Does a politician’s religion influence their policymaking? While existing research has examined how gender, class, and ethnicity shape political decisions, the role of religiosity remains understudied. This paper investigates how religious values influence debt repayment decisions among local politicians. I develop a novel measure of individual religiosity, based on names matching local patron saints, and apply it to 62,908 candidates in Italian municipal elections. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that narrowly elected religious Catholic mayors are more likely to increase debt repayment. This effect likely reflects two mechanisms: Catholic moral teachings, which stress the obligation to repay debt, and risk aversion rooted in religion. Overall, these findings demonstrate that religion meaningfully shapes the fiscal behavior of elected officials.

In what conditions are national episcopates in Latin America likely to confront autocratic regimes? In what conditions are bishops positioned to mediate state-society conflicts? This article offers a structural account of episcopal responses to autocracy through comparative analysis of church-state relations and pastoral letters published in Cuba and Nicaragua during critical junctures from the Cold War to the 2020s. The personalization of regime authority, combined with repressive violence, increases the likelihood that bishops publicly confront autocracy. Personalization reduces opportunities for mediation, as regime leaders resist compromising their authority in mediation processes. Moreover, United States punitive measures against autocracies dependent on great power support can shift bishops into confrontational roles. Latin American regimes seeking alliances with geopolitical adversaries of the United States can also preclude opportunities for bishops to mediate conflicts. Conversely, the depersonalization of authority and the necessity to alleviate United States pressure opens the space that makes episcopal mediation efforts possible.

Studies testing the relationship between preferences for Islamism and preferences for democracy in the Muslim world are inconclusive—and likely the result of measurement issues. Previously, we introduced a four-question battery measuring conceptions of Islamism and found that responses vary predictably across two components: whether respondents consider a shari‘a-based government to be one that provides services or one that imposes restrictive Islamic norms. Here, we demonstrate the consistency, generalizability, and utility of the battery through an analysis of 11,849 respondents in 11 Muslim countries. Defining a shari‘a-based government as one that provides is significantly and positively correlated with support for democracy, while defining it as a government that imposes is negatively correlated with these preferences across the entire sample.

The Korean Peninsula is often neglected in investigations on Islam in East Asia. The region already occupies the conceptual peripheries of studies on Muslim societies. During the two decades after the Korean War (1950–1953), however, Seoul hosted a small yet active community of Korean Muslim converts and visitors from places such as Malaysia/Singapore, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The early Korean Muslim leaders, some of whom first encountered Islam in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, attempted to plug themselves into transnational Islamic networks and politics in the transformed context of the Cold War. Internally, Korean Muslim leaders advocated for the utility of Islam as a diplomatic resource for the South Korean government in the struggle against communism, thereby reformulating pre-war articulations of Islam policy that had circulated across China and Japan, as well as narratives on unified Islamic civilization with an inherent cultural essence. Externally, they forged educational and philanthropic networks by connecting with Muslim diasporic figures in the East and Southeast Asian sphere, such as Ibrahim Omar al-Saqqāf, the Hadrami Arab consul of the Saudi consulate in Singapore and an agent of the World Muslim League in Mecca. By situating the emergent Korean Muslim community in Seoul within a regional and trans-regional religio-political nexus, this article repositions it as having formed through encounters with modern state(s) and power, and through interactions with Muslim diasporic agents who (re-)directed post-war mobility channels.

While much scholarship has considered the role of racial attitudes in shaping public opinion, this paper extends this line of research by examining how racial resentment influences voter turnout and further, how this effect differs across religious and racial groups. Building on conflict decision theory and theories of racialized social pressure, the paper develops expectations about the conditional influence of racial attitudes on voter participation, depending on these compounding religious and racial identities. Analysis of the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) reveals that racial resentment is associated with higher voter turnout among White evangelicals, Asian American evangelicals, and Latino evangelicals, while having no impact on White, Latino, and Asian Americans who do not identify as evangelical. In contrast, holding more conservative racial attitudes is associated with a lower, rather than higher, likelihood of voting among both Black evangelicals and Black non-evangelicals. The paper concludes by underscoring the need to examine how multiple social identities can structure the factors that influence political decision-making in American politics.

This exchange began in Chicago as a roundtable at the American Society for Church History’s annual conference in January 2026. It brought together scholars whose work has pushed the study of American liberal Protestantism in pathbreaking directions. In Chicago, we discussed how we came to study liberal Protestantism, how we defined the boundaries of this community, how we understood its place in American history and the history of liberalism, and the relationship between clergy and laity. After a lively conversation with an engaged audience, Church History invited the panelists to reflect further on these important questions and to print our discussion in this journal. The following exchange took place by correspondence during February and March 2026. We invited Thomas A. Tweed, who attended the original panel, to write a response. His thoughtful meditations on the meaning of “liberal” and “liberalism” appear after our exchange.

Using data from the 2018–2019 National Congregations Study, I explore the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation in American religious congregations. In particular, I examine the relationship between the presence of clergywomen or gender inclusive leadership policies (i.e., congregational policies allowing women to serve as the head pastor or priest) and a congregation’s participation in “women’s issues” political activism. Statistical analysis reveals partial support for my hypotheses. Collective gender representation, as demonstrated through the presence of gender inclusive leadership policies within a congregation, predicts pro-LGBT activism and the number of “women’s issues” a congregation pursues. This project serves to extend understanding of 1) how descriptive gender representation relates to the substantive representation of women’s interests in religious congregations and 2) the comparability of women’s leadership across political and religious contexts.

Religious language plays a pivotal role in shaping political behavior and attitudes. This study investigates how representatives utilize religious rhetoric when addressing the House floor and their constituents, and how this language is influenced by congressional leadership. The inauguration of openly religious Mike Johnson as House Speaker in 2023 provides a unique case to explore these dynamics. Using difference-in-differences and triple difference models, we analyze House speeches and newsletters from before and after Johnson became House Speaker to assess changes in religious speech between Republican and Democratic representatives. Our findings reveal a significant increase in newsletters using religious language sent out by Republicans after Johnson became Speaker, while religious speech on the House floor remains unchanged. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between religion, partisanship, and Congressional leadership, highlighting the potential influence of the Speaker of the House on religious communication to constituents.

Why do Islamists regularly win elections in the Middle East? Why, for instance, did Ennahda perform well in every election in Tunisia’s democratic era (2011–2021)? I argue that regular interactions in mosques allow Islamists to build deeper ties and greater trust with their supporters than secular parties can. Post-election, this trust also allows Islamists to better sell their performance and justify their compromises, contributing to re-election as well. I test this infrastructure advantage in Tunisia in two ways. First, an original survey shows that mosque attendance strongly correlates with voting for Ennahda in the 2019 elections and that this correlation is driven by greater trust in Ennahda. Second, a dataset of Tunisia’s 6,000 mosques shows that sub-nationally, mosque density strongly correlated with Islamist vote share in the 2011, 2014, and 2019 elections. Overall, these results help us understand the continued victories of Islamist political parties even in contexts of poor performance.

Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers' political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics' overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members' political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.

This paper explores the intersections of religion, heritage, and politics in divided societies by focusing on two events that occurred in Cyprus before the crossing points opened (2003). These are the Greek and Turkish Cypriot reciprocal pilgrimages to a Christian and Muslim site, respectively, and the two sites' restoration. I argue that in these events the Cyprus Issue effected the transformation of pilgrimage practices and sites into matters of political agreement, implicating them in processes of conflict management and resolution. In this context, pilgrimage facilitated inter-communal exchanges and intra-communal frictions and antagonisms that question binary oppositions through which questions of conflict and amity have been debated in pilgrimage studies.

The rights of people who are marginalised by their sexual orientation and gender identity (LGBTI) have improved in many countries. Largely, these achievements can be traced back to the ‘spiral model’ of factors including transnational mobilisation by the LGBTI rights movement, the actions of a few pioneering governments, and advances in the human rights frameworks of some international organisations (IOs). Yet a rising and increasingly globally connected resistance works against LGBTI rights. It rests predominantly in the hands of a transnational advocacy network (TAN) that attempts to lay claim to international human rights law by reinterpreting it. Drawing on a decade of fieldwork and 240 interviews with LGBTI, anti-LGBTI, and state and IO actors, this article explores how the conservative TAN functions, in terms of who comprises it and how its agenda is constructed. We argue that this TAN has employed many of the same transnational tools that garnered LGBTIQ people their widespread recognition. It also conforms to the spiral model of rights diffusion, but in a process we call a double helix. As the double-helix metaphor suggests, rival TANs have a reciprocal relationship, having to navigate each other’s presence in an interactive space and thus using related strategies and instruments for mutually exclusive ends.

While scholars have devoted significant attention to religious institutions’ role in democratization, less attention has been given to their role in autocratization. Moreover, religious economy approaches suggest that religious institutions are flexible to offer whatever is of interest to the marketplace, but here the role the institutions played in the third wave of democratization suggests a stable commitment. I test the impact of religious monopoly and the historical pro-democratizing role on 52 dominant religious institutions’ stances towards autocratic practices related to regime survival in the post-third wave period. Logistic regression models reveal that stronger religious monopolies decrease the probability of opposing regime survival, while the historical pro-democratizing role of the dominant religious groups in the third wave increases the probability. Furthermore, when the religious market is highly monopolized, the commitment to a democratic role in the third wave is weak, and it is strengthened when there is intense religious competition.