To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The fifth chapter of this book reviews the earliest banking crises experienced by different Latin American countries. The impact of the financial crisis of 1857 in Havana and Rio de Janeiro represents a clear case of transmission of a crisis from center to periphery, and allow us to speak of international financial contagion. On the other hand, the panic of 1864 in Rio de Janeiro was a notable example of financial imbalance with domestic roots. In the mid 1870s another cluster of financial crises ricocheted across Latin America. In those years, a series of bank panics occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Peru, accompanied by local stock market panics, currency crises and the abandonment of convertibility schemes. The most catastrophic financial debacle was that of Peru, where a dramatic debt default coincided with an exchange crisis and the collapse of the banking system in the years 1876–1879. The review of these early financial crises allows us to reflect on the diverse trajectories of Latin American banks and the possible causes of their relative fragility before the end of the century.
Debtors’ prisons played a vital – albeit seemingly paradoxical – role in early modern society. In many cases, those incarcerated could not or would not pay their debts. Instead, they languished in prison and racked up new debts to their gaolers. Chapter 2 addresses this seemingly self-contradictory system by showing that, even when it prevented the repayment of debts, imprisonment helped to protect wider social and economic interests, balancing those of landed wealth and emergent capital. It analyses the social, economic, legal and ideological shifts that underwrote this convoluted system, excavating emergent carceral ideologies. In turn, it considers the array of measures taken to alleviate the pressure that growing numbers of insolvent debtors placed on England’s prisons, mitigating the worst effects of the structural weakness of debt incarceration. These attempts to relieve an overburdened system – which ultimately stabilised the debtors’ prison into the eighteenth century – were essential because prisons had developed disciplinary purposes that proved vital to early modern social relations, even when its coercive functions failed.
Climate impacts extend beyond physical destruction to include widespread financial distress. This article explores the role that debt relief policies – particularly personal insolvency or bankruptcy law – might play within a range of measures to raise the capacity of individuals to withstand climate-related shocks. Through the cancellation of unpayable debt, personal insolvency acts as a form of insurance against the unavoidable risks inherent in a volatile and unpredictable economy. Reviewing the links between climate impacts, debt and default, and the inevitable gaps in supports to victims of these impacts, the paper makes a case for personal insolvency as a rules-based system for stabilising chaotic financial distress associated with disasters and crises. As an extraordinary exception to the law’s usual orientation toward upholding past obligations and facilitating market allocations, bankruptcy might represent an internal means of accommodating the disruptions and contradictions with which climate change confronts the legal system.
Institutional economics holds that informal institutions shape which formal rules communities adopt and how those rules work, yet it has not specified which informal institutions govern which outcomes. This paper identifies one, cultural reintegration architecture: the mechanism by which a community judges the failure of an economic actor and opens or closes the path to commercial standing. Its four observable elements, narrative scripts, moral attribution, ceremonial pathways, and community acceptance, locate a community on a spectrum from stigmatising to reintegrative. Six historical cases spanning eight centuries, Venice, the Hanseatic League, Meiji Japan, the Nattukottai Chettiar, the nineteenth-century United States, and Silicon Valley, ground three claims: the architecture is a structural variable separable from formal institutions, it conditions long-run entrepreneurial dynamism, and it shifts over time. The account specifies a mechanism within the informal-institutional space that North, Greif, and Putnam jointly occupy, grounded in the older institutionalism of Veblen and Commons.
Edited by
Latika Chaudhary, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,Tirthankar Roy, London School of Economics and Political Science,Anand V. Swamy, Williams College, Massachusetts
Under the extremes of Indian socialism, the financial system was a handmaiden for state control of the economy, directing resources according to the wishes of the government. State control was achieved through government ownership. A great deal has changed, with a first (1947–1992) and second (1992–2016) phase of central planning where there were conflicting themes of liberalization and enhanced state control. In many areas, private financial firms are now important. The full ecosystem of modern finance, with information processing and risk taking by private persons, blossomed in the equity market. For two decades there was a remarkable policy process that yielded gains in fields such as the equity market, pension reforms, bankruptcy code and so on. But alongside this there was the expansion of the ‘administrative state’ in the form of financial regulators. Regulators engage in micro-management of products and processes. While there is isomorphic mimicry with many things that look like a financial system, officials retain substantial control over how finance works. In a functional perspective, Indian finance today resembles the environment of the 1980s more than meets the eye.
Edited by
Latika Chaudhary, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,Tirthankar Roy, London School of Economics and Political Science,Anand V. Swamy, Williams College, Massachusetts
Soon after independence, the relationship between private enterprise and the state changed. The industrialization policy made certain sectors of high priority – machines, metallurgy or heavy chemicals – and made it easier for them to access scarce capital and foreign exchange. On the other hand, traditional businesses in textiles, plantations and commodity trades were deprived of access to capital and modernization opportunities, or even banned, along with moneylending. As some of the highly protected priority industries failed to become profitable, and bankruptcy accumulated in the low-priority sectors like textiles, the strategy became unsustainable. After a sharp break around the 1980s or 1990s, private enterprise faced a more liberal environment where it was easier to access capital and technology abroad and invest in offbeat fields. New patterns of inequality in the corporate sector developed again, now due to the challenges of operating in a globally connected and integrated world. The chapter presents this two-stage transition in a chronological narrative.
As a monetary capital provider, creditors play an important role in external governance with shareholders, although they have no legal voting right outside of the bankruptcy process. Chapter 8 will compare the legal institutions and practices regarding the roles of creditors in the three countries by dividing them into ex ante monitoring of solvent firms, renegotiation in financially distressed firms, legal bankruptcy, and debtor directors’ fiduciary duty during the zone of insolvency. In the United States, banks play an active role in the governance of the firm whose business stumbles, by using the loan agreements for the revolving credit facilities. In Japan, contingent governance by main banks as representative of monetary capital providers worked well during Japan’s rapid economic growth era, but was not able to monitor their client companies’ use of free cash flow after the economic growth stopped. Although China is a bank-centered economy and state banks keep a dominant position, Chinese banks play a limited role in monitoring borrowers, especially borrowers who are SOEs, which can be supported financially by the government with cheap credit.
This article concerns the ‘rule in Gibbs’: a controversial principle of English private international law which provides that a debt is only discharged in a foreign insolvency proceeding if the contract is governed by the law of that proceeding. Critics of the rule consider that it undermines the foundation of corporate insolvency as a unitary process in which individual collection efforts are replaced by a collective proceeding for all creditors. This article offers a qualified defence of the rule. It suggests that it could be abandoned in ‘true’ insolvency cases, in which the company’s assets are sold to a third party and the proceeds distributed to its creditors, but only if the rule is replaced with a cross-border insolvency law framework. It also suggests, however, that Gibbs is the ‘right’ rule in a cross-border corporate restructuring, in which only some of the company’s creditors stay with the firm to benefit from any future upside that the third party would otherwise capture in a sale. It argues that European Union private international law adopts this approach to a restructuring and that the Gibbs rule is, therefore, not nearly as exceptional as it is sometimes made out to be.
Seventeenth-century Amsterdam was a city of innovations. Explosive economic growth, the expansion of overseas trade, and a high level of religious tolerance sparked great institutional, socioeconomic and legal changes, a period generally known as 'the Dutch Golden Age.' In this book, Maurits den Hollander discusses how insolvency legislation contributed to the rise of a modern commercial order in seventeenth-century Amsterdam. He analyzes the procedure and principles behind Amsterdam's specialized insolvency court (the Desolate Boedelskamer, 1643) from a theoretical perspective as well as through the eyes of citizens whose businesses failed. The Amsterdam authorities created a regulatory environment which solved insolvency more leniently, and thus economically more efficiently, than in previous times or places. Moving beyond the traditional view of insolvency as a moral failure and the debtor as a criminal, the Amsterdam court recognized that business failure was often beyond the insolvent's personal control, and helped restore trust and credit among creditors and debtors.
This chapter examines the development of an ideology of middle-class behaviour based on the ability to save and to maintain enough capital to prevent a cash flow crisis that would result in being arrested or imprisoned. This led to a new type of class-based thinking about society that was closely linked to the security that new forms of capital provided to successful savers. Such individuals were those who were able to accumulate large amounts of capital through entrepreneurship or inheritance, and not dissipate it though overspending. This was a small elite group who gradually came to be termed the middle class, to differentiate themselves from the middling sort of smaller traders. They also increasingly thought of their capital as a form of property created out of righteousness, and that the role of the law was to protect it from those who were less able.
Seventeenth-century Amsterdam was a city of innovations. Explosive economic growth and the expansion of overseas trade went hand in hand with a high level of religious tolerance. In this world of increasing complexity, legal and governmental innovations were essential in order to adapt the urban institutional landscape to the challenges posed by these great social, economic, and cultural changes. The topic of insolvency legislation, as a crucial junction of the fundamental contextuality of commercial law, is most suitable to shed new light on the precise circumstances under which the most striking and seminal developments in the rise of a modern commercial order took place. This introductory chapter explains how new empirical evidence from Amsterdam's legal archives can help understand how innovative governance and legal practices interacted with moral thought in order to produce a liberal, open-access insolvency regime.
Genevieve Lakier (University of Chicago Law) examines Upsolve v. James, where a district court enjoined the application of New York state’s unauthorized practice of law statutes to the Justice Advocates that the nonprofit organization, Upsolve, planned to train, to assist low-income New Yorkers file for bankruptcy. The opinion represents a clear victory for the access-to-justice movement. But it also represents a potentially significant change in how courts understand the First Amendment to apply in unauthorized-practice-of-law cases. Although the decision may be overturned on appeal, the logic of the opinion thus makes clear the promise that what critics have sometimes described as a “Lochnerized” First Amendment holds out to access-to-justice advocates, as well as some of its perils. In this chapter, Lakier explains why the decision is significant, embeds it within a broader story of doctrinal transformation, and spells out some of the benefits and costs of using a Lochner-like First Amendment to promote access to justice.
This article explores the dynamics of court practice with regard to mercantile preinsolvency in later nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Belgium. In 1883, the Belgian legislature introduced the proceeding of concordat préventif, making it possible for insolvent entrepreneurs to remain outside the liquidation-oriented procedure of faillite. Instead, they could declare their financial problems and propose a scheme of payment to their creditors. Despite this goal, however, the 1883 law, along with subsequent laws of 1885 and 1887, imposed high majority voting requirements. Accordingly, in the Antwerp commercial court, the shortcomings of the legislation were amended to ameliorate its procedural and judicial practice. The new practices of the court resulted in higher rates of acceptance of applications. However, these success ratios were not evenly distributed among the groups of debtors who applied. Perceptions shared by both creditors and judges may have advantaged merchants, brokers, and entrepreneurs who belonged to the higher strata of the city’s business world.
Chapter 5 focuses on the enforcement of credit contractual agreements and questions the meaning of trust in credit networks. Despite the norms of solidarity, cooperation, and fairness that characterized pre-industrial society, breach of agreement did occur. When lenders and debtors had exhausted all the possibilities available to settle their disagreement, taking the matter to court was often the last resort. The aim was to recover the money owed, but often the emotional and social implications of a lawsuit went beyond the simple economic dimension. Throughout the period, the burden of debt increased rapidly, as well as the number of discontented creditors. The apparent dichotomy is intriguing: on the one hand, financial arrangements were flexible and renegotiable, but on the other, contract enforcement at court was sought after. These lawsuits are rich sources of information for the historian. They highlight the shortcomings and failures of debtors, and the (im)patience of creditors. But above all, they display the dynamics of complex and multiple layers of social and economic relationships. Overall, this chapter reconstructs both transactional and dispute resolution practices in
This chapter introduces the concept of insurance as a product and explores why people want to purchase insurance in general (and health insurance in particular). The main discussion centers around explaining that health insurance (and all insurance) is primarily financial protection: health insurance does not protect your health but instead protects your wealth from health-related risk. The chapter then moves on to discuss the operations of an insurance company: how premiums are set, the difference between correlated and uncorrelated risk, group insurance, and experience rating. The chapter ends by discussion moral hazard in the context of an individual with insurance coverage. The end of chapter supplement provides a mathematical example of why someone who is risk averse would want to purchase insurance.
This article analyzes a single bankruptcy case—Hancock v Halliday (1742–1752)—as it was litigated in the Court of Chancery across a ten-year period. By incorporating local sources, the work attempts to move away from assumptions surrounding the “implicit contract” of family, and to provide a more nuanced analysis of “family strategies” in action. I argue that business historians—looking at networks—and economic and social historians—analyzing the use and implementation of credit—should continue to explore the divisions within families, which will help to reemphasize the role of women within business transactions and the wider credit-based economy. Ultimately, this article makes a significant contribution to the burgeoning scholarship on the negative aspects of familial networks of credit and debt, demonstrating how the complex and multifaceted nature of family indebtedness has been overlooked, and misunderstood, in the existing literature.
This study examines the influence of founding conditions and decisions on new companies' performance, analysing how both environmental context and organisational dynamics interact to determine their success. It distinguishes between two different success indicators: survival and profitable growth. An empirical study conducted using a sample of 3,722 new agri-food companies in two different periods, one of economic stability and the other of recession, showed that founding conditions had long-lasting effects on post-entry performance. The economic context acted as a moderator of the relationship between individual factors and success. Adverse environmental conditions were also a determinant of success, making surviving firms more competitive and resilient. The results reflect the survival of the fitter principle by showing that early profitability reduced the risk of failure and made firms more likely to become profitable in the medium term. Internationalisation strategies developed organisational capabilities that created an imprint for adaptability and growth.
This essay explores the relationship of literature and perversity in Roberto’s Bolaño’s short fictions “The Secret of Evil,” “The Insufferable Gaucho,” and Distant Star. While literature within the history of Latin American letters often provides a critique of or antidote to political and economic atrocities, in Bolaño’s texts literature is complicit in the very horrors it depicts. In Bolaño’s view, any effort to pit fiction and social actuality against each other in the interest of rescuing either represents a means to avoid the disturbance that, for Bolaño, defines contemporary existence.
This paper examines whether CEO turnover affects company performance and the optimal time for CEO renewal during a turnaround process. Results, derived from data collected from Italian companies, highlight the necessity of introducing the new CEO before beginning an insolvency procedure. A later appointment can reduce his/her impact, probably due to the difficulty of managing negotiations with the creditors. Moreover, we show a positive and significant relationship between CEO turnover and the likelihood of a bankrupt firm re-emerging from an insolvency procedure. The analysis was based on the traditional logit model and more modern approaches like the random forest and the AdaBoost models, combined with the SHAP technique. Overall, our findings provide valuable insight for all company stakeholders, whose interests are significantly impacted by its default.
Warren Buffett famously commented that the U.S. airline industry had made zero profit in its first nine decades. Subsequently, between the millennium and the Great Financial Crisis the airlines in total lost almost $60 billion. Yet no major airline was liquidated or taken over in those nine years. Financial support was repeatedly provided by GE, the conglomerate supplier of leasing finance, engines, and servicing. The article offers a historical perspective on the factors behind this relationship between GE and airlines. It outlines the benefits or costs to GE, airline shareholders, and passengers; the relevance of the model for other industries; and implications for different notions of efficiency.