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Even if a state is democratic, it will fail its citizens if it cannot raise sufficient revenue or distribute public goods effectively. Keeping the State Weak points to widespread economic informality as a key feature that keeps poor democracies unstable. Jessica Gottlieb traces the colonial roots of this pernicious type of embedded informality and theorizes how it impacts both state citizens and state actors. Quantitative and qualitative evidence shows how widespread informality prevents a would-be middle class from coordinating programmatic claims on the state and how informal intermediaries who benefit from their status resist attempts at formal state-building. The book concludes with a sobering perspective on the potential for formalization campaigns to initiate socio-political transitions and more optimistic suggestions for where a programmatic transition might originate.
Approximately 230 million people worldwide are infected with schistosomes, and more than 90% of those requiring treatment live in sub-Saharan Africa. Senegal and Madagascar both have high prevalences of schistosomiasis, which has a significant impact on human health and on each country’s economy. In Africa, schistosomiasis is caused by Schistosoma trematodes with a life cycle that depends on a definitive human host and intermediate Bulinus or Biomphalaria snail hosts. Drug treatment kills adult stages of the parasite but does not prevent reinfection, and elimination strategies therefore require prevention or targeted control of the intermediate host snail. In Senegal, irrigation canals and rice fields often harbour schistosome host snails and are well-described potential sites of infection. In Madagascar, it remains unknown whether similar habitats harbour host snails despite schistosomiasis and rice cultivation being highly prevalent. This study presents results of a snail survey in Senegal in 2024 and repeated surveys in 2022 and 2023 in Madagascar as case studies to compare schistosomiasis as an aspect of human health in the context of rice farming in the 2 countries. To account for differences in sampling effort, total snail counts per site were normalized by the number of sweeps deployed. Detection of intermediate host snails for the parasite was significantly associated with country. While snails were found in fields and canals in Senegal, competent hosts were not detected in Madagascar, indicating possible differences in habitat and population dynamics and that geographic differences may require different research and intervention approaches.
This study addresses the empirical nexus between electricity unreliability, firm productivity and gender-based productivity for the case of Senegal. We analyse 437 small and medium enterprises from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, using an instrumental variable (IV) framework to investigate the effect of power cuts on the gender-based productivity gap. We supplement the IV framework with descriptive tools, including Combes' quantile approach and the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition, to further explore the gender–productivity gap. We find a significant negative effect of power outages on firm performance. Findings further suggest a significant association between power outages and the gender-based productivity gap. Despite male- and female-owned enterprises being equally affected by power outages, their productivity reducing effect is more pronounced for women. For policy-making, this implies that reliable energy services should be provided with the objective of concomitantly reducing the gender-based productivity gap.
Acceptance, faith, and duty are key for women navigating metabolic disorders in Senegal, West Africa. Senegalese women suffering from diabetes, hypertension, and kidney disease/failure found solace in Islam and their faith in Allah for navigating their disease experiences. Religion and faith are seen as sources of strength and agency rather than as foregone conclusions or as something “fated,” providing women ways to make meaning from their chronic illness experiences. Living with chronic illness in under- and low-resourced settings constrain women’s ability to navigate their disease. Religion and faith allow ways of making meaning from these challenging situations.
This chapter introduces the country context of Senegal and illustrates how and why embedded informality can be particularly resilient, helping to explain how one pathway out of the weak-state trap, a slow shrinking of the informal sector, is unlikely. To interrogate the historical antecedents of embedded informality and explore scope conditions, I chart the history of indigenous capital development in Senegal. We see the ways in which the colonial regime depressed opportunities for formal capital development and contributed to the segregation of indigenous capital in the informal sector; this was less true in settler colonies, where the informal economy was restricted to force indigenous labor into plantations or mines. I use cross-national data to show how patterns of colonial settlement map onto contemporary patterns of embedded informality, suggesting that the theory is most applicable to former nonsettler colonies. The chapter also considers factors that make embedded informality so durable: Language serves as a key barrier to exit, and investments in social networks increase the comparative advantage of remaining informal.
This chapter provides evidence that embedded informality restricts one pathway out of the weak-state trap by constraining programmatic claim-making. More historical evidence from Senegal illustrates the rarity of organized claim-making by the informal sector and shows that prior attempts have been short-lived due to the inequalities and fractionalization within the sector. An original in-person survey of formal and informal sector members in Dakar from 2017 then directly tests implications of the argument that informality reduces expectations of state capacity and the ability to coordinate around shared preferences for public goods, sampling economic agents who would be most-likely candidates for mobilizing around programmatic demands. Specifically, I exploit variation in the irregularity of actors’ fiscal relationship to the state to understand how it shapes demand for programmatic politics. Finally, a phone survey of formal and informal firms in the run-up to the 2022 local elections provides evidence that the informal sector is less likely to vote for candidates who have a more programmatic platform.
If clientelistic politics are standing in the way of the potential for electoral competition to induce investment in state-building, might the decline of clientelism be a way out of the weak-state trap? This chapter considers the case of urban Senegal, where the role of informal intermediaries as political brokers has been on the decline – at least in Dakar, which is home to most informal businesses. Using historical, geographic, and electoral data, I first show that collective clientelism, while still a prominent phenomenon in rural Senegal, has declined over time in Dakar, where it used to be a dominant strategy. Interview data suggest this is due to the decline in demand for locally excludable goods and the decline in reliance on social networks and local leaders. Instead of turning to programmatic candidates, the case indicates that many urban voters instead move from patronage politics to populism, attracted by charismatic leaders and populist promises. This suggests that programmatism is not a necessary substitute for clientelism and that the reduction of clientelistic politics is not sufficient to spur a programmatic transition.
This chapter asks whether increasing electoral competitiveness in weak states might be a way to induce pressure for state-building and the provision of public goods. The evidence suggests it cannot: that when politics do not cleave along programmatic lines, electoral competition is unlikely to have these salutary effects. A case comparison of two public bureaucracies charged with tax collection in contexts of widespread economic informality and clientelistic electoral politics illustrates how different levels of electoral competition can produce very different incentives to invest in state capacity. Interviews with current and former members of the Internal Revenue Service in Dakar and Lagos suggest that greater electoral competition in Senegal weakened political will to regulate and tax the informal sector, while longer time horizons of ruling party elites in Lagos increased the perceived future benefits of making costly investments in fiscal capacity. Using a panel dataset of 31 countries from 1870 to 2010, I then show that increases in electoral competition reduce subsequent tax revenue collection, but only in polities where elections cleave along less programmatic lines.
During the colonial period, Lebanese migrants in Dakar played a significant role in the local economy, benefiting from a historical and evolving French imperial framework in the Levant. From the 1930s onwards, their presence was increasingly perceived as a threat by white settlers, culminating in the post-1945 period when Maurice Voisin articulated a rhetoric of “Frenchness” to exclude them from Senegalese colonial society. This rhetoric, invoking economic, cultural, and political arguments, sought to defend a supposed imperial community uniting French settlers and African subjects. Yet archival evidence reveals that Voisin’s vision was increasingly disconnected from French imperial strategic interests, which recognized the Lebanese as clients and valuable intermediaries. Drawing on colonial administrative archives and press sources, this article examines how Lebanese migrants navigated these challenges, asserting their agency and negotiating their position both within Dakar’s society and the broader imperial order. By highlighting the clash between settler rhetoric, imperial policy, and migrant strategies, the study contributes to a nuanced understanding of Lebanese identification in French West Africa and the complex dynamics of colonial power, belonging, and transnational ties in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Senegalese drummers often recite improvised texts while playing, considering the texts to reflect the rhythms’ meanings. Unlike in other African traditions, drums are rarely used as a speech surrogate. It is shown here that Senegalese rhythms involve language-like grammar rules, which are partly independent of the grammar of the players’ spoken language. The rhythms do not acoustically mimic speech, and the speech-drum matching is based on a lexicon of rhythms and their meanings. Players use this lexicon to produce an unlimited number of meaningful rhythms. The analysis of complex rhythms shows nonlinear alignments with spoken sentences containing plurals, definites, and negation. It is concluded that rhythms are generated by drum-specific grammatical rules. The musical functions of the drum grammar make it especially relevant to current work on language and music, and to ongoing debates between functionalist and formalist approaches to grammar.
How do social hierarchies affect patterns of discrimination in democratic contexts? While studies of identity politics in diverse societies often focus on relations between groups formed around parallel identities like ethnicity, these same societies often feature hierarchical identities that rank individuals into stratified groups. This paper examines how culturally embedded caste identities, inherited at birth, continue to shape everyday life. Drawing on an original survey of 2,160 Senegalese citizens, we show that caste remains a salient axis of perceived discrimination despite its formal abolition over a century ago. Individuals from occupational caste and slave-descended backgrounds are significantly more likely to report experiences of exclusion such as the denial of basic services. Most respondents attribute caste-based discrimination to cultural norms rather than economic competition, religious instruction, or biological differences. Moreover, we find that high-status individuals systematically overreport tolerant attitudes in face-to-face interviews with lower-status enumerators, suggesting that social desirability can obscure the extent of status-based attitudes. These findings shed light on the persistence of caste hierarchies and their impact on citizenship in societies otherwise considered tolerant and democratic. These findings contribute to research on identity politics by highlighting the need to distinguish between ranked and unranked forms of social difference.
In the early 1980s, a group of radical African economists working at the Dakar-based Institut Africain de Développement Economique et de Planification (IDEP) were dismissed. Among them were three Ghanaian economists, Tony Obeng, Cadman Atta Mills, and Kwame Amoa, who applied a neocolonial analysis of global political economy to critique international development policies. Although the precise circumstances of their dismissal remain unclear, it was evident that their revolutionary approach to development clashed fundamentally with IDEP’s methods. Inspired by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s theory of neocolonialism and the Latin American school of dependency theory, these Pan-African scholars refuted the dominant, anti-political, dehistorical, and simplistic Western explanation of Africa’s underdevelopment and urgently searched for better explanations. Drawing on institutional records, working papers, interviews, memos, and published and unpublished papers, this article centers Africans and African institutions engaged in development thinking in the larger history of economic thought in the 1970s and 1980s.
In 1864, Umar Taal, one of the most consequential figures of nineteenth-century West Africa, perished in Maasina (Mali), a region he had conquered two years prior. Historians have studied the political and intellectual underpinnings of Taal’s last conquest, but not its ramifications inside families. Exploring colonial-era migrations and marriages in my own family in Mali, I suggest intimate history as mode of historical inquiry and writing to elucidate the afterlives of war. I provide a translocal and gendered microhistory of the aftermath of Taal’s jihad, showing how the ripples of past Islamic revolutions shaped the intimacies of twentieth-century family life.
In colonial West Africa, where the level of literacy, in European language, was low, movies served as an accessible means to convey attitudes, ideas or stories. This chapter addresses the dialogue between movies and the written text (posters, advertisements, etc) to explore the ways in which African film spectators made sense of foreign images brought to them on screens. Urban movie goers read newspapers to look for schedules or film reviews, and the general public depended on posters displayed in front of movie theaters and also on word of mouth for information about movies. Sometimes posters were printed locally but most of them came with the movies, conveying foreign cultural messages which passers-by had to decipher according to their own cultures and cinematographic knowledge.
Before the twentieth century, to be literate in the Western Sahel meant to be literate in Arabic—or in other African languages written with the Arabic script. Yet works by West African Muslim scholars, composed largely in Arabic, are often overlooked in discussions of West African literature. This chapter highlights this gap by reconstructing the history of the region’s ‘Islamic literature’ and its relationship to print. Focusing on the literary production of two of the region’s major Sufi orders, the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya, it shows that printed works of Islamic erudition became increasingly important elements of public life across the twentieth century and continued to serve as one of the most frequent and readily available means of experiencing ‘literature’, even alongside the expansion of colonial and postcolonial educational institutions that employed European languages of instruction. Comprising some of the most common forms of reading material in West Africa today, they are the fruit of an encounter between a well-established Sufi literary tradition and newfound access to the affordances of print.
Chapter 6 aims to construct a future-looking theoretical framework for handling cultural objects for which questions of past illegality and/or illegitimacy arise but where a potential claimant – whether an individual, a community, or a source nation – is unable to pursue formal legal proceedings against the current possessor, and the relevant law enforcement agencies cannot equally pursue criminal, administrative, or public law proceedings. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to identify normative principles for dealing with the issue of “restitution” (broadly defined) that operates outside the realm of hard-law norms and institutions. It starts by examining the key aspects of the institutional/procedural and normative principles of the restitution committees established in certain European countries and tasked with the development and implementation of “just and fair solutions” to address Holocaust-era wrongful dispossessions. It then considers whether “just and fair solutions” can be devised for other contexts and, if so, how legalistic ethical reasoning could be adapted for these settings. The focus then shifts to the case study of France and its complex approach to the restitution of colonial-era objects to African source countries. The chapter then examines the various remedial mechanisms that are in operation, or that can be developed, to apply such normative principles to broader contexts of addressing past wrongs, including long-term loans, digital restitution, and the establishment of cross-border trusts to enable the joint custody and stewardship of collections. The chapter, and the book, conclude by addressing the role of such a normative blueprint, aligned with the concept of new cultural internationalism, in moving toward the convergence of law, policy, and markets for cultural property.
The domination and exploitation inherent to colonialism entailed casting Africans as violators of European standards, expectations, and even aspirations. This article identifies messaging which permeated the everyday experiences of African wage earners by locating the ways in which employers embedded their understanding of Africans as potential violators into the employment relationship. It examines the records of the Tribunal de Première Instance in Dakar, Senegal, during the decades of high colonialism to reveal the nature of that dynamic, exploring implicit expectations among employers regarding their employees, particularly related to allegations of theft or abandonment of work brought against workers. Analysis of such cases particularly highlights domestic workers, who were overwhelmingly male. The interactions and claims in the justice records reveal clear constructions of violation within the attitudes and actions of non-African employers in colonial Dakar and present the court as a venue for perpetuating that rhetoric.
This Element weaves together literatures on autochthony and belonging and on African urbanism to shed new light on the ability of the African state to undertake development interventions in some of the most important urban centers on the continent. It explains variations in levels of trust in the African state that shape neighborhoods' responses to states' development interventions. Focusing on the Senegalese state's construction of the VDN 2 highway on the outskirts of the capital, Dakar, the author argues that in major African cities with colonial origins, whether neighborhoods project themselves as 'autochthonous' or 'migrant' communities shapes general attitudes toward the state and influences the capacity of the state to carry out development interventions in these areas. In these cities, states are more likely to successfully intervene in neighborhoods dominated by 'new' migrants to the city than in those neighborhoods that portray themselves as 'autochthones' of these cities.
This chapter explores the nonviolence of Senegalese Sufi Amadou Bamba in terms of its critiques of racism and political domination, its pedagogy of productive service, and the relationship between spiritual hierarchy and its apparent ambivalence between absolute nonviolence and defensive warfare.