Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) model of art appreciation aims to improve on previous models by doing justice to the role of art-historical context. One of the factors that B&R ostensibly include in that context is function. The “psycho-historical framework,” they write, “requires that … a work of art is an artifact that has historical functions” (sect. 2.1, para. 2). We applaud their attempt to encompass the function of artworks within their model, but suggest that they must go further in this regard.
In our book Functional Beauty (Parsons & Carlson Reference Parsons and Carlson2008), we attempted to analyze the notion of artwork function. The term “function” has several senses. Sometimes talk of function F is merely a way of saying that something is doing F (this chair is functioning as a stool) or was intended to do F (What is the function of the chair you put against the door?). But these casual uses do not capture the main and central sense of the term, that of having the function F. For an object can perform F, or be intended to perform F, without having F as its function. This is the case in the examples just mentioned: although a chair can serve as a stool or be used in an effort to bar a door, chairs really have the function of allowing people to sit, and not these other things. Hence, to analyze the function of art, one must focus on these proper functions, rather than looser uses of the term.
Following an account developed by Beth Preston (Reference Preston1998) and others, we held that proper functions must be analyzed in terms of artwork's causal histories. Specifically, an artwork has F as its proper function just in case it belongs to a type that has achieved selective success in the marketplace as a result of performing F. On this account, functions are historical, but, importantly, the relevant causal history occurs at the social level – the artist's intention that his artwork perform F is neither necessary nor sufficient for F to be its proper function (Parsons & Carlson Reference Parsons and Carlson2008, pp. 63–84).
At one point, B&R maintain that they follow our account of artwork functions (sect. 2.2). But there is an important difference in our approaches. We focused on proper functions, but on B&R's “historical approach to artifact functions” artist intentions, as well as social-level processes, can give rise to functions (sect. 2.2, para. 4) And in their subsequent discussion of function, the focus is entirely on “functions” arising from artist intentions.
For example, in discussion of the second mode of appreciation, that involving the design stance, they write that “Humans adopt the design stance when they reason about artifacts and their functions” (sect. 3.2, para. 4). In design stance appreciation, however, the focus is squarely on interpreting the “intentions of the artist” (sect. 3.2, para. 5), implying that the functions being reasoned about are not proper functions but merely effects intended by the artist. This comes out in B&R's remark that work by Keleman and Carey “suggests that artifact categorization is sensitive to the original function intended by the designer of an artifact” (sect. 3.2, para. 3). Function also comes into play in the model's third mode of appreciation, artistic understanding: “Appreciators have artistic understanding of a work,” they write, “if art-historical knowledge acquired as an outcome of the design stance provides them with an ability to explain the…functions of the work” (sect. 3.3, para. 1). But B&R do not indicate that the functions involved differ from the intention-based “functions” figuring in design-stance appreciation.
Hence, B&R's model, as described, does not accord a substantive role to proper functions. However, it seems to us that it should. One reason is simply that if “function,” as it figures in the model, is reducible to “what the artist intended the work to do,” then their model simply does not encompass the function of Art, in the main and central sense of that term. For, as mentioned above, this sense cannot be explicated in terms of the individual intentions of designers or makers. Hence, if B&R's model aspires to bring function into the art-historical context, as we agree it should, it must distinguish proper functions from artist intentions and accord the former a clear role.
A second reason for doing this is that, as mentioned, B&R take function to be involved in artistic understanding. However, if this is to be so, then the functions at issue cannot be equivalent merely to what the artist intended to do. For the fundamental distinction between art-historical understanding and design stance appreciation, as we understand it, is that the former necessarily involves an appeal to relevant context beyond those factors accessible to, and causally salient for, the artist. If function is involved in art-historical understanding, then it ought to pertain to something that can lie outside of the artist's own conceptions and intentions. Proper function, as we analyze it, is just such an element, for the broader causal history of his artwork type is something the artist might well be ignorant of, or unconcerned with. Hence, the internal coherence of the B&R model would be strengthened by distinguishing proper function from artistic intention, and according it a clear place.
This would have another effect as well. It is perhaps safe to say that every artwork was intended, by its creator, to do something or other. But we cannot similarly say that every artwork has a proper function, for only works belonging to an established type, subjected over time to the process of marketplace selection, are candidates for possessing proper functions. Some artworks, failing to belong to such type, might have no proper function (Parsons & Carlson Reference Parsons and Carlson2008, pp. 223–227). Whether a work has a proper function is a matter of the specific nature of its causal history and its ties to established types, which are matters for empirical inquiry within art history and perhaps other disciplines. If the appreciation of art involves its function, such inquiry must also be an important part of the art-historical context.
Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) model of art appreciation aims to improve on previous models by doing justice to the role of art-historical context. One of the factors that B&R ostensibly include in that context is function. The “psycho-historical framework,” they write, “requires that … a work of art is an artifact that has historical functions” (sect. 2.1, para. 2). We applaud their attempt to encompass the function of artworks within their model, but suggest that they must go further in this regard.
In our book Functional Beauty (Parsons & Carlson Reference Parsons and Carlson2008), we attempted to analyze the notion of artwork function. The term “function” has several senses. Sometimes talk of function F is merely a way of saying that something is doing F (this chair is functioning as a stool) or was intended to do F (What is the function of the chair you put against the door?). But these casual uses do not capture the main and central sense of the term, that of having the function F. For an object can perform F, or be intended to perform F, without having F as its function. This is the case in the examples just mentioned: although a chair can serve as a stool or be used in an effort to bar a door, chairs really have the function of allowing people to sit, and not these other things. Hence, to analyze the function of art, one must focus on these proper functions, rather than looser uses of the term.
Following an account developed by Beth Preston (Reference Preston1998) and others, we held that proper functions must be analyzed in terms of artwork's causal histories. Specifically, an artwork has F as its proper function just in case it belongs to a type that has achieved selective success in the marketplace as a result of performing F. On this account, functions are historical, but, importantly, the relevant causal history occurs at the social level – the artist's intention that his artwork perform F is neither necessary nor sufficient for F to be its proper function (Parsons & Carlson Reference Parsons and Carlson2008, pp. 63–84).
At one point, B&R maintain that they follow our account of artwork functions (sect. 2.2). But there is an important difference in our approaches. We focused on proper functions, but on B&R's “historical approach to artifact functions” artist intentions, as well as social-level processes, can give rise to functions (sect. 2.2, para. 4) And in their subsequent discussion of function, the focus is entirely on “functions” arising from artist intentions.
For example, in discussion of the second mode of appreciation, that involving the design stance, they write that “Humans adopt the design stance when they reason about artifacts and their functions” (sect. 3.2, para. 4). In design stance appreciation, however, the focus is squarely on interpreting the “intentions of the artist” (sect. 3.2, para. 5), implying that the functions being reasoned about are not proper functions but merely effects intended by the artist. This comes out in B&R's remark that work by Keleman and Carey “suggests that artifact categorization is sensitive to the original function intended by the designer of an artifact” (sect. 3.2, para. 3). Function also comes into play in the model's third mode of appreciation, artistic understanding: “Appreciators have artistic understanding of a work,” they write, “if art-historical knowledge acquired as an outcome of the design stance provides them with an ability to explain the…functions of the work” (sect. 3.3, para. 1). But B&R do not indicate that the functions involved differ from the intention-based “functions” figuring in design-stance appreciation.
Hence, B&R's model, as described, does not accord a substantive role to proper functions. However, it seems to us that it should. One reason is simply that if “function,” as it figures in the model, is reducible to “what the artist intended the work to do,” then their model simply does not encompass the function of Art, in the main and central sense of that term. For, as mentioned above, this sense cannot be explicated in terms of the individual intentions of designers or makers. Hence, if B&R's model aspires to bring function into the art-historical context, as we agree it should, it must distinguish proper functions from artist intentions and accord the former a clear role.
A second reason for doing this is that, as mentioned, B&R take function to be involved in artistic understanding. However, if this is to be so, then the functions at issue cannot be equivalent merely to what the artist intended to do. For the fundamental distinction between art-historical understanding and design stance appreciation, as we understand it, is that the former necessarily involves an appeal to relevant context beyond those factors accessible to, and causally salient for, the artist. If function is involved in art-historical understanding, then it ought to pertain to something that can lie outside of the artist's own conceptions and intentions. Proper function, as we analyze it, is just such an element, for the broader causal history of his artwork type is something the artist might well be ignorant of, or unconcerned with. Hence, the internal coherence of the B&R model would be strengthened by distinguishing proper function from artistic intention, and according it a clear place.
This would have another effect as well. It is perhaps safe to say that every artwork was intended, by its creator, to do something or other. But we cannot similarly say that every artwork has a proper function, for only works belonging to an established type, subjected over time to the process of marketplace selection, are candidates for possessing proper functions. Some artworks, failing to belong to such type, might have no proper function (Parsons & Carlson Reference Parsons and Carlson2008, pp. 223–227). Whether a work has a proper function is a matter of the specific nature of its causal history and its ties to established types, which are matters for empirical inquiry within art history and perhaps other disciplines. If the appreciation of art involves its function, such inquiry must also be an important part of the art-historical context.