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This chapter examines how baker apprentices in Danish bakeries learn to become bakers. Learning is part of everyday practices shaped by conflictual issues involving, among other factors, economy, gender, power structures, and identities. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss why modern learning theories often fail to integrate contradictions and conflicts as important elements in understanding learning processes. In the second part, I present an ideology of critical relational thinking, drawing on Gramsci and the concept of situated learning (Lave and Wenger 1991), both of which link learning to processes of social change. This perspective foregrounds the role of contradictions and conflicts in shaping practice. In the final section, I apply these ideas empirically, analyzing how apprentices’ everyday activities both reflect and transform the social dynamics of their workplaces.
Groups, and the ways in which they function, are of fundamental importance to human life. This engaging textbook offers a comprehensive introduction to group processes for students across the social sciences. Covering topics such as social influence, leadership, creativity, and intergroup relations, this book blends foundational work with up-to-date research to help students navigate the key theories and principles in a wide variety of contexts. Designed with teaching and learning in mind, each chapter features an outline, a chapter summary, review and discussion questions, and suggested multimedia and further reading resources. Recurring box features provide opportunities for deeper engagement with the issues raised. With an interdisciplinary focus throughout, this textbook is an ideal resource for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in psychology, as well as courses in business, communication, and related fields.
Chapter 6 examines authority and the fragile structures that hold society together. It surveys concepts of justice and order, the roles of kings and councils, and the practice of assemblies, including debates about the ‘seeds’ of democracy. Through episodes of dispute and persuasion, it shows how Homeric communities negotiated power when coercion, charisma, and tradition competed.
The political resource curse posits that newly resource-rich states risk experiencing authoritarianism and conflict. This article examines Guyana as a most-likely case of that phenomenon. Drawing on interviews and quantitative indicators, we find that oil has not driven the recent democratic backsliding and rising geopolitical tensions. Instead, Guyana’s democratic fragility stems from winner-take-all electoral institutions in a context of deep ethnic polarisation and major parties’ limited normative commitment to democracy. Regarding conflict, Venezuela’s domestic politics, not oil, is the key driver of regional tensions. We therefore argue that the political resource curse framework may at times obscure more than it reveals, misattributing long-standing political tensions to resource wealth. Domestic and international political dynamics may be better understood as ‘politics with resources’ than politics cursed by oil. Promoting electoral reform, fostering stronger commitment to democratic norms within political parties and ensuring credible deterrence may therefore matter more than technocratic resource governance.
The general purpose of this article is to investigate how conflict and struggle, observed in history and experienced in one’s own being, might serve to bolster faith. Two areas are of particular significance regarding the strengthening of faith vis-à-vis conflict: facilitating assent to religious truth claims and renewing catechetical approaches. Concretely, this article is comprised of three sections. The first section briefly elucidates the terms ‘catechesis’, ‘conflict’, and ‘struggle’. The second section provides an overview of Newman’s religious epistemology and analyzes how it conceives of struggle in the process of coming to assent and certitude regarding religious truth claims, primarily treating Newman’s major 1870 work on religious epistemology, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. The third section then analyzes how conflict and struggle are being incorporated into a variety of cognate disciplines to improve student engagement and outcomes. Case studies demonstrate the potential fruit of being forthright regarding the struggles of major figures in history, as well as the value of introducing students to manageable levels of confusion and responsibility for course content. The conclusion offers several constructive reflections while not shying away from the pitfalls that accompany any incorporation of conflict and struggle into the catechetical process.
This article examines the ways in which three communities in South-West Colombia understand ‘security’ and the practices they adopt in pursuit of it. Building on the burgeoning literature on vernacular security, we show the centrality of territorio as the key referent object of security in the region, and a wide variety of collective efforts adopted by communities in pursuit of securing their territorios. Through this, we make three contributions to the vernacular security literature. Methodologically, we show that Participatory Action Research (PAR) can be a powerful tool for identifying and understanding vernacular concepts and practices of security. But more than this, PAR can also play a role in helping to build and sustain community-level collective security practices, bridging research and action. Empirically, we bring vernacular security analysis to a region that, to date, has not been examined, documenting discourses and practices of security that are radically different from those that have dominated (Western) security studies. Conceptually, we show how understandings and practices of security in the region draw directly upon indigenous, mestizo and Afro-Colombian cultures, histories, and epistemologies – and in many respects do not conform to Western security registers that are too often assumed to be universal. This reiterates the importance of PAR, which can help researchers avoid (unwittingly) perpetuating Western-centric assumptions about what visions of security communities are trying to achieve and how they pursue those objectives.
The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which began in April 2023, has triggered a severe but under-recognized mental health crisis. Nearly two-thirds of hospitals in conflict-affected regions are non-functional, supply chains have collapsed, and fewer than 100 psychiatrists serve a population of 45 million. Emerging evidence documents rates of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety among displaced and non-displaced civilians, children, and health workers, yet mental health remains systematically neglected in humanitarian response. This commentary examines the gap between global commitments—including the Sustainable Development Goals and WHO’s Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP)—and the realities of care in conflict settings. Drawing on lessons from Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine, we outline a 6-priority framework for immediate mental health integration: (1) training lay health workers for task-shifted psychological support; (2) rebuilding essential psychiatric infrastructure; (3) establishing protected humanitarian corridors for psychotropic medications; (4) expanding tele-psychiatry and remote counselling; (5) integrating mental health into primary and emergency care; and (6) addressing stigma through community engagement. We argue that without explicit funding allocations and operational mandates for mental health services, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding in Sudan will remain compromised. We call on donors to allocate at least 10% of health-related humanitarian aid to mental health initiatives and for WHO and UNICEF to embed mhGAP in all emergency responses. Sudan represents both an urgent crisis and a global warning: mental health can no longer remain the invisible dimension of humanitarian emergencies.
Chapter 3 parallels the Njemanze and the Collectif Cri de Coeur Pour Le Mali v. Republic of Mali cases. While the Njemanze decision was ruled in favour of the women victims, the Collectif decision was not. The applicants in Collectif relied on Njemanze to support their claims against the Republic of Mali. The Court further clarified its jurisprudence and limitations regarding holding states accountable for violations against women. The Collectif case raised important questions about when a state discharges its obligations under the Maputo Protocol to punish acts of violence against women and to implement programmes for the rehabilitation of victims. The chapter shows how the Court’s reasoning largely echoes the principles of the due diligence doctrine, which is why it rightly found Mali not responsible for the victims. However, it also reveals two jurisprudential faults in the Court’s reasoning. One involving the use and application of a decision of the African Court out of context, and another concerning its interpretation of when the due diligence principle applies in relation to healthcare services. It demonstrates how this flawed reasoning conflicts with the operation of the ECOWAS Court’s human rights mandate, especially its rule on local remedies.
Change isn’t always harmonious – in fact, it rarely is. Chapter 4 explores a tension perspective on change, where conflict, contradiction, and power struggles aren’t problems to be solved but engines that drive transformation. This view reframes conflict not as dysfunction but as a sign of deeper dynamics at play. Drawing on dialectics and dialogic theory, the chapter shows how competing interests and political tensions shape the course of change through friction, negotiation, and narrative. Rather than seeking neat resolutions, it invites readers to embrace tension, plurality, and the messy – but often generative – nature of organisational life. At its core, this perspective reminds us that change is as much about who holds power as it is about where an organisation is going.
Leviathan is not just a larger, but a different sort of book from its predecessors ‘The Elements’ and De Cive. It is a response to a conflict that spanned the British Isles whose later phases took the form (at least as Hobbes opted to frame them) of an Anglo-Scottish conflict in which the main point at issue was religious liberty. Hobbes claims to have begun the work in 1646–47, composing it initially ‘little by little’. He also claims his motive was to defend the ‘civil power’ against clerical subversion. Internal evidence tallies with both these assertions. His reluctance to tell his friends about this literary project is probably best explained by its religious radicalism. Even in 1651, there are good grounds for thinking he sustained his royalism. The nature of his argument encouraged a strong distinction between outward deeds and words (which the sovereign should control) and an inner life escaping the control of human agents.
Violent upheavals in landownership following conquest often change not only the concentration of land across individuals, but also the inequality of its distribution between groups. We argue that variation in landowners’ group identity has important implications for the provision of local public goods. We test this claim by studying the aftermath of the Cromwellian Settlement in seventeenth-century Ireland. Leveraging the lottery-based allocation of expropriated Catholic land to distinct groups of English Protestants, we find significant local variation in the extent of Protestant landownership. Drawing on rich original data, we find fewer local public goods in the long run in areas with more Protestant elites, with the largest reductions in goods that were either directly elite-funded or disproportionately benefited the Catholic majority. The results illustrate how conquest reshapes not just institutions but also long-run local inequalities, and highlight the distinct consequences of between-group inequality for the provision of public goods.
Chapter 6 focuses on Iran’s thirteen minority ethno-nations. These nations differ from the ethno-nation formed by Iran’s ruling Persians (who are discussed in other chapters). These minority ethno-nations differ from one another but also share some features. Their affiliates, social organizations, leaderships, and cultural systems vary but they all provide structure and meaning for adherents in ways that are often lacking for other citizens. Many affiliates of minority ethno-nations do not identify as Iranians. Undergoing discrimination and persecution in Iran, they respond by enhancing their distinctive groupings and furthering their internal cohesion. Iran’s minority peoples formed political coalitions outside Iran, in their pursuit to oust the theocracy, form a secular democracy, and improve conditions for Iranians of all ethnicities. Most affiliates of these movements support a pluralist federal Iran in which communities could achieve regional autonomy. Some affiliates consider separating from Iran and joining their compatriots in adjoining countries. A few of them advocate for independence as new nation-states, just as the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union had done in 1991.
Research on psychology and foreign policy offers compelling evidence that leaders’ predispositions to aggression influence their decisions to initiate military conflicts. However, most indicators of leader proclivities are limited both spatially and temporally, reducing their generalizability. To mitigate these issues, this study employs the facial width-to-height ratio (FWHR), a measure of aggression drawn from theories of evolutionary psychology, and available for most leaders in the post-World War II era. FWHR not only provides broad coverage but it also taps into a dimension of leader characteristics overlooked in most international conflict research. Empirical analysis of over 1,700 leaders across 174 countries during 1947–2010 reveals that higher-FWHR leaders are significantly more likely than their lower-FWHR counterparts to initiate conflict. The results are particularly strong early in a leader’s tenure.
This paper focuses on the bottom-up process of nation formation in multiethnic empires. The key idea is that nations emerge from a conflict over economic, political, and other resources. Under specific conditions, these conflicts give rise to coalitions based on shared ethnicity. The nation emerges if the number of ethnic-based coalitions is sufficiently large. We identify the following conditions for nations to emerge: the existence of conflict, a locally heterogeneous population, and the salience of shared ethnicity. We apply this model to account for the emergence of the Czech nation in the late Habsburg Empire and Austria-Hungary.
Roald Amundsen’s South Pole party is routinely depicted as an unusually harmonious and high-performing team. This article re-examines that assumption by returning to the only contemporary sources that intermittently record interpersonal strain during the Pole march: the diaries of Sverre Hassel and Olav Bjaaland. Using a deliberately narrow empirical base and a transparent inclusion procedure, the study restricts all claims about friction to what the diarists explicitly note. A minimal coding vocabulary—task, process/authority, and relationship/tone—serves as an organising device rather than an explanatory framework. Seventeen diary passages document irritation, disagreement, reprimand, sarcasm, or social sanction linked to identifiable expedition members. Read conservatively, the diaries neither support a counter-myth of dysfunction nor permit inferences about the prevalence or long-term significance of conflict. They do, however, make one conclusion difficult to avoid: the Pole march cannot responsibly be described as frictionless simply because it succeeded logistically or was later narrated smoothly. Instead, the diary evidence shows that operational excellence coexisted with domain-specific frictions—over judgement, rations, navigation, role allocation, and tent-life tone—and that authority and contradiction repeatedly appear as interactional fault lines. Cohesion, where it existed, was not the absence of strain but a condition under which strain could still be written down.
In this chapter, religion’s role in conflict and violence is examined, covering the decades from c. 1603 until shortly before the outbreak of rebellion in October 1641. The chapter traces how it was increasingly religious flashpoints – sacred objects, churches and churchyards, and rituals such as the Mass among others – that generated tension, unrest and even violence in seventeenth-century Ireland. As Protestant settlers sought to implement the work of ‘converting and civilising’, Irish Catholics pushed back against what they viewed as heretical incursions. They reveal battles over ideas of possession, heritage, power and the nature of the sacred itself, and how religious symbols and language were growing ever more important in how Irish and British, Catholic and Protestant viewed and lived alongside one another. Intra-confessional conflict is also addressed, through examining the eruption of violence by Scottish settlers against the Church of Ireland in the wake of the National Covenant and ensuing unrest in Scotland. It indicates religion’s potent ability to motivate and mobilise resistance, even unto violence, as crisis Unfolded across the Three Kingdoms.
Integrating insights from chapters 2 and 3, I study the strategic problems at the origins of great power rivalries under the assumption that state motives are tied to principles. I find that great power rivalries rationally unfold in one of two ways: delayed (rather than immediate) competition if emerging threats hold expansive aims, and delayed peace otherwise. While the top-line result is simple, my qualitative signaling mechanism explains four of the most puzzling aspects of how great powers forge rationalist threat perceptions and how these perceptions influence patterns of competition, hedging, and peace. Specifically, I explain: (1) why status quo powers are reassured by a rival’s early diplomatic promises of limited motives; (2) why status quo powers are willing to make repeated concessions even as a rival makes violent demands, takes territory, rapidly militarizes, or seeks to undermine the status quo in other ways; (3) punctuated (rather than gradual) changes in status quo powers’ beliefs about a rival’s strategic motives; and (4) why some cases end in competition following a specific demand, while others end in stable peace.
I test my predictions about the timing of competition and peace through a medium-N analysis of the universe of great power cases since 1850. My central hypothesis is that great power relations devolve into competition shortly after an emerging power takes actions that contradict its declared principles. I otherwise expect peace following a period of hedging. This holds even when the emerging threat makes territorial demands and militarizes in support of a limited principle. The analysis supports this prediction: in 12 of 14 cases, competition emerges within two years of the emerging power’s first inconsistent action, outperforming key predictions of realism and power transition theory. Through four case vignettes—Hitler’s rise, Prussian unification, Anglo-American relations circa 1900, and Anglo-German relations circa 1900—I demonstrate how my theory applies across diverse historical and cultural contexts. This approach contributes to explaining patterns of competition and peace by providing deeper insight into cases that existing power-based theories struggle to address.
This article introduces the global Women’s Safety Index (WSI), outlining its rationale, purpose, and potential applications. The Index consist of three dimensions: Equity, Protection, and Resources, identified as foundational to women’s safety. Key indicators within each dimension are selected based on theoretical relevance and empirical evidence. We detail the statistical methodology and framework used to construct the Index and present validation analyses demonstrating its ability to capture changes in women’s safety, particularly in response to external disruptions. The WSI is available on an interactive digital platform, enabling users to explore, visualize, and compare women’s safety data across regions and over time.
With nearly one in six children globally living in conflict zones, evidence-based mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) is crucial. This systematic mapping review with narrative synthesis followed the PRISMA 2020 guidelines to synthesize fifty-six studies examining in-country interventions for conflict-affected youth under 25 from 1990 to 2025. The studies were mostly conducted in the global South and utilized various methods, including Teaching Recovery Techniques, trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy, and school-based programmes.
The findings were mixed. While twenty-five studies reported positive outcomes regarding post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS), anxiety and social functioning, the effects often diminished over time, and long-term data (>6 months) remains scarce. The review identified three critical success factors: multilayered stepped-care models, task-sharing with trained lay workers, and family engagement. To be effective, cultural adaptation and age-appropriate tailoring were essential; efforts in this regard ranged from play-based interventions for younger children to structured therapies for adolescents.
The evidence base is limited by methodological heterogeneity and short follow-up periods. To bridge the research–practice gap, future efforts must prioritize longitudinal evaluations and stronger collaboration between researchers and humanitarian actors to ensure that interventions effectively mitigate the long-term impacts of conflict.