In my paper, I point out that the definition and theory of society cannot disregard the moral component, which we can call a moral community. If we assume, following Moffett, that the essence of society is a sense of belonging to the same and recognizing each other as “we,” then this sense of belonging must be moral in nature. In turn, for it to include a moral component, it cannot be abstract. The theory of society according to Moffett is abstract, as it does not refer to categories such as gender and race, which makes it a-moral. What I am pointing out is that after decades of developing knowledge about the mechanisms of discrimination and social exclusion running around these two categories – however there are more such categories – we should not propose a way of understanding and studying society that ignores the existence of oppression and discrimination, and therefore that is devoid of a moral criterion. Moffett proposes a genderless and raceless theory of society, in which members of society are understood as individuals who recognize each other and maintain control over physical space; however, the author adds that this sense of belonging may extend beyond the boundaries of a territorial community.
The biggest flaw in the way of understanding society proposed by Moffett is the exclusion of “power relationships, statuses, or roles” from the definition of society. According to the author, these categories are not relevant. However, the exact opposite is true. In the first place, we are a person of a particular gender, not simply a person or an individual or an element of society (de Beauvoir, Borde, & Malovany-Chevallier, Reference de Beauvoir, Borde and Malovany-Chevallier2010). Moffett seems to assume precisely the abstractness of human being understood as an individual without properties and without categories, forming a society, who only then obtains categories of one kind or another within that society. The sense of belonging is primary. This understanding of society may seem correct at first glance, but it becomes troublesome when we look at the case of unequal treatment of individual members of society on the basis of their categories, for instance gender. Should we consider, according to Moffett's understanding, a society created by privileged men and subordinated women as the primary sense of belonging for women treated in an oppressive and subordinate manner? Or rather, assume that the primary and dominant sense of belonging for an oppressed woman will be the society of oppressed women? If the former, it is not clear why the strength of the sense of belonging to the same with oppressive women men would be stronger or more important for the scientific definition of society, than with other women. If, on the other hand, we assume that for an oppressed woman “we” means her and other oppressed women, then what is primary is the social category and position in power structures, not the sense of belonging. The category as primary determines the sense of belonging, not the sense of belonging determines or at least precedes the category, as Moffett suggests. Moffett somewhat like Rawls (Reference Rawls1971) in his famous thought experiment known as the veil of ignorance seems to imply that we are, as members of society, devoid of all categories, those, after all, he considers irrelevant to the definition of society. So who are we and what do we have in common as a society? If we exclude the all-encompassing influence of categories, social roles, and place in power structures, we are left with pre-feminist categories such as language, race, ethnicity, and territory; that is, categories that are a-moral and that do not provide the tools to understand this individual's understanding of belonging. These categories simply ignore an authentic sense of belonging.
The way of understanding society proposed by Moffett is anachronistic, as it does not withstand contemporary criticism, which is rooted in feminism and postcolonial studies (Khader, Reference Khader2019). Taking inspiration from this perspective, we can say that the understanding of society should not be a-moral, but include a moral component as a necessary element. It is this moral component that makes an oppressed woman feel that she belongs to a virtual, abstract society of all the (oppressed) women of the world, rather than members of society in the classical sense understood by Moffett, which, it seems, would mean her compatriots, the inhabitants of a region, people of the same nationality, and so on.
It is this moral component, absent from Moffett, that makes the definition of society today go far beyond the understanding he proposed. A society cannot be immoral, it cannot deprive certain categories of people, such as women and others discriminated against because of their gender identity, people with disabilities, or racialized minorities, of equal moral status. Such an immoral society deprives itself of the right to use the term society as a collection of people who recognize each other and have a sense of belonging. In this moral understanding of society, society is oppressed women, but not oppressed women and oppressor men, even if the latter have many characteristics that allow them to recognize their common belonging (origin, history, location, language, and many other characteristics). Similarly, for those who respect and defend the rights of LGBTQIA + people, society – according to the criterion of a sense of belonging and recognition – is no other individuals with whom they are accidentally linked by history and location, but all those who respect and defend the rights of LGBTQIA + people. We may share a common belonging with a hypothetical extraterrestrial intelligence, but not with many of our compatriots. This moral understanding of belonging is determined by a category, in this case gender, and respecting and defending the right of individuals to recognize their own gender – or lack thereof. This moral understanding of society, or belonging to the same moral value that seems to inform who we are, to a much stronger and more significant degree than language, ancestry, skin color, or region inhabited, also applies to attitudes toward the environment, climate change, respect for animals, immigration.
Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez
[Opens in a new window]Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez
, 
You have
Access
In my paper, I point out that the definition and theory of society cannot disregard the moral component, which we can call a moral community. If we assume, following Moffett, that the essence of society is a sense of belonging to the same and recognizing each other as “we,” then this sense of belonging must be moral in nature. In turn, for it to include a moral component, it cannot be abstract. The theory of society according to Moffett is abstract, as it does not refer to categories such as gender and race, which makes it a-moral. What I am pointing out is that after decades of developing knowledge about the mechanisms of discrimination and social exclusion running around these two categories – however there are more such categories – we should not propose a way of understanding and studying society that ignores the existence of oppression and discrimination, and therefore that is devoid of a moral criterion. Moffett proposes a genderless and raceless theory of society, in which members of society are understood as individuals who recognize each other and maintain control over physical space; however, the author adds that this sense of belonging may extend beyond the boundaries of a territorial community.
The biggest flaw in the way of understanding society proposed by Moffett is the exclusion of “power relationships, statuses, or roles” from the definition of society. According to the author, these categories are not relevant. However, the exact opposite is true. In the first place, we are a person of a particular gender, not simply a person or an individual or an element of society (de Beauvoir, Borde, & Malovany-Chevallier, Reference de Beauvoir, Borde and Malovany-Chevallier2010). Moffett seems to assume precisely the abstractness of human being understood as an individual without properties and without categories, forming a society, who only then obtains categories of one kind or another within that society. The sense of belonging is primary. This understanding of society may seem correct at first glance, but it becomes troublesome when we look at the case of unequal treatment of individual members of society on the basis of their categories, for instance gender. Should we consider, according to Moffett's understanding, a society created by privileged men and subordinated women as the primary sense of belonging for women treated in an oppressive and subordinate manner? Or rather, assume that the primary and dominant sense of belonging for an oppressed woman will be the society of oppressed women? If the former, it is not clear why the strength of the sense of belonging to the same with oppressive women men would be stronger or more important for the scientific definition of society, than with other women. If, on the other hand, we assume that for an oppressed woman “we” means her and other oppressed women, then what is primary is the social category and position in power structures, not the sense of belonging. The category as primary determines the sense of belonging, not the sense of belonging determines or at least precedes the category, as Moffett suggests. Moffett somewhat like Rawls (Reference Rawls1971) in his famous thought experiment known as the veil of ignorance seems to imply that we are, as members of society, devoid of all categories, those, after all, he considers irrelevant to the definition of society. So who are we and what do we have in common as a society? If we exclude the all-encompassing influence of categories, social roles, and place in power structures, we are left with pre-feminist categories such as language, race, ethnicity, and territory; that is, categories that are a-moral and that do not provide the tools to understand this individual's understanding of belonging. These categories simply ignore an authentic sense of belonging.
The way of understanding society proposed by Moffett is anachronistic, as it does not withstand contemporary criticism, which is rooted in feminism and postcolonial studies (Khader, Reference Khader2019). Taking inspiration from this perspective, we can say that the understanding of society should not be a-moral, but include a moral component as a necessary element. It is this moral component that makes an oppressed woman feel that she belongs to a virtual, abstract society of all the (oppressed) women of the world, rather than members of society in the classical sense understood by Moffett, which, it seems, would mean her compatriots, the inhabitants of a region, people of the same nationality, and so on.
It is this moral component, absent from Moffett, that makes the definition of society today go far beyond the understanding he proposed. A society cannot be immoral, it cannot deprive certain categories of people, such as women and others discriminated against because of their gender identity, people with disabilities, or racialized minorities, of equal moral status. Such an immoral society deprives itself of the right to use the term society as a collection of people who recognize each other and have a sense of belonging. In this moral understanding of society, society is oppressed women, but not oppressed women and oppressor men, even if the latter have many characteristics that allow them to recognize their common belonging (origin, history, location, language, and many other characteristics). Similarly, for those who respect and defend the rights of LGBTQIA + people, society – according to the criterion of a sense of belonging and recognition – is no other individuals with whom they are accidentally linked by history and location, but all those who respect and defend the rights of LGBTQIA + people. We may share a common belonging with a hypothetical extraterrestrial intelligence, but not with many of our compatriots. This moral understanding of belonging is determined by a category, in this case gender, and respecting and defending the right of individuals to recognize their own gender – or lack thereof. This moral understanding of society, or belonging to the same moral value that seems to inform who we are, to a much stronger and more significant degree than language, ancestry, skin color, or region inhabited, also applies to attitudes toward the environment, climate change, respect for animals, immigration.
Financial support
None.
Competing interest
None.