Why are women underrepresented in civil service management across rich democracies? We argue that government ideology matters for this question, and that women bureaucrats’ careers stagnate under right-wing governments, since they do not suppress gender-inequality-reinforcing promotion patterns. We examine this using administrative occupation data on all Danish central government employees, observed quarterly from 1998 to 2019. The evidence is consistent with our argument: Under left-wing governments, men and women in the civil service progress similarly, while women progress more slowly than men under right-wing governments. The gender gap in career progression widens at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, where political attention is greater, and this gap is not reduced by the presence of women ministers.

Do larger polities hinder gender parity in elected office? We theorize that when populations grow faster than elected assemblies, a “seat congestion” effect intensifies competition for nominations, enabling men candidates to crowd out women. We test this argument using two nationwide natural experiments: Swedish municipal amalgamations in 1952 and 1973 that abruptly increased electorates. We track the effects in newly digitized historical panel data. Where electorate-per-seat ratios rose, growth in women’s representation slowed. Decomposition analyses show that expanding councils only partially offsets congestion. By identifying polity size as a systematic brake on descriptive representation, the study adds a demographic dimension to debates on institutional design and points to an overlooked cost of increasing jurisdictional size.

This paper investigates the impact of remittances from democratic countries on the political institutions of recipient nations. We argue that the democratic origin of remittances, rather than their aggregate level, is what matters for institutional outcomes. To test this proposition, we analyse a sample of 156 countries from 1970 to 2023, using a novel dataset that distinguishes between remittances from democratic and autocratic source countries. Our instrumental-variable strategy uses common-language exposure to democratic source countries, weighted by inverse bilateral distance and interacted with global trade openness. Results from our analysis and several robustness tests indicate that remittances from democratic countries significantly enhance democratic institutions. While the analysis is global in scope, the findings are particularly relevant to debates on political change in autocratic and weakly democratic regimes.

A massive amount of research examines the representation of public opinion by policymakers, increasingly on actual policy actions. The work often provides evidence of a positive association between expressed public preferences and policy, but only some of the time and only to some degree, and there is even less evidence of responsiveness. This essay delves into the conditions for responsiveness, focusing on public demand for policy and policy supply, building on what research on the subjects reveals. The examination makes clear that policy responsiveness requires a great deal of both the represented and the representatives (and scholars too) and that these conditions are not easily met, though sometimes are. The emergent structure seemingly is much as empirical democratic theory would predict, and helps account for patterns of policy “responsiveness” we observe. The concluding section contemplates future research.

We demonstrate that the impact of descriptive representation on citizens’ perceptions of democratic processes varies with levels of representation and the nature of the issue decided. In a survey experiment, a committee decides on three policies that disproportionately impact women, but vary in whether individuals perceive them as moral or conferring targeted benefits. Our findings show that citizens associate descriptive representation with fairness. However, perceptions of some decisions, e.g., abortion, strongly improve with women’s equal and over-representation. On other issues—those perceived as offering women a targeted benefit—women’s over-representation reduces perceptions of fairness. These findings highlight the importance of exploring the interaction between decision-making body composition and policy agenda when seeking to understand citizens’ views of democratic policymaking.

Scholars debate whether the presence of multiple parties in the legislature stabilizes dictatorships or promotes their demise. We show that authoritarian regimes face a dilemma: allowing for multipartism reduces the risk of bottom-up revolt, but facilitates protracted top-down democratization. Concessions to the opposition diminish the long-term benefits of authoritarian rule and empower regime soft-liners. We test our theory in Latin America—a region with a broad range of autocracies —using survival models, instrumental variables, random forests, and two case studies. Our theory explains why rational autocrats accept multipartism, even though this concession may ultimately undermine the regime. It also accounts for democratic transitions that occur when the opposition is fragmented and without a stunning authoritarian defeat.

Canadian political scientists have often taken a normative approach to political institutions like the constitution, the electoral system, and Parliament. An assumption that institutional reform can itself be a solution to political problems is also reflected in general public commentary and at times has been openly encouraged and supported by the Canadian state itself. This approach has many strengths but also deficiencies, particularly the degree to which it replicates existing understandings of the state, focused on the distribution of power among white men. The study of political institutions in Canada must continue growing to incorporate and integrate a greater diversity of perspectives, including interrogating and challenging their very foundations.

This article examines legislative waffling behavior—where legislators reverse their position between bill sponsorship and floor voting—in the South Korean National Assembly from 2004 to 2020. Using multilevel logistic regression analysis of 21,292 bill-legislator observations across four legislative terms, we develop a novel theoretical framework that disaggregates waffling into three distinct strategic types: dissent (voting against), abstention, and no-show (strategic absence). Our findings challenge US-based theories by revealing that minority party members in Korea exhibit significantly higher rates of waffling across all types, with the effect particularly pronounced when bills are passed as chairman’s substitutes in majority-controlled committees. We demonstrate that ideologically extreme legislators are more prone to waffling, while main sponsors maintain greater consistency throughout the legislative process. The analysis of committee control structures reveals complex dynamics where minority party members face heightened waffling pressures even in committees they control, suggesting that formal institutional authority cannot fully overcome broader power imbalances in consensus-based systems. These findings highlight how Korea’s distinctive institutional features—including proportional distribution of committee chairs, mixed electoral system, and consensus-oriented legislative culture—create fundamentally different incentive structures for legislative behavior compared to majoritarian systems, underscoring the importance of developing context-specific theoretical frameworks for comparative legislative studies.

Thousands of federal policies have been produced by coalitions of executive agencies over the last few decades. Despite this, little attention has been paid to why agencies collaborate. The decision among relatively autonomous agencies to collaborate and therefore cede some of their power demands theoretical attention. I argue that agencies form coalitions to overcome legislative oversight attempts by activating veto points and exploiting collective action problems in Congress. Using data on dozens of agencies over twenty-four years, I find that agencies form policy-making coalitions when it helps them activate veto points and exploit collective action problems among their overseers in Congress: namely, committee freeriding in oversight and legislative gridlock in lawmaking. These collective action problems, in turn, inhibit Congressional attempts to overturn bureaucratically led policies and therefore allow agency policies to stick. Agencies form coalitions actively in order to insulate their policies against congressional oversight.

In the USA states, there is substantial institutional variation among executive branch administrative officials, with state executive branch offices varying by their selection method. Prior scholarship has devoted little attention to the policy implications of this institutional variation. In this article, we explore the consequences of this administrative characteristic by examining state attorneys general. We develop the theoretical rationale that during periods of high crime, for states with an elected attorney general, there should be an increase in the state’s incarceration rate. Conversely, for states with appointed attorneys general, increases in crime will have little effect on the state’s incarceration rate. When analyzing the incarceration rates among all USA states across a seventeen-year period, we find some evidence to support our theoretical expectation. These results highlight the implications that executive branch design has on public policy and governance in several ways.

The article examines the patterns of turnover of Latin American legislators. It contributes (1) by introducing a large original dataset of turnover rates in 204 elections between 1985 and 2023 based on manually coded lists of all Latin American legislators elected since 1985, (2) by describing the cross-national and temporal patterns of turnover in Latin America, and (3) by examining empirically the relationship between turnover rates and temporal institutional arrangements designed to regulate the time horizons of legislators. The data reveals that turnover rates in Latin America are extremely high on average (around 70%) compared to democracies in other regions, although with significant variation. Institutional determinants governing time horizons of politicians are associated with turnover, with term limits, the presence of staggered elections and term length being positively associated with elevated turnover rates.