Imagine you are ordering a salad at your favorite deli. This dietary choice reflects your desire to lose weight and an accompanying belief that a reduction in daily caloric intake is necessary to accomplish your goal. The young man at the counter innocently inquires if you would like to add bacon to your salad. You begin trying out various beliefs that, if true, might allow you to eat the bacon in good faith. In other words, you begin rationalizing an action that you know to be contrary to your overarching desires and beliefs before beginning that action. You order the bacon and commit to an unfounded justificatory belief-like state against your better epistemic sense.
While the above may not be an exciting enough scene to warrant inclusion in the next Jason Bourne film, it demonstrates an aspect of rationalization that is neglected in Fiery Cushman's account – rationalization may occur antecedent to a behavioral choice (sect. 1). It is not only a device which “concocts the beliefs or desires that would have made [a past action] rational” (sect. 1.1, para. 1). Rather, rationalization often crafts such beliefs, or rather some temporary justificatory analog to belief, in order to allow ourselves to perform an action driven by a non-rational process. Ignoring antecedent rationalization obscures our investigation into the nature of rationalization generally. As such, my commentary will argue for its inclusion in an account of the overall evolutionary history and function of rationalization. While I do not reject Cushman's conclusion that rationalization is an example of a representational exchange mechanism, my claim here is that an account of rationalization that does not include antecedent rationalization is incomplete.
Cushman points out that rationalization is a useful fiction because it can improve subsequent reasoning by crafting post hoc reasons for our non-rational actions. In the case of antecedent rationalization, a different sort of useful fiction emerges from an urge to act in a non-rational way. Picture our Pleistocene ancestor battling a desire to behave in some non-rational fashion. Perhaps she is considering concealing a portion of some collective resource in violation of a group norm. She wants to stash away a bit of food to eat later when she is alone. Assume for the moment that this is a non-rational decision because being caught would lead to a loss of trust between her and other group members and that this will inhibit her fitness in the future. Assume also that getting caught is likely and the small payoff that the snack will provide is not worth the risk. She begins to adopt various quasi-beliefs that would allow her to carry out her plan. First, she underestimates the likelihood of being caught. Then she overestimates the likelihood of other group members engaging in similar behavior. She eventually concocts a useful fiction that allows her to steal away her extra portion of food against her better judgment and in direct defiance of her overarching beliefs and desires concerning her fitness optimization. She rationalizes a non-rational behavior prior to engaging in it. We can imagine a similar process occurring prior to more contemporary examples of non-rational behavior: the adulterous spouse, the tax evader, even the murderer. Of course, as in the case of cheating on your diet, antecedent rationalization does not only precede norm violations. The resulting behavior does not even need to be negative. It may be irrational to drop out of a university program to pursue a career as an artist. One can imagine some amount of belief manipulation is necessary to commit to such a risk. The point is, in all the cases above, someone mixes their own Kool-Aid before the party begins, just so they can indulge in sipping it (sect. 1.1, para. 4).
Nothing entailed by antecedent rationalization precludes the correctness of Cushman's model of rationalization as a representational exchange mechanism. It does, however, demand an expansion of that model. Antecedent rationalization is consistent with Cushman's conception of seeking cognitive consonance as well as the sort of reflective equilibrium he describes in the context of moral reasoning (sects. 1.1 and 4.5). It is consistent with the notion of non-rational action being guided by instinct, habit, and norms (sect. 4.1). It squares with the functions of impression management and responsibility avoidance that Cushman attributes to rationalization (sect. 2.3). It may function in part, for example, to provide a pre-social explanation to have at the ready in case a nefarious actor is found out. Alternatively, perhaps it emerged in part because gambling pays off just often enough to allow for the preservation of a mechanism that rationalizes risky behavior. In any case, it is consistent with Cushman's representational exchange model and possesses sufficient overlap with the functions of rationalization to which he draws attention. In short, antecedent rationalization is a form of rationalization. As such, Cushman must modify his model in a way that accommodates it.
It may be argued that a justificatory belief-like state is not a belief. To state this is to ignore their relevant functional similarity. They both justify non-rational behavior. In both instances, we piece together what would need to be believed in order to make a particular non-rational action a rational one. We then behave in a manner consistent with those beliefs being true. In both cases, we stir up a useful fiction. Alternatively, it could be argued that what I'm describing as antecedent rationalization is just a form of rational planning. The distinction, however, is that in the case of antecedent rationalization, the actor knows that the behavior is contrary to his overarching beliefs and desires yet guides his decision by fictionalized quasi-beliefs.
Antecedent rationalization is not a counter-example of Cushman's model. It fits neatly within the concept of rationalization as a representational exchange mechanism. It is, however, a ubiquitous form of rationalization that is absent from Cushman's treatment. As such, Cushman's model must be expanded to include and account for antecedent rationalization.
Imagine you are ordering a salad at your favorite deli. This dietary choice reflects your desire to lose weight and an accompanying belief that a reduction in daily caloric intake is necessary to accomplish your goal. The young man at the counter innocently inquires if you would like to add bacon to your salad. You begin trying out various beliefs that, if true, might allow you to eat the bacon in good faith. In other words, you begin rationalizing an action that you know to be contrary to your overarching desires and beliefs before beginning that action. You order the bacon and commit to an unfounded justificatory belief-like state against your better epistemic sense.
While the above may not be an exciting enough scene to warrant inclusion in the next Jason Bourne film, it demonstrates an aspect of rationalization that is neglected in Fiery Cushman's account – rationalization may occur antecedent to a behavioral choice (sect. 1). It is not only a device which “concocts the beliefs or desires that would have made [a past action] rational” (sect. 1.1, para. 1). Rather, rationalization often crafts such beliefs, or rather some temporary justificatory analog to belief, in order to allow ourselves to perform an action driven by a non-rational process. Ignoring antecedent rationalization obscures our investigation into the nature of rationalization generally. As such, my commentary will argue for its inclusion in an account of the overall evolutionary history and function of rationalization. While I do not reject Cushman's conclusion that rationalization is an example of a representational exchange mechanism, my claim here is that an account of rationalization that does not include antecedent rationalization is incomplete.
Cushman points out that rationalization is a useful fiction because it can improve subsequent reasoning by crafting post hoc reasons for our non-rational actions. In the case of antecedent rationalization, a different sort of useful fiction emerges from an urge to act in a non-rational way. Picture our Pleistocene ancestor battling a desire to behave in some non-rational fashion. Perhaps she is considering concealing a portion of some collective resource in violation of a group norm. She wants to stash away a bit of food to eat later when she is alone. Assume for the moment that this is a non-rational decision because being caught would lead to a loss of trust between her and other group members and that this will inhibit her fitness in the future. Assume also that getting caught is likely and the small payoff that the snack will provide is not worth the risk. She begins to adopt various quasi-beliefs that would allow her to carry out her plan. First, she underestimates the likelihood of being caught. Then she overestimates the likelihood of other group members engaging in similar behavior. She eventually concocts a useful fiction that allows her to steal away her extra portion of food against her better judgment and in direct defiance of her overarching beliefs and desires concerning her fitness optimization. She rationalizes a non-rational behavior prior to engaging in it. We can imagine a similar process occurring prior to more contemporary examples of non-rational behavior: the adulterous spouse, the tax evader, even the murderer. Of course, as in the case of cheating on your diet, antecedent rationalization does not only precede norm violations. The resulting behavior does not even need to be negative. It may be irrational to drop out of a university program to pursue a career as an artist. One can imagine some amount of belief manipulation is necessary to commit to such a risk. The point is, in all the cases above, someone mixes their own Kool-Aid before the party begins, just so they can indulge in sipping it (sect. 1.1, para. 4).
Nothing entailed by antecedent rationalization precludes the correctness of Cushman's model of rationalization as a representational exchange mechanism. It does, however, demand an expansion of that model. Antecedent rationalization is consistent with Cushman's conception of seeking cognitive consonance as well as the sort of reflective equilibrium he describes in the context of moral reasoning (sects. 1.1 and 4.5). It is consistent with the notion of non-rational action being guided by instinct, habit, and norms (sect. 4.1). It squares with the functions of impression management and responsibility avoidance that Cushman attributes to rationalization (sect. 2.3). It may function in part, for example, to provide a pre-social explanation to have at the ready in case a nefarious actor is found out. Alternatively, perhaps it emerged in part because gambling pays off just often enough to allow for the preservation of a mechanism that rationalizes risky behavior. In any case, it is consistent with Cushman's representational exchange model and possesses sufficient overlap with the functions of rationalization to which he draws attention. In short, antecedent rationalization is a form of rationalization. As such, Cushman must modify his model in a way that accommodates it.
It may be argued that a justificatory belief-like state is not a belief. To state this is to ignore their relevant functional similarity. They both justify non-rational behavior. In both instances, we piece together what would need to be believed in order to make a particular non-rational action a rational one. We then behave in a manner consistent with those beliefs being true. In both cases, we stir up a useful fiction. Alternatively, it could be argued that what I'm describing as antecedent rationalization is just a form of rational planning. The distinction, however, is that in the case of antecedent rationalization, the actor knows that the behavior is contrary to his overarching beliefs and desires yet guides his decision by fictionalized quasi-beliefs.
Antecedent rationalization is not a counter-example of Cushman's model. It fits neatly within the concept of rationalization as a representational exchange mechanism. It is, however, a ubiquitous form of rationalization that is absent from Cushman's treatment. As such, Cushman's model must be expanded to include and account for antecedent rationalization.