This chapter shows that Aristotle’s discussion of being as truth and not-being as falsehood in Metaphysics Δ, E, and Θ is a sustained reflection on the Sophist’s account of falsehood and its analysis of categorial sentences; and that the Metaphysics responds to the Sophist on whether Motion-Itself and Knowledge-Itself exist among separate intelligibles, a point on which Plotinus would later defend the Platonic position against Aristotle.

But while this line of argument remains widespread in general surveys of the Crusades and the Latin East, recent scholarship has significantly expanded our knowledge concerning intellectual activities undertaken in Outremer. Thus, to mention just several important examples, Kedar explored the exchanges in the sphere of learning between Franks and Oriental Christians, and Minervini studied the production and circulation of manuscripts as well as translation activities. In his work on the knightly culture of Outremer, David Jacoby also touched related issues, and several articles have been devoted to intellectual activities undertaken in specific cities in the Latin East.

This epilogue concludes the book by reflecting on emerging opportunities and challenges in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. It highlights six unfolding revolutions: life sciences, information and communications, complexity theory, data science, education and rights-based activism. The latter is particularly important, as the potential of all the other revolutions to improve the health of all depends on it. Finally, we reaffirm our commitment to clear thinking for effective action: In our turbulent world, knowledge remains the most powerful force for enlightened social transformation.

This chapter sets the stage by offering a general account of Aquinas’s understanding of scientia as a good habit of mind that has as its proper act the act of demonstrating. While the emphasis this chapter places on the psychological status of science and demonstration is somewhat novel vis-à-vis the secondary literature, the core claims it makes concerning scientia, quia demonstration, and propter quid demonstration are not.

The Introduction raises the question of what the task, job, or purpose of metaphysics is and, by extension, what the metaphysician should aspire to do. It then canvasses different conceptions of metaphysics that answer these questions in different ways, noting how some answers are bolder and more ambitious than others. Among the boldest and most ambitious of these conceptions of metaphysics is that of Thomas Aquinas, who held both that metaphysics studies everything and that it can do so in such a way as to produce rigorous knowledge of the highest sort – what Aristotle would call unqualified episteme.

This chapter analyzes Aquinas’s account of the principles of metaphysics – both the causal principles of common being and the scientific principles (i.e., the per se nota propositions) from which metaphysical reasoning proceeds. Because the subject-matter of Aquinas’s metaphysics has real efficient, formal, and final causes, it is possible to formulate corresponding real causal definitions of that subject, which can, in turn, serve as terms used to construct the primitive principles of metaphysical science. This means is that it is possible for Aquinas’s metaphysics to be “scientific” in the strongest sense in which he understood the word – that is, that Aquinas’s metaphysics can meet even the most rigorous standards of Aristotelian episteme.

This chapter motivates the central problem of the book from within the broadly Aristotelian tradition. Every Aristotelian science must have (1) a clearly delineated subject-matter about which its inquiry proceeds, (2) identifiable properties that can be demonstrated to belong to that subject-matter, and (3) principles to which the science’s practitioner can appeal in demonstrating that those properties belong to that subject. But even a cursory glance at the Peripatetic tradition shows that it is no easy task to state what metaphysics is about, what properties should count as metaphysical, or what principles metaphysicians should invoke when doing their work – let alone to make those answers harmonize.

Every single lawyer you have ever seen, or heard of, or read about, once sat right where you are sitting now. Every single one of them sat down, for the very first time, pulled open their very first law textbook, took a deep breath and began to learn. In this first chapter of your legal studies, we begin by looking, in general terms, at the profession your degree will qualify you to enter. We ask what lawyers actually do, we ask what skills lawyers have and we ask what lawyers know.

This chapter explores Aquinas’s account of knowledge, first in creatures and then in God. Aquinas distinguishes between scientia (understanding) and cognitio (awareness), situating knowledge within the broader framework of living beings, sensation, and intellect. For him, knowledge entails the immaterial reception of form: animals possess cognition through sensation, while humans attain scientia by grasping natures universally and immaterially. Aquinas links knowledge with immateriality, arguing that intellect expands in proportion to freedom from matter. Turning to God, Aquinas contends that divine knowledge is identical with God’s essence, wholly immaterial, and thus unlimited. Unlike human discursive reasoning, God’s knowledge is simple, immediate, and comprehensive: God knows himself perfectly, and in knowing himself as Creator, knows all things, including non-existent and future contingent beings. The chapter concludes by examining Aquinas’s treatment of truth, omniscience, and divine causality, showing how God’s knowledge differs fundamentally from creaturely.

The international environmental law regime relating to the protection of stratospheric ozone is widely considered to be one of the most successful international law regimes to date. This regime has been highly effective in regard to phasing out ozone-depleting substances, thereby protecting stratospheric ozone, and ensuring that we remain within the planetary boundary for stratospheric ozone depletion. Nevertheless, its implementation has given rise to several concerns, including the creation of new, unregulated problems. The chapter explores some of these concerns and argues that they potentially arise as a result of the human-centred and utilitarian values that underlie the ozone regime; and the chapter begins to explore how these underlying values might evolve to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the ozone regime, while also contributing to efforts to equitably protect all earth system components.

This chapter concludes the book by synthesizing its main themes and revisiting its central questions: What kind of ethics do we need to grapple with the planetary boundaries framework and the issues it raises? Is it sufficient to accept scientific frameworks as the baseline for ethics or are there other ways of knowing that matter both within and beyond western scientific frameworks? Key themes such as complexity, time, epistemic justice, and scale emerge as central to thinking across, and with, the interdisciplinary chapters that comprise this book, and these themes also suggest important considerations for future ethical engagements with the planetary boundaries framework.

Luther offered a paradigm shift for theological method with his particular cross-orientation. With their own experience of suffering and despair serve, theologians of the cross can discern the true meaning of the gospel of Christ, name the reality as it is, and mystically know God radically present and compassionately loving.