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Disappearances are used by states, insurgents, militias, criminal groups, and transnational security services, yet international studies lack a shared framework for systematically comparing them across contexts. Despite their relevance to repression, civil conflict, criminal governance, and migration, they remain theoretically fragmented and empirically under-measured, examined across partially overlapping literatures employing distinct definitions and case-bound approaches. This article introduces the first global, systematically coded database of disappearances (1999–2023) and a purpose-based typology identifying nine strategic logics underpinning the practice, ranging from state repression and counterinsurgency to criminal extraction, trafficking, and identity-based targeting. The typology reveals shared rationales across political and criminal domains, while the dataset traces how disappearance practices diffuse, evolve, and adapt over time. By reconceptualizing disappearances as an adaptive form of coercion operating under conditions of heightened external scrutiny, the article contributes to international studies debates on repression, sovereignty, and the governance of violence.
The Conclusion traces the arc of Philippine Drug War through the present day, a trajectory that encompasses both Duterte’s arrest and pending trial at the International Criminal Court, and the changing public activism of Catholic elites as the Drug War violence fades, but challenges of democratic backsliding persist. There is evidence that Catholic elites’ willingness to publicly defend human rights during the Drug War buttressed their perceived moral authority, but questions remain about the nature of effective intervention to strengthen democracy more broadly. The chapter’s middle section uses key elements of the theory of religious protection from populist state violence to identify substantive new research questions relating to religion and democratic backsliding, populism and political violence, and civil society and human rights. A final section sets out practical implications of the research for the on-the-ground work of religious elites, civil society activists, local government officials, journalists, and others to identify specific, actionable steps to take should state violence under populism threaten local communities.
This chapter builds a theory of local community protection from populist state violence, focusing on the “meso” level where state agents and communities interact. After describing the characteristics of this new type of political violence, it explains how two key variables – the moral commitment of local elites (Catholic priests and other religious actors) and the capacity of local social organizations (in this case, the Catholic parish) – facilitate community protection. Commitment and capacity have a path-dependent character, reflecting formative experiences for clergy, exposure to Catholic religious orders with histories of public action, and long church embeddedness in local communities. These two independent variables operate via six mechanisms: disrupting operations and reducing targets function through interactions with local state agents, threatening accountability and reintegrating victims involve partnerships with civil society, and raising moral salience and building solidarity work at the level of the local public.
This research note extends existing knowledge on anti-pluralism among identifiers of a populist radical right party (PRRP) by investigating their sense of understanding for citizens who engage in two key forms of political violence: threatening and spreading false information about political opponents. Building on methodological advances in political science research, we estimate a series of Bayesian zero-inflated regression models using original Flemish data (N = 2,963). Results reveal a positive correlation between PRRP identity and sense of understanding. Results further indicate that this correlation diminishes with higher levels of education in the case of spreading false information, but remains equally strong in the case of threatening. This research note offers new insights into anti-pluralism among PRRP identifiers.
This article explores the strategies of politicians from the pastoralist Samburu of northern Kenya since the country’s 2013 devolution – a reform ostensibly designed to remedy Kenya’s corrosive and often violent elite politics. Drawing on ethnographic data gathered between 2021 and 2025, I argue that devolution has rendered the political arena in north-central Kenya more diffuse, convoluted and contested. Ahead of elections, shifting coalitions of actors – cutting across the political structures and scales created by devolution – deploy the material rewards of government to intervene in Samburu beliefs around cattle prestige, gerontocratic norms and spiritual life. They do so to assert political influence, mobilise violence against rival groups, and win local elections. Rather than resolving Kenya’s elite problems, devolution has thus refracted them through new structures, producing distinctive patterns of power and violence across the northern pastoralist landscape.
Protection at the Margins is a ground-breaking account of how and why religious actors protect local communities from state-driven populist violence. Focusing on Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte's notorious 'Drug War,' the book provides an intricate view of how religion, populism, and political violence interact on the ground. Drawing on original surveys of Catholic clergy, experiments with members of the Philippine National Police, spatial data on thousands of drug killings, and dozens of field interviews in these neighborhoods, the book shows how Catholic elites used moral commitment and institutional capacity to influence street-level bureaucrats with discretion over violence, work with secular partners, and challenge populist dehumanization. It also highlights obstacles to protection, in the Philippines as well as Brazil and the United States. Amidst rising global concern about populism and violence, Protection at the Margins generates new insights into how religious actors shielded communities in one of the world's largest mega-cities.
Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) has attracted significant attention from policy-makers, practitioners and the public over the past two decades, but it continues to occur in conflicts around the world – in some places, on a massive scale. Research on CRSV has also grown remarkably in recent years. This article assesses the state of the scholarly literature on CRSV. It first reviews advances in the field, including the widespread recognition of variation in CRSV, the power of mapping the complete pattern of violence (repertoire, targeting, estimated frequency), and the importance of distinguishing between CRSV that occurs as a policy (either a military strategy or a policy for non-military purposes, often the management of the sexual and reproductive lives of combatants) and CRSV that occurs as a practice (in which sexual violence is driven by social dynamics among combatants and is tolerated by commanders). It then highlights emergent themes, including intersectional approaches to studying survivors, victims who did not survive, and their communities, as well as perpetrators, and ongoing debates, including how gender hierarchies and norms shape CRSV. It identifies persistent gaps in scholarly understanding of causes and consequences, along with opportunities for deepening that understanding. After discussing the implications for policy to address CRSV, the article concludes by laying out some lingering questions for future research.
The rise of political extremism is often attributed to citizens' economic and cultural grievances. Less is known about how the state itself may facilitate extremism in contemporary democracies, despite frequent claims that elected leaders fail to contain it. How valid is this critique? Analyzing thousands of documents on the behavior of political parties, intelligence agencies, and the police in Germany across decades and states, the authors show that blind spots in combating extremism are widespread and deeply partisan. In parliamentary debates and election manifestos, right-wing parties devote less attention to right-wing extremist crimes than their prevalence warrants, while left-wing parties often downplay left-wing extremism. Similar divisions appear within ostensibly neutral intelligence agencies and the police. Across institutions, partisanship and ideology shape how state actors address extremist threats, raising concerns about the state's capacity to safeguard public safety and democracy. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The eighth chapter digs into the topic of political violence in the United States and how Trump has used the threat of violence as another tool for maintaining control over his party. Unlike some modern political coverage that suggested that what happened on January 6, 2021 at the US Capitol was unprecedented, this provides a brief history of American political violence. It then turns to more evidence from the county chairs to understand their beliefs about political violence. While the vast majority reject violence as a legitimate act in pursuit of political ends, there are important differences in assessments of January 6th, and evidence suggests that who oppose Trump are far more worried about political violence than his supporters are.
This chapter centers on Bieral’s role in the 1854 Anthony Burns fugitive slave case, where he organized armed guards to prevent Burns’s rescue. Bieral’s participation reveals his alignment with pro-slavery Democrats and his complex racial identity. The chapter interrogates his motivations – political loyalty, racial self-interest, and personal pride – while contrasting his actions with abolitionist efforts. Bieral’s subsequent assault on attorney Richard Henry Dana, Jr., exemplifies the violent enforcement of political power. The narrative situates Bieral within the broader context of antebellum racial politics, highlighting the paradox of a possibly mixed-race man defending slavery to assert his whiteness and authority.
Bieral’s service in the Civil War, particularly at the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, transformed his public image from thug to hero. The chapter chronicles his bravery, injuries, and subsequent court martial, revealing tensions between his violent past and military discipline. Bieral’s postwar activities – supporting Reconstruction, working in customs, and engaging in political violence – illustrate the persistence of private coercion in public life. His association with figures such as Boss Tweed and involvement in the Erie Railroad wars underscore the continuity of corruption and brutality. The chapter situates Bieral within the contested terrain of postbellum governance and reform.
This chapter claims that Emerson’s consideration of slavery occurs in terms that are by definition contradictory, as he both emphasizes and tries to reconcile a series of oppositions within transcendentalist principles. These oppositions include conflicts between self-reliance and social reform; between labor as a means of self-development and of economic development; between absolute moral law and temporal statute law; between teleological history and evolutionary history; and, finally, between the refusal of violence and the use of violence as a political expedient. The chapter examines the complexities of Emerson’s formulations of these transcendentalist oppositions, showing how his commentaries on slavery can play out in counterintuitive ways, such that Emerson’s idiosyncratic version of antislavery “free labor” ideology supports his expressed resistance to a career as an abolitionist, his argument that slavery contravenes a “higher” law than statute law equivocally denounces slavery, and his defense of abolitionist violence transforms physical force into moral force.
Free and open public debate is a cornerstone of democratic representation, yet many politicians refrain from participating in policy debates. This study examines how political violence contributes to such silencing and whether it disproportionately affects historically marginalized groups. Using a unique Swedish politician survey (five waves, N = 43,000), we analyze whether violence reduces marginalized politicians’ participation in debates and whether it disproportionately silences debates challenging hegemonic male interests. We find that women and immigrant-background politicians are significantly more likely than their counterparts to report withdrawing from public debates because of violence and to avoid a broader range of topics. Women are particularly likely to refrain from debates on gender equality, while immigrant-background politicians are not more likely to avoid immigration debates. These chilling effects suggest that violence can narrow the range of voices present in policy debates, potentially diminishing marginalized groups’ ability to represent constituents and reinforcing hegemonic men’s political dominance.
Genocide is a contested concept with normative, legal, political, and empirical dimensions, each pulling in different directions. The chapter emphasizes that, in addition, a fundamental contradiction exists in the concept: The legal definition, anchored in an international treaty, dominates the social sciences, even though the legal definition is problematic for the specification of a particular type of violence. The concept is thus perpetually trapped between legal and empirical imperatives, rendering it unwieldy for the social science objective of isolating a particular type of phenomenon. The chapter rejects the solution of jettisoning the concept, instead proposing a set of solutions for how to retain the concept and separate it from its legal origins. The chapter concludes by arguing that such solutions are unlikely to carry the day, but that social scientists should still seek to develop a rigorous conceptualization of the term that allows for the identification of specific types of political violence. Finally, a postscript offers an interim assessment – from the perspective of this chapter – of the war in the Middle East that began on October 7, 2023.
This chapter explores the complex interaction between (human) migration and terrorism. It proposes a ‘terrorism-migration cycle’ to investigate systematically this interaction for various stages of the migration process. Importantly, no stage of the migration process is independent of what happened on the previous stage, affecting how terrorism and migration interact. It is shown that terrorism may be a trigger of migration in the origin country, that only particular selections of migrants choose to leave a country, and that these migrants then sort into different destinations. The role of migration governance as a means to avoid the influx of potential terrorists is explored as well as the responses of destination-country populations and governments to the threat of imported terrorism. In addition, homegrown terrorism produced in immigrant communities is discussed as well as political violence directed against immigrants. Finally, it is argued that there are feedback effects from diasporas on the origin countries of immigrants.
The Introduction outlines the role of Syrian intellectuals in shaping meaning around the 2011 revolution and its aftermath. It traces how early hope and discursive agency among intellectuals gave way to political fragmentation, repression, and exile, leading many to reassess their roles. It explores how exiled intellectuals engaged in a war of ideas, navigating pressures from authoritarian regimes, shifting public expectations, and host society constraints. Drawing on cultural sociology, intellectual positioning, and social movement theory, the Introduction situates Syrian intellectuals within global debates on public intellectualism, examining how political upheaval transforms their influence. The book investigates how exiled intellectuals’ work – once invested in revolutionary hope – became dominated by trauma narration, reshaping their discursive impact but weakening political efficacy. Through qualitative research, it examines how their meaning-making processes evolved, with broader implications for intellectuals in failed, or stalled, revolutionary movements.
This study examines the mediating roles of dehumanization and humiliation in the relationship between political violence and mental health outcomes characterized by depression, anxiety and stress among Palestinians. This cross-sectional quantitative study was conducted in October 2024 with 633 Palestinian adults from the West Bank. The sample was recruited online through convenience sampling. Participants completed Arabic versions of the Exposure to Political Violence Scale, the Experience of Dehumanization Scale, the Humiliation Inventory and the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale-21. All measures were culturally adapted and validated. Ethical approval was obtained from the An-Najah National University, and informed consent was obtained. The findings revealed that political violence is positively associated with stress (r = 0.38), anxiety (r = 0.35) and depression (r = 0.34; all p < 0.01). Additionally, structural equation modeling revealed that political violence predicted higher stress (β = 0.66), anxiety (β = 0.83) and depression (β = 0.77), with significant indirect effects through dehumanization and humiliation (β range = 0.21–0.28; p < 0.01). Findings highlight the strong associations between exposure to political violence and poorer mental health, particularly when accompanied by experiences of humiliation and dehumanization. This research highlights the importance of developing culturally tailored, community-based mental health programs in Palestine that address the psychological effects of these experiences and promote resilience and recovery.
Peaceful transfers of power are a fundamental principle of democracy. Yet, in times of heightened affective polarisation, election losses may trigger strong negative emotional reactions in partisans, which in turn undermine support for fundamental democratic principles among partisans. We test this idea through two pre-registered survey experiments conducted after the 2022 and 2024 elections in the United States. We randomly assign partisans to receive either a placebo or an emotive reminder about the election that their party lost, containing others’ angry or worried reactions at the election outcome. Contrary to our pre-registered expectations, we do not find evidence that priming negative feelings about electoral loss affects support for political violence or democratic norms. Emotive reminders about salient political events can momentarily turn up the heat on politics, but are not enough to propel partisans to adopt extreme anti-democratic attitudes. By linking the study of emotions to democratic norms, this article contributes to our understanding of when negative emotions (fail to) radicalise partisans.
This chapter introduces the Greek concept of stasis, which is the term archaic and classical authors most frequently apply to episodes of regime-threatening political violence. It also reviews existing scholarship on the nature of stasis; describes the elements and dynamics that are typical of stasis; defines this commonly misunderstood term; and introduces a set of criteria designed to enable accurate diagnosis of as many staseis as possible, allow for consistent implementation in a broad range of historical and evidentiary contexts, map onto fifth- and fourth-century understandings of stasis as closely as possible, and ensure that, when departures from that emic understanding are necessary, they are implemented in a way that strengthens the validity of the results obtained in Chapters 2–12.
Does deference to religious authority undermine support for democratic norms, including those forbidding the use of violence for political ends? Scholars have struggled to answer this question, in part, we believe, because they have typically employed proxies for religious deference (e.g. Biblical literalism, worship attendance, and self-reported religiosity) instead of measuring it directly. We develop a new measure of deference to religious authority in politics (DRAP), using the 2024 Chapman Survey of American Fears. We find that (1) DRAP is strongly correlated with support for political violence; (2) other common measures of religiosity (e.g. Biblical literalism and self-reported religiosity) are generally uncorrelated with support for political violence once the effects of our new measure are taken into account; and (3) the positive relationship between DRAP and support for political violence is more pronounced among respondents with low levels of religious participation.