One of the most striking charges against experimental and neuroaesthetics is that, despite claims to the contrary, these fields cannot genuinely explain the nature of aesthetic experience (Noë Reference Noë2011). Bullot & Reber (B&R) attempt to avert this alleged difficulty by uniting the “two cultures” of science and art history. They take pains to describe an art-historical context that is sufficient for explaining the distinctive aspects of artistic appreciation (sect. 2, para. 1).
My comments raise questions concerning the very notion of “artistic appreciation,” a concept I believe is inadequately defined in the psycho-historical account. Specifically, the authors illustrate three “modes of aesthetic appreciation”: basic exposure, design stance, and artistic understanding (sect. 3). The modes account for a wide range of our aesthetic experiences of artworks, including our perceptual, emotional, historical, and causal reasoning (B&R, Fig. 2). Importantly, the latter two modes are causally and necessarily dependent on the previous – the design stance depends on basic exposure and artistic understanding depends on design stance.
My worry is that none of these modes are individually necessary for artistic appreciation, and together they are insufficient for it. First, I believe that we can appreciate works of art without any of the particular modes playing a role in that experience. The causal/dependent nature of the modes is particularly important here. For example, the basis of basic exposure is perceptual representation and attentional tracking of observable features of the work (sect. 3, Fig. 2). The notion of “perceptual representation” is vague as currently stated. It is unclear in what way we must perceive an artwork in order for appreciation to take place. Can we appreciate artworks that we have seen in the past or only seen in a text or online? What about artworks that we know quite a bit about through various social interactions but have never directly perceived – as with films or novels? If perceptual representation of the kind the authors describe is necessary for appreciation, then we must deny that we appreciate artworks in these cases or modify the view to accommodate them.
Here is the puzzle as I see it. If we need basic exposure to an artwork in order for our appreciation to get off the ground, then denying its necessity should affect the other two modes that causally depend on it. But is this really the case? I think that one can appreciate an artwork in terms of its causal or art-historical context without ever directly perceiving it, as with art history students who never directly encounter a work of art they study. Relatedly, I also deny that sensitivity to art-historical context is necessary for artistic appreciation. B&R cite Jerry Fodor, who makes a similar point to mine (Fodor Reference Fodor and Rollins1993). The authors' dismissal of Fodor's claims is too hasty. While I agree that sensitivity to art-historical context will make for greater or more intellectual appreciation, surely one can significantly appreciate a work without knowledge of the author, style, or social context in which it was created. It may be possible to appreciate an artwork without taking the design stance at all – without engaging in mind-reading practices, causal reasoning, or contemplation of the work's creation.
My second concern is that the three modes may be insufficient for artistic appreciation. Obviously, other factors not mentioned here might be involved in artistic appreciation; I think B&R would be happy to grant this claim. However, I would also argue that it is unclear what makes these modes distinctive artistically. In other words, the modes do not show what it means to undergo an aesthetic experience (i.e., an experience of an artwork) versus any other type of experience. This is the same charge made against experimental and neuroaesthetic theories mentioned above: they do not tell us anything uniquely interesting about aesthetic experiences (see Onians Reference Onians2008; Ramachandran & Hirstein Reference Ramachandran and Hirstein1999; Zeki Reference Zeki1999).
Consider indiscernibles such as those in Arthur Danto's gallery of red squares, some of which are artworks and some of which are not. Indiscernibles seem to require an art-historical context for identification as artworks. But what makes our appreciation of them an aesthetic experience rather than merely the ordinary contemplation of an everyday object? One possible answer that Danto suggests is that knowledge of art theory will actively shape our further experiences with the work beyond (Danto Reference Danto1981).
So far, so good for B&R's theory. The problem is that the authors never make it clear the way in which the modes need to be activated in our experiences with artworks. Must we consciously take the design stance in order to aesthetically experience the red square or any artwork? Must we reflect on our knowledge of art history or theory in order for our experience to be an artistic one? If the answer to these questions is “yes,” then we have strong criteria for what makes artistic experiences different from ordinary ones: the conscious reflection and engagement with the aesthetic and art-historical features of a work. However, this also seems like an overly robust notion of artistic appreciation. Consciously and deliberately engaging in causal or historical features of an artwork seems like an extra step of artistic appreciation, not a necessary one – something we may do on occasion, but certainly not something we must do with each work we encounter. On the other hand, if we deny that conscious or deliberate contemplation of an artwork is required for artistic appreciation, then it is less clear what makes these experiences aesthetic to begin with. We would passively perceive, respond to, or otherwise engage with a work in much the same way we do with any ordinary object.
B&R may need to adjust their discussion of the aesthetic modes in order to overcome the worries I present here. My second point may simply require further explanation concerning the nature of our aesthetic experiences. The first point, however, seems more problematic. If I am right that none of the modes are necessary for aesthetic appreciation, then the authors may wish to reconsider the strict causal/dependent aspect of their theory.
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One of the most striking charges against experimental and neuroaesthetics is that, despite claims to the contrary, these fields cannot genuinely explain the nature of aesthetic experience (Noë Reference Noë2011). Bullot & Reber (B&R) attempt to avert this alleged difficulty by uniting the “two cultures” of science and art history. They take pains to describe an art-historical context that is sufficient for explaining the distinctive aspects of artistic appreciation (sect. 2, para. 1).
My comments raise questions concerning the very notion of “artistic appreciation,” a concept I believe is inadequately defined in the psycho-historical account. Specifically, the authors illustrate three “modes of aesthetic appreciation”: basic exposure, design stance, and artistic understanding (sect. 3). The modes account for a wide range of our aesthetic experiences of artworks, including our perceptual, emotional, historical, and causal reasoning (B&R, Fig. 2). Importantly, the latter two modes are causally and necessarily dependent on the previous – the design stance depends on basic exposure and artistic understanding depends on design stance.
My worry is that none of these modes are individually necessary for artistic appreciation, and together they are insufficient for it. First, I believe that we can appreciate works of art without any of the particular modes playing a role in that experience. The causal/dependent nature of the modes is particularly important here. For example, the basis of basic exposure is perceptual representation and attentional tracking of observable features of the work (sect. 3, Fig. 2). The notion of “perceptual representation” is vague as currently stated. It is unclear in what way we must perceive an artwork in order for appreciation to take place. Can we appreciate artworks that we have seen in the past or only seen in a text or online? What about artworks that we know quite a bit about through various social interactions but have never directly perceived – as with films or novels? If perceptual representation of the kind the authors describe is necessary for appreciation, then we must deny that we appreciate artworks in these cases or modify the view to accommodate them.
Here is the puzzle as I see it. If we need basic exposure to an artwork in order for our appreciation to get off the ground, then denying its necessity should affect the other two modes that causally depend on it. But is this really the case? I think that one can appreciate an artwork in terms of its causal or art-historical context without ever directly perceiving it, as with art history students who never directly encounter a work of art they study. Relatedly, I also deny that sensitivity to art-historical context is necessary for artistic appreciation. B&R cite Jerry Fodor, who makes a similar point to mine (Fodor Reference Fodor and Rollins1993). The authors' dismissal of Fodor's claims is too hasty. While I agree that sensitivity to art-historical context will make for greater or more intellectual appreciation, surely one can significantly appreciate a work without knowledge of the author, style, or social context in which it was created. It may be possible to appreciate an artwork without taking the design stance at all – without engaging in mind-reading practices, causal reasoning, or contemplation of the work's creation.
My second concern is that the three modes may be insufficient for artistic appreciation. Obviously, other factors not mentioned here might be involved in artistic appreciation; I think B&R would be happy to grant this claim. However, I would also argue that it is unclear what makes these modes distinctive artistically. In other words, the modes do not show what it means to undergo an aesthetic experience (i.e., an experience of an artwork) versus any other type of experience. This is the same charge made against experimental and neuroaesthetic theories mentioned above: they do not tell us anything uniquely interesting about aesthetic experiences (see Onians Reference Onians2008; Ramachandran & Hirstein Reference Ramachandran and Hirstein1999; Zeki Reference Zeki1999).
Consider indiscernibles such as those in Arthur Danto's gallery of red squares, some of which are artworks and some of which are not. Indiscernibles seem to require an art-historical context for identification as artworks. But what makes our appreciation of them an aesthetic experience rather than merely the ordinary contemplation of an everyday object? One possible answer that Danto suggests is that knowledge of art theory will actively shape our further experiences with the work beyond (Danto Reference Danto1981).
So far, so good for B&R's theory. The problem is that the authors never make it clear the way in which the modes need to be activated in our experiences with artworks. Must we consciously take the design stance in order to aesthetically experience the red square or any artwork? Must we reflect on our knowledge of art history or theory in order for our experience to be an artistic one? If the answer to these questions is “yes,” then we have strong criteria for what makes artistic experiences different from ordinary ones: the conscious reflection and engagement with the aesthetic and art-historical features of a work. However, this also seems like an overly robust notion of artistic appreciation. Consciously and deliberately engaging in causal or historical features of an artwork seems like an extra step of artistic appreciation, not a necessary one – something we may do on occasion, but certainly not something we must do with each work we encounter. On the other hand, if we deny that conscious or deliberate contemplation of an artwork is required for artistic appreciation, then it is less clear what makes these experiences aesthetic to begin with. We would passively perceive, respond to, or otherwise engage with a work in much the same way we do with any ordinary object.
B&R may need to adjust their discussion of the aesthetic modes in order to overcome the worries I present here. My second point may simply require further explanation concerning the nature of our aesthetic experiences. The first point, however, seems more problematic. If I am right that none of the modes are necessary for aesthetic appreciation, then the authors may wish to reconsider the strict causal/dependent aspect of their theory.