In “Rationalization Is Rational,” Cushman offers a serious consideration of the function of rationalization that is long overdue and represents an important contribution to the literature on human psychology. He states that “the ultimate function of belief is to represent true properties of the world, and the ultimate function of desire is to represent the fitness consequences of these properties.” (target article sect. 4.4.1, para. 13). In this commentary, we offer an additional function of rationalization. Namely, in certain social contexts, the proximal and ultimate function of beliefs and desires is social inclusion. In such contexts, rationalization often facilitates distortion of rather than approximation to truth. Understanding social identity is not only timely and important, but also critical to fully understand the function(s) of rationalization.
Although Cushman's discussion of rationalization focuses on the self, we think he understates the truly social nature of the self. In our view, any self-related process, including rationalization, must take into consideration how people categorize themselves in a social context (Turner et al. Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). Thus, the functions of rationalization need to be understood within the context of intragroup and intergroup dynamics.
We argue that rationalization of actions and beliefs of fellow group members, and of one's own actions and beliefs in relation to these group members, can enhance the fitness of an individual by maintaining one's position in the group, even if the rationalization leads to false beliefs about the world. Rationalization and adoption of group-based beliefs can also help fulfill more proximal goals, including the need to belong, obtain status, understand the social world, and feel morally justified (Van Bavel & Pereira Reference Van Bavel and Pereira2018).
The domain of politics offers extensive evidence that political identities motivate people to resist factual evidence that undercuts their group affiliation, to rationalize lies from group leaders, to believe identity-bolstering fake news, and to generate politicized conspiracy theories. These examples highlight the critical role of social identity in rationalization:
• Resist evidence. People often discount or rationalize evidence that contradicts their firmly held political beliefs or party affiliation. For instance, people are less likely to update their political views in the face of counterevidence compared to their non-political views (Kaplan et al. Reference Kaplan, Gimbel and Harris2016). This belief resistance was associated with activity in the prefrontal cortex – suggesting a role for motivated reasoning or rationalization. In some cases, exposure to opinions from political out-group members can even backfire – making people more entrenched in their political beliefs than before (Bail et al. Reference Bail, Argyle, Brown, Bumpus, Chen, Hunzaker, Lee, Mann, Merhout and Volfovsky2018).
• Rationalize lies. Cushman argues that rationalization allows people to translate gut instincts into rational thoughts that “represent[s] true properties of the world.” However, people readily rationalize false information when it is propagated by party elites and aligns with their political identity For example, all Trump-branded hats are made in the United States, but when Clinton supporters were told to imagine that Trump would make his merchandise outside the United States if it were cheaper to do so, they felt it would be less unethical to lie that this merchandise was made outside the United States, and that political elites who espouse these lies deserve less punishment (Effron Reference Effron2018).
• Believe fake news: People also rationalize fake news that is positive about one's in-group or negative about one's out-group. For example, Democrats were more likely to believe negative fake news about Republican politicians than negative fake news about Democratic politicians, and vice versa for Republicans (Pereira et al. Reference Pereira, Harris and Van Bavel2019). People are typically motivated to hold true beliefs, but in the case of identity-bolstering fake news, it can be more beneficial to rationalize these false beliefs as true. In believing them, people can share similar beliefs with in-group members and maintain positive beliefs about the group.
• Generate conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories connect different, unrelated, and inconsistent events in a way that seems meaningful and rational. As such, conspiracy theories can help uphold a positive group-identity under the guise of rationality. For instance, some scholars argue that conspiracy theories are for losers, such that the loss of political power increases conspiracy theory beliefs (Uscinski & Parent Reference Uscinski and Parent2014). Indeed, prior to the 2012 U.S. presidential election, Republicans and Democrats were similarly likely to expect electoral fraud. However, after President Obama was re-elected, Republicans were more likely to believe that electoral fraud had occurred (Edelson et al. Reference Edelson, Alduncin, Krewson, Sieja and Uscinski2017). Reducing the their loss to a conspiracy allowed Republicans to rationalize and uphold positive beliefs about their in-group.
This is a sample from a large literature exploring the social function of rationalization. Factors that increase identification with political parties or movements can increase the value of rationalization given that it may help people remain in good standing with fellow group members (see Van Bavel & Pereira Reference Van Bavel and Pereira2018). Furthermore, rationalizing actions of in-group elites can reduce accountability for harmful behavior and create conflict with out-group members, thus increasing polarization. At the same time, polarization can increase commitment and identification with one's in-group, thereby motivating rationalization. Thus, aspects of the intergroup context, like polarization, can both amplify rationalization and result from group-based rationalization.
Understanding the role of social identity in rationalization is not only critical for understanding the function(s) of this psychological process, but also clarifying when and why features of the context will elicit and result from rationalization. For instance, situations that increase the salience of identities or the norms associated with those identities will impact rationalization. These forms of rationalization not only help an individual maintain or increase their standing within the group (which can promote well-being and survival), but also ensure that the group maintains cohesion during intergroup competition.
In “Rationalization Is Rational,” Cushman offers a serious consideration of the function of rationalization that is long overdue and represents an important contribution to the literature on human psychology. He states that “the ultimate function of belief is to represent true properties of the world, and the ultimate function of desire is to represent the fitness consequences of these properties.” (target article sect. 4.4.1, para. 13). In this commentary, we offer an additional function of rationalization. Namely, in certain social contexts, the proximal and ultimate function of beliefs and desires is social inclusion. In such contexts, rationalization often facilitates distortion of rather than approximation to truth. Understanding social identity is not only timely and important, but also critical to fully understand the function(s) of rationalization.
Although Cushman's discussion of rationalization focuses on the self, we think he understates the truly social nature of the self. In our view, any self-related process, including rationalization, must take into consideration how people categorize themselves in a social context (Turner et al. Reference Turner, Oakes, Haslam and McGarty1994). Thus, the functions of rationalization need to be understood within the context of intragroup and intergroup dynamics.
We argue that rationalization of actions and beliefs of fellow group members, and of one's own actions and beliefs in relation to these group members, can enhance the fitness of an individual by maintaining one's position in the group, even if the rationalization leads to false beliefs about the world. Rationalization and adoption of group-based beliefs can also help fulfill more proximal goals, including the need to belong, obtain status, understand the social world, and feel morally justified (Van Bavel & Pereira Reference Van Bavel and Pereira2018).
The domain of politics offers extensive evidence that political identities motivate people to resist factual evidence that undercuts their group affiliation, to rationalize lies from group leaders, to believe identity-bolstering fake news, and to generate politicized conspiracy theories. These examples highlight the critical role of social identity in rationalization:
• Resist evidence. People often discount or rationalize evidence that contradicts their firmly held political beliefs or party affiliation. For instance, people are less likely to update their political views in the face of counterevidence compared to their non-political views (Kaplan et al. Reference Kaplan, Gimbel and Harris2016). This belief resistance was associated with activity in the prefrontal cortex – suggesting a role for motivated reasoning or rationalization. In some cases, exposure to opinions from political out-group members can even backfire – making people more entrenched in their political beliefs than before (Bail et al. Reference Bail, Argyle, Brown, Bumpus, Chen, Hunzaker, Lee, Mann, Merhout and Volfovsky2018).
• Rationalize lies. Cushman argues that rationalization allows people to translate gut instincts into rational thoughts that “represent[s] true properties of the world.” However, people readily rationalize false information when it is propagated by party elites and aligns with their political identity For example, all Trump-branded hats are made in the United States, but when Clinton supporters were told to imagine that Trump would make his merchandise outside the United States if it were cheaper to do so, they felt it would be less unethical to lie that this merchandise was made outside the United States, and that political elites who espouse these lies deserve less punishment (Effron Reference Effron2018).
• Believe fake news: People also rationalize fake news that is positive about one's in-group or negative about one's out-group. For example, Democrats were more likely to believe negative fake news about Republican politicians than negative fake news about Democratic politicians, and vice versa for Republicans (Pereira et al. Reference Pereira, Harris and Van Bavel2019). People are typically motivated to hold true beliefs, but in the case of identity-bolstering fake news, it can be more beneficial to rationalize these false beliefs as true. In believing them, people can share similar beliefs with in-group members and maintain positive beliefs about the group.
• Generate conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories connect different, unrelated, and inconsistent events in a way that seems meaningful and rational. As such, conspiracy theories can help uphold a positive group-identity under the guise of rationality. For instance, some scholars argue that conspiracy theories are for losers, such that the loss of political power increases conspiracy theory beliefs (Uscinski & Parent Reference Uscinski and Parent2014). Indeed, prior to the 2012 U.S. presidential election, Republicans and Democrats were similarly likely to expect electoral fraud. However, after President Obama was re-elected, Republicans were more likely to believe that electoral fraud had occurred (Edelson et al. Reference Edelson, Alduncin, Krewson, Sieja and Uscinski2017). Reducing the their loss to a conspiracy allowed Republicans to rationalize and uphold positive beliefs about their in-group.
This is a sample from a large literature exploring the social function of rationalization. Factors that increase identification with political parties or movements can increase the value of rationalization given that it may help people remain in good standing with fellow group members (see Van Bavel & Pereira Reference Van Bavel and Pereira2018). Furthermore, rationalizing actions of in-group elites can reduce accountability for harmful behavior and create conflict with out-group members, thus increasing polarization. At the same time, polarization can increase commitment and identification with one's in-group, thereby motivating rationalization. Thus, aspects of the intergroup context, like polarization, can both amplify rationalization and result from group-based rationalization.
Understanding the role of social identity in rationalization is not only critical for understanding the function(s) of this psychological process, but also clarifying when and why features of the context will elicit and result from rationalization. For instance, situations that increase the salience of identities or the norms associated with those identities will impact rationalization. These forms of rationalization not only help an individual maintain or increase their standing within the group (which can promote well-being and survival), but also ensure that the group maintains cohesion during intergroup competition.