This article offers two novel backtests to evaluate the adequacy of well-known systemic risk measures such as CoVaR, MES, SES, and SRISK. Both the new backtests are robust to estimation risk (i.e., their null distributions remain invariant in the presence of estimation risk). While existing backtest is consistent against divergence from the null hypothesis up to a finite order, the article shows that the new backtests are fully consistent. The real-world implications brought by the new backtests are economically significant as they reveal significantly more cases of inadequate systemic risk modeling among the major financial institutions.

We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.

Housing and human capital represent two major forms of household wealth. This article investigates the potential for housing speculation to crowd out household investment in children’s education, an endeavor that only pays off in the long run. To address endogeneity concerns, we exploit the unintended spillover effect of staggered house purchase restrictions (HPR) in China. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that HPR reduce educational investment of households in nearby unregulated cities. We also provide evidence consistent with a housing speculation channel. These findings shed new light on the socioeconomic consequences of housing market booms.

In a setting with a tradable value-weighted market index, ambiguity-averse investors do not trade, and the index is not mean–variance efficient. But when a passive fund offers the risk-adjusted market portfolio (RAMP), whose weights depend on information precision as well as market values, investors share risk via index investing and effectively hold the same portfolios as in the economy without model uncertainty. This follows from a new Information Separation Theorem: equilibrium portfolios are the sum of RAMP, which is the optimal portfolio conditional on public information, and their optimal private-information-based portfolios. RAMP is in equilibrium mean–variance efficient.

Employing a cross-country sample, we examine how a population’s underlying cultural values help explain gender compensation variation across corporate executives. The results show that the cultural differences, embedded in societies long before the board’s compensation decisions, have significant explanatory power for the observed gender gap in executive compensation. Using an Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition combined with variables previously shown to be fundamental determinants of executive compensation, we find that adding cultural measures increases the model’s explanatory power of the gender compensation gap from 44% to 95%. We use further identification strategies to support causal inference.

While the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) mandates board risk committees for large banks, we argue that such committees do not benefit all banks. Banks forced by the DFA to adopt a board risk committee do not experience a reduction in risk following adoption. In contrast, banks that voluntarily established risk committees before the DFA exhibit lower risk, especially when these committees possess greater risk expertise. Using unique interview data, we find that board risk committees serve as active monitors rather than merely rubber-stamping management proposals. However, regulatory-mandated tasks limit their monitoring role.