We respond to Moffett's thesis through the lens of the core configuration model of human groupings (Brewer & Caporael, Reference Brewer, Caporael, Schaller, Simpson and Kenrick2006; Caporael, Reference Caporael1997). The model postulates that there are four fundamental and universal ways in which humans come together in coordinated groups that vary in size, function, and mechanism of coordination. These four configurations are the dyad, the task group, the deme (or band), and the macrodeme (macroband) (see Caporael & Garvey, Reference Caporael and Garvey2014, for a concise elaboration of this basic structure). A core configuration is a joint function of group size and activity such that each configuration affords functional possibilities and coordination mechanisms that do not exist at the other levels. Critically, as the term “configuration” implies, the model holds that individuals move fluidly among these groupings both within and between levels.
Of most relevance here is the distinction between demes (moderate-sized coordinating groups based on face-to-face interaction and interpersonal relationships), and macrodemes (large-scale symbolic groups held together by common identity). From this core configuration perspective, Moffett's definition of “society” is at once too broad and too narrow.
In his effort to seek continuity across species, Moffett's definition of “society” subsumes both individual recognition groups (for which examples among nonhuman vertebrates abound) and anonymous identity groups (which are unique to humans among vertebrates), thereby conflating demes and macrodemes under the same umbrella. The basic premises of the core configuration model hold that these two forms are distinct and non-interchangeable. Most specifically, the deme level of grouping is not sufficient for reproductive diversity and one critical function of the macrodeme is providing a defined pool for mate selection. We see Moffett's description of “anonymous societies” as equivalent to the macrodeme level of coordination and herein refer to this form as identity groups. We share Moffett's recognition of the significance of such groups that are based on shared understandings independent of individual recognition.
Do identity groups require territory?
Whereas Moffett overextends the concept of society when he subsumes two distinct basic forms, he unnecessarily narrows the concept of identity groups when he insists on incorporating territory and control of physical space as a foundational element of his definition of society.
Groups defined by shared understandings and symbols not only free collectives from limits of group size but also limits of distance and even time. Although groups in interaction necessarily require occupation of some physical (or virtual?) space, it is not necessary that the group be defined or bounded by that space. To limit our understanding of identity groups to territorially defined groupings cuts the enterprise short. It fails to appreciate the enormous diversity of collective coordination that is made possible by the development of identity groups and the role they play in human social life.
Boundaries, distinctiveness, and permeability
Identity groups not only free collectives from size and spatial limits but also exist independent of the composition of membership at any one point in time. Enduring groups exist across time, generations, and turnover of individual members. All identity groups have provisions for movement of individuals into and out of the group, so do not require impermeability at the level of individuals. Identity groups are not constrained by the number or identity of its members but by factors that allow for the preservation of shared meaning.
As Moffitt emphasizes, groups require boundedness, and the boundaries of identity groups lie in mutual belief in shared distinctiveness. Membership in large distinctive groups satisfies human needs for both inclusion and differentiation (Brewer, Reference Brewer1991). Members are motivated to maintain and defend group distinctiveness (even though the basis for distinction may shift over time and social context). However, it is not sufficient that shared identity exists in the minds of individual members. Instantiation of group identity requires recurring materialized manifestations in the form of practices, rituals, gatherings, and symbolic displays that reinforce the reality of the group as an entity. In other words, individuals have to experience group identity, not just believe in it.
Nested versus cross-cutting identity groups
Moffett acknowledges that humans form multiple meaningful social groups but states that “societies can be picked out from other tiers by their primacy with respect to abiding identities.” Despite his intent to define society broadly, it is clear that his definition is heavily influenced by the nation-state as a prototypic example. He implies that other identity groups are essentially nested within this “primal” version. We would argue in contrast that there are many variants of identity groups and individuals recognize membership in many such groups on an equal par with national identities. Scientific disciplines, global religions, ethnic identity groups have all the properties of shared identity groups that cross-cut national identity.
Movement across identity groups is fluid. Just as participation in task groups or communities is specific to time and place, activation and enactment of specific identity group memberships is similarly situated. We may be aware of our membership in a particular identity group on a daily basis or only occasionally, depending on what role that group plays in coordinating our actions with others for specific purposes. Moffett's focus on one form of collective organization fails to capture the functional fluidity of social identity groups.
To conclude, while we fully appreciate Moffett's agenda to inspire cross-disciplinary attention to the nature of both human and nonhuman social grouping, we would encourage a more organic understanding of life in groups.
Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez
[Opens in a new window]Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez
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We respond to Moffett's thesis through the lens of the core configuration model of human groupings (Brewer & Caporael, Reference Brewer, Caporael, Schaller, Simpson and Kenrick2006; Caporael, Reference Caporael1997). The model postulates that there are four fundamental and universal ways in which humans come together in coordinated groups that vary in size, function, and mechanism of coordination. These four configurations are the dyad, the task group, the deme (or band), and the macrodeme (macroband) (see Caporael & Garvey, Reference Caporael and Garvey2014, for a concise elaboration of this basic structure). A core configuration is a joint function of group size and activity such that each configuration affords functional possibilities and coordination mechanisms that do not exist at the other levels. Critically, as the term “configuration” implies, the model holds that individuals move fluidly among these groupings both within and between levels.
Of most relevance here is the distinction between demes (moderate-sized coordinating groups based on face-to-face interaction and interpersonal relationships), and macrodemes (large-scale symbolic groups held together by common identity). From this core configuration perspective, Moffett's definition of “society” is at once too broad and too narrow.
In his effort to seek continuity across species, Moffett's definition of “society” subsumes both individual recognition groups (for which examples among nonhuman vertebrates abound) and anonymous identity groups (which are unique to humans among vertebrates), thereby conflating demes and macrodemes under the same umbrella. The basic premises of the core configuration model hold that these two forms are distinct and non-interchangeable. Most specifically, the deme level of grouping is not sufficient for reproductive diversity and one critical function of the macrodeme is providing a defined pool for mate selection. We see Moffett's description of “anonymous societies” as equivalent to the macrodeme level of coordination and herein refer to this form as identity groups. We share Moffett's recognition of the significance of such groups that are based on shared understandings independent of individual recognition.
Do identity groups require territory?
Whereas Moffett overextends the concept of society when he subsumes two distinct basic forms, he unnecessarily narrows the concept of identity groups when he insists on incorporating territory and control of physical space as a foundational element of his definition of society.
Groups defined by shared understandings and symbols not only free collectives from limits of group size but also limits of distance and even time. Although groups in interaction necessarily require occupation of some physical (or virtual?) space, it is not necessary that the group be defined or bounded by that space. To limit our understanding of identity groups to territorially defined groupings cuts the enterprise short. It fails to appreciate the enormous diversity of collective coordination that is made possible by the development of identity groups and the role they play in human social life.
Boundaries, distinctiveness, and permeability
Identity groups not only free collectives from size and spatial limits but also exist independent of the composition of membership at any one point in time. Enduring groups exist across time, generations, and turnover of individual members. All identity groups have provisions for movement of individuals into and out of the group, so do not require impermeability at the level of individuals. Identity groups are not constrained by the number or identity of its members but by factors that allow for the preservation of shared meaning.
As Moffitt emphasizes, groups require boundedness, and the boundaries of identity groups lie in mutual belief in shared distinctiveness. Membership in large distinctive groups satisfies human needs for both inclusion and differentiation (Brewer, Reference Brewer1991). Members are motivated to maintain and defend group distinctiveness (even though the basis for distinction may shift over time and social context). However, it is not sufficient that shared identity exists in the minds of individual members. Instantiation of group identity requires recurring materialized manifestations in the form of practices, rituals, gatherings, and symbolic displays that reinforce the reality of the group as an entity. In other words, individuals have to experience group identity, not just believe in it.
Nested versus cross-cutting identity groups
Moffett acknowledges that humans form multiple meaningful social groups but states that “societies can be picked out from other tiers by their primacy with respect to abiding identities.” Despite his intent to define society broadly, it is clear that his definition is heavily influenced by the nation-state as a prototypic example. He implies that other identity groups are essentially nested within this “primal” version. We would argue in contrast that there are many variants of identity groups and individuals recognize membership in many such groups on an equal par with national identities. Scientific disciplines, global religions, ethnic identity groups have all the properties of shared identity groups that cross-cut national identity.
Movement across identity groups is fluid. Just as participation in task groups or communities is specific to time and place, activation and enactment of specific identity group memberships is similarly situated. We may be aware of our membership in a particular identity group on a daily basis or only occasionally, depending on what role that group plays in coordinating our actions with others for specific purposes. Moffett's focus on one form of collective organization fails to capture the functional fluidity of social identity groups.
To conclude, while we fully appreciate Moffett's agenda to inspire cross-disciplinary attention to the nature of both human and nonhuman social grouping, we would encourage a more organic understanding of life in groups.
Financial support
This work received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.