Bullot & Reber (B&R) propose to close the “divide between the sciences and the humanities” (sect. 1.2, last paragraph). Achieving this goal would undoubtedly open new perspectives for interdisciplinary cooperation and would be an important step regarding a comprehensive theory of art appreciation. As presented here, however, the psycho-historical approach is encumbered with some serious problems that need to be addressed.
First, the authors claim that the historical, hermeneutic art sciences somehow aim to explain art appreciation. Rather, according to my experience, the sciences of art history primarily aim to explain what art is, and they study artworks, not responses to them. Art historians, hence, study the historical conditions of art and thereby provide the knowledge that B&R believe enables what they regard as artistic appreciation. Interestingly, their description of “deciphering the causal history” (sect. 3.2.), referring to the nineteenth century art historian Morelli, alludes to highly specialized skills of a kind that in my experience only art historians attain. The processes involved in reconstructing the historical origins and contexts of artworks are typically very complex, requiring extensive knowledge, which is out of reach for most nonexperts. Thus, the psycho-historical framework seems to overestimate the likelihood with which artistic appreciation, as conceived by the authors, actually takes place. It probably is, in fact, a very restricted and specialized way of approaching artworks. If psychological studies were restricted only to those situations where art was perceived in such a “properly artistic appreciation-stance,” many kinds of art appreciation would be excluded, leaving only a small subclass of possible aesthetic experiences (Leder et al. Reference Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin2004).
However, in real life – and in studies of experimental aesthetics – most people's appreciation of works of art is supplemented by some form of additional information (Belke et al. Reference Belke, Leder and Augustin2006). Artworks in galleries and museums are presented with titles, the artist's name, and perhaps some explanatory information regarding style, biography, and so on. Psychologically, there is nothing wrong or poor about using such kinds of information. It might be true that such information is not related with a very sophisticated artistic perspective, but it is nonetheless provided by the art experts who are responsible for the way artworks are presented.
Second, if the role of art-specific information and context are accepted as relevant aspects of an artistic appreciation, then the authors have omitted a large corpus of existing research focusing on such components, and which is surely in accordance with their psycho-historical approach. For example, Cupchik (Reference Cupchik, Cupchik and Laszlo1992) referred to the processes of assigning meaning (also see Millis & Larson Reference Millis and Larson2008), and Leder et al. (Reference Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin2004) postulated a stage of cognitive mastering, in which interpretation and assigning meaning are crucial and claimed that “with expertise, the artwork, its historical importance, or the knowledge about the artist also become the content of the aesthetic object” (Leder et al. Reference Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin2004, p. 497). All of these approaches – including B&R's psycho-historical approach – argue that perceivers' processing can depend on knowledge. In fact, the effects of expertise and knowledge, as well as the effects of context, which are key elements of B&R's conception of artistic appreciation, have been the focus of a considerable number of empirical studies in the past. B&R, however, have neglected many of these. For example, level of expertise has been shown to mediate the influence of style – as a historically bounded means of production (Cupchik Reference Cupchik, Cupchik and Laszlo1992) – on aesthetic appreciation (Augustin & Leder Reference Augustin and Leder2006). Explicitly informing participants how the artworks were made can modulate the influence of style (Belke et al. Reference Belke, Leder and Augustin2006). The role of meaning in aesthetic appreciation has also been examined, for example, by experimentally manipulating titles that provided descriptive or elaborative information (Millis Reference Millis2001; Leder et al. Reference Leder, Carbon and Ripsas2006). Also knowledge and level of understanding affects art appreciation of different kinds of art (Leder et al. Reference Leder, Gerger, Dressler and Schabmann2012). The effects of context have also been the focus of much research in the realm of experimental aesthetics and even neuroaesthetics (Cupchik et al. Reference Cupchik, Vartanian, Crawley and Mikulis2009; Kirk et al. Reference Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen and Zeki2009).
Finally, the idea of an art that as an artifact is informing about a historical context is itself a historically very recent invention, eventually emerging during the eighteenth century (see Shiner, Reference Shiner2001). What today is called the fine arts is a result of social changes in the eighteenth century. This modern notion of fine arts appeared hand in hand with the notion that artworks represented individual virtuosity and even genius. This goes even beyond B&R's claim that art represents certain historical states, because in the modern art system, artworks are valued because they represent highly idiosyncratic aspects of creation. The way an artist draws – or in Fontana's case cuts – a line depends on his mood, level of sleep, concentration, and so on. The psycho-historical approach, hence, risks becoming trapped in an increasingly idiosyncratic model, in which the subjective, personal state of the artist needs to be considered as important as any other historical context. The core of this problem lies in B&R's unnecessarily normative pretense that art is only truly appreciated in the artistic understanding mode. A view that could even widen the gap between the “two cultures” by making the empirical study of aesthetics more difficult, if not impossible, because of this idiosyncrasy. However, even avoiding the burden of idiosyncrasy, the contextual approach still remains delicate because art contexts probably always are ambiguous.
To conclude, it is worth remembering how Kreitler and Kreitler framed their Reference Kreitler and Kreitler1972 book on art and psychology: “The enormous diversity of meanings attributed as a rule to one and the same work of art by different individuals and in various historical periods also demonstrates that not even on the level of the general meaning of the product of art is a correspondence to be expected between the artist's possible intention and the spectator's interpretation” (p. 5). Thus, for a comprehensive theory of art appreciation, empirical and historical sciences will have to conduct innovative, and often interdisciplinary, research programmes.
Bullot & Reber (B&R) propose to close the “divide between the sciences and the humanities” (sect. 1.2, last paragraph). Achieving this goal would undoubtedly open new perspectives for interdisciplinary cooperation and would be an important step regarding a comprehensive theory of art appreciation. As presented here, however, the psycho-historical approach is encumbered with some serious problems that need to be addressed.
First, the authors claim that the historical, hermeneutic art sciences somehow aim to explain art appreciation. Rather, according to my experience, the sciences of art history primarily aim to explain what art is, and they study artworks, not responses to them. Art historians, hence, study the historical conditions of art and thereby provide the knowledge that B&R believe enables what they regard as artistic appreciation. Interestingly, their description of “deciphering the causal history” (sect. 3.2.), referring to the nineteenth century art historian Morelli, alludes to highly specialized skills of a kind that in my experience only art historians attain. The processes involved in reconstructing the historical origins and contexts of artworks are typically very complex, requiring extensive knowledge, which is out of reach for most nonexperts. Thus, the psycho-historical framework seems to overestimate the likelihood with which artistic appreciation, as conceived by the authors, actually takes place. It probably is, in fact, a very restricted and specialized way of approaching artworks. If psychological studies were restricted only to those situations where art was perceived in such a “properly artistic appreciation-stance,” many kinds of art appreciation would be excluded, leaving only a small subclass of possible aesthetic experiences (Leder et al. Reference Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin2004).
However, in real life – and in studies of experimental aesthetics – most people's appreciation of works of art is supplemented by some form of additional information (Belke et al. Reference Belke, Leder and Augustin2006). Artworks in galleries and museums are presented with titles, the artist's name, and perhaps some explanatory information regarding style, biography, and so on. Psychologically, there is nothing wrong or poor about using such kinds of information. It might be true that such information is not related with a very sophisticated artistic perspective, but it is nonetheless provided by the art experts who are responsible for the way artworks are presented.
Second, if the role of art-specific information and context are accepted as relevant aspects of an artistic appreciation, then the authors have omitted a large corpus of existing research focusing on such components, and which is surely in accordance with their psycho-historical approach. For example, Cupchik (Reference Cupchik, Cupchik and Laszlo1992) referred to the processes of assigning meaning (also see Millis & Larson Reference Millis and Larson2008), and Leder et al. (Reference Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin2004) postulated a stage of cognitive mastering, in which interpretation and assigning meaning are crucial and claimed that “with expertise, the artwork, its historical importance, or the knowledge about the artist also become the content of the aesthetic object” (Leder et al. Reference Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin2004, p. 497). All of these approaches – including B&R's psycho-historical approach – argue that perceivers' processing can depend on knowledge. In fact, the effects of expertise and knowledge, as well as the effects of context, which are key elements of B&R's conception of artistic appreciation, have been the focus of a considerable number of empirical studies in the past. B&R, however, have neglected many of these. For example, level of expertise has been shown to mediate the influence of style – as a historically bounded means of production (Cupchik Reference Cupchik, Cupchik and Laszlo1992) – on aesthetic appreciation (Augustin & Leder Reference Augustin and Leder2006). Explicitly informing participants how the artworks were made can modulate the influence of style (Belke et al. Reference Belke, Leder and Augustin2006). The role of meaning in aesthetic appreciation has also been examined, for example, by experimentally manipulating titles that provided descriptive or elaborative information (Millis Reference Millis2001; Leder et al. Reference Leder, Carbon and Ripsas2006). Also knowledge and level of understanding affects art appreciation of different kinds of art (Leder et al. Reference Leder, Gerger, Dressler and Schabmann2012). The effects of context have also been the focus of much research in the realm of experimental aesthetics and even neuroaesthetics (Cupchik et al. Reference Cupchik, Vartanian, Crawley and Mikulis2009; Kirk et al. Reference Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen and Zeki2009).
Finally, the idea of an art that as an artifact is informing about a historical context is itself a historically very recent invention, eventually emerging during the eighteenth century (see Shiner, Reference Shiner2001). What today is called the fine arts is a result of social changes in the eighteenth century. This modern notion of fine arts appeared hand in hand with the notion that artworks represented individual virtuosity and even genius. This goes even beyond B&R's claim that art represents certain historical states, because in the modern art system, artworks are valued because they represent highly idiosyncratic aspects of creation. The way an artist draws – or in Fontana's case cuts – a line depends on his mood, level of sleep, concentration, and so on. The psycho-historical approach, hence, risks becoming trapped in an increasingly idiosyncratic model, in which the subjective, personal state of the artist needs to be considered as important as any other historical context. The core of this problem lies in B&R's unnecessarily normative pretense that art is only truly appreciated in the artistic understanding mode. A view that could even widen the gap between the “two cultures” by making the empirical study of aesthetics more difficult, if not impossible, because of this idiosyncrasy. However, even avoiding the burden of idiosyncrasy, the contextual approach still remains delicate because art contexts probably always are ambiguous.
To conclude, it is worth remembering how Kreitler and Kreitler framed their Reference Kreitler and Kreitler1972 book on art and psychology: “The enormous diversity of meanings attributed as a rule to one and the same work of art by different individuals and in various historical periods also demonstrates that not even on the level of the general meaning of the product of art is a correspondence to be expected between the artist's possible intention and the spectator's interpretation” (p. 5). Thus, for a comprehensive theory of art appreciation, empirical and historical sciences will have to conduct innovative, and often interdisciplinary, research programmes.