Cushman portrays representational exchange as a set of exclusively within-individual processes, even when based on one's observation of another's action (e.g., Fig. 7 in the target article). But processes like rationalization often occur at the collective levels of groups, societies, and cultures. Collective rationalization – whereby a group's collective action leads them to update or create new shared beliefs and desires – may be rational as well. Just as individual rationalization can extract useful information from non-rational sources like instincts and habits, communal processes can cohere moral intuitions and norms into the shared “useful fictions” of shared moral narratives.
As the target article makes clear, even individual rationalization is inherently social. When individuals rationalize, they are extracting useful information from social inputs. We need to update our beliefs and desires to better align with those around us. We do this via social norms, of course, but much of our instincts and habits also provide information about our social world, not just our natural world. In collective rationalization, shared beliefs and desires are updated, but so are the overarching structures tying many beliefs and desires together. These collective cases involve what Cushman calls “deeper” forms of norm compliance: value caching and updating reward representations themselves.
This unique output of collective rationalization – the structures organizing many beliefs and desires into some coherent worldview or narrative – calls to mind the renewed academic interest in ideology, which Jost (Reference Jost2006, p. 652) defines as “any abstract or symbolic meaning system used to explain (or justify) social, economic, or political realities” (see also Graham & Yudkin, Reference Graham, Yudkin, Vargas and Dorisin press). Individual representational exchange can update specific beliefs and desires, while collective representational exchange updates the overarching structures organizing many beliefs and desires into shared meaning. For instance, work on system justification (Jost & Banaji Reference Jost and Banaji1994) has shown how ideological worldviews supporting existing social systems can predict collective action (Jost et al. Reference Jost, Becker, Osborne and Badaan2017). Collective rationalization turns this on its head, as collective action becomes the input and the shared belief system becomes the output.
In collective rationalization, such outputs (belief systems, worldviews, narratives, and shared meaning) are especially likely to take on moral dimensions – moral belief systems, moral worldviews, moral narratives, and shared moral meaning. Group-level moral concerns like in-group loyalty and respect for authorities and traditions can be used to collectively justify the system (Haidt & Graham Reference Haidt, Graham, Jost, Kay and Thorisdottir2009) and bind groups into tightly knit moral communities (Graham & Haidt Reference Graham and Haidt2010). The group-binding function of these moral concerns can undoubtedly be advantageous for the group as a whole, and a shared sense of moral meaning can have palliative benefits for individuals in that group. But shared moral worldviews can also inspire violence within the group and against outgroups; for instance, acts of white supremacist hate crimes are often justified with language invoking moral imperatives of racial loyalty and purity (Graham & Haidt Reference Graham, Haidt, Shaver and Mikulincer2012).
Describing rationalization as a useful fiction, Cushman argues that “we can, should, and do actually adjust our beliefs and desires to match this fiction” (sect. 2.2, para. 6). Here “should” is meant to merely convey that doing so is adaptively advantageous (at least sometimes). But this is nevertheless a pretty rosy view of rationalization, and it is worth considering the moral “should” as well. Should Jason Bourne adopt the view that the man he just shot must have been a threat? Should a tribe or nation at war adopt the view that their enemies are evil and that God calls for their eradication? Collective rationalization highlights the dangers of representational exchange; rather than simple extractions of useful information from non-rational sources, these cases can involve motivated justifications or even denials of heinous past actions. For example, the ideology of manifest destiny in the United States has been described as a motivated rationalization of the atrocious collective actions of white immigrants, including slavery and Native American genocide (Winthrop Reference Winthrop1852).
Cushman's account of rationalization centers on the true beliefs and adaptive desires this process can provide, and these of course often do co-occur. But collective rationalization shows how these two provisions can be in opposition: system justification and shared narratives about the moral exceptionalism of the in-group can be advantageous, in forming a loyal and orderly collective body, but these useful fictions come at the expense of the truth. The bias Cushman describes (in connection with individual theory of mind) to perceive all behavior as rational can motivate collective rationalization as well, as groups create shared beliefs and (objectively false) narratives to make sense of – and justify – their histories.
Collectives see what they've done and see it as justified. We drink our shared Kool-Aid together, and as history has shown, that can have disastrous consequences.
Cushman portrays representational exchange as a set of exclusively within-individual processes, even when based on one's observation of another's action (e.g., Fig. 7 in the target article). But processes like rationalization often occur at the collective levels of groups, societies, and cultures. Collective rationalization – whereby a group's collective action leads them to update or create new shared beliefs and desires – may be rational as well. Just as individual rationalization can extract useful information from non-rational sources like instincts and habits, communal processes can cohere moral intuitions and norms into the shared “useful fictions” of shared moral narratives.
As the target article makes clear, even individual rationalization is inherently social. When individuals rationalize, they are extracting useful information from social inputs. We need to update our beliefs and desires to better align with those around us. We do this via social norms, of course, but much of our instincts and habits also provide information about our social world, not just our natural world. In collective rationalization, shared beliefs and desires are updated, but so are the overarching structures tying many beliefs and desires together. These collective cases involve what Cushman calls “deeper” forms of norm compliance: value caching and updating reward representations themselves.
This unique output of collective rationalization – the structures organizing many beliefs and desires into some coherent worldview or narrative – calls to mind the renewed academic interest in ideology, which Jost (Reference Jost2006, p. 652) defines as “any abstract or symbolic meaning system used to explain (or justify) social, economic, or political realities” (see also Graham & Yudkin, Reference Graham, Yudkin, Vargas and Dorisin press). Individual representational exchange can update specific beliefs and desires, while collective representational exchange updates the overarching structures organizing many beliefs and desires into shared meaning. For instance, work on system justification (Jost & Banaji Reference Jost and Banaji1994) has shown how ideological worldviews supporting existing social systems can predict collective action (Jost et al. Reference Jost, Becker, Osborne and Badaan2017). Collective rationalization turns this on its head, as collective action becomes the input and the shared belief system becomes the output.
In collective rationalization, such outputs (belief systems, worldviews, narratives, and shared meaning) are especially likely to take on moral dimensions – moral belief systems, moral worldviews, moral narratives, and shared moral meaning. Group-level moral concerns like in-group loyalty and respect for authorities and traditions can be used to collectively justify the system (Haidt & Graham Reference Haidt, Graham, Jost, Kay and Thorisdottir2009) and bind groups into tightly knit moral communities (Graham & Haidt Reference Graham and Haidt2010). The group-binding function of these moral concerns can undoubtedly be advantageous for the group as a whole, and a shared sense of moral meaning can have palliative benefits for individuals in that group. But shared moral worldviews can also inspire violence within the group and against outgroups; for instance, acts of white supremacist hate crimes are often justified with language invoking moral imperatives of racial loyalty and purity (Graham & Haidt Reference Graham, Haidt, Shaver and Mikulincer2012).
Describing rationalization as a useful fiction, Cushman argues that “we can, should, and do actually adjust our beliefs and desires to match this fiction” (sect. 2.2, para. 6). Here “should” is meant to merely convey that doing so is adaptively advantageous (at least sometimes). But this is nevertheless a pretty rosy view of rationalization, and it is worth considering the moral “should” as well. Should Jason Bourne adopt the view that the man he just shot must have been a threat? Should a tribe or nation at war adopt the view that their enemies are evil and that God calls for their eradication? Collective rationalization highlights the dangers of representational exchange; rather than simple extractions of useful information from non-rational sources, these cases can involve motivated justifications or even denials of heinous past actions. For example, the ideology of manifest destiny in the United States has been described as a motivated rationalization of the atrocious collective actions of white immigrants, including slavery and Native American genocide (Winthrop Reference Winthrop1852).
Cushman's account of rationalization centers on the true beliefs and adaptive desires this process can provide, and these of course often do co-occur. But collective rationalization shows how these two provisions can be in opposition: system justification and shared narratives about the moral exceptionalism of the in-group can be advantageous, in forming a loyal and orderly collective body, but these useful fictions come at the expense of the truth. The bias Cushman describes (in connection with individual theory of mind) to perceive all behavior as rational can motivate collective rationalization as well, as groups create shared beliefs and (objectively false) narratives to make sense of – and justify – their histories.
Collectives see what they've done and see it as justified. We drink our shared Kool-Aid together, and as history has shown, that can have disastrous consequences.