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Edited by
Gabriel Kessler, Universidad Nacional de San Martin-Escuela Interdisciplinaria de Estudios Sociales (EIDAES), Argentina,Maria Victoria Murillo, Columbia University, New York
This chapter analyzes the sociopolitical impacts of the mass arrival of Venezuelan migrants in South America, focusing on public opinion and political reactions across six main receiving countries. Drawing on Latinobarómetro data and other sources, Cerrutti shows that anti-immigrant sentiment – often tied to fears over crime, labor competition, and strained public services – has grown significantly, especially in Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile. These attitudes are shaped by both structural conditions (such as the speed and scale of migration, irregular status, and weak state capacities) and individual-level factors like education, age, and economic dissatisfaction. The media, particularly in countries with high levels of xenophobia, has played a crucial role in amplifying negative stereotypes. Politically, right-wing governments initially welcomed migrants as a way to denounce the Maduro regime but later recalibrated their rhetoric in response to rising public resentment. The chapter warns that xenophobic rhetoric may increasingly be instrumentalized during moments of social unrest, fueling democratic discontent and scapegoating migrants as symbols of broader frustrations.
This Element advances the Scalar Deictic Space approach as a cognitive–discursive framework for analysing how political discourse constructs, differentiates, and dynamically reorganises identity, agency, urgency, and legitimacy. Building on the primacy of spatial cognition, SDS conceptualises political meaning-making as a scalar configuration anchored in a deictic centre, organised across proximal, medial, and distal zones of positioning. These zones reflect graded relations of intentionality, dependency, and symbolic alignment rather than fixed group memberships. By moving beyond binary Us–Other models, SDS reveals how political discourse internally stratifies the in-group, redistributing power and responsibility through shifting spatial, temporal, and modal configurations. Drawing on variety of examples including US, Iranian, and Ukrainian political discourse, the Element demonstrates how scalar positioning enables actors to legitimise action and project future while maintaining ideological coherence. As a dynamic analytical tool for tracing diachronic change in political worldviews, SDS critically examines cognitive foundations of political persuasion.
This article seeks to explore the nature and determinants of political conflict in European Parliament (EP) debates within the unique context of the Rule of Law Crisis (RoLC). While previous research on this topic has mainly studied the ideological dimension of this conflict, we shift focus to the affective dimension, analysing the roles of negative sentiment and motive-based criticism through a quantitative analysis of 53 hand-coded debates. We find that negativity dominates, and that this tone is adopted by Members of the EP (MEPs) irrespective of the ideological orientation or geographical origin of their national party. However, concerning levels of motive-based cynicism are primarily driven by MEPs from more right-wing, Eurosceptic and, to a lesser extent, Central and Eastern European parties. These findings suggest that the EP, an institution traditionally geared towards compromise-building, is becoming increasingly susceptible to the normative jeopardies of negative and attack politics when it comes to the RoLC.
The aim of corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS) is the uncovering, in the discourse type under study, of what we call nonobvious meaning, that is, meaning which might not be readily available to naked-eye perusal. By combining the quantitative approach, that is, statistical overviews of large amounts of the discourse in question with the more qualitative approach typical of discourse analysis, that is, the close analysis of particular stretches of discourse, it may be possible to access such nonobvious meanings. This chapter describes a set of CADS case studies into the facework performed during media and political interaction, from early work on White House press briefings to contrastive examinations of the facework typical of the US State Department and Chinese Foreign Ministry briefings which envisage not just the study of interpersonal im/politeness but also the performance of ‘national facework’. The facework involved in all these settings is multifaceted and complex. Firstly it is not always collaborative, indeed it is often downright competitive, and impoliteness is not uncommon, and it also comprises a mixture of personal, group and vicarious facework. The corpora employed in these studies are also multimedia in that videos of the briefings are also mostly available alongside the transcripts.
This article reconceptualizes Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Xi Thought hereafter) not as a coherent doctrine but as a rhizomatic ideological formation. Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, it treats Xi Thought as a configuration in which coherence is not presupposed but produced through the continual recombining of fragments across institutional sites. Based on an analysis of official publications, including collected works, excerpt volumes and study readers, the article shows how Xi’s speeches are disassembled and reassembled across domains such as law, economy, diplomacy and culture. These recompositions render ideology modular and resilient, allowing elements to be activated, re-weighted or sidelined without destabilizing the system as a whole. The article further argues that ideological coherence is generated through distributed and compulsory participation by Party and state actors, who are required to embed fragments of Xi Thought into institutional practice. Conceptualizing Xi Thought as a rhizome shifts analysis from doctrinal meaning to the operational logic through which ideology acquires administrative force within the Chinese party-state.
Howat considers whether appeals to truth should play a role in political discourse. He examines two kinds of response: that of Richard Rorty and his followers, and of “New Pragmatists” like Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse. Rorty rejected the idea of objective truth and hailed as “anti-authoritarian” the sort of pragmatism that sets that concept aside. Howat notes some overlap between Rorty’s position and that of Hannah Arendt, who didn’t reject the idea of truth itself but still argued against the use of that idea in political contexts. Unlike Rorty or Arendt, the New Pragmatists hold that the principal goal of political discourse is not agreement but rather a view that can withstand critical scrutiny – and according to the New Pragmatists, such a view can qualify as true. While tentatively aligning himself with the New Pragmatists and against Rorty, Howat argues that not all political discourse has truth as its aim. He also argues that it is unclear whether the New Pragmatist account of democracy, truth, and political discourse has the resources to deal adequately with the ways in which “our bounded rationality” allows us to be exploited.
In recent elections across major destination countries in the developed world, migration has become a major issue of political salience. Japan has traditionally been an outlier to the trend, but migration did become a major topic driving public opinion in the 2025 Upper House election. This article explores the overall political salience of migration in Japan, focusing primarily on how the ruling coalition managed public discourse as it pushed through major reforms over the past decade, why it lost control of the narrative in the recent election, and what this means for the politics of migration in Japan going forward.
When authors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wrote about what it meant to have rights, they discussed a great diversity of ways in which that concept could be understood, but they almost always concurred on one point. It was vital, they argued, that right should never be conflated with power. As Hugo Grotius put it, we must never agree with the claim that might is right. The twenty-six essays in this volume show that the idea of rights was widely used in the early modern period to resist and limit power. Accordingly, modern liberals have portrayed the period in terms of a struggle for rights against arbitrary power. However, the authors in this volume question that the story of rights as resistance was the dominant narrative of rights. If there was a dominant discourse of rights in the early modern period at all, it was one in which rights were coextensive with power.
The paper introduces a deep‐learning model fine‐tuned for detecting authoritarian discourse in political speeches. Set up as a regression problem with weak supervision logic, the model is trained for the task of classification of segments of text for being/not being associated with authoritarian discourse. Rather than trying to define what an authoritarian discourse is, the model builds on the assumption that authoritarian leaders inherently define it. In other words, authoritarian leaders talk like authoritarians. When combined with the discourse defined by democratic leaders, the model learns the instances that are more often associated with authoritarians on the one hand and democrats on the other. The paper discusses several evaluation tests using the model and advocates for its usefulness in a broad range of research problems. It presents a new methodology for studying latent political concepts and positions as an alternative to more traditional research strategies.
In 2005, the European Parliament rejected the directive ‘on the patentability of computer‐implemented inventions’, which had been drafted and supported by the European Commission, the Council and well‐organised industrial interests, with an overwhelming majority. In this unusual case, a coalition of opponents of software patents prevailed over a strong industry‐led coalition. In this article, an explanation is developed based on political discourse showing that two stable and distinct discourse coalitions can be identified and measured over time. The apparently weak coalition of software patent opponents shows typical properties of a hegemonic discourse coalition. It presents itself as being more coherent, employs a better‐integrated set of frames and dominates key economic arguments, while the proponents of software patents are not as well‐organised. This configuration of the discourse gave leeway for an alternative course of political action by the European Parliament. The notion of discourse coalitions and related structural features of the discourse are operationalised by drawing on social network analysis. More specifically, discourse network analysis is introduced as a new methodology for the study of policy debates. The approach is capable of measuring empirical discourses both statically and in a longitudinal way, and is compatible with the policy network approach.
This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.
The article explores the energy security relations of the European Union with the Russian Federation through the prism of the political discourse. It identifies key formations and topics related to the concept of security. Drawing on a detailed discourse analysis of 339 statements, interviews, speeches, press releases, and documents produced by EU political leaders and institutions, the article focuses on (a) the basic themes of EU political discourse on the energy security relations with Russia and (b) the perception of Russia by the European Union. The majority of the documents used in the article come from 2010 to 2019, the period of the second Barroso Commission and the Juncker Commission. At the theoretical level, the article is focused on the relationship between the main concept, political discourse, and security.
Portuguese politics and mainstream media have been resistant to the recent spread of populism. This article examines the specific features of Portuguese politics and media that might explain the apparent exception, and puts it to test by analysing the prevalence of populist discourses and styles of communication in different types of online media. The sample is composed of mediated and unmediated messages on immigration and corruption, two issues that are commonly present in populist discourses by both right- and left-wing political actors. Overall, the content analysis shows that although populist discourses are not recurrent in politics and media, social media have amplified the visibility of this kind of discourses in Portugal.
The modern study of the Peloponnesian War has suffered from a double blind spot. On the one hand, the traditional study of political history based on events has shown little interest in the great development in the study of ancient Greek economic, social and cultural history. On the other hand, social, economic and cultural history has shown little interest in the study of events like the Peloponnesian War. In this chapter I want to discuss an alternative framework that can incorporate the full wealth provided by Thucydides and bridge the gap between economic, social and cultural history based on static analysis and political history based on dry narrative. The key for accomplishing this task is the concept of entanglement. The Peloponnesian War can be understood as a history of three different kinds of entanglements. The first entanglement is that between different levels: local communities, micro-regions, macro-regions and the Panhellenic world. The second entanglement concerns a series of processes put into motion by certain key factors: violence, honour, wealth and political discourse. The third entanglement concerns the variety of actors involved in the Peloponnesian War: state apparatuses, alliances, empires, potentates, factions, networks, exiles, mobile humans, the enslaved.
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the strategic use of negative evaluations in the Twitter campaigns by the Republican and Democratic candidate for the US presidency in 2020. The study combines a corpus-linguistic method (key semantic domain method) with Martin and White’s Appraisal framework to systematically capture and compare the dispersion, frequency and contextual use of negative evaluations by Joe Biden and Donald J. Trump. The study shows how corpus-linguistic methods can be usefully employed to systematize the quantitative and qualitative exploration of attitudinal evaluations in mid-size language corpora. Further, results indicate that Donald Trump’s targets and objects of negative evaluation in 2020 have broadened compared to his previous Twitter election campaign. This is likely to reflect Trump’s new official status as leader of the government, needing to defend his actions and decisions. In turn, Joe Biden’s negative evaluations on Twitter criticise such government policies with the principal aim to present Biden as a challenger of the status quo, fighting to create new jobs for the ‘ordinary man’. This constitutes a clear change in campaign policies of the Democratic party compared to their Twitter campaign for Hillary Clinton in 2016.
Metaphors, arguments and emotional appeals have considerable persuasive power in political discourse, yet they are rarely studied together. To explore the interactions between these interrelated phenomena, we employ three methods of analysis: Metaphor Identification Procedure, Inference Anchoring Theory, and lexicon-based sentiment analysis. Our data come from Polish political debates broadcasted during the 2019 pre-election campaign. We test hypotheses about the frequency of the associations between metaphors, arguments and emotional appeals. Hypothesis 1 predicts that arguments containing metaphors are more frequent than arguments without metaphors, hypothesis 2 predicts that arguments containing emotional appeals are more frequent than arguments without them, and hypothesis 3 predicts that arguments with metaphors and emotional appeals are more frequent than any other combination. The results show that metaphorical arguments do not outnumber non-metaphorical ones (H1 is falsified), and arguments that are both metaphorical and emotional do not outnumber the sum of all other types (H3 is falsified). Emotional arguments are more common than non-emotional ones (H2 is verified). We suggest that when political actors articulate their arguments, they often choose a particular metaphor to evoke positive or negative emotions in their audience.
Politics is an inherently symbolic practice. This innovative book advances a framework for the critical analysis of political texts and talk based in cognitive linguistics. Through detailed analyses of attested semiotic practices, it provides a current, comprehensive and authoritative statement on the paradigm of Cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis (Cognitive CDA). The ideological effects of dominant conceptualisations and their implications for the legitimation of social action are explored with reference to political topics that have defined the last decade, including immigration, the rise of nationalism, the right to protest, Brexit and Covid-19. A range of conceptual phenomena are addressed, including image schematic patterning, attentional distribution, viewpoint and metaphor, as they feature in various contexts, genres and modes of political discourse. In a major advancement of the paradigm, the book extends Cognitive CDA to images and gesture to consider the role played by multiple semiotic modes in the discursive performance of politics.
During the Late Classic (a.d. 600–900), Maya stone monuments from the Western Lowlands documented people with the sajal title. This position was associated with corporate group leaders who acted as governors of secondary sites, supervised warfare-related activities, and manufactured and distributed goods. The increase in records, along with the elaboration of monuments by sajals with differing narratives from those of the rulers, has been identified as a contributing factor to the regional political instability that led to the abandonment of Classic Maya capitals. This article aims to analyze monuments from the political spheres of Yaxchilan, Piedras Negras, and Palenque using a discourse analysis approach to identify the discursive strategies sajals used to showcase and strengthen their hierarchical positions. To accomplish this, I will analyze the discourse in relation to the intermediality of monuments to examine how sajals rivaled the rulers of these cities. Additionally, I will explore the correlation between these discourses and the sociopolitical transformations that preceded the regional collapse in the ninth century a.d.
For over fifty years, Canada’s language regime has centered - in theory, policy, and practice - on a binary: linguistic duality and authority of the two settler colonial powers, English and French. The legislative enshrinement of status for these colonial languages, by way of the 1969 Official Languages Act, has on most accounts failed in multiple ways. As is well documented, legislated equality between French and English has rarely manifested itself in practice. Less attention - scholarly or political - has been paid to the Indigenous languages erased by both political discourse and public policy in Canada. What limited policy attention there has been has focused on Indigenous languages as second languages. The development of the Canadian Parliament’s Indigenous Languages Act, launched by the Government of Canada on December 5, 2016, attempted to fill this gap. Analysis of this process reveals the tensions within Canada’s established language regime, while putting into sharp relief the difficulties of policy and policymakers to attend to - and move beyond - Canada’s colonial past and framework.