756C read παρεγγραφῆς [: παρεισγραφῆς MSS] … καὶ νοθείας (παρεισγραφή should be omitted from our dictionaries).
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of some key aspects of Sellarsian inferentialism, addressing two main problems. The first problem is the language–world relationship: if meaning is the use of an expression, how exactly are extra-linguistic objects relevant to the meaningfulness of expressions? The correct use of an expression entails its use in the appropriate non-linguistic circumstances, but the correlation between a linguistic predicate and an object, even when ostensible, must not be understood as a meaning relation.The second problem concerns the ontological status of Sellarsian linguistic notions, such as roles and functions. Given that Sellars is a nominalist, how can we avoid concluding that he introduces new kinds of universals: linguistic? Although inferentialism requires the ability to categorise expressions, categorisation can be successfully done using linguistic distributive sortals, which translate property and kind talk into the talk of linguistic tokens. Therefore, there is no need for Platonic or linguistic universals. Explanation through human practice is sufficient.
Chapter 1 is mainly devoted to articulating Wittgenstein’s normativism. This label reflects what I consider to be Wittgenstein’s fundamental insight: that mathematical sentences actually serve to formulate norms, or rules; furthermore, as rules, they lack truth-values. (However, in my reading, he also accepts that these sentences can make truth-apt assertions.) The chapter also sketches the two doctrines relevant to the subsequent discussion – platonism and conventionalism – and highlights the eliminativist aspect of normativism while emphasizing its therapeutic consequences: by eliminating problems, one achieves ‘peace of mind.’
Chapter 2 further articulates the normativist view, but its central task is to demonstrate its effectiveness; that is, to illustrate the eliminativist aspect of normativism by showing how normativists dissolve three central problems in the philosophy of mathematics. It first deals with the problem of the specialness of mathematical propositions, traditionally considered necessarily true. Then it tackles the so-called Benacerraf dilemma, the (supposed) difficulty of knowing mathematical truths – but before that, it clarifies the notion of a pseudo-problem as understood by Wittgenstein. In the last sections, the chapter dissolves a third problem, the traditional ontological question ‘do mathematical objects exist?’ More concretely, it tackles three incarnations of realism: traditional platonism, Fregean logicist realism, and the species of realism due to Quine and defended on the basis of indispensability considerations.
This article argues for a possible route by which Thomism might affirm the goodness of physical deformity as an aid to abstraction. Recent scholarship has shown how Aquinas can speak positively of bodily diversity as part of God’s providential order, without treating physical defect as a loss of dignity. I extend this line by asking whether Aquinas can also give physical deformity an intrinsic epistemic role. For Augustine, the cosmos is an intelligible whole ordered by eternal Forms in the Word, mediated by rationes seminales, so that even physical defects remain diminished likenesses of their exemplars and can serve the good of the whole. Aquinas rejects this strong Platonic imaging: he retains divine ideas as extrinsic measures determined by God’s will, treats cosmic unity as an ordo communis under providence, and identifies goodness with the actualisation of natural potency. I therefore locate physical deformity as a mixed case of David Oderberg’s notion of ‘goodness by approximation’. The paper states conditions under which a mixed case can clarify a ratio and sharpen the universal: intelligible species are entia rationis grounded in substantial similarity, and atypical cases can remove misleading accompaniments so that what belongs per se becomes more evident.
This chapter explores Augustine’s intellectual formation and conversion to Christianity in the context of late antiquity’s philosophical, religious, and political transformations. Tracing his journey through Manichaean dualism, Neoplatonism, and finally Pauline Christianity, the chapter highlights Augustine’s struggles with the nature of evil, the limits of human will, and the role of divine grace. Drawing on the Confessions, it examines Augustine’s dialogue with Platonism, particularly Plotinus, whose hierarchy of being and emphasis on inner ascent deeply influenced him – but could not resolve the question of the incarnation. Augustine’s embrace of Christ as both divine and human offered a radically new model of wisdom grounded in humility and love (caritas), unavailable in pagan philosophical traditions. The chapter contextualizes Augustine’s thought within Roman imperial history, the codification of Christian scripture, and the evolving notion of philosophy as a way of life. Ultimately, it shows how Augustine’s life and writings forged a new intellectual synthesis, in which classical reason and biblical faith coalesced into a powerful vision of human transformation, one that would shape Christian anthropology, literary practice, and theological reflection for centuries.
This chapter examines an important but underappreciated episode in the history of the concept of concept, namely, its developments in the School of Brentano and early phenomenology. It discusses Brentano and his first students – Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Twardowski and Husserl – as well as the students of these students, including those of Marty, such as Brod and Weltsch, and followers of Husserl, such as Pöll, Reinach and Stein. The chapter shows that these authors developed strongly systematic views about concepts, first by thoroughly exploring questions about the ontology, structure, semantics and acquisition of concepts, and second by showing how theoretical choices in one domain influence those in others. Their systematic approach is particularly well-developed in a central distinction in their theory of concepts, among ordinary concepts, scientific concepts and – for Husserl and his students – ‘pure’ concepts.
Iris Murdoch challenged the intellectual climate of her day. She transcended the reductive, behavioristic view of consciousness, sought to transcend the theory of values that focuses on will and desire, and defended instead a transcendent understanding of goodness and the Good that can transform us, leading us to renounce our egocentric nature. Her positive view of individual freedom and value led her to oppose strict gender roles and structuralism. Murdoch proposed that, ideally, our lives may be a pilgrimage toward the Good. She believed that the experience of beauty and art can enhance the pursuit of the Good. And yet Murdoch shunned the quest to discover some meaningful, transcendent reality (God or an impersonal, purposive force) to understand ourselves and the cosmos. In her words, 'we are simply here.' The authors ask whether Murdoch's foregoing a search for a broader transcendent reality to understand why we are here is compelling.
Augustine's Confessions, written between AD 394 and 400, is an autobiographical work which outlines his youth and his conversion to Christianity. It is one of the great texts of Late Antiquity, the first Western Christian autobiography ever written, and it retains its fascination for philosophers, theologians, historians, and scholars of religious studies today. This Critical Guide engages with Augustine's creative appropriation of the work of his predecessors in theology generally, in metaphysics, and in philosophy as therapy for the soul, and reframes a much discussed - but still poorly understood - passage from the Confessions with respect to recent philosophy. The volume represents the best of contemporary scholarship on Augustine's Confessions from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, and builds on existing scholarship to develop new insights, explore underappreciated themes, and situate Augustine in the thought of his own day as well as ours.
Unlike any other ancient author, the philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi discussed all aspects of religious tradition, praxis, and even personal piety. He talks about religion more or less in all parts of his oeuvre, either in connection with philosophy, history, music and the household, or with myths, symbols, and rituals. He deals with personal religion both as a historian and from the perspective of the experiences of personal life – as a biographer of illustrious Greeks and Romans, as a priest and initiate, and as a husband and father. Several of the speakers in his dialogues talk about religious matters on a personal level, and the author also expresses his views on the importance of religion for the individual in his own voice in works such as On Isis and Osiris, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, or the Consolation to His Wife. Once the religious perspective is recognized not only as a general trait of Plutarch’s thought, but also as an aspect of his philosophy as an ars vitae, it becomes visible across the whole of his oeuvre.
This article examines Numenius’ use of the concept of undiminished giving in fr. 14 des Places, discussing briefly its philosophical antecedents and parallels from Plato to Early Imperial thinkers and highlighting the striking similarity of the fragment to Philo of Alexandria’s De gigantibus 25–8. This similarity indicates the potential direct influence of Philo on Numenius, contributing to the debate on Philo’s impact on pagan philosophy, particularly Neoplatonism.
Rationalist accounts of thought experiment in epistemology offer an alternative to the more predominantly empiricist approaches in philosophy of science. In this chapter, I will pose a Kantian critique of recent rationalist accounts of intellectual intuition. Some epistemologists have recently argued that intellectual intuitions can provide prima facie justification for judgments. In this chapter, I highlight some promising elements of recent rationalist accounts, especially the proposal that there can be nonsensory presentations analogous to empirical perceptions. If they are right, then thought experiments can provide new experiential content even without empirical confirmation. However, I also draw attention to Kant’s objections to the possibility of purely intellectual intuitions.
In 362/363 the Roman emperor Julian composed a treatise titled Against the Galileans in which he set forth his reasons for abandoning Christianity and returning to devotion to the traditional Greco-Roman deities. Sixty years later Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, composed a response. His resulting treatise Against Julian would dwarf the size of Julian's original work and in fact serves as our primary source for the fragments of it that have survived. Julian's treatise was the most sophisticated critique of Christianity to have been composed in antiquity and Cyril's rebuttal was equally learned. The Christian bishop not only responded directly to Julian's own words but drew upon a wide range of ancient literature, including poetry, history, philosophy, and religious works to undermine the emperor's critiques of the Christian Bible and bolster the intellectual legitimacy of Christian belief and practice. This is the first full translation of the work into English.
Provides a short epilogue that discusses how the works of Ovid and especially the Metamorphoses were aligned with Platonist and Neoplatonist views of the cosmos in the eleventh and twelfth centuries before making some concluding remarks.
This Element aims to make good an imbalance in scholarly work on the thought of Karl Popper. Towards the end of his life he developed a dualistic view of the self, and connected to it, a model of reality consisting of three worlds: first the inorganic world; a second level domain of consciousness; and a third world of ideas, institutions and concepts. This third world develops beyond the ideas and understanding of its human inventors. The implications of these later developments has not been fully considered, nor has his idea that his critical rationalism rests on an irrational faith. These are considered against the context of his more famous work on science and the open society. Popper saw his late work in quasi-Platonic terms, and the similarities and differences here are explored. Does Popper's work as a whole tend in an unfulfiled Platonic direction or need a religious foundation?
This article is part of Religious Studies’ new initiative to publish a series of interviews with distinguished philosophers of religion. Each interview explores the personal and academic background of the interviewee and discusses their core philosophical views. The aim is to inspire students and scholars and to provide an overview of some of the most important works developed by contemporary philosophers of religion. In this interview, Kirk Lougheed interviews John Leslie, covering such topics as working in advertising after finishing his BA at Oxford, returning to graduate school, and developing and defending Axiarchism throughout his philosophical career.