What makes a person resilient to stress? As Kalisch et al. correctly point out, the predictors of resilience are many, spanning individual differences (e.g., intelligence, emotion regulation, neuroticism), social dimensions (e.g., perceived and received support, social integration), and contextual factors (e.g., severity of exposure, material resources, and current stress). In this stew of influences, no single resilience ingredient has predominated, and resilience usually is thought to derive from a complex array of risk and protective factors (Bonanno Reference Bonanno2004; Masten Reference Masten2001). Although theorists have made preliminary attempts to integrate these factors along the lines of shared mechanisms (Benight & Cieslak Reference Benight, Cieslak, Southwick, Litz, Charney and Friedman2011; Mancini & Bonanno Reference Mancini and Bonanno2009; Masten et al. Reference Masten, Powell, Luthar and Luthar2003), the need for a better theoretical understanding of resilience remains clear. In the target article, Kalisch et al. provide that understanding, making expansive use of a concept long recognized in the stress and emotion literatures: appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman Reference Lazarus and Folkman1984; Russell Reference Russell2003). The authors have shaken the dust off appraisal, provided a scholarly and sophisticated overview of it, and given it a new pride of place as the single explanatory mechanism of resilience. In the process, they have provided a compelling and generative framework for the study of resilience.
Any single-mechanism theory has the virtue of parsimony. By the same token, any single-mechanism theory has the potential vice of oversimplification. The authors' account synthesizes an unwieldy resilience literature, provides a variety of falsifiable hypotheses, and explains the heterogeneous nature of resilience predictors. But it also relies excessively on a simple evaluative distinction between positive and negative appraisal that neglects, in my view, the more complex situational and contextual demands that must be accommodated (and appraised) in order to achieve resilience. I will address my comments to this point.
The key contributions of Kalisch et al. are twofold. First, they introduce an appraisal “style” that characterizes individuals' habitual interpretation of stressful experiences. Second, and more important, they argue that appraisal is the single mediating mechanism of resilience. This last is a radical and deeply interesting proposal. Thus, all of the varied predictors of resilience – perceived social support, worldviews, self-enhancement, repressive coping, perceived coping efficacy, hardiness, mastery, and material resources – are hypothesized to contribute to resilience through their influence on a more positive or benign appraisal of stressful experiences. For individuals with a more positive appraisal style, stressful events usually are interpreted more benignly, either through positive situation classification (for minor stressors) or through positive reappraisal (for stressors that are objectively negative). For those with a more negative appraisal style, stressful events are viewed in a more threatening light, resulting in minor stressors being viewed as threatening and major stressors as more catastrophic.
The authors' argument on these points is straightforward and, in the main, persuasive. But despite their assertions of the multidimensional nature of appraisal, their theory relies on a key assumption: that positive (or non-negative) appraisal = positive adaptation. Are positive appraisals always adaptive for functioning? A compatible literature suggests that emotions, both positive and negative, are adaptive to the extent that they are sensitive and appropriate to the context (Bonanno et al. Reference Bonanno, Colak, Keltner, Shiota, Papa, Noll, Putnam and Trickett2007; Coifman & Bonanno Reference Coifman and Bonanno2010). By extension, appraisals of an acute stressor are likely also adaptive to the extent that they promote coping behaviors appropriate to the context, not simply whether the appraisal is positive or negative (though it seems clear that positive appraisals hold a general adaptive advantage). For example, a person who views a significant stressor in too positive of a light (through either positive situation classification or easy positive reappraisal) might fail to mobilize his coping efforts and to anticipate significant obstacles ahead. In effect, too positive of an appraisal, either of the person's capacity to cope or of the event itself, would have potentially negative consequences for long-term adaptation. Conversely, an excessively negative appraisal of an event would likely lead to a defeatist response that also fails to mobilize coping efforts. In both cases, it is not simply the positive or negative valence of the appraisal but the degree to which it supports, through an optimistic and realistic appraisal of the objective circumstances, adaptive coping behaviors.
Is there any evidence for this perspective? My colleagues and I examined survivors of traumatic injury that required surgery at a Level 1 trauma center (deRoon-Cassini et al. Reference deRoon-Cassini, Mancini, Rusch and Bonanno2010). They were assessed while in the hospital and at 1, 3, and 6 months post-surgery. We identified four distinct trajectories of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression symptoms: resilient, gradual recovery, chronic distress, and delayed. A robust differentiator of these trajectories was the person's early perceived coping efficacy, an index of his or her appraisal of the event. To our surprise, both excessively positive and excessively negative appraisals of coping efficacy were maladaptive. Specifically, the group who eventually showed a delayed PTSD response reported the highest levels of perceived coping efficacy, substantially higher than the resilient group; whereas the group that reported chronic distress showed the lowest levels of perceived coping efficacy. In between these extremes were resilient persons, who viewed their coping efficacy as neither excessively positive nor negative. These findings indicate that an appraisal of one's coping that fails to take full stock of the realities of the situation puts that person at risk.
Indeed, despite my broad agreement with the authors' theoretical framework and my belief that it is an important advance, their emphasis on the uniformly adaptive value of positive appraisal fails to contemplate the adaptive implications of negative appraisals. In short, simple positive appraisal (and reappraisal) has difficulty providing a full accounting of the flexible and adaptive union of subjective experience and objective reality that is the hallmark of resilience.
What makes a person resilient to stress? As Kalisch et al. correctly point out, the predictors of resilience are many, spanning individual differences (e.g., intelligence, emotion regulation, neuroticism), social dimensions (e.g., perceived and received support, social integration), and contextual factors (e.g., severity of exposure, material resources, and current stress). In this stew of influences, no single resilience ingredient has predominated, and resilience usually is thought to derive from a complex array of risk and protective factors (Bonanno Reference Bonanno2004; Masten Reference Masten2001). Although theorists have made preliminary attempts to integrate these factors along the lines of shared mechanisms (Benight & Cieslak Reference Benight, Cieslak, Southwick, Litz, Charney and Friedman2011; Mancini & Bonanno Reference Mancini and Bonanno2009; Masten et al. Reference Masten, Powell, Luthar and Luthar2003), the need for a better theoretical understanding of resilience remains clear. In the target article, Kalisch et al. provide that understanding, making expansive use of a concept long recognized in the stress and emotion literatures: appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman Reference Lazarus and Folkman1984; Russell Reference Russell2003). The authors have shaken the dust off appraisal, provided a scholarly and sophisticated overview of it, and given it a new pride of place as the single explanatory mechanism of resilience. In the process, they have provided a compelling and generative framework for the study of resilience.
Any single-mechanism theory has the virtue of parsimony. By the same token, any single-mechanism theory has the potential vice of oversimplification. The authors' account synthesizes an unwieldy resilience literature, provides a variety of falsifiable hypotheses, and explains the heterogeneous nature of resilience predictors. But it also relies excessively on a simple evaluative distinction between positive and negative appraisal that neglects, in my view, the more complex situational and contextual demands that must be accommodated (and appraised) in order to achieve resilience. I will address my comments to this point.
The key contributions of Kalisch et al. are twofold. First, they introduce an appraisal “style” that characterizes individuals' habitual interpretation of stressful experiences. Second, and more important, they argue that appraisal is the single mediating mechanism of resilience. This last is a radical and deeply interesting proposal. Thus, all of the varied predictors of resilience – perceived social support, worldviews, self-enhancement, repressive coping, perceived coping efficacy, hardiness, mastery, and material resources – are hypothesized to contribute to resilience through their influence on a more positive or benign appraisal of stressful experiences. For individuals with a more positive appraisal style, stressful events usually are interpreted more benignly, either through positive situation classification (for minor stressors) or through positive reappraisal (for stressors that are objectively negative). For those with a more negative appraisal style, stressful events are viewed in a more threatening light, resulting in minor stressors being viewed as threatening and major stressors as more catastrophic.
The authors' argument on these points is straightforward and, in the main, persuasive. But despite their assertions of the multidimensional nature of appraisal, their theory relies on a key assumption: that positive (or non-negative) appraisal = positive adaptation. Are positive appraisals always adaptive for functioning? A compatible literature suggests that emotions, both positive and negative, are adaptive to the extent that they are sensitive and appropriate to the context (Bonanno et al. Reference Bonanno, Colak, Keltner, Shiota, Papa, Noll, Putnam and Trickett2007; Coifman & Bonanno Reference Coifman and Bonanno2010). By extension, appraisals of an acute stressor are likely also adaptive to the extent that they promote coping behaviors appropriate to the context, not simply whether the appraisal is positive or negative (though it seems clear that positive appraisals hold a general adaptive advantage). For example, a person who views a significant stressor in too positive of a light (through either positive situation classification or easy positive reappraisal) might fail to mobilize his coping efforts and to anticipate significant obstacles ahead. In effect, too positive of an appraisal, either of the person's capacity to cope or of the event itself, would have potentially negative consequences for long-term adaptation. Conversely, an excessively negative appraisal of an event would likely lead to a defeatist response that also fails to mobilize coping efforts. In both cases, it is not simply the positive or negative valence of the appraisal but the degree to which it supports, through an optimistic and realistic appraisal of the objective circumstances, adaptive coping behaviors.
Is there any evidence for this perspective? My colleagues and I examined survivors of traumatic injury that required surgery at a Level 1 trauma center (deRoon-Cassini et al. Reference deRoon-Cassini, Mancini, Rusch and Bonanno2010). They were assessed while in the hospital and at 1, 3, and 6 months post-surgery. We identified four distinct trajectories of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression symptoms: resilient, gradual recovery, chronic distress, and delayed. A robust differentiator of these trajectories was the person's early perceived coping efficacy, an index of his or her appraisal of the event. To our surprise, both excessively positive and excessively negative appraisals of coping efficacy were maladaptive. Specifically, the group who eventually showed a delayed PTSD response reported the highest levels of perceived coping efficacy, substantially higher than the resilient group; whereas the group that reported chronic distress showed the lowest levels of perceived coping efficacy. In between these extremes were resilient persons, who viewed their coping efficacy as neither excessively positive nor negative. These findings indicate that an appraisal of one's coping that fails to take full stock of the realities of the situation puts that person at risk.
Indeed, despite my broad agreement with the authors' theoretical framework and my belief that it is an important advance, their emphasis on the uniformly adaptive value of positive appraisal fails to contemplate the adaptive implications of negative appraisals. In short, simple positive appraisal (and reappraisal) has difficulty providing a full accounting of the flexible and adaptive union of subjective experience and objective reality that is the hallmark of resilience.