In the third chapter we describe the takeoff of commercial banking in Latin America from midcentury onwards, as witnessed by the establishment of almost 100 joint-stock banks in the more dynamic economies of the region between 1850 and 1873. The creation of banks was especially notable in cities and ports of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, Mexico and Uruguay, developments that have not previously been analyzed from a comparative perspective. Our text argues that the dynamics of export economies (from the early 1850s) as well as the entry of foreign direct investments (from the 1860s) generated demand for the creation of new types of financial enterprise that spurred early capitalism in Latin America. A striking feature was the growing prominence of large banks that had connections with public administrations, such as the Banco do Brasil (1853), which became a pillar of finance for the imperial government, and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (1854), a commercial bank that operated in Argentina as a key agency for the government and for ranchers and merchants. Finally, attention is turned to the Banco Español de la Habana, which became the main financial support for the Spanish colonial administration in Cuba during the Ten Years’ War (1868–1878).

The seventh chapter of this book reviews the several waves of expansion of foreign banks in Latin America during the last third of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. This story is of special interest for readers interested in aspects of a complex and diverse phase of financial globalization. Foreign banks participated in several phases of capital flows from Europe, and much later from the United States and Canada, marking a new stage of capitalism that was becoming truly global. The entry of banks of different nationalities into Latin America was pioneered by British overseas banks from the 1860s, which established offices and branches in many countries. They were followed by French investment banks that participated in many public works projects such as canals and railroads, as well as in government banks. Then came the powerful German universal banks from the 1890s, which specialized in trade finance and in some foreign debt transactions. From the 1850s onwards there appeared Spanish colonial banks in Cuba and Puerto Rico that continued to operate until the Spanish American War of 1898. Last of all arrived Canadian and United States commercial banks, in the first decades of the twentieth century.

This chapter analyzes the different banking models that were debated and adopted by the elites of the various Latin American nations after midcentury. The examples of the financial and monetary institutions of Europe were influential, but they were not simply replicated. In fact, there was a creative process of adaptation of foreign models of banking organization and regulation that were adjusted to local and regional situations in each country in a prolonged process of trial and error. In Chile and Colombia the advocates of the free banking model tended to gain the upper hand, whereas in Argentina and Brazil the supporters of a single bank of issue tended to dominate. The intense political and financial discussions in each country revealed strong differences between orthodox theorists, in favor of a strict gold standard, and pragmatists, who preferred the flexibility of inconvertibility. These confrontations remained characteristic of many later episodes in Latin American financial history and resonate down to the present day.

This chapter presents a sociolinguistically focused overview of the history of Received Pronunciation (RP). The sociolinguistic community for whom it is a vernacular is a small one numerically but its form of speech had an outsized historical and sociolinguistic impact for over a century. Fundamental sociological and historical changes have since upended the sociolinguistic status of the elite sociolect in Great Britain and across the world. In attempting to place RP within the overall history of the English language, its development as a vernacular has often been overshadowed by, and confused with, its status as a standard accent in certain contexts and settings. The present discussion will distinguish between vernacular and standard, and focus on the variation and change of a vernacular elite sociolect over time, with an emphasis on the evolutions that took place in the period after the Second World War in Great Britain.

During the 1790s, the US developed a partisan political culture based upon both old and new rituals. Political culture is the expression of a people’s beliefs and values through the rites and rituals of politics – as practiced both within the doors of government and out in the streets. This partisanship culture was expressed through newspapers, petitions, public meetings, parades, toasts, clothing, and accessories. Through use of the similar rituals and rites, Federalists and Republicans sought to convey different messages to the people. Federalists used these rituals to stress the need for confidence or trust in the new Constitution and government. Republicans emphasized the need for the people to be jealous or protective of their rights won in the Revolution as the best way to protect the Republic. Each party claimed to speak for the people and in the best interest of the nation.

While Shelley produced many of his most important works in self-imposed exile from Great Britain, various locales in England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales played an important role in his personal and poetic development. Attending to Shelley’s experiences across Great Britain and Ireland, and to local sociopolitical dynamics in the places where he lived and worked, this chapter traces some formative influences upon his later poems and essays. It finds that Shelley’s political and aesthetic maturation owed much to his geographical and institutional surroundings and illuminates how these surroundings contributed to his alienation, radicalisation, and visionary zeal.

The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was shaped by significant geopolitical developments, including the end of colonialism and the emergence of the Cold War. As former colonial powers relinquished control over territories, the Middle East became a focal point for global power struggles. Great Britain and France, seeking to protect their interests in the region, became involved in the conflict, aligning with Israel to achieve their strategic goals. Amidst these shifting dynamics, the Sinai Campaign unfolded as a pivotal military endeavor. The campaign was characterized by the emphasis on speed in battle, as articulated by Moshe Dayan. Dayan’s strategic vision prioritized the relative advantage of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), focusing on areas where they could create a decisive edge over their adversaries. This approach led to a reevaluation of force-building principles, with an emphasis on offense and rapid execution capabilities. Furthermore, the campaign revealed the formidable power of the IDF’s armored corps, triggering a genuine revolution in Israeli military strategy. The Sinai Campaign thus stands as a multifaceted historical event, shaped by geopolitical realignments, military innovations, and ethical dilemmas.

In chapter 15, Going off the gold standard? (July 14 - August 21) attention shifts to Great Britain and the weakness of sterling. As pressure on sterling increases, Norman fall sick with ’stress’ and he has to take leave of absence from the bank in late July, only to return after Britain has left gold on September 21, 1931. With Norman out of the picture, his deputy Ernest Harvey takes over as the Banque de France and the New York Fed arrange a $200 million credit to the Bank of England. Tensions arise between Harvey on the one hand and Clément Moret (Banque de France) and Harrison on the other, about the use of the credit. The weakening of sterling continues and in late August, Harry Siepmann writes an ominous note discussing the consequences of Great Britain leaving gold.

This chapter provides a history of sweatshops during the industrial revolution in the United States and Great Britain and explains how higher wages and better conditions were eventually attained. It then looks at the postwar East Asian economies that had sweatshops and that developed more rapidly than Great Britain and the United States did. Finally, the chapter looks at how economic development has taken place over the last two decades in countries that had sweatshops identified in the first edition of this book and how sweatshop wages have improved.

This chapter introduces the book’s main research question, that is, the fact that rising inequality does not appear to benefit an egalitarian redistributive agenda. It shows how, in Great Britain, despite a sharp rise in income inequality, agreement with the claim that the government should redistribute income from the rich to the poor has decreased over time. In the United States, overall stability in mass support for redistribution hides a decline in the attitudinal gap between the high- and low-income respondents, despite expectations that this gap should increase with income inequality. How can this empirical evidence be reconciled with reasonable assumptions underpinning expectations of rising support for redistribution? Under what conditions can attitudes toward redistributive social policies change and act as a countervailing force to rising inequality? The remainder of the chapter lays out the book's answers to these questions and presents the empirical strategy. A central claim is that attitudes toward redistributive social policies are shaped by at least two motives, material self-interest and fairness reasoning, and that the relative importance of each is situational.

Chapter 8 traces the unexpected empirical patterns described in Chapter 1 to belief change and framing effects, themselves triggered by changes in how elites compete over redistributive issues. In line with the argument presented in Part 1, it also shows that belief change plays out differently depending on (1) which type of fairness beliefs is affected by partisan dynamics (proportionality or reciprocity) and (2) people’s position as net beneficiaries (or net contributors) of redistribution to policies, as proxied by their income level. In Great Britain, in particular, I find that framing effects tied to survey design further explain how belief change affects answers to the traditional redistribution question. In the United States, the decline in the size of the income gradient follows from the politicization of redistribution to policies (and reciprocity concerns) over redistribution from policies (and proportionality concerns). Against common expectations, the decline in the income gradient originates in growing support for redistribution among rich Democrats, not declining support among poor (often white) Republicans.

The Soviets deployed a performative politics of the market everywhere they went, but they used with particular insistence in Great Britain. The British economy had performed well in the postwar period, but its industry was losing out to competitors in continental Europe and Japan. This was something the Soviets liked to point out, and often. But Great Britain had a unique advantage: a still international currency with relatively deep captial markets. It is in this ambit that the British sought, in 1964, a competitive edge over its allies for Soviet business. In order to counter rising competition – and against strong American pressure – the British offered to liberalize parts of its national economy and to offer better and temporally longer finance for Soviet purchases of British industrial products. In doing so, they breached financing practices from the 1930s. The Soviets then used these new terms to pressure other European countries into better financial arrangements for their deal-making. The promotion of market practices of competition, the Soviets understood, could be achieved through financial competition in the absence of integrated global markets for industrial commodities. British financiers would be the bearers of the political transformation the Soviets sought and strove for in the world economy.