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Disappearances are used by states, insurgents, militias, criminal groups, and transnational security services, yet international studies lack a shared framework for systematically comparing them across contexts. Despite their relevance to repression, civil conflict, criminal governance, and migration, they remain theoretically fragmented and empirically under-measured, examined across partially overlapping literatures employing distinct definitions and case-bound approaches. This article introduces the first global, systematically coded database of disappearances (1999–2023) and a purpose-based typology identifying nine strategic logics underpinning the practice, ranging from state repression and counterinsurgency to criminal extraction, trafficking, and identity-based targeting. The typology reveals shared rationales across political and criminal domains, while the dataset traces how disappearance practices diffuse, evolve, and adapt over time. By reconceptualizing disappearances as an adaptive form of coercion operating under conditions of heightened external scrutiny, the article contributes to international studies debates on repression, sovereignty, and the governance of violence.
Many authoritarian regimes, including some of the world's most populous autocracies, such as China and Egypt, often do not make it clear what views, attitudes, and behaviors people may express openly without being sanctioned. This Element investigates how the uncertainty that this style of rule instills among people impacts the effectiveness of repression in deterring dissent. The authors develop a novel argument about how it can magnify the effect of repression by affecting how people understand what repression signals about a regime's resolve to sanction dissent. Their analysis, based on two laboratory experiments conducted in Egypt, confirms their argument and, in the process, challenges aspects of prominent behavioral arguments linking negative emotions to uncertainty. The authors' results imply that repression is least effective against acts of dissent regimes are opposed to the most and are very clear about their resolve to repress them as a result.
This chapter analyzes the historical, political, and ideological roots of the Russo-Ukrainian war, situating the 2022 full-scale invasion within a century-long struggle over Ukraine’s sovereignty. It contrasts competing narratives of the Soviet period, one emphasizing “brotherly unity” and modernization, the other underscoring repressions, famine, and Russification, and shows how these legacies shaped divergent post-Soviet trajectories. After independence in 1991, Russia consolidated an authoritarian system and increasingly cultivated imperial nostalgia and great- power ambitions, while Ukraine developed an increasingly competitive political system and an inclusive national identity. These differences became sharper during the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, moments that signaled Ukraine’s determination to pursue democracy and European integration while Russia entrenched its view of Ukraine as integral to its imperial vision. The chapter further evaluates alternative explanations for Russia’s war on Ukraine since it started in 2014.
This chapter establishes the analytical lens of stability and fragility to take stock of political, economic, and social forces that may trigger change in the authoritarian and deeply centralized regime dominated by Vladimir Putin. It explains how “high Putinism” blends formal institutions and informal networks to maintain control over political life, the economy, and the flow of information across Russian society. Through state managed media, selective state involvement in the economy, and loyalty among political and military elites, Putin’s political regime has strengthened, even as corruption, inequality, and rising inflation expose its weaknesses. The Russo-Ukrainian war reveals both the reach and the limits of this system, demonstrating how personalistic rule and propaganda maintain legitimacy while intensifying repression and international isolation.
How did the climate movement, so strong and dynamic after 2018 face such a sharp backlash even in eco-minded democratic environments? To answer this question, this article analyses political strategies and the media discourse regarding climate activism in Austria. Drawing on theoretical notions of changing civic spaces and civil society capture, we illustrate how delegitimization lays the groundwork for multiple forms of repression. Ultimately, activists and civil society scale back their activities, while public support diminishes. Methodologically, we take a mixed-methods approach and combine interviews with civil society representatives with a quantitative analysis of newspaper articles. Our contribution is twofold: first, we validate and expand upon the civil society capture model through empirical investigation; second, we enrich the social movements literature by analyzing the conditions and effects of repression.
This article introduces CriTaRep v1, a geo-coded event dataset documenting state repression against Crimean Tatars (2000–2024). Drawing on locally sourced materials in Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, and Russian languages, CriTaRep records n = 709 repression events affecting more than 2,200 individual victims. We inductively identify 22 repression types across three categories: deprivation of liberty, legal and administrative repression, and physical repression. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea marked the onset of a large-scale and systematic repression campaign against the Crimean Tatar population. We document a concentration of arbitrary searches on Thursdays, physical repression targeting elites, and intensified repression during periods of dissent. Empirical analyses show that repression spikes in response to protest activity. Russian authorities respond rapidly and increasingly harshly to dissent, pursuing a dual strategy of protest suppression and long-term deterrence. CriTaRep fills critical gaps in existing datasets and provides new opportunities to study patterns and mechanisms of demographically targeted repression in Russian-occupied territories and beyond.
This chapter constructs the study’s conceptual framework, focusing first and foremost on detailing demobilisation. In particular, it clarifies that the outcome of interest is ‘negative demobilisation’, when collective action does not achieve its objective(s) but instead is compelled by internal and/or external factors to cease their activities. By drawing from extant research on demobilisation and on social control, the chapter formulates a typology of demobilising factors. Moreover, identifying several key causal characteristics of demobilisation processes relates to the methodological choices described in the following chapters. The second half of the chapter presents the rationale for studying demonstration campaigns in Germany, Austria, and England, most especially that the contextual variation helps ensure diversity in the demobilising factors present in cases and guards against the particularism of studying cases from only one country. The chapter explains the nature of that contextual variation by providing an overview of the relevant background to far-right activity in the three countries. Crucially, this background knowledge provides the basis for interpreting case evidence and building inferences in the case-study chapters.
This chapter starts by transforming the demobilising factors elaborated in Chapter 2 into set-theoretic conditions and calibrating the degree of set membership for each demonstration campaign case. This enables a cross-case qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Not finding any necessary conditions, the chapter proceeds to the sufficiency analysis, revealing four sufficient patterns related to the demobilisation outcomes: (1) closing opportunity, (2) state repression, (3) civil counter-mobilisation, and (4) anti-far-right militancy. The chapter unpacks these patterns and explains how they guide case selection for in-depth process tracing. The QCA findings are fundamentally based on set-relational observations, dataset-level findings. The three subsequent chapters transition to causal process observations in order to trace how factors combined and what mechanisms produced demobilisation. These case study chapters also check the causation suggested by the QCA by evaluating alternative causal explanations based on the conceptual framework provided in Chapter 2.
Demobilising the Far Right focuses on dynamics of mobilisation, counter-mobilisation, and state coercion to offer a new comparative study of far-right demonstration campaigns across Austria, England, and Germany from 1990–2020. With rigorous qualitative comparative analysis and process-tracing case studies, the book explores what factors drive the demobilisation of far-right movements and the critical role of state and societal responses. By examining key far-right groups like the British National Party and the German People's Union, it sheds light on a crucial yet underexplored area of social movement theory. Combining innovative methodology with rich empirical analysis, Demobilising the Far Right provides vital insights for understanding political violence, extremism, and protest movements as well as how states and social actors respond, and the implications for democratic societies.
Chapter 17 explores the implication of the failure to establish a proper legal sovereign in the Mandates under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The tension was never resolved between the Mandatory power exercising the attributes of sovereignty and actually possessing it, notably on the all-important issue of maintaining ‘public order’. Repression as interpreted politically through the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) thus shaped Mandatory rule. Three examples show dialogue between the PMC and the Mandatory powers articulated sovereignty as a system of legal practice. The repression of the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 and the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–27 muddled the distinction between Class C and Class A Mandates. The repression of the Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936–38 exemplified legalist tensions within the Mandate system that had been there all along. Neither the PMC nor the Mandatory power (Britain) could either construct sovereignty over a unitary Palestine or partition it. As Europe veered towards war in 1939 and as the League itself started to disintegrate, ‘public order’ in Palestine came to exist for its own sake, disconnected from any resolution of the political stalemate.
What repressive strategies do dictators use to maintain regime stability as anti-government movements rise under conditions of economic growth? We investigate the changing function of authoritarian repression and the ways in which dictators accommodated rising opposition during Taiwan’s period of authoritarian rule. Using time-series data spanning 39 years (1949–1988), this article analyses the relationship between economic development, opposition movements, and shifts in repression strategies under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule. Drawing on historical documents and statistical analysis, we argue that economic development influences patterns of repression. With economic growth, autocrats tend to adopt selective repression rather than indiscriminate violence (e.g., mass killings), as the latter risks inciting greater social unrest and endangering regime stability. Using an additive dynamic linear model (ADLM), our findings suggest that economic development, when coupled with rising social movements, compels dictators to rely on less severe yet more targeted forms of coercion. While this adaptation may temporarily bolster regime control amid economic growth and social unrest, it may ultimately undermine the foundation of long-term authoritarian resilience. This work bridges the gap between repression literature and modernisation theory by demonstrating that authoritarian decision-making in repressive policies plays a crucial role in shaping the fate of both dictatorships and opposition movements.
What are the long-term legacies of authoritarian repression on civil society? While much research has focused on high-intensity repression, we examine the more pervasive, low-intensity repression characteristic of many authoritarian regimes. We argue that repression’s effects vary by generation, reducing civic engagement among those who came of age during the authoritarian period but not among younger generations who either only lived their childhood under the regime or were children and grew up under democracy. Using data from around 140,000 individual surveys conducted between 1989 and 2017, we find that cohorts who reached adulthood during the Franco regime consistently exhibit lower civic engagement than those who came of age in democratic Spain. We show evidence consistent with the main results from complementary analyses using local-level data on repression. These findings contribute to the literature on authoritarian legacies, emphasizing the generational and contextual variability of their effects on civil society.
This chapter reflects on what international human rights litigation has achieved for labor movements in an era of growing repression and backlash against international courts. Focusing on the experiences of Turkish public sector unions and blacklisted workers in the UK, it addresses a central question: Can international courts meaningfully support workers’ rights in the face of neoliberal restructuring and authoritarian resurgence? The chapter argues that while human rights law is no substitute for rank-and-file mobilization, it has provided activists with tools to contest repression, demand accountability, and carve out political space in hostile environments. Legal victories have not reversed the long-term weakening of organized labor, but they have enabled fragile gains – moments of visibility, legitimacy, and mobilization – that matter both symbolically and materially. Labor’s engagement with human rights remains pragmatic, and hence potentially tenuous; but the resources, aspirations, and alliances this engagement leaves behind can seed future movements. Drawing out both the limits and possibilities of international legal mobilization, the chapter closes by emphasizing the enduring struggles and adaptive strategies of labor in hard times.
This article addresses the problem of unclear usage of “coercion” and “repression” in literature concerning protest and repression in democratic and nondemocratic states. It questions the bases and conclusions of domestic democratic peace theory and discusses its consequences. The article proposes expanding definitions of coercion and repression in terms of timing, agency, and perceptiveness. Using vocabulary of poststructuralist discourse theory and the “logics” approach to analyzing social phenomena, it introduces the notion of hegemonic coercion and repression and describes their functioning. It argues that contemporary liberal democracies are not free from coercion and repression, but that the hegemony embodied in the state is able to sustain itself by means of hegemonic coercion with little use of direct violence. Consequently, the absence of state violence is not a criterion of a mature democracy, but can also be a characteristic of a totalitarian regime where ideological deviations are strictly and preemptively controlled.
In this introductory essay to the special issue on civil society in authoritarian and hybrid regimes, we review core themes in the growing literature on shrinking or closing space for civil society. We discuss the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as agents of democratization and note the emergence of dual, at times apparently conflicting policy postures within authoritarian regimes (restriction and repression for some CSOs vs. financial support and opportunities for collaboration for others). We posit that different conceptual perspectives applied to civil society can help account for the duality of authoritarian postures and examine repercussions for three key subgroups of CSOs: claims-making (or advocacy) NGOs, nonprofit service providers and regime-loyal NGOs supporting often populist and nationalist discourses.
Orthodox terrorism studies tend to focus on the activities of illiberal non-state actors against the liberal democratic states in the North. It thus excludes state terrorism, which is one of a number of repressive tools that great powers from the North have used extensively in the global South in the service of foreign policy objectives. I establish the reasons for the absence of state terrorism from orthodox accounts of terrorism and argue that critical–normative approaches could help to overcome this major weakness.
LGBTQ+ organizations have a crucial dual role. They advocate and lobby for equality, while simultaneously providing vital services for LGBTQ+ communities. Different literatures provide perspectives on the hybridity of these organizations’ activities, highlighting the relation between political context and organizational capabilities. Yet, each body of literature emphasizes different elements. Building on key insights from nonprofit, social movement, and interest group literatures, this study investigates the contextual and organizational factors shaping the political and community-oriented activities of 294 LGBTQ+ organizations across 17 European Union countries. Using a unique dataset, it reveals that organizations faced with governmental repression reduce their political activities and increase their community-oriented activities. Organizational factors such reliance on membership fees and amount of funding sources have only a limited influence on organizations’ activities. These findings offer a more comprehensive understanding of how political and organizational contexts shape the work of LGBTQ+ organizations and emphasize the need for LGBTQ+ organizations to balance advocacy with community engagement, particularly in diverse and repressive environments.
Mao’s violent collectivization and forced labour campaigns during China’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) led to as many as 45 million deaths in what is widely regarded as the worst famine in human history. Drawing on a corpus of over 300 interviews with famine survivors, I apply a mixed-methods approach to examine the impact of mass state repression on how such survivors speak about a repressive regime that remains in power. Exploiting variation in county-level mortality rates, I find that interviewees exposed to more intense state violence do not publicly voice more explicitly negative attitudes towards the state, but they do possess more latent negative sentiments. Furthermore, I use the establishment and subsequent dissolution of communal canteens – a key repressive institution through which the state functioned as the sole food distributor during a time of extreme scarcity – as an analytical lever to show that although some survivors may be unwilling to express grievances directly against an enduring regime that perpetrated mass violence, they readily express negativity towards a long-dead institution.
Chapter 6 uses this new understanding of chilling effects to elaborate the dangers of chilling effects both on an individual level and societal scale. The chapter elaborates the two dimensions of chilling effects – repressive and productive. The former speaks to how chilling effects today can repress speech and other rights on a mass scale; the latter speaks to how chilling effects are conforming effects, and thus produce conforming and compliant behavior on a societal scale, which has critical implications for individual identity, development, autonomy, and equality, but is also corrosive to democracy and democratic societies.
Quantitative research has established a strong association between ethnopolitical exclusion and civil war onset, but direct investigation of the proposed causal pathway has been limited. This article applies large-N qualitative analysis (LNQA) to 15 post–Cold War cases to trace how exclusion may generate grievances, mobilization, and conflict escalation. In nine cases, grievance-based mobilization preceded civil war, and escalation followed governments’ reliance on indiscriminate repression or on inconsistent mixes of rejection and accommodation. In six cases, however, conflict itself produced exclusion, revealing recursive dynamics rather than a one-way sequence. These findings refine grievance theory by showing that escalation is shaped by patterns of state response and that exclusion may also emerge as a result of violence. More broadly, the study demonstrates how systematic qualitative analysis across multiple cases can trace mechanisms, address concerns about endogeneity and measurement validity, and still support cautious generalization.