In this discussion note, we contrast two models of pluralistic policy advice that have recently been proposed: Stephen John’s (2025) representative model and our integrative model (Bschir and Lohse 2022, 2024). We believe that the contrast between representative and integrative pluralism is of high relevance for the broader philosophical discussion on scientific policy advice.

Is it permissible to implicate non-epistemic values in the ‘core’ of scientific reasoning? This paper offers an appraisal of Parker’s (2024) Epistemic Projection Approach (EPA) prescribing acceptable relations between epistemic and non-epistemic values in research conduct. Non-epistemic values are granted a role in determining epistemic characteristics for a research project but are meant to be ‘screened off’ from core research decisions via epistemic projection. This discussion takes the EPA for a test drive. We identify three challenges to its conceptual and practical viability and show how EPA currently lacks resources to address them, indicating a need for further development.

Theories of ecological function often appeal to the liberality criterion to evaluate a theory’s adequacy. The liberality criterion requires that a functional description successfully differentiates between functions and nonfunctions. A functional description is considered inadequate if it is excessively liberal or excessively restrictive. I criticize the deference that is shown to the liberality criterion. I present a hypothetical case to illustrate how the application of the liberality criterion needlessly problematizes the four general theories of ecological function. Instead, a theory’s functional description should be considered adequate as long as it produces a better understanding of the complex phenomenon under study.

Trevor Griffith and Adrian Kind argue that we should reject a standard interpretation of pain asymbolia, according to which asymbolics experience pain even though their pain lacks the affective-motivational element that typical pains possess. We make the case that Griffith and Kind’s reasons for rejecting the standard interpretation are relatively weak. We end by arguing that debates between the standard interpretation and alternative interpretations cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of how we should taxonomize pain asymbolia as a neurological condition.

Jha et al. (2024) offer several objections to Lange’s account of “distinctively mathematical” scientific explanations (DMEs). This article argues that these objections fail. Jha et al.’s arguments fail to show that Lange is inconsistent in characterizing DMEs—that, by Lange’s lights, every causal explanation involving mathematical facts is a DME. Jha et al.’s arguments fail to suggest that on Lange’s account, DME’s are too common or explanatorily insubstantial to underwrite any philosophical lessons about explanation. Jha et al.’s arguments also fail to show that Lange relies on underhanded manipulations of the explananda targeted by DMEs.