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Once Congress declared war on the Central Powers in April 1917, local, state, and federal authorities moved quickly to suppress dissent among public school teachers. Across the United States, school boards and superintendents dismissed teachers deemed disloyal and warned others about the consequences of certain forms of speech and conduct. Colleges and universities likewise dismissed faculty members for dissent, prompting widespread debate within academic circles over the limits of free speech during wartime. This article argues that coercion alone cannot explain why teachers and academics came to accept the view that obstructing the war effort was morally unacceptable. During the war, prevailing debates over education and democracy shifted in both meaning and purpose. These arguments appealed directly to the moral commitments of teachers and scholars. Many came to see criticism of the government in the classroom as an indirect reproach to students—and parents—who supported the war. Such criticism could also appear to dishonor the soldiers who had died on the Western Front. Teachers’ associations and the American Association of University Professors ultimately aligned with the government, arguing that teachers and faculty members could not assume their First Amendment rights would be fully protected during periods of national crisis.
Theories of democratic diffusion predict that exposure to liberal democracies fosters support for political liberalism, while recent studies on Chinese overseas students suggest studying abroad generates backlash against liberal values. Using a unique four-year longitudinal dataset of nearly 1,000 Chinese college students in China and the United States, we examine how studying abroad shapes students’ ideology, attitudes, and identity. Our findings challenge both perspectives. Students who study in the United States are already more politically liberal, market-oriented, and cosmopolitan, and less nationalistic than their peers upon departure, underscoring the importance of selection. Ideological preferences remain remarkably stable throughout college, regardless of location. However, support for China’s political system and affective identification with Chinese national identity declines among students in both countries from 2022 to 2023, with a greater decline among students in the United States. These results show that selection, home-country shocks, and host-country context jointly shape overseas students’ political attitudes.
Thucydides' book on the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians has generally been considered a historical chronicle. By contrast, Peter Ahrensdorf here makes the case that it is better understood as a work of philosophy, inasmuch as it seeks to understand the permanent truth about human nature. Thucydides, he argues, focuses on this particular war because of its theoretical significance. It presents a clash, not only between military powers, but between two theoretical outlooks – Periclean Athenians' progressive and humanistic understanding of the fundamental character and condition of human beings, and the Spartans' traditional and religious understanding. Ahrensdorf leads us through Thucydides' examination of the case for and against both Athens and Sparta and shows how Thucydides ultimately offers for our consideration an account of himself as an individual who – unlike outstanding characters such as such Alcibiades, the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta and Melos, Diodotus, and Pericles – ascends to a truly independent and genuinely philosophic understanding of the human condition.
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has aspired to remain a major power in international relations. Until the mid-2000s, the country’s leaders sought to revive its great power status in partnership with Western nations. Since the mid-2000s, Russia has moved in the direction of challenging Western global priorities by stressing values of national sovereignty and patriotism. More recently, Russia has sought to establish areas of mutual noninterference in relations with the West. In 2022, this approach resulted in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the escalation of tensions and confrontation with the United States and NATO. Outside the West, Moscow has aspired to take advantage of global economic and geopolitical opportunities. The chapter reviews the main developments in Russian foreign policy since 1991, giving an overview of the country’s relations with Western and non-Western countries.
I begin here to articulate Rorty’s alternative understanding of hope. Rorty’s understanding has been ignored both by those scholars interested in hope and by those concerned with his intellectual legacy and political identity. I argue that hope, for Rorty, involves the yearning for a future that is contingent and the commitment to redescribing – and thereby contesting – the identity of a fragile social world and political inheritance in the name of its betterment. I suggest that Rorty’s understanding of hope stems from his reading of Hegel’s account of philosophy in The Philosophy of Right. I then unpack Rorty’s enigmatic claim – advanced in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity – that ‘common hopes’ are necessary for sustaining liberal community, which I suggest is given revealing illustration in his infamous Achieving Our Country. I argue that Achieving Our Country is a much-misunderstood text and suggest that we should not regard it as a kind of prediction, but rather as the articulation of hope for his own community and a contestation of its political future through a narrative of redemption.
Recent United States economic policy has renewed a long-standing debate between protectionism and free trade. This essay examines the lesser-studied views of Adam Smith on the debate concerning liberal trade policy, arguing that while Smith promotes free trade as the “system of natural justice and liberty,” he also acknowledges the need for political judgment in questions of trade. While Smith has many concerns about limiting free trade, he also has a wider understanding of human flourishing in Wealth of Nations beyond opulence that cannot be achieved by strict adherence to any system. This essay argues that Smith understands human flourishing to include the development and exercise of judgment that will allow individuals to satisfy their material needs and extend moral concern to others, especially those within their immediate sphere of influence—their nation. His exceptions to free trade redirect national sentiment away from zero-sum economic transactions between nations or between groups within a nation to support other goals for human flourishing beyond opulence, such as security, a regular administration of law, and special concern for one’s countrymen.
On May 18, 1918, fourteen thousand high school students from St. Louis, Missouri, public schools, accompanied by fourteen drum corps and seven professional bands, paraded through the city’s Forest Park. Each school marched behind the US flag and its banners. Boys were dressed like soldiers and girls like nurses, in white uniforms bearing a tiny red cross. Battalions of young drummers, followed by legions of adult nurses, closed the parade. As the young people passed by, spectators applauded the inspiring sight. They could feel their hearts burn with new patriotism and new reverence. As the parade ended at Art Hill, eight thousand children in red caps and capes stood at attention on the slope, saluted the onlookers, and began to form a living cross. Below them, the remaining six thousand young people fell into place to form the word Red Cross. For the occasion – the Inaugural Junior Red Cross Parade – the youth had been rallied to demonstrate their patriotism and participation in the war effort. One journalist noted that “the present generation of children are learning that Service means sympathy as well as sacrifice, a desire and willingness to help others as well as a feeling that it is one’s duty and obligation to do so.”
A national conference on Americanization in April 1918 evidenced how social and political concerns mattered in wartime. Many regarded the global war as an unhoped-for opportunity to patch up the American nation and bring together the various ethnic groups living in the United States. Across the United States, ethnic enclaves existed and hyphenated Americans oscillated between pledging allegiance to the Stars and Stripes and being loyal to their homelands. Assimilationists seized the opportunity to foster American ideals in children. They consistently rallied politicians in their crusade against the hyphen and eventually defeated progressive integrationalists.
From August 1914 to April 1917, although the United States remained officially neutral, private individuals engaged American children in the war effort. At the local and state levels, initiatives mushroomed to capture children’s energy. Educationalists feared that explicit talk of war and propaganda in all forms would spoil children’s innocence. This is why they decided to engage children in civic leagues while others sought to mobilize children in the war effort. Although the leaders of these initiatives differed on how best to foster patriotism in the nation’s youth, the consensus was that American children needed to be engaged in civic and patriotic activities and be aware of their responsibilities as future adults.
As the war ended, politicians and educationalists saw the American Junior Red Cross as a means to promote American ideals abroad. Consequently, the American Junior Red Cross shifted its focus on a new form of Americanization, using children as part of a cultural diplomacy that positioned the United States as the global Good Samaritan. Children reached out around the globe, waged war against diseases, dedicated much of their spare time to rescue foreign "brothers" and "sisters," and sponsored children overseas.
Across the nation, children were urged to become “soldiers of the soil,” members of the United States School Garden Army, an initiative created in February 1918 by the US Bureau of Education to promote local gardening. Federal authorities urged local communities to feed themselves while the United States fed the Allies and other nations dependent on the US food supply. The more food civilians grew, the better the United States could feed the world. Children thus became part of a large pool of unpaid labor, serving the interests of both politicians and educationalists: as youth helped to increase food production, they learned skills and habits of self-reliance. Through the United States School Garden Army, children hooverized and learned to change their diet and eat with moderation. Gardening taught them the meaning of sacrifice.
In organizing a juvenile division of the American Red Cross – the so-called American Junior Red Cross – in September 1917, Woodrow Wilson attempted to mobilize the nation’s twenty-two million schoolchildren. Consequently, the American Junior Red Cross became the first federal youth-focused organization to be specifically dedicated to mobilizing American youth in wartime. In designing this first national youth-focused organization, Wilson impeded radical interventionists and quelled educationalists’ concerns. While directing children’s energy to altruistic humanitarian tasks, the organization opened schools to federal oversight of efforts to instill loyalty and deter dissent. Federal authorities attempted to control teachers and relied upon the educational structures to instill loyalty in the future generations of Americanyouth.
This article offers an overview of the statuary dedicated to Cavour erected in Italy during the first 50 years after unification (1861–1915), focusing on the most significant cases. Promoted by moderate circles close to the former prime minister, the construction of public monuments to the so-called ‘‘weaver of unification’’ responded to the requirements of patriotic education. Pursuing a policy of unveiling monuments throughout central and northern Italy, liberal elites sought to strengthen the population’s sense of national identity, while simultaneously promoting the memory and myth of Cavour as a founder of the unified state, champion of liberty and master diplomat. This was no easy task, given Cavour’s limited popularity, and it involved citizens’ committees, mayors, and accomplished artists in an effort to establish an effective and enduring iconographic model.
In Teaching America, Paul Carrese offers an intellectual justification for reviving a reflective and discursive approach to civic education. He explores why civic education is crucial for sustaining our democratic republic and explains how a sober, yet hopeful, civics is vital to both civic learning and perpetuating the American experiment. Blending gratitude for America with civil argument about what America means, Carrese implores educators to explore civics informed by rational patriotism. In this Tocquevillean approach, civil disagreement is a feature, not a failing, of our constitutional democracy. He argues that schools, colleges, and culture must develop citizens with the knowledge and virtues to operate our civic order, seeing self-government as crucial for pursuit of happiness. Using a portrait of jazz as an American e pluribus unum this compelling case provides a hopeful renewal of civics and civic friendship needed across formal learning and civic culture.
Doxastic Partialism in Friendship is the view that part of being a good friend is having positively tilted beliefs about one’s friends. Being a patriot — like being a good friend — is demanding. And there is a case to be made that patriotism — like friendship — demands doxastic partiality, this time towards one’s country. Although doxastic partiality in friendship has been widely discussed in the philosophical literature, comparatively little has been written on its patriotic cousin. Focusing on doxastic partiality in the Canadian context, this article seeks to rectify this lack by considering both motivations and worries for Patriotic Doxastic Partialism.
Chapter 2 explores nationalism, patriotism, and national identity, in relation to immigration. These are constructions that depend largely on context, and can change as circumstances vary. Psychological theories of intergroup relations, that can be applied to relations between host populations and immigrants, are conceptualized as on a continuum. At one end of this continuum are purely material explanations, and at the other extreme are purely psychological explanations.
The ‘American model’ is one of the central points of reference in the debate on the European Union's (EU's) constitutional future. However, replicating the ‘us-versus-them’ mode of thinking that made constitutional patriotism possible in the United States would paradoxically destroy what is truly unique in the EU's constitutional model. Instead of ‘patriotism’ nurtured by opposition to the ‘other’, the EU needs a ‘constitutional discipline’ founded on rational calculations and a readiness to assess critically one's own national loyalty.
An epilogue assesses the impact of the antiwar movement. Both activists and scholars disagree over its significance. Despite common misperceptions of the movement by the public, antiwar activists generally represented mainstream American political values. While the movement did not stop the war by itself, it imposed real limits upon presidential decisions to escalate American military expansion. Movement activists overwhelmingly waged peace using the tools of democracy to align the nation’s practice with its most righteous vision.
The Vietnam antiwar movement moved along mutually supportive paths; one within the formal political system and one outside. Dissent within the government expanded over time. Distinct elements of the outsider movement exerted greater influence at different points. Liberal reformers dominated until 1967 and after mid-1971, and intermittently during election campaigns and the fall 1969 Moratorium. Leftists were most evident during major coalition events of 1967 through the May Day demonstrations of spring 1971. Massive student protests in both 1968 and 1970 were ideologically ambiguous. Drawing encouragement and political leverage from the “outsider” movement, federal and state legislators and officials in the executive branch played their most significant role in collaboration with the activist core after 1971.
Waging Peace dispels lingering myths of the frequently disregarded Vietnam antiwar movement as dominated by a subversive collection of political radicals and countercultural rebels. This comprehensive history defines a broad movement built around a core of liberal and mainstream activists who challenged what they saw as a misguided and immoral national policy. Facing ongoing resistance from the government and its prowar supporters, demonstrators upheld First Amendment rights and effectively countered official rationales for the war. These dissenting patriots frequently appealed to traditional American principles and overwhelmingly used the tools of democracy within conventional boundaries to align the nation's practice with its most righteous vision. This work covers not only the activists and organizations whose coalitions sponsored mass demonstrations and their often-symbiotic allies within the government, but also encompasses international, military, and cultural dissent. Achieving positive if limited impact, the movement was ultimately neither victorious nor defeated.