Jacques Maritain brought to bear a well-developed concept of theocentric humanism on his understanding of the proper function of the state. Maritain conceived persons as individuals but as individuals that were made persons by means of freedom, communication, and gift. He deployed this theological anthropology in particular to delegitimise those conceptions of the state that were dominant in the 1930s and 40, namely liberal, capitalist, nationalist, and socialist/ communist ones. In their place, and in light of his theological anthropology, he advocated a state that was mandated to serve the "temporal common good". In practice, this oriented him, albeit tentatively, towards a particular understanding of the state’s responsibility for the provision of welfare, namely a ‘personalistic pluralism’ in which the state stood simultaneously as broker and regulator of a socialised economy and civil society, and as guarantor of personal, civil and social rights.

William Temple was a foundational figure in the establishment of the welfare state in Britain, having helped popularise the term pre-war and written at length about the duty of a Christian state to provide for the welfare of its citizens. His most popular intervention, the war-time book Christianity and Social Order, and the post-war tradition that assumed his name, usually position Temple as an unequivocal supporter of extensive and direct state-based welfare provision. However, Temple changed his views subtly on this issue, and in partiuclar during his ‘middle period’, from the mid-1920s to the mid-late 30s, he expressed the view that the state was better placed to broker welfare services, rather than to provide them directly. This chapter looks at Temple’s shifting position on this, and roots his political theology in his underlying theological anthropology. Specifically, it was Temple’s incipient "personalism" (though the term is slightly anachronistic), and his understanding of the person as free, self-determining, meant for relationship, self-giving, but susceptible to sin that informed his approach to the state in its "provision" of welfare services.

This conlcuding chapter harvests insights from the theological anthropology of William Temple, Jacques Maritain, John Paul II, and Rowan Williams, and the way in which these thinkers shaped their political theology of the welfare state. It draws out a "multidimensional" conception of the human person that is (1) created, (2) material, (3) vulnerable, (4) agential, (5) sinful, (6) relational, (7) transcendent, (8) creative, and (9) oriented to, and fulfilled by gift. It then uses this conception to return to the work of Alan Deacon (to underline the centrality of anthropology in welfare state theory), Raymond Plant (to help fill in the content of contestable social concepts) and Gøsta Esping-Andersen (to affirm but underline the limitations of the idea of welfare regimes). It concludes by outlining what a welfare state (or regime) might actually look it in the light of this, by focusing on the foundation, the funding, the structure, and the ethos of welfare.

Rowan Williams has an acute sense of how serious political debates hinge on different and deep conceptions of the person. His theological anthropology is self-consciously “multi-dimensional”, and while he shares with William Temple, Jacques Maritain, and John Paul II an understanding of the material, relational and gift-oriented nature of the human person, he also places a consistent and fresh emphasis on both the essentially communicative nature of the person, and on the final unknowability of personhood. Building on this, he shares others’ convictions that human personality is best formed and shaped in the ‘first-level’ communities in and through which people learn to communicate, relate, create, imagine, and give. However, he is also less antagonistic to the welfare state (certainly than John Paul II), and happier to grant it a direct role in securing “a safety net of public welfare provision” and “a basic level of protection of human dignity”. Hence the idea of the welfare state as a “referee” for first-level communities is ultimately inadequate for him, as it ignores the more direct and morally freighted role in ensuring the welfare of citizens that is proper to the state.

The connection between Christianity and the development of Western welfare states is long-standing, albeit somewhat neglected by scholarship. Recent work has suggested the formative influence on the formation of different welfare "regimes" through different Christian ideas of work, need, poverty, and the family, as well as differnt ecclesiologies. The chapter outlines these and proceeds to examine the philsophical connection between social welfare and religion, through the work of Raymond Plant. Plant argues that welfare policy invariably draws on inherently "contestable" social concepts, such as ‘need’, ‘want’, ‘right’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, and ‘community’. To know what kind of good social policy is pursuing, it is essential to clarify what meaning and weight we accord to such concepts. But doing this demands we have a clear idea of the kind of creatures whose goods we are pursuing. In essence, social welfare theory of this kind rests on anthropological commitments. The chapter illustrates this by reference to Richard Titmuss, Margaret Thatcher, and Frank Field, and in so doing, underlines how this entire debate is open to theological perspectives.

Although by no means uncompromising in his hostility to the “welfare” – or as he termed it the “social assistance” – state, Pope John Paul II was more critical of its legitimacy, processes and results than were William Temple, Jacques Maritain (or Rowan Williams). His antagonism was drawn, in part, from his formative experiences in Communist Poland, but it is the anthropological reasons for his more critical appreciation that are foundational. John Paul conceived of the human person as created and oriented to transcendence, as an effective moral agent, and with a clear capacity for reason and truth, as well as being relationally constituted and completed by ‘gift’. The consequence of this for his understanding of the welfare role of the state was a palpable reluctance to countenance social welfare structures that removed agency and responsibility from people. His resulting vision of welfare was not one in which the state had no direct role for welfare provision, but one in which work, family and the natural patterns of associational solidarity were the first and primary basis for welfare.

Although it has long been claimed that the welfare state is crisis, demographic and economic pressures on state welfare provision are particularly intense today, and invite a systemic analysis of what welfare is for. Doing so widens the welfare debate from its habitually narrow and technocratic focus to include unfamiliar dialogue partners, such as Christian theology. This introductory chapter draws on the work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen to explain the nature of different welfare "regimes" and steer the conversation away from narrowly economic measures of welfare. It then touches on why Christian thought is a particularly fruitful dialogue partner in this, arguing that Christianity was present at the birth of the welfare state in Britain, and has continued to play an active role in both the support of state-based welfare, and in the delivery of welfare services. More pertinently, a systemic re-evaluation of welfare requires a careful understanding of the kind of creature whose welfare we are pursuing, and that is a subject on which Christian theology has much to contribute.

Chapter 3 considers the developments of the emotional genre of unemployment in the British postwar welfare state. The chapter goes on to consider the development of the genre of unemployment as it enveloped the feeling of guilt over a perceived violation of a social contract between state and worker.

This chapter provides a historical overview of social welfare provision in Brazil and Argentina. It details how both countries, in the early twentieth century, established welfare systems that were largely regressive and favored formal workers and privileged groups. The chapter then describes the social policy expansions that have occurred in recent decades, particularly since the countries’ transitions to democracy in the 1980s. While these reforms have expanded access to previously excluded populations, the chapter notes that uneven access persists despite these new commitments. It also summarizes the current state of public provision of health care, especially medication for chronic illness, and early childhood education in each country.

The study of European capitalism since 1945 has revealed three key findings. First, Europe’s governance of capitalism has been marked by four main periods: : 1) embedded liberalism (1945–73); 2) global attempts at mixed capitalism (1973–92); 3) high neoliberalism (1992–2016); and 4) the return of community capitalism since 2016. Second, Europeans have invented an original system to reach compromise between both states and the three types of capitalist governance, thereby offering choice, far from the image of a neoliberal technocratic dictatorship. The European Union is a mix between the influence of many countries, including Germany, France, and Britain, in addition to Italy and many others. Third, the trinity points to three alternatives that were – and still are – present: the neoliberal free-trade area, the socio-environmental alternative and the challenge of the return of community capitalism, between protectionist tensions, Fortress Europe and the possible hollowing out of the European Union from the pressure of growing nationalism.

Which form of capitalist governance best fosters peace, prosperity, social cohesion, and environmental protection? I argue that making sense of this complexity calls for revisiting the three different principles of capitalist governance: liberty (freeing the market to unleash growth), solidarity (reining in the free market to protect the weak and the environment), and community (safeguarding the group through protectionism and military might). I contend that studying the European Union helps provide insight into how a compromise between liberty, solidarity, and community capitalisms is struck, as the Union is in a constant process of negotiation among bickering members. Dealing with community capitalism, in particular with protectionism and nationalism, has been the most pressing challenge for Europe in the past, not just today. This book will focus on the interaction between capitalism and European integration between 1945 and 2025, drawing on studies from areas of scholarship that rarely enter into dialogue with one other (history, political science, comparative political economy, international relations), as well as through new archival research.

What is the best form of governance for capitalism? It is a balance between three types of capitalist governance, namely liberty capitalism, solidarity capitalism, and community capitalism, i.e. a trinity. In any given society, leaders emphasise liberty if they believe that freeing markets will unleash plenty; solidarity if they prioritise protecting the weak (the poor, minorities, nature); and community if they emphasise the power of the group to which they belong (through protectionism and military might). Each of these three types has a radical variant, such as neoliberalism for liberty capitalism, or Nazi Germany for community capitalism. This trinity is useful in making comparisons across time and space. Capitalism is not solely based on a compromise between liberty and solidarity. Community capitalism must also be taken into consideration. Community capitalism emphasises protectionism, restrictive migration policy, cartelisation and unilateral foreign policies. The chapter examines these three types of capitalist governance one by one (including the question of neoliberalism, of ordoliberalism, of neomercantilism, of the Commons), and then explores how they have applied to various countries.

A targeted European welfare state emerged between 1950 and 1992, one that was referred to in the late 1980s as the ‘social flank to the internal market’. This chapter will begin with a chronological overview, including a first section on the slow development of this European social policy between 1945 and 1985, and a second one its heights under Jacques Delors (1985–1995). It will then proceed with a topical exploration of European measures in this area (protecting the weak, environmental policy, regional solidarity), before concluding with an analysis of the two most important alternatives that were later abandoned: planning, and comprehensive social and fiscal harmonisation. This relative weakness of social Europe can be explained by its late development, by the sheer difficulty of organising a transnational social movement, as well as by divisions among its supporters. Besides, Thatcher was a formidable obstacle, one that Delors sought to circumvent through greater use of qualified majority voting. Other important actors were European trade unions, gender and environmental activists, as well as members of the European Parliament.

Despite the neoliberal wave solidarity capitalism has remained important in Europe. Since it was impossible to tame capitalism globally, promoters of solidarity turned to the European Union, and strove to strengthen its ‘flanking’ welfare state. The early 1990s brought a first peak of international awareness regarding environmental protection and interest in social Europe, but that was shattered by a neoliberal reaction from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s. Since then, social and environmental policies have been on the rise again, only to be challenged by the Russo-Ukrainian War. Three expressions of solidarity will be examined. The first deals with the legal regulation of globalisation through social legislation and trade regulation. The second involves financial redistribution towards the neediest, with transfers to poor regions (cohesion policy), and later with specific measures during the Covid-19 crisis (2020–21). The third addresses the rising importance of environmental regulation in general (air and water pollution, biodiversity, etc.), especially with regard to climate change (Kyoto Protocol, 2015 Paris Agreement), despite the lobbying of the ‘Merchants of Doubts’.