Moffett proposes a definition of “society” resting on two main pillars: a shared sense of “belonging” amongst members, and control over the territory in which those members live. In offering this definition, he seeks to stimulate an interdisciplinary examination of society through an appeal to scholars from sociology, biology, philosophy, politics, and more. By engaging with literature from the field of international relations (IR), we seek to show that the maintenance and external independence of a “society” does not coincide with or follow from the existence of a group with shared identity.
For our purposes, we will refer to a group that understands itself as having a collective identity as a nation (Anderson, Reference Anderson1990). Separately, a state is a territorially bound group boasting internal supremacy (total authority over its members) and external independence (freedom from outside authority) (Bull, Reference Bull1977). When combined, these two form the conceptual “nation-state,” understood as a “community of sentiment” in which members feature a specific sense of solidarity toward each other while exercising exclusive dominion over the territory they occupy (Gerth & Mills, Reference Gerth and Mills2014).
Moffett's proposed “society” as an “enduring territorial group whose members recognize each other as belonging” is thus a replication of the “nation-state” (target article, sect. 1, para. 1). By reifying an existing IR term, Moffett fails to counter what he terms as the prevalent and reductionist understanding of society as “passport-holding, national anthem-singing territorial groups” (target article, sect. 1.1, para. 1).
The issue inherent to this reification is that the nation-state does not exist. A true, stable polity in which the identity-based belonging of a nation coincides with the territorial boundaries of a state is unknown to history (Walby, Reference Walby2003). Broadly, the association between nation and state is manufactured by the post-World War I international system, in which the state has become the basal unit of political power. A nation wishing to protect itself, further develop, or conduct its own foreign policy is obliged to become, create, or join an existing state (Hurrell, Reference Hurrell2007). In practice, the resultant states have always been multi-national endeavors. This is partially due to the inherited nature of political geography: The 1884 Berlin Conference, for example, drew boundaries agnostic to national identity across the African continent, dividing some groups and lumping others together haphazardly (Griffiths, Reference Griffiths1986). The existence of multiple nations within a state, however, need not have a historical precedent. By virtue of existing within a state, a population will develop majorities and minorities that could themselves grow to form new nations (Walby, Reference Walby2003). By defining society as a nation-state in IR terms, Moffett renders his own criterion of “belonging” meaningless. If the state is the only unit by which exclusive territorial domain can be secured, only a state can be a society – regardless of whether all the members of that state see themselves as a nation.
Further, the assumption that a state has what Moffett calls “identity markers” follows from the confounding of the power-wielding entity of a state and the cultural entity of a nation. The understanding of identity associated with a state is not a characteristic of the state itself, but of a nation within said state (Reus-Smit, Reference Reus-Smit2017). Great Britain here provides a fitting example, as a state featuring four distinct nations bound within a single territory. There is no “identity marker” for being British beyond a state-issued passport. What one may think of as “being British” – be it an accent, a mannerism, a religion – is likely a marker of one of its constituent nations.
While we agree with Moffett's intent to separate a notion or definition of society from a strictly political one, we believe that his current definition instead recapitulates it. Some of this failing can be traced to the attempt to engage with philosophers and biologists; namely, the metaphysical appeal to “shared perception of belonging” which seeks to include animals, namely vertebrates, but falls prey to the same criticisms (Dennett, Reference Dennett1993) as Nagel, and later Peter Godfrey-Smith's, consciousness requirements of animal minds. Particularly, that there is something that it is like to be a bat (Nagel, Reference Nagel1974) or more broadly something it is to be conscious (Godfrey-Smith, Reference Godfrey-Smith2021). For Moffett, there is something that it is to be a society, most importantly a shared perception of belonging. By envoking perception, there is the additional worry that one seeking to call something a society must also furnish an account of an individual's “perception” which seems unneeded.
We propose that instead of the metaphysical requirement for constituents to perceive belonging, the argument might benefit from considering a functional definition of society, looking at the aggregate. Namely, a society is the kind of thing that does “x, y, z” where “x, y, z” might consist of persisting for generations, declaring war, possessing a metric separating internal from external, and so on. This allows for a discussion about the kinds of societies in which Moffett is interested, namely mammals, without sacrificing the broad, cooperation-based definition of E.O. Wilson. For example, much of what makes ant societies so fascinating is their lack of “steadfast affiliation to the collective” (target article, sect. 2, para. 3); instead, they boast a dynamic ruleset governing local links that results in a collective. Here, we see that the end result looks an awful lot like a collaborative collective of individuals who seem to have a shared perception of belonging. In reality, they do not, but they are still a society. Working from the functional rather than the form may provide a better opportunity for interdisciplinary collaboration.
Taking an IR lens to Moffett's definition highlights its weakness. The inclusion of a territorial control criterion means that, in its application to modern humanity, a society can only be a state. This unfortunately undercuts his claim that a “society” is the primary unit defining “groupiness” throughout human history. Looking beyond form toward function may be key to formulating a more widely applicable and interdisciplinary understanding of society.
Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez
[Opens in a new window]Gabriel Ramos-Fernandez
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Moffett proposes a definition of “society” resting on two main pillars: a shared sense of “belonging” amongst members, and control over the territory in which those members live. In offering this definition, he seeks to stimulate an interdisciplinary examination of society through an appeal to scholars from sociology, biology, philosophy, politics, and more. By engaging with literature from the field of international relations (IR), we seek to show that the maintenance and external independence of a “society” does not coincide with or follow from the existence of a group with shared identity.
For our purposes, we will refer to a group that understands itself as having a collective identity as a nation (Anderson, Reference Anderson1990). Separately, a state is a territorially bound group boasting internal supremacy (total authority over its members) and external independence (freedom from outside authority) (Bull, Reference Bull1977). When combined, these two form the conceptual “nation-state,” understood as a “community of sentiment” in which members feature a specific sense of solidarity toward each other while exercising exclusive dominion over the territory they occupy (Gerth & Mills, Reference Gerth and Mills2014).
Moffett's proposed “society” as an “enduring territorial group whose members recognize each other as belonging” is thus a replication of the “nation-state” (target article, sect. 1, para. 1). By reifying an existing IR term, Moffett fails to counter what he terms as the prevalent and reductionist understanding of society as “passport-holding, national anthem-singing territorial groups” (target article, sect. 1.1, para. 1).
The issue inherent to this reification is that the nation-state does not exist. A true, stable polity in which the identity-based belonging of a nation coincides with the territorial boundaries of a state is unknown to history (Walby, Reference Walby2003). Broadly, the association between nation and state is manufactured by the post-World War I international system, in which the state has become the basal unit of political power. A nation wishing to protect itself, further develop, or conduct its own foreign policy is obliged to become, create, or join an existing state (Hurrell, Reference Hurrell2007). In practice, the resultant states have always been multi-national endeavors. This is partially due to the inherited nature of political geography: The 1884 Berlin Conference, for example, drew boundaries agnostic to national identity across the African continent, dividing some groups and lumping others together haphazardly (Griffiths, Reference Griffiths1986). The existence of multiple nations within a state, however, need not have a historical precedent. By virtue of existing within a state, a population will develop majorities and minorities that could themselves grow to form new nations (Walby, Reference Walby2003). By defining society as a nation-state in IR terms, Moffett renders his own criterion of “belonging” meaningless. If the state is the only unit by which exclusive territorial domain can be secured, only a state can be a society – regardless of whether all the members of that state see themselves as a nation.
Further, the assumption that a state has what Moffett calls “identity markers” follows from the confounding of the power-wielding entity of a state and the cultural entity of a nation. The understanding of identity associated with a state is not a characteristic of the state itself, but of a nation within said state (Reus-Smit, Reference Reus-Smit2017). Great Britain here provides a fitting example, as a state featuring four distinct nations bound within a single territory. There is no “identity marker” for being British beyond a state-issued passport. What one may think of as “being British” – be it an accent, a mannerism, a religion – is likely a marker of one of its constituent nations.
While we agree with Moffett's intent to separate a notion or definition of society from a strictly political one, we believe that his current definition instead recapitulates it. Some of this failing can be traced to the attempt to engage with philosophers and biologists; namely, the metaphysical appeal to “shared perception of belonging” which seeks to include animals, namely vertebrates, but falls prey to the same criticisms (Dennett, Reference Dennett1993) as Nagel, and later Peter Godfrey-Smith's, consciousness requirements of animal minds. Particularly, that there is something that it is like to be a bat (Nagel, Reference Nagel1974) or more broadly something it is to be conscious (Godfrey-Smith, Reference Godfrey-Smith2021). For Moffett, there is something that it is to be a society, most importantly a shared perception of belonging. By envoking perception, there is the additional worry that one seeking to call something a society must also furnish an account of an individual's “perception” which seems unneeded.
We propose that instead of the metaphysical requirement for constituents to perceive belonging, the argument might benefit from considering a functional definition of society, looking at the aggregate. Namely, a society is the kind of thing that does “x, y, z” where “x, y, z” might consist of persisting for generations, declaring war, possessing a metric separating internal from external, and so on. This allows for a discussion about the kinds of societies in which Moffett is interested, namely mammals, without sacrificing the broad, cooperation-based definition of E.O. Wilson. For example, much of what makes ant societies so fascinating is their lack of “steadfast affiliation to the collective” (target article, sect. 2, para. 3); instead, they boast a dynamic ruleset governing local links that results in a collective. Here, we see that the end result looks an awful lot like a collaborative collective of individuals who seem to have a shared perception of belonging. In reality, they do not, but they are still a society. Working from the functional rather than the form may provide a better opportunity for interdisciplinary collaboration.
Taking an IR lens to Moffett's definition highlights its weakness. The inclusion of a territorial control criterion means that, in its application to modern humanity, a society can only be a state. This unfortunately undercuts his claim that a “society” is the primary unit defining “groupiness” throughout human history. Looking beyond form toward function may be key to formulating a more widely applicable and interdisciplinary understanding of society.
Financial support
The authors wish to acknowledge the Rhodes Trust for funding.
Competing interest
None.