COVID-19 led to the single largest year-over-year decline in Latin America’s GDP per capita in more than a century. Although the region has endured several macroeconomic shocks before, mostly related to financial dislocations, none has been so deep and synchronized, as measured by the negative co-movement of GDP rates in the major regional economies. Our analysis of the COVID-19 experience for the region and eight economies with available historical data reveals the extent of the damage. Through 2020, four economies suffered “rare disasters” (cumulative contractions by 10% or more): Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. In addition, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, together with the Latin America regional aggregate, underwent a “lost decade” (prolonged periods of stagnation), which highlights the confluence of the large COVID-19 shock and scarring effects with the underlying vulnerabilities that in many cases were built over several decades.

The failure of exceptional monetary measures pursued in response to the financial crisis in advanced economies to achieve a strong recovery has created a widespread concern that these economies suffer from a chronic demand gap and face the prospect of stagnation. This article reviews and discusses the alternative views on the causes of the slowdown in accumulation and growth and the policies implemented and proposed to deal with it. It is argued that growing inequality, notably the secular decline in the share of wages, and financialisation are the main factors. Neither spending booms driven by financial bubbles, nor exporting unemployment through trade provides sustainable solutions. It is necessary to rebalance capital and labour, restrain finance and assign a greater role to the public sector in aggregate demand management and income and wealth distribution. However, the dominant neoliberal ideology rules out such socially progressive and economically effective solutions. Consequently, stagnation is likely to remain the new normal in the years to come with governments attempting to reignite growth by creating credit and asset bubbles and/or trying to export unemployment through beggar-thy-neighbour macroeconomic, labour market, trade and exchange rate policies, thereby generating financial and economic instability and tensions in international economic relations with significant repercussions for emerging and developing economies.

In the wake of the global financial crisis, unemployment rates and openness to trade have been the subject of considerable research, especially in developing countries. This study analyses the impacts of trade policy on unemployment rates in Nigeria. Using time series data from 1970 to 2010, it adopts the vector error correction methodology. In order to explore the impact of a range of variables on the relationship between trade openness and national unemployment rates, these variables, in a system of equations, include measures of trade openness, public recurrent spending on education, foreign price shocks and real gross domestic product or alternatively income per capita. The findings reveal that in the long run, real output and income per capita lead to a decline in unemployment, but trade openness policy is associated with an increase in unemployment. Foreign policy shocks, as proxied by commodity prices, also exert a positive effect on unemployment rates and do not contribute subsequently to restoring the system to equilibrium. However, the initial impact of openness and foreign price shocks captured by short-term dynamics are observed to reduce unemployment.

We analyse the possible optimality of the path followed by the current account of the Spanish economy over a very long period of almost 170 years (1850-2016), according to the intertemporal approach to the current account and using a present-value model. In particular, from the estimation of a bivariate vector autoregression model for the current account, we attempt to assess the extent to which the latter has been used to smooth private consumption over time in the presence of temporary shocks that the economy might suffer. In general, evidence does not seem to be particularly favourable to the validity of the model over the period of analysis.

Since the Lisbon agenda (2000), European policies are increasingly oriented towards R&D and innovation. In this context, we analyze the effects of a centralized R&D subsidy policy upon steady state and welfare using an agglomeration and growth model composed of two asymmetric countries. If the policy leads to a steady state characterized by a higher growth rate and lower inequalities, the welfare analysis provides a more contrasted vision on the effects of the policy. Indeed, even though such a policy can eliminate some distortions and improve global welfare, it implies a zero-sum game at national level (the policy increases the welfare in the periphery country and decreases the welfare in the core country) when knowledge spillovers are sufficiently localized. Consequently, a centralized R&D subsidy policy conducted in an economy composed of two asymmetric countries would be a positive-sum game only if international knowledge spillovers are sufficiently large.

This paper is an attempt at assessing the economic impact of market-oriented reforms undertaken during General Franco's dictatorship, in particular the 1959 Stabilisation and Liberalisation Plan. Using an index of macroeconomic distortions, the relationship between economic policies and the growth record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macroeconomic distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan opened the way to a new institutional design that favoured a free market allocation of resources and allowed Spain to accelerate growth and catch up with Western Europe. Without the 1950s reforms and, especially, the 1959 Plan, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower in 1975.

The UK, with its relatively liberal immigration policies following recent enlargements, has been one of the main recipients of migrants from new EU member states. This paper poses the questions: what is the effect of immigration on a receiving economy such as the UK? Is the effect beneficial or adverse for growth? Does emigration have brain drain effects on sending economies? How differently would skilled (or unskilled) migration affect both receiving and sending economies? What factors would contribute to immigration/emigration benefits/costs and economic growth driven by migration? Who are the winners and losers in both the sending and host regions? We utilise a two-bloc endogenous growth model with labour mobility of different skill compositions to address these questions. We show that migration, in general, is beneficial to the receiving country and increases the world growth rate. With remittances, the sending country in aggregate can also benefit. The only exception is in the case of unskilled migration, which can actually have a detrimental impact on the world growth rate. This possibility however seems to be unlikely by our examination of migration trends. Winners are migrants, and the skill group in the region that sees its relative size decrease.

Spain’s financial position during the late 19th and early 20th centuries has usually been presented as one of persistent deficit on current account, which resulted from her integration into international commodity and factor markets and this, in turn, slowed down the growth of the economy. In this essay a preliminary reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account allows us to reject this view. In fact, a net capital inflow made possible to meet the demand for investment-boosting economic performance. Current account reversals in a context of macroeconomic domestic imperfections help to explain the economic slowdown at the turn of the century.

The productivity performance of the UK relative to its major competitors has been a concern for much of the postwar period. There is a general perception that, in recent years, its position has improved, however, most work stops short of the period in question. Newly constructed data from the EU KLEMS productivity and growth accounts database provides an insight into UK productivity performance and that of its major competitors. This paper provides an overview of recent UK performance relative to France, Germany and the US and finds that the UK has seen a rise in output and employment growth since 1995. Growth has been particularly strong in ICT producing sectors and market service sectors. With this in mind, there are perhaps some grounds for optimism for the future of productivity growth in the UK.

Dans un modèle à deux pays et à horizon infini, dans lequel la mobilité ducapital est imparfaite, on présente une analyse dynamique de la transmissioninternationale des chocs qui affectent les dépenses publiques. Trois typesde financements d’une augmentation des dépenses publiques sont comparés:l’imposition des salaires, l’imposition des revenus du capital à la sourceet l’imposition des revenus du capital selon le principe de taxation à larésidence. L’imposition des salaires ou des revenus du capital à la sourcecrée une réduction du produit dans le pays qui mène cette politique et uneaugmentation du produit à court terme à l’étranger. L’imposition des revenusdu capital de tous les résidents conduit, en introduisant un canalsupplémentaire de transmission internationale, à une baisse de la productionmondiale. Malgré cette baisse, le bien-être progresse dans le pays quiaugmente ses dépenses publiques.

On utilise le modèle d’accumulation optimale de Ramsey pour analyser la dynamique des inégalités au sein d’un pays s’ouvrant aux échanges avec un pays plus pauvre. Avec une fonction de production Cobb-Douglas, le modèle prédit, en même temps qu’une augmentation des inégalités de revenu, une diminution des inégalités de patrimoine. Ce résultat reproduit la dynamique croisée des distributions de revenu et de patrimoine observée en France sur la période récente.